United Kingdom Film Distribution (1990) Ltd. et al v. Moonpay USA LLC

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No.: 24-cv-24955-JB/Torres
UNITED KING FILM
DISTRIBUTION (1990) LTD, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MOONPAY USA LLC,
Defendant.
_______________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendant MoonPay USA LLC’s
(“Defendant” or “MoonPay”) Motion for Summary Judgment and Statement of
Material Facts (the “Motion”). ECF Nos. [82], [83], [84]. Plaintiffs United King Film
Distribution (1990) LTD and Stream IL Communications Ltd. (“Plaintiffs”) filed a
Response in Opposition and Statement of Material Facts in Opposition. 	ECF Nos.
[88], [89]. 	Defendant filed a Reply, and a Reply Statement of Material Facts. 	ECF
No. [93], [91]. On March 26, 2026, the Court held oral argument on the Motion. ECF
No. [121]. Following the hearing and pursuant to the Court’s Paperless Order dated
March 30, 2026, both parties filed a Supplemental Memorandum of Law to address a
United States Supreme Court decision issued after the briefing on the Motion was
complete, ECF Nos. [126], [127]. Upon due consideration of the parties’ submissions,
argument 	of 	counsel, 	the 	pertinent 	portions 	of 	the 	record, 	and 	the 	relevant
Case 1:24-cv-24955-JB Document 132 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2026 Page 1 of 29

2
authorities, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDED that Defendant’s Motion is
GRANTED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are Israeli corporations who produce and distribute copyrighted
movie and television content to paying subscribers via cable, satellite broadcasting,
or through its own platforms. 	ECF No. [40] ¶¶ 6–7. 	Defendant is a financial
technology company whose platform allows users to convert traditional currency (or
“fiat”) into cryptocurrency. ECF No. [84] ¶ 18.
The parties’ dispute arises from the actions of a third-party infringer, Israel
TV, who “own[s] and operate[s] a streaming service . . . [and has been] illegally
broadcasting 	and 	streaming 	pirated 	copies 	of 	Plaintiffs’ 	original 	content,
broadcasting channels and TV services.” 	ECF No. [40] ¶ 8. 	Plaintiffs allege that
Israel TV offers these broadcasts at a significantly lower price than offered by
Plaintiffs, diverting customers away from Plaintiffs’ own streaming services. Id. 	As
a result, Plaintiff United King Film Distribution Ltd., along with five other parties
(the “New York Plaintiffs”), filed suit against Israel TV in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York. Id. ¶ 12; see United King Distribution
Ltd., et al., v. Does 1–10, No. 1:21-cv-11024-KPF-RWL (S.D.N.Y) (the “New York
Action”).
The New York Plaintiffs obtained a $7,650,000 default judgment against the
owners and operators of Israel TV (the “New York Default Judgment”). See ECF No.
[40] ¶14; ECF No. [83] at 16; ECF No. [38-6] at 5. The New York Default Judgment
Case 1:24-cv-24955-JB Document 132 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2026 Page 2 of 29

3
also permanently enjoined the continued infringement of Plaintiffs’ copyrights,
including “any persons acting in concert or participation with them or third parties
providing services used in connection with [the defendants’] operations, having actual
knowledge 	of 	this 	Default 	Judgment 	and 	Permanent 	Injunction 	Order” 	(the
“Injunction”). See New York Action, ECF No. [97].1
Plaintiffs served the Injunction on MoonPay and requested that MoonPay
cease providing payment processing services to Israel TV. See New York Action, ECF
No. [130-3]. Although MoonPay explained that it has no association with Israel TV,
ECF No. [84] ¶¶ 1–16, the New York Plaintiffs filed a motion for contempt in the New
York Action. 	ECF No. [83] at 16. 	The Southern District of New York denied the
motion for contempt, finding that Israel TV does not have a MoonPay account and
that MoonPay “has no knowledge whatsoever of which wallets belong to [Israel TV].”
Id.; see also New York Action, ECF No. [42], at 16:3-9–29:23-30.
A. 	The Instant Action
The present dispute centers on the mechanics of Israel TV’s payment process.
According to Plaintiff, Israel TV allows its users to pay for its infringing service
through various means, including by directing subscribers to Defendant’s payment
platform. See ECF No. [88-1] ¶ 75. Defendant’s platform permits users to exchange
fiat currency for crypto currency. ECF No. [84] ¶ 18. The platform is non-custodial,
1 The Court takes judicial notice of the filings in the New York Action, including the
New York Default Judgment. See Universal Express, Inc. v. S.E.C., 177 F. App’x 52,
53 (11th Cir. 2006) (a district court may take judicial notice of certain facts, including
public records).
Case 1:24-cv-24955-JB Document 132 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2026 Page 3 of 29

4
meaning it does not hold or control users’ wallets, digital assets, or place orders for
payments from user wallets to third parties. Id. ¶20.
Utilizing MoonPay’s platform is straightforward. 	To utilize the platform, a
user must provide personal identifying information to satisfy certain Know Your
Customer (“KYC”) and Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) requirements.2 	The user
must also pass Defendant’s background check and vetting process. 	Id. ¶ 23. 	Only
users who have completed Defendant’s KYC and AML processes can use Defendant’s
platform. Id. ¶ 24.
Users also agree to Defendant’s Terms of Use (“TOU”) which serve as the
governing rules of each user’s use of their own account. Id. ¶ 27. The TOU includes,
among other things, prohibitions against engaging in unlawful activity, including
copyright infringement. Id. ¶ 27. The TOU states in pertinent part:
6. PROHIBITED USE. This outlines some of the things you
cannot use the Services for.
1. You may not use your MoonPay Account or any of the
Services 	to 	engage 	in 	the 	following 	categories 	of 	activity
(“Prohibited Use”):
. . .
F. Intellectual Property Infringement: Engage in transactions
involving 	items 	that 	infringe 	or 	violate 	any 	copyright,
trademark, right of publicity . . .
ECF No. [84-15] at 18–19. The TOU also requires users to certify that they own and
control the crypto wallet address3 used in connection with their account. ECF No. [84]
2 Defendant’s KYC and AML policies are not available to the general public. Id. ¶ 62.
3 A crypto wallet address is a random string of letters and numbers used to send and
receive 	digital 	currencies. 	This 	random 	string 	does 	not 	contain 	identifying
information about the wallet owner. ECF No. [84] ¶ 29.
Case 1:24-cv-24955-JB Document 132 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2026 Page 4 of 29

5
¶ 28. According to Defendant, aside from third party AML and sanctions compliance
checks, 	it 	has 	no 	post-transaction 	monitoring 	and 	cannot 	determine 	whether
cryptocurrency deposited into a user’s wallet is being withdrawn to pay for a
subscription to Israel TV or any other goods or services. 	Id. ¶ 38. 	Defendant’s
assertion is consistent with the Court’s finding in the New York Action that
Defendant “has no knowledge whatsoever of which wallets belong to [Israel TV].” See
New York Action, ECF No. [42], at 16:3-9–29:23-30.
Defendant also provides services to select businesses referred to as “Partners.”
ECF No. [84] ¶ 39. Partners undergo a more thorough “Know Your Business” (“KYB”)
due diligence review, and are offered an application programing interface (“API”)
which allows them to track their own end-user customers’ use of Defendant’s platform
to purchase crypto in order to purchase their goods. 	Id. ¶ 41. 	The API includes a
public API “key” that can be embedded into a Partner’s website to direct traffic to
Defendant’s platform and track the customer transactions associated with the key.
Id. ¶ 42. 	This API key can also appear as a “widget” displaying Defendant’s logo,
akin to a Paypal or Apple Pay logo. See id. ¶ 43. These keys are publicly visible and
can be copied by anyone. Id. ¶45. Defendant’s representative testified that the public
nature of API keys complicates Defendant’s ability to differentiate traffic originating
from a copied-and-pasted API key versus a vetted partner’s API key. 	See ECF No.
[84] ¶ 46; see also Skoberne 30(b)(6) Vol. 1, 74:23-75:23, ECF No. [84-18].
According to Plaintiffs, Israel TV subscribers create an account and select a
subscription plan and are then directed to a website with the domain name “Billnet”
Case 1:24-cv-24955-JB Document 132 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2026 Page 5 of 29

6
to pay for the subscription. ECF No. [88-1] ¶¶ 76–77. A user then has two options:
it can complete the purchase by credit card, or it can process its payment through
MoonPay. Id. ¶¶ 78–79.
In its attempts to stop Israel TV’s infringement of its content, Plaintiffs and
their counsel asked Defendant to cease providing services to Israel TV. See id. ¶ 86.
In 	June 	2022, 	when 	Plaintiffs 	contacted 	Defendant 	about 	a 	misappropriated
MoonPay widget, Defendant immediately disabled the API key associated with that
widget and required signature authentication from the authorized partner to whom
it belonged. 	Id. ¶ 50. 	Defendant also notified Plaintiffs that it does not provide
software or personnel to Israel TV, does not receive any payments from Israel TV,
and has never had any communications with Israel TV. 	ECF No. [84] ¶¶ 3, 8, 10.4
Defendant also initiated a whitelisting feature, which prevented non-partners from
integrating 	their 	widget 	into 	unauthorized 	websites. 	Id. 	¶ 	50. 	Additionally,
Defendant 	blocked 	web 	domains 	associated 	with 	Israel 	TV 	or 	its 	alleged
intermediary, Billnet.5 Id.
In October 2024, Plaintiffs made an additional request, that Defendant disable
another API key belonging to a verified Partner that Plaintiffs claimed was being
used by Israel TV. Id. ¶ 53. According to Defendant, doing so caused disruptions for
4 Plaintiffs do not dispute these facts. ECF No. [88-1] ¶¶ 2, 8, 10.
5 According to Defendant, although blocking is the best way to stop a particular
domain from routing users to Defendant’s platform, ECF No. [83] at 17, it does not
stop a third party from “scrubbing” or removing the information from their URL. ECF
No. [84] ¶¶ 50–51. 	As such, blocking cannot stop the domain from routing users to
the MoonPay platform. Id.
Case 1:24-cv-24955-JB Document 132 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2026 Page 6 of 29

7
both it and its Partner but had little impact on Israel TV, id. ¶ 54, as it is undisputed
that Israel TV found another API key to use less than forty-eight hours later, id. ¶
55. 	Defendant contends that disabling these API keys each time Plaintiffs advised
that Israel TV had misappropriated a Partner’s API key would significantly disrupt
its platform and make little difference to Israel TV’s ability to find another API key
since they are publicly available, and it does not preclude Israel TV from simply
directing traffic to their website via URL. Id. ¶¶ 57–58.
On November 14, 2024, Defendant sent a letter stating that it would no longer
disable API keys and/or blacklist URLs. ECF No. [89–17].
The following day, Plaintiffs filed this action.6 The Amended Complaint raises
four claims: (i) Count I for Contributory Copyright Infringement, (ii) Count II for
violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, (iii) Count III for
“Interference with Economic Expectation,”7 and (iv) Count IV for Negligence. 	ECF
No. [40] at 18–24. 	Plaintiffs seek damages under the theory that Defendant is
contributing to Israel TV’s infringement by refusing to take additional measures to
prohibit 	users 	from 	using 	the 	MoonPay 	platform 	to 	convert 	currency 	that 	is
ultimately used to subscribe to Israel TV. 	Id. 	Plaintiffs also argue that its various
policies are deceptive to the public and affect Florida consumers and businesses. ECF
No. [88] at 27.
6 This matter was originally filed in the Middle District of Florida and was transferred
to the Southern District of Florida on December 18, 2024.
7 Count III was dismissed with prejudice on March 20, 2025, pursuant to the Court’s
Order on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. See ECF No. [117].
Case 1:24-cv-24955-JB Document 132 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2026 Page 7 of 29

8
II. 	THE INSTANT MOTION
Defendant filed its Motion arguing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law as to each cause of action in the Amended Complaint. See generally ECF No.
[83]. 	Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’
contributory infringement claim because (i) the record contains no evidence of direct
infringement, (ii) Defendant does not materially contribute to any infringement by
Israel TV, (iii) Defendant’s platform is capable of substantial non-infringing use, and
(iv) Defendant does not induce or encourage any infringement by Israel TV.8 Id. at
19–27. Defendant also argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’
FDUTPA claim because (i) the claim is preempted by the Copyright Act, (ii) there is
no evidence that Defendant’s TOU is deceptive, (iii) the record evidence cannot
support the “causation” element of Plaintiffs’ FDUTPA claim because Defendant’s
AML, KYC, and KYB policies are not publicly available, and (iv) Plaintiffs cannot
establish damages. 	Id. at 27–30. 	Further, Defendant argues that it is entitled to
summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ negligence claim because (i) it is preempted by the
Copyright Act, and (ii) Plaintiffs cannot establish the existence of a duty because
there is no duty to prevent the conduct of third persons or to prevent a third party’s
economic loss. Id. at 31–32. Finally, Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary
8 Defendant also argues that that Plaintiffs do not plead a claim for vicarious
infringement. 	ECF No. [83] at 25–26. 	Plaintiffs do not address this argument in
their Response, nor do they direct the Court to any evidence that establishes that
Defendant can be liable under a theory of vicarious infringement. See generally, ECF
No. [88]. 	Accordingly, Plaintiffs have implicitly conceded that Count I cannot be
based on vicarious infringement and, therefore, the Court does not consider this
argument in its analysis below.
Case 1:24-cv-24955-JB Document 132 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2026 Page 8 of 29

9
judgment on the issue of damages and injunctive relief because (i) there is no
admissible evidence that Plaintiffs suffered lost profits as a result of Defendant’s
alleged conduct, and (ii) Plaintiffs fail to establish copyright liability as a matter of
law. Id. at 32–38.
In their Response to Defendant’s Motion, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant has
not properly established the lack of a genuine issue of material fact for each of
Plaintiffs’ claims. 	See generally ECF No. [88]. 	Plaintiffs argue that Defendant is a
payment 	processor 	and 	can 	be 	held 	liable 	for 	contributory 	infringement 	for
facilitating payments to Israel TV, and that Plaintiffs have sufficient evidence to
show that Defendant materially contributes to Israel TV’s infringement. 	Id. at 18–
19. Plaintiffs also argue that Defendant’s ability to take “simple measures” to prevent
facilitating payments to Israel TV further demonstrates that it contributes to
infringement, and that its platform is not capable of non-infringing use. Id. at 21–
26. 	With respect to their FDUTPA claim, Plaintiffs argue that (i) the claim is not
preempted, (ii) the TOU improperly misleads users to believing that Defendant
monitors copyright infringement, and (iii) Plaintiffs have sufficiently established
their damages through expert reports. Id. at 27–28. Plaintiffs also argue that their
negligence claim is not preempted and that Defendant’s AML and KYC policies, as
well as the TOU, support Plaintiffs’ negligence claim. Id. at 28–29. Lastly, Plaintiffs
argue that they have sufficiently established damages. Id. at 30–35.
In Defendant’s Supplemental Memorandum of Law, it further argues that it is
entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ contributory infringement claim based
Case 1:24-cv-24955-JB Document 132 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2026 Page 9 of 29

10
on the Supreme Court’s decision in Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music
Entertainment, 607 U.S. __, 146 S. Ct. 959 (2026). 	ECF No. [127]. 	Specifically,
Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs cannot establish the requisite intent to support a
contributory infringement claim because (i) Defendant does not induce Israel TV’s
alleged infringement, and (ii) Defendant’s service is not tailored to infringement. Id.
at 	3–5. 	In 	Plaintiffs’ 	Supplemental 	Memorandum 	of 	Law, 	they 	argue 	that
Defendant’s conduct satisfies both the “inducing infringement” and “tailored to
infringement” forms of intent, as set forth in Cox, to support their contributory
infringement claim. ECF No. [126] at 3–4.
III. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 	A genuine issue of material fact is one with “a
real basis in the record” such that “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
non-movant.” Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1303 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Pub. Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993)); Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). 	Speculation cannot create a genuine
issue of material fact sufficient to defeat a well-supported motion for summary
judgment. Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005).
The movant has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). To
determine whether the movant has met this burden, courts view the movant’s
Case 1:24-cv-24955-JB Document 132 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2026 Page 10 of 29

11
evidence and all factual inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to
the non-movant. 	Denney v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1181 (11th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1187 (11th Cir. 1999)). 	As to
issues on which the non-moving party would bear the burden of proof at trial, it is
sufficient for the movant to highlight a failure of proof concerning an essential
element of the non-movant’s case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23.
Once the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-
moving party to present evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact that
precludes summary judgment. Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284 F.3d 1237, 1243 (11th Cir.
2002); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 	“If reasonable minds could differ on the
inferences 	arising 	from 	undisputed 	facts, 	then 	a 	court 	should 	deny 	summary
judgment.” 	Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1534 (11th
Cir. 1992). But if the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact
to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial, and summary
judgment is proper. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587 (1986).
“A court need not permit a case to go to a jury[ ] when the inferences that are
drawn from the evidence, and upon which the non-movant relied, are “implausible.”
Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. Of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing
Matsushita 	Elec. 	Indus. 	Co., 	475 	U.S. 	at 	592–94). 	“Where 	the 	evidence 	is
circumstantial, a court may grant summary judgment when it concludes that no
reasonable jury may infer from the assumed facts the conclusion upon which the non-
Case 1:24-cv-24955-JB Document 132 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2026 Page 11 of 29

12
movant’s claim rests.” Id.
IV. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Defendant is Entitled to Summary Judgment on Count I.
Defendant argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because
Plaintiffs cannot establish a claim of contributory infringement. ECF No. [83] at 10–
17. 	Defendant asserts that the record contains no evidence of direct infringement,
and that Defendant does not materially contribute to any infringement by Israel TV.
Id. at 10–14. Defendant further asserts that the MoonPay platform is capable of
substantial non-infringing use. Id. at 14–16. In addition, Defendant asserts that it
does not “induce or encourage” any infringement by Israel TV and that its services
are not “tailored to infringement”. Id. at 15–16.
“A claim for contributory copyright infringement has two elements: “(i) direct
infringement and (ii) intentional inducement or encouragement.” Microsoft Corp. v.
Guirguis, No. 20-cv-24514, 2022 WL 1664181, at * 3 (S.D. Fla. March 30, 2022) (citing
Cable/Home Commc’n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 845 (11th Cir.
1990) (explaining that “[c]ontributory infringement necessarily must follow a finding
of direct or primary infringement”).
As for the first element, to prove direct infringement, a plaintiff must show “(1)
ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work
that are original.” Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1232–33 (11th Cir.
2010). Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not shown direct infringement because
they have not provided sufficient evidence that they own a valid copyright. ECF No.
[83] at 19. 	The only evidence Plaintiffs offer to prove that they own the relevant
Case 1:24-cv-24955-JB Document 132 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2026 Page 12 of 29

13
copyrights are two declarations: one which contains only a conclusory assertion that
Plaintiffs “own[] a valid U.S. copyright for original works, subject to copyright
protection as provided in the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976,” and another which merely
identifies the name of four copyrighted works available on Israel TV without stating
that Plaintiffs own the copyright to those works. ECF No. [89-7] ¶7; ECF No. [89-8]
¶13. 	In its Reply, Defendant offers evidence that the U.S. Copyright Office Public
Records System does not reflect that any of the four works identified in Plaintiffs’
supporting 	declaration 	are 	registered, 	copyrighted 	works 	belonging 	to
Plaintiffs. ECF No. [91-6].
As to the first prong, Plaintiffs’ evidence is quite thin. And although it is well-
settled that a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to survive summary judgment.,
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (“The mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there
must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.”),the
evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs as the non-movants.
As such, the Court finds that as to this first issue there is a disputed issue of fact as
to whether Plaintiffs own a valid copyright for the works available on Israel TV.
However, 	summary 	judgment 	is 	nevertheless 	appropriate 	because, 	as
explained below, there is an absence of evidence from which a reasonable juror could
find that Defendant had the intent required for contributory liability and, thus, the
second element is not satisfied. 	During the pendency of the Motion, the Supreme
Court clarified in Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment, the
Case 1:24-cv-24955-JB Document 132 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2026 Page 13 of 29

14
standard for the second element of a contributory infringement claim. 146 S. Ct. at
967. The Court explained that “[t]he provider of a service is contributorily liable for
the user’s infringement only if it intended that the provided service be used for
infringement.” Id. “The intent required for contributory liability can be shown only
if the party induced the infringement or the provided service is tailored to that
infringement.” 	Id. (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545
U.S. 913, 930 (2005); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
440–41 (1984)).
Plaintiffs 	assert 	that 	Defendant’s 	conduct 	satisfies 	both 	the 	“inducing
infringement” and “tailored to infringement” forms of intent set forth in Cox. 	ECF
No. [126] at 2. Defendant, however, asserts that there is no evidence to support that
it induced Israel TV’s alleged infringement and that its service is not tailored to
infringement. 	ECF No. [127] at 3–5. 	As explained below, the Court agrees with
Defendant.
1. 	There is Insufficient Evidence from Which a Reasonable Juror
Could Find that Defendant “Induced Infringement.”
For purposes of a contributory infringement claim, “[a] provider induces
infringement if it actively encourages infringement through specific acts[,]” such as
promoting, marketing, or advertising its service as a tool to infringe copyrights. Cox,
146 S. Ct. at 967 (citing Grokster, 545 U.S. at 942 (holding that a jury could find two
file-sharing companies liable for inducement where the companies promoted and
marketed their software as a tool to infringe copyrights and the “principal object” of
their business models “was use of their software to download copyrighted works”); see
Case 1:24-cv-24955-JB Document 132 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2026 Page 14 of 29

15
also Kalem Co. v. Harper Brothers, 222 U.S. 55, 62–63 (1911) (finding liability where
“[t]he defendant not only expected but invoked by advertisement the use of its films”
for infringement of an author’s copyright); Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 49
(1912) (finding liability because the sale was made “with the purpose and intent” that
the objected be used for patent infringement), overruled on other grounds, Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917)).
As in Cox, “[Defendant] did not ‘induce’ or ‘encourage’ its [users] to infringe in
any manner.” Cox, 146 S. Ct. at 968. Like the plaintiff in Cox, “[Plaintiffs] provided
no ‘evidence of express promotion, marketing, and intent to promote’ infringement.”
Id. (quoting Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930). 	To the contrary, the undisputed evidence
reflects that Defendant has no affirmative contact with Israel TV or its subscribers
to be able to induce or encourage the infringement. See ECF No. [84] ¶¶ 3, 8, 10, 12,
14; ECF No. [88-1] ¶¶ 3, 8, 10, 12, 14. For example, it is undisputed that Defendant
(i) does not provide software or personnel to Israel TV; (ii) does not host, store, display
control or distribute Israel TV’s content (or Plaintiffs’); (iii) does not have any
independent, non-public knowledge of Israel TV’s content; (iv) does not receive any
payments from or on behalf of Israel TV; and (v) has never communicated with Israel
TV. 	See ECF No. [84] ¶¶ 3, 8, 10, 12, 14; ECF No. [88-1] ¶¶ 3, 8, 10, 12, 14. 	In
addition, Defendant discouraged copyright infringement through various means,
such 	including 	a 	prohibition 	against 	copyright 	infringement 	in 	its 	TOU 	and
“blacklisting” web domains identified by Plaintiffs as belonging to Israel TV or its
alleged intermediary. ECF No. [84] ¶¶ 27, 50–51; ECF No. [88-1] ¶¶ 27, 50–51.
Case 1:24-cv-24955-JB Document 132 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2026 Page 15 of 29

16
Plaintiffs 	argue 	that 	Defendant’s 	“conduct 	demonstrates 	affirmative
encouragement” because Defendant disabled an API key, “watched the infringement
stop, and then allowed the pipeline to flow again” by refusing to continue disabling
API keys. ECF No. [126] at 3.9 However, this argument is foreclosed by the Supreme
Court’s “repeated admonition that contributory liability cannot rest only on a
provider’s knowledge of infringement and insufficient action to prevent it.” Cox, 146
S. Ct. at 969 (citing Kalem Co., 222 U.S. at 62 (explaining that “mere indifferent
supposition or knowledge on the part of the seller” that the buyer will use the product
unlawfully is “not enough” to make the seller liable for the buyer’s conduct); Sony,
464 U.S. at 439 (explaining that “[t]here is no precedent in the law of copyright” for
liability based only “on the fact that [the defendant has] sold equipment with
constructive knowledge of the fact that [its] customers may use that equipment to
make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material”); Grokster, 545 U.S. at 939, n.12
(confirming that “a court would be unable to find contributory infringement liability
merely based on a failure to take affirmative steps to prevent infringement”)).
In short, there is insufficient record evidence for a reasonable juror to find that
Defendant induced infringement. Thus, absent any evidence that Defendant’s service
is tailored to infringement, Plaintiffs’ claim of contributory copyright infringement
cannot stand.
9 It is undisputed that Israel TV found another API key to use less than forty-eight
hours after Defendant disabled the API key. ECF No. [84] ¶ 55.
Case 1:24-cv-24955-JB Document 132 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2026 Page 16 of 29

17
2. 	The Record Evidence Establishes that Defendant’s Services are
Not “Tailored to Infringement.”
“A service is tailored to infringement if it is ‘not capable of “substantial” or
“commercially significant” noninfringing uses.’” 	Cox, 146 S. Ct. at 967 (quoting
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 942 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also Sony, 464 U.S. at 442
(concluding that a tape recorder “is capable of substantial noninfringing uses”—like
personal use—so “sale of such equipment to the general public does not constitute
contributory infringement” despite the fact that customers may use the tape recorder
to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material). 	Simply put, to be tailored to
infringement, the service must be “‘good for nothing else’ but infringement.” Grokster,
545 U.S. at 932.
Here, as in Cox, Defendant’s service is “clearly capable of substantial or
commercially significant noninfringing uses.” Cox, 146 S. Ct. at 967 (quotation marks
omitted). 	Indeed, 	Plaintiffs 	do 	not 	dispute 	that 	“MoonPay’s 	[cryptocurrency
exchange] platform and services … are capable of being used for non-infringing
purposes.” ECF No. [84] ¶ 66; ECF No. [88-1] ¶ 66 (disputing only that “MoonPay’s
platform is designed to be used for infringing purposes” and failing to dispute that
the platform is capable of being used or non-infringing purposes); see also ECF No.
[88-1] ¶ 19 (Plaintiffs stating that, “MoonPay offers users the ability to exchange (1)
traditional 	currencies 	for 	cryptocurrency; 	(2) 	cryptocurrency 	for 	traditional
currencies; and (3) one cryptocurrency for another cryptocurrency”).
Notwithstanding, Plaintiffs contend that “MoonPay’s widget, as deployed
through Israel TV’s payment flow is ‘especially adapted’ for infringement” because
Case 1:24-cv-24955-JB Document 132 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2026 Page 17 of 29

18
“[t]he widget operates as a turnkey payment mechanism configured with prefilled
subscription amounts and wallet addresses to consummate transactions for pirated
content.” ECF No. [126] at 4. This argument ignores the standard set forth in Cox,
which asks only whether the service is capable of noninfringing use. 	See 146 S. Ct.
at 967. Plaintiffs further contend that “[Defendant] has submitted no evidence that
is platform is used for substantial noninfringing purposes[,]” such as “user testimony,
marketing materials, or evidence of what users do with purchased cryptocurrency.”
ECF No. [126] at 4. Again, this argument misapprehends Cox. The inquiry turns on
capability, not actual use, so the absence of evidence about how users in fact utilized
the platform does not bear on the tailoring analysis. Cox, 146 S. Ct. at 967.
Because the undisputed record establishes that Defendant’s services are
capable of “substantial” or “commercially significant” noninfringing uses, the Court
finds that Defendant’s services are not tailored to infringement. 	Indeed, the record
is devoid of evidence supporting either an inducement or tailoring theory of intent, as
required under Cox to sustain a claim for contributory copyright infringement.10
Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs’
contributory infringement claim, and its Motion is GRANTED as to Count I.
B. 	Defendant is Entitled to Summary Judgment on Count II.
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ FDUTPA claim also fails as a matter of law.
ECF No. [83] at 27. 	Defendant offers four reasons in support of its argument: (i)
10 Given this conclusion, the Court does not reach Defendant’s argument regarding
material contribution.
Case 1:24-cv-24955-JB Document 132 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2026 Page 18 of 29

19
Plaintiffs’ FDUTPA claim is preempted by the Copyright Act, (ii) there is no evidence
that Defendant’s TOU is deceptive, (iii) the record evidence cannot support the
“causation” element of Plaintiffs’ FDUTPA claim because Defendant’s AML, KYC,
and KYB policies are not publicly available, and (iv) Plaintiffs cannot establish
damages. 	As explained below, the Court concludes that while Plaintiffs’ FDUTA
claim is not preempted, there is insufficient evidence to support the first two elements
of a FDUTPA claim, namely a deceptive or unfair practice and causation.11
1. 	The Copyright Act Does Not Preempt Plaintiffs’ FDUTPA Claim.
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ FDUTPA claim is preempted by federal
copyright law. 	The Copyright Act “preempts all state causes of action based on a
right found in the Act or an equivalent to such a right.” 	Foley v. Luster, 249 F.3d
1281, 1285 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 301(a)). 	As the Eleventh Circuit
explained, “Section 301 in effect establishes a two-pronged test to be applied in
preemption cases,” namely, (i) “whether the rights at issue fall within the ‘subject
matter of copyright’ set forth in sections 102 and 103 [of the Act]” and (ii) “whether
the rights at issue are ‘equivalent to’ the exclusive rights of section 106 [of the Act].”
Crow v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1224, 1225–26 (11th Cir. 1983). 	With respect to the
second prong, the Eleventh Circuit employs the “extra element” test, which asks
whether “an extra element is required instead of or in addition to the acts of
reproduction, performance, distribution or display,” such that the extra element
11 Given this conclusion, the Court does not reach Defendant’s arguments regarding
damages.
Case 1:24-cv-24955-JB Document 132 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2026 Page 19 of 29

20
“changes the nature of the action so that it is qualitatively different” from a copyright
infringement or, in this case, a contributory infringement claim. 	Foley, 249 F.3d at
1285–86; see also Crow, 720 F.2d at 1226–27. 	If an extra element exists, then the
state law claim is not preempted. 	Id. 	In short, the Act “preempts only those state
law rights that may be abridged by an act which, in and of itself, would infringe one
of the exclusive rights provided by federal copyright law.” 	Foley, 249 F.3d at 1285
(quoting Comp. Assoc. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 716 (2d Cir. 1992)).
Here, neither prong of Section 301 preemption is satisfied. 	As to the first
prong, Plaintiffs’ FDUTPA claim is not based on Defendant’s alleged contribution to
Israel TV’s copyright infringement. 	ECF No. [40] at 19–23. 	Rather, it is based on
Defendant’s allegedly deceptive representations in their TOU, AML, and KYC
policies. 	Id. As such, the “rights at issue” in Plaintiffs’ FDUTPA claim do not “fall
within the subject matter of copyright” because the FDUTPA claim does not allege
that Defendant’s conduct violates Plaintiffs’ rights in their copyrighted works.
Even if the first prong was met, the second prong is not. 	To state a claim for
direct copyright infringement under the Copyright Act, “two elements must be
proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of
the work that are original.” Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 361 (1991). 	A claim for contributory copyright infringement likewise has two
elements: “(i) direct infringement and (ii) intentional inducement or encouragement.”
Microsoft Corp. v. Guirguis, No. 20-cv-24514, 2022 WL 1664181, at * 3 (S.D. Fla.
March 30, 2022). By contrast, “[t]he elements of a FDUTPA claim are: ‘(1) a deceptive
Case 1:24-cv-24955-JB Document 132 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2026 Page 20 of 29

21
act or unfair trade practice; (2) causation; and (3) actual damages.’” Gov. Emp. Ins.
Co. v. Right Spinal Clinic, No. 23-11778, 2024 WL 4564168, at * 9 (11th Cir. Oct. 24,
2024) (quoting Dolphin LLC v. WCI Cmtys., Inc., 715 F.3d 1243, 1250 (11th Cir.
2013)).
It is evident that Plaintiffs’ FDUTPA claim requires proof of an additional
element, namely that Defendant’s TOU and AML, KYC, and KYB policies contain
deceptive representations. 	Indeed, each of the elements of a FDUTPA claim (i.e.,
deceptive act, causation and damages) require Plaintiffs to provide evidence distinct
from a copyright claim. 	As such, Plaintiffs’ FDUTPA claim is qualitatively distinct
and, therefore, has “extra elements” for purposes of Section 301 preemption. 	See
Foley, 249 F.3d at 1286; TushBaby, Inc. v. Shiaon, No. 24-cv-21136, 2024 WL
5054925, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 9, 2024) (determining that FDUTPA claim was not
preempted because “the deception allegation is an ‘extra element’ of the FDUTPA
claim not necessary to prove the copyright infringement claim”). For these reasons,
the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ FDUTPA claim is not preempted. See Crow, 720
F.2d at 1225–26; see also Ediciones Musicales Y Representaciones Internacionales,
S.A. v. San Martin, 582 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1361 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (“Unlike a claim for
copyright infringement, this particular claim requires the ‘extra element’ of a
deceptive act or unfair practice.”).
2. 	There is Insufficient Evidence from Which a Reasonable Juror
Could Find that the First and Second Elements of a FDUTPA
Claim Are Satisfied.
Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs have not provided evidence to support
that it has any “unfair” or “deceptive” practices, or that such practices caused harm
Case 1:24-cv-24955-JB Document 132 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2026 Page 21 of 29

22
to consumers. 	ECF No. [83] at 28. 	On this point, the Court agrees. 	“[D]eception
occurs if there is a representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead the
consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer’s detriment.”
Zlotnick v. Premier Sales Grp., Inc., 480 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting
PNR, Inc. v. Beacon Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 842 So. 2d 773, 777 (Fla. 2003)); see also Angelo
v. Parker, 275 So. 3d 752, 755 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (stating that a deceptive practice
is 	a 	practice 	that 	is 	likely 	to 	mislead 	consumers 	acting 	reasonably 	in 	the
circumstances, to the consumers’ detriment). 	Whether an act is deceptive or unfair
may be decided as a matter of law. See, e.g., Zlotnick, 480 F.3d at 1287; Jones v. TT
of Longwood, Inc., No. 6:06-cv-651, 2007 WL 2298020 *7 (M.D. Fla. August 7, 2007).
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s “policies and [TOU] are deceptive” because
they “falsely misrepresent[ ] that [Defendant] prohibits ‘transactions involving items
that infringe or violate any copyright . . .’” which “misleads customers into believing
that [Defendant] actively ensures that illegal activities do not occur through their
platform.” ECF No. [88] at 28. This misreads Defendant’s TOU. The TOU are terms
that govern a user’s conduct, not Defendant’s own conduct. They are instructions for
each user’s use of the platform, as agreed to by each MoonPay user and Defendant.
See ECF No. [84-15] at 2 (“This Agreement applies to an individual’s use of the
following 	MoonPay products 	and 	services.”). 	The 	TOU 	clearly 	instructs 	each
MoonPay user to “not use [their] MoonPay Account or any of the Services to engage
in . . . transactions involving items that infringe or violate any copyright . . . .” 	Id.
Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, no reasonable
Case 1:24-cv-24955-JB Document 132 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2026 Page 22 of 29

23
juror could understand these terms to mean that Defendant is monitoring copyright
infringement in any way. Tellingly, Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence that a
MoonPay user had such a belief, or was otherwise misled by Defendant’s TOU. 	See
generally ECF No. [88-1]. 	Absent evidence that Defendant’s TOU is deceptive,
Plaintiffs’ FDUTPA claim fails as matter of law. See e.g., Blobner v. R.T.G. Furniture
Corp., No. 8:17-cv-1676, 2020 WL 13597866, at * 2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 8, 2020)
(“[Plaintiffs’] FDUTPA claims fail as a matter of law because there is no evidence of
a deceptive act or unfair trade practice.”); Carriuolo v. Gen. Motors Co., 823 F.3d 977,
983–84 (11th Cir. 2016) (applying Florida law) (recognizing that for purposes of a
FDUTPA claim, the alleged practice must be likely to deceive).
As for Defendant’s KYC, KYB and AML policies, it is undisputed that these
policies are not available to the public. 	See ECF No. [84] ¶62; ECF No. [88-1] ¶ 62.
“To establish a violation of the FDUTPA, the plaintiff must show that ‘the practice
was likely to deceive a consumer acting reasonably in the same circumstances.’” Pfeil
v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 284 F. App’x 640, 643 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting State v.
Wyndham Int'l, Inc., 869 So.2d 592, 598 (Fla.App.2004)); see also, Cold Stone
Creamery, Inc. v. Lenora Foods I, LLC, 332 F. App’x 565, 567 (11th Cir. 2009)
(recognizing that for a FDUTPA claim, “the plaintiff must prove that ‘the alleged
practice 	was 	likely 	to 	deceive 	a 	consumer 	acting 	reasonably 	in 	the 	same
circumstances.’”) (quoting Office of the Att’y Gen. v. Com. Com. Leasing, LLC, 946
So.2d 1253, 1258 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)). Here, no reasonable juror could conclude that
Defendant’s internal policies are likely to deceive a reasonable consumer given that
Case 1:24-cv-24955-JB Document 132 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2026 Page 23 of 29

24
consumers are not privy to those policies. Stated differently, a reasonable consumer
cannot be deceived into believing that Defendant is complying with its AML, KYC,
and KYB policies when the consumer necessarily has no awareness of those policies.
As such, Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the causation element of their FDUTPA claim
because consumers have no access to such policies.
Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs’
FDUTPA claim, and Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED as to Count II.
C. 	Defendant is Entitled to Summary Judgment on Count IV.
Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’
negligence 	claim 	because 	(i) 	Plaintiffs’ 	negligence 	claim 	is 	preempted 	by 	the
Copyright Act, and (ii) Plaintiffs cannot establish the existence of a duty. 	ECF No.
[83] at 31–32. 	As explained below, the Court concludes that while Plaintiff’s
negligence claim is not preempted, Plaintiffs have failed to establish the existence of
a legal duty as required to prevail on their negligence claim.
1. 	The Copyright Act Does Not Preempt Plaintiffs’ Negligence
Claim.
As explained above, the Eleventh Circuit has adopted a two-prong test to
determine whether the Copyright Act preempts a state law cause of action, namely
(i) “whether the rights at issue fall within the ‘subject matter of copyright’ set forth
in sections 102 and 103 [of the Act]” and (ii) “whether the rights at issue are
‘equivalent to’ the exclusive rights of section 106 [of the Act].” 	Crow, 720 F.2d at
1225–27. 	Defendant contends that “Plaintiffs’ negligence claim relies on the same
set of allegations as its contributory infringement claim.” 	Id. at 31. 	However, the
Case 1:24-cv-24955-JB Document 132 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2026 Page 24 of 29

25
basis of Plaintiffs’ negligence claim is that Defendant breached its alleged duty “not
to knowingly allow its platform to be used for illegal activities” and “not to make
material misrepresentations on its website that would lead Plaintiffs and other
consumers to believe it is complying with KYC and KYB regulations.” ECF No. [40]
¶¶ 68–69. As with their FDUTPA claim, the “rights at issue” in Plaintiffs’ negligence
claim do not “fall within the subject matter of copyright.” 	Crow, 720 F.2d at 1225–
26. Thus, the first element of Section 301 preemption is not met.
Once again, even if the first prong was met, the second prong is not. A claim
for negligence under Florida law has four elements: (1) duty, (2) a breach of that duty,
(3) causation, and (4) damages. 	See Virgilio v. Ryland Group, Inc., 680 F.3d 1329,
1339 (11th Cir. 2012). 	As discussed above, a claim for copyright infringement
requires that a plaintiff show (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of
constituent elements of the work that are original, Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at
361, 	and 	a 	claim 	for 	contributory 	infringement 	has 	two 	elements: 	(i) 	direct
infringement and (ii) intentional inducement or encouragement, Guirguis, 2022 WL
1664181, at *9. 	Plaintiffs’ negligence claim requires proof of qualitatively different
elements (i.e., duty, breach, causation, and damages) than those in a copyright claim.
Compare Foley, 249 F.3d at 1286 (finding that the breach of duty essential to a trade
secret case is an extra element that qualitatively distinguishes those claims from
copyright claims) with Millennium Funding, Inc. v. 1701 Mgmt. LLC, 576 F. Supp.
3d 1192, 1218 (S.D. Fla. 2021) (holding that state law claims for negligence and fraud
were preempted by the Copyright Act where the copyright infringement claim relied
Case 1:24-cv-24955-JB Document 132 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2026 Page 25 of 29

26
on allegations of false statements).12 Stated differently, Plaintiffs’ negligence claim
requires proof of elements beyond mere reproduction or distribution of copyrighted
works and, therefore, is not preempted.
2. 	Plaintiffs Have Failed to Establish the Existence of a Legal Duty
as Required to Prevail on Their Negligence Claim.
Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs’ negligence claim fails as a matter of law
because there is no duty to prevent the conduct of third persons or to prevent a third
party’s economic loss. ECF No. [83] at 31–32. 	More specifically, Defendant argues
that it has no duty to police third party infringement, and that such infringement is
an intervening cause of the damages Plaintiffs allege. 	Id. 	In their Response,
Plaintiffs argue that the relevant duty is Defendant’s “duty to not misrepresent to its
users and prospective users that it was disallowing and stopping illicit activity.” ECF
No. [88] at 28–29. 	Plaintiffs also argue that Defendant’s policies are “toothless and
cannot…be relied upon.” Id.
Under Florida law, a claim for negligence requires proof of “a duty, breach of
that duty, causation, and damages.” Virgilio v. Ryland Group, Inc., 680 F.3d at 1339.
The existence of a duty is a question of law, rather than a question of fact for the jury.
Id. 	Florida law establishes that a duty may arise from four general sources: “(1)
legislative enactments or administration regulations; (2) judicial interpretations of
such enactments or regulations; (3) other judicial precedent; and (4) a duty arising
from the general facts of the case.” Clay Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Johnson, 873 So. 2d 1182,
12 Here, Plaintiffs’ contributory infringement claim does not rely upon Defendant’s
alleged misrepresentations. See ECF No. [40] at 18.
Case 1:24-cv-24955-JB Document 132 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2026 Page 26 of 29

27
1185 (Fla. 2003); see also Limones v. Sch. Dist. of Lee Cnty., 161 So.3d 384, 389 (Fla.
2015). Plaintiffs’ negligence claim is not rooted in any of these four sources.
Plaintiffs do not allege, or even argue, that Defendant’s alleged duty arises
from 	any 	legislative 	enactments 	or 	administration 	regulations, 	or 	judicial
interpretations thereof. 	See generally, ECF Nos. [40], [88]. 	Similarly, Plaintiffs do
not identify any caselaw that creates the alleged duty that Defendant purportedly
breached. 	Id. 	Indeed, Plaintiffs’ Response is devoid of a single legal citation that
establishes the existence of the duties alleged in Count IV.13 ECF No. [88] at 29. To
be sure, Plaintiffs fail to meaningfully address Defendant’s argument. Id.
At best, Plaintiffs’ Response argues that their negligence claim falls within the
fourth source, namely “a duty arising from the general facts of the case.” 	However,
this argument also fails. 	“[W]hen the duty is rooted in the fourth prong, factual
inquiry into the existence of a duty is limited to whether the defendant’s conduct
foreseeably created a broader zone of risk that poses a general threat of harm to
others.” Limones, 161 So.3d at 389 (internal citations omitted). 	However, “a legal
duty is not established by evidence of foreseeability alone.” Aguila v. Hilton, Inc., 878
So. 2d 392, 396 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). “There must also be some evidence that the risk
was created by the alleged negligence of the defendant.” Id. at 397.
13 Plaintiffs cite Bass v. Facebook, Inc., a non-binding decision issued by the Northern
District of California under the motion to dismiss standard where the court found
that allegations the defendant owed a duty to protect its own users’ personal data
from foreseeable harm of disclosure stated a claim for relief. 394 F. Supp. 1024, 1039
(N.D. Cal. June 21, 2019). The facts and procedural posture of this action are wholly
inapposite to Bass.
Case 1:24-cv-24955-JB Document 132 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2026 Page 27 of 29

28
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant “has a duty not to
knowingly allow its platform to be used for illegal activities,” and “a duty not to make
material misrepresentations on its website that would lead Plaintiffs and other
consumers to believe it is complying with KYC and KYB regulations.” ECF No. [40]
¶¶ 68–69. 	Plaintiffs make no argument as to how Defendant’s cryptocurrency
conversion platform creates a risk of harm to consumers who seek to subscribe to
Israel TV, particularly given the absence of evidence that Defendant induces or
encourages them to do so. 	Further, Plaintiffs have not identified any evidence that
shows how Defendant’s internal KYC and KYB policies14 foreseeably created any risk
to consumers, when Defendant’s KYC and KYB policies are not available to the
public. 	Given 	that 	these 	are 	internal 	documents, 	Defendant’s 	purported
misrepresentations on its website could not have “foreseeably created a broader zone
of risk” that the public would be harmed by believing that Defendant was complying
with its KYC and KYB policies. 	As such, Plaintiffs have failed to establish the
existence of a legal duty as required to prevail on their negligence claim.
Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to judgment as matter of law on Plaintiffs’
negligence claim, and its Motion is therefore GRANTED as to Count IV.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
ECF No. [82], is GRANTED. The Court will separately enter final judgment in favor
14 	In 	their 	Amended 	Complaint, 	Plaintiffs’ 	negligence 	claim 	references 	only
Defendant’s KYC and KYB policies. See ECF No. [40] ¶¶ 67–72.
Case 1:24-cv-24955-JB Document 132 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2026 Page 28 of 29

29
of Defendant MoonPay USA LLC. 	The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case, and
any pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.
DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 13th day of July, 2026.
__________________________________________
JACQUELINE BECERRA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 1:24-cv-24955-JB Document 132 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/13/2026 Page 29 of 29