Energy Enhancement System, LLC et al v. Shurka et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 25-20981-CIV-MARTINEZ/SANCHEZ
ENERGY ENHANCEMENT SYSTEM, LLC, a
Nevada limited liability company, MICHAEL
BERTOLACINI, an individual; and DR.
SANDRA ROSE MICHAEL, DNM, an
individual,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JASON SHURKA, an individual; UNIFYD
WORLD, INC., a South Carolina corporation;
UNIFYD HEALING; UNIFYD TV; ROBERT
RELIGA, an individual; DOES I-X; and ROE
CORPORATIONS XI-XX,
Defendants.
_______________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLAINTIFFS ’
VERIFIED MOTION TO D ETERMINE REASONABLE FEES
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Verified Motion to Determine Reasonable
Fees. ECF No. 25.1 Having carefully considered Plaintiffs’ motion, the pertinent portions of the
record, and the applicable law, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the undersigned
RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDS that Plaintiffs’ Verified Motion to Determine Reasonable
Fees, ECF No. 25, be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, and that Plaintiffs be
awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of $46,526.55.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On January 16, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an action in Clark County, Nevada. ECF No. 1-2. On
1 The Honorable Jose E. Martinez, United States District Judge, referred the instant motion to the
undersigned for a report and recommendation. ECF No. 26.
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March 3, 2025, Defendant Shurka removed this matter to this Court, ECF No. 1, and Plaintiffs
thereafter filed an Expedited Motion to Remand, or Alternatively to Dismiss the Notice of
Removal, ECF No. 8. On March 28, 2025, Judge Martinez granted Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand
and held that Plaintiffs were entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in
responding to the notice of removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). ECF No. 22. Subsequently,
Plaintiffs filed the instant motion, requesting $70,980.50 in attorneys’ fees. 	Defendant Shurka
responded with a Motion for Remittitur of Attorney Fees, arguing that Plaintiffs’ attorneys
“perpetrated fraud upon the Court” and should not be entitled to fees. ECF No. 28. Judge Martinez
denied the Motion for Remittitur on April 24, 2025, ECF No. 32, and the only remaining issue is
the amount of fees Plaintiffs’ attorneys are entitled to.
II. 	ANALYSIS
To determine whether the requested attorneys’ fees have been reasonably calculated, courts
in this Circuit apply the lodestar method, which requires that a reasonable hourly rate be multiplied
by the reasonable number of hours expended. See, e.g., Gray v. Lockheed Aeronautical Sys. Co.,
125 F.3d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1997); Walker v. Iron Sushi LLC, 752 F. App’x 910, 913 (11th Cir.
2018).
a. 	Hourly Rate
“A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for
similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Norman v.
Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988). The Court “is itself an
expert on the question [of a reasonable hourly rate] and may consider its own knowledge and
experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an independent judgment.” Loranger
v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303). In determining
what is a reasonable hourly rate, the Court considers:
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(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the
skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment
by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the
fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the
circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience,
reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the
nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in
similar cases.
Meyrowitz v. Brendel, No. 16-81793-CV, 2018 WL 4440492, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 17, 2018)
(quoting Bivins v. Wrap It Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, 1350 n.2 (11th Cir. 2008)).
Here, the requested hourly rate varies by seniority, from $740 for partners to $350 for
associates. ECF No. 25 at 5-6. Plaintiffs’ motion and accompanying exhibits explain the attorneys’
qualifications, including their education and experience. Id.; ECF Nos. 25-3 (Declaration of Javier
A. Reyes), 25-4 (Declaration of Robert Cassity). Given the attorneys’ experience and the work
performed, the undersigned finds that the requested rates are reasonable. See Efron v. Candelario,
No. 22-CV-21452, 2025 WL 906127, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 10, 2025) (finding that attorneys’ rates
ranging from $350 to $650 were reasonable), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL
901541 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 2025); CITGO Petroleum Corp. cv. Petroleum Logistics Serv. USA,
Inc., No. 22-MC-20762, 2022 WL 17718802, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 30, 2022) (awarding reasonable
rate ranging from $300 to $850 for attorneys), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL
17716483 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 15, 2022).
b. 	Hours Expended
Plaintiffs’ counsel reports expending a total of 125.4 hours on the Motion to Remand,
Motion to Stay, and Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to the Counterclaims. ECF No. 25
at 7.
As a threshold finding, Plaintiffs’ request for fees related to the motion to stay and motion
for extension of time is proper. The removal statute provides that “[a]n order remanding the case
may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a
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result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “Courts have interpreted the ‘incurred as a result’
language to include expenses ‘caused by’ the improper removal, including those expenses incurred
in remanding the case and ‘the necessary expenses of being in the second judicial system.’”
Treasure Cay Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Frontline Ins. Unlimited Co., No. 4:19-CV-10211-JLK, 2023
WL 1444995, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 13, 2023) (quoting Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am. v. Henkel
Corp., No. 615CV548ORL22GJK, 2017 WL 4082440, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 2017)), report
and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 1434037 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2023). The motions to stay
and for extension of time were both filed because Defendant Shurka removed the case to federal
court and Plaintiffs were properly seeking to avoid unnecessary additional proceedings. Plaintiffs’
attorneys should thus be entitled to fees related to the motion to stay and motion for extension of
time. 	See Squire v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., No. 12-23315-CIV, 2013 WL 474705, at *6 (S.D. Fla.
Feb. 7, 2013) (awarding fees under § 1447(c) for a motion for extension for time where “[s]uch
work was done only because of [defendant’s] wrongful removal in the first instance”).
On the other hand, there are number of time entries for matters occurring in Nevada that
do not appear to have been incurred because of the improper removal to this Court. See ECF No.
25-2 at 1. The unrelated time entries from March 13-14, 2025, include “correspondence to Nevada
AG’s office regarding potential investigation,” “application for default judgment,” and press
releases regarding “Shurka’s attacks” and “copyright claims.” Id. Because the $4,514.00 in fees
corresponding to the 6.1 hours billed for that work were not incurred as a result of the removal in
this case, those fees should be deducted from the attorneys’ fees award. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c);
see also, e.g., Morenco v. J.C. Painting Contractor LLC, No. 1:24-21463-CIV, 2025 WL 1047136,
at *8 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2025) (excluding unrelated time entries from attorneys’ fees award), report
and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 814826 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2025).
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Next, under the lodestar method, the Court must determine whether the hours expended on
the case are reasonable and make adjustments as needed, considering, among other factors, the
final result in the case. See Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299, 1301-02; see also Bivins, 548 F.3d at 1350-
52. A court may make such adjustments to arrive at the lodestar by either conducting an hour-by-
hour analysis or applying an across-the-board reduction of the requested compensable hours.
Bivins, 548 F.3d at 1351. Reasonable hours are “billable hours—that is, work that would be paid
for by a reasonable client of means seriously intent on vindicating the rights in issue.” Perkins v.
Mobile Hous. Bd., 847 F.2d 735, 738 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301). In the
Eleventh Circuit, “the measure of reasonable hours is determined by the profession’s judgment of
the time that may be conscionably billed and not the least time in which it might theoretically have
been done.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1306. Additionally, “the Supreme Court requires fee applicants
to exercise ‘billing judgment.’” 	Id. at 1301 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437
(1983)). “‘[E]xcessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary’ hours should be excluded from the
amount claimed” because these hours “would be unreasonable to bill to a client and therefore to
one’s adversary irrespective of the skill, reputation or experience of counsel.” 	Id. (quoting
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434). 	“Redundant hours generally occur where more than one attorney
represents a client.” Id. at 1301-02. However, “[t]here is nothing inherently unreasonable about
a client having multiple attorneys, and they may all be compensated if they are not unreasonably
doing the same work and are being compensated for the distinct contribution of each lawyer.” Id.
at 1302. When seeking to recover fees from multiple attorneys, the movant bears the “burden of
showing that the time spent by those attorneys reflects the distinct contribution of each lawyer to
the case and is the customary practice of multiple-lawyer litigation.” Am. C.L. Union of Georgia
v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 432 (11th Cir. 1999).
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Here, Plaintiffs assert that four attorneys from Bell Rosquete Reyes Esteban PLLC
(“BRRE”) expended a total of 62.6 hours working on this case, while three attorneys from Holland
& Hart expended 62.8 hours, and Plaintiffs provide a breakdown of the time that each attorney
spent on each specific activity.2 ECF Nos. 25-1, 25-2, 25-3, 25-4. A review of the billing records,
however, indicates that the attorneys from BRRE and Holland & Hart performed similar,
overlapping legal tasks (i.e., researching, drafting, and revising the same motions and memoranda),
and many entries involve communications among the lawyers at the two firms regarding those
legal tasks. ECF Nos. 25-1, 25-2; see also ECF No. 25 at 7 (requesting fees for “hours researching,
reviewing, 	drafting, 	revising, 	conferences 	between 	counsel, 	conferring 	with 	Shurka, 	and
strategizing internally, among other tasks”). 	But nowhere does the Plaintiffs’ motion or its
supporting exhibits indicate that the attorneys divided the work involved in researching and
preparing Plaintiffs’ filings, nowhere does the motion or its supporting exhibits identify any
distinct contribution to the research and preparation of the Plaintiffs’ filings by individual lawyers
who worked on identical motions and memoranda, and nowhere does Plaintiffs’ motion provide
an explanation or justification for why multiple attorneys were doing the same work. 	See ECF
Nos. 25, 25-1, 25-2. 	On the contrary, the time entries submitted by Plaintiffs demonstrate that
there has been duplication of much of the attorney work that was done in this case. See ECF Nos.
25-1. 25-2. Indeed, as just one example, there were no less than seven lawyers (four from BRRE
and three from Holland & Hart) that participated in researching, drafting, reviewing, and revising
Plaintiffs’ motion to remand with no explanation about how their contributions to the preparation
of the motion to remand were separate and non-redundant. See ECF Nos. 25-1, 25-2. Although
the undersigned finds that some amount of duplication and coordination among the attorneys at
2 As explained above, however, the 62.8 hours billed by Holland & Hart should be reduced as an
initial matter to 56.7 hours due to the 6.1 hours of work that were not incurred as a result of the
removal.
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BRRE and Holland & Hart is understandable and warranted under the circumstances that resulted
in the removal of this matter to this Court, Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of
demonstrating that the vast amount of time spent by Plaintiffs’ attorneys working on the same
filings at two different firms reflect distinct and non-duplicative contributions. As such, an across-
the-board reduction in the lodestar amount to account for the duplication of attorney work is
warranted.3 See, e.g., Barnes, 168 F.3d at 433 (holding that the “district court abused its discretion
by failing to exclude the hours” billed by multiple attorneys where there was no showing of a
division of labor among the attorneys or that the hours billed reflected a distinct contribution by
the attorneys); United States Sugar Corp. v. Com. & Indus. Ins. Co., No. 22-21737-CIV, 2023 WL
4953191, at *6-8 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2023) (reducing fees where multiple law firms engaged in
duplicative work); Rodriguez v. GeoVera Specialty Ins. Co., No. 18-23585-CIV, 2020 WL
6800451, *8-11 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2020) (reducing fees where “the participation of three law
firms in this case, resulted in overlap between the work performed by the three firms”).
Additionally, the undersigned finds that the more than 120 hours billed by Plaintiffs’
attorneys (corresponding to $70,980.50 in fees) is excessive and unreasonable—and further serves
to demonstrate that there was a duplication of attorney work—given that this case was pending
before this Court for only four weeks, from the filing of the notice of removal on March 3, 2025,
ECF No. 2, to the entry of the order granting Plaintiffs’ motion to remand on March 31, 2025, ECF
3 In making adjustments to the lodestar amount, the undersigned has not recommended a reduction
of the hourly rates for the attorneys at Holland & Hart, but such an adjustment to a paralegal rate
or non-admitted attorney rate might have been warranted in the alternative given that the Holland
& Hart attorneys are not licensed in the state of Florida, did not move for admission pro hac vice,
and did not otherwise enter a formal appearance as Plaintiffs’ counsel in this case, and that their
largely duplicative work under the circumstances present in this case should at most be considered
at a paralegal or non-admitted attorney rate. See, e.g., Callaway v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
802 F. App’x 533, 537 (11th Cir. 2020); Walker v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 844 F. App’x 104,
109-10 (11th Cir. 2021); Ramones v. AR Res., Inc., No. 19-62949-CIV, 2022 WL 1443062, at *3
(S.D. Fla. May 6, 2022).
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No. 22. Moreover, the resolution of the case involved well-established legal principles. As Judge
Martinez explained in a short four-page order granting the motion to remand, Defendant Shurka
failed to establish that the Court had jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, and Defendant
“Shurka improperly removed the case to the wrong district” because the Southern District of
Florida is not the district embracing Neveda, where the case was initially pending. ECF No. 22 at
2-3; see 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (requiring removal to the district court embracing the place where an
action is pending). Notwithstanding the thorough work done by Plaintiffs’ attorneys, such clear
issues do not warrant more than 120 hours of work, especially when the record only reflects
Plaintiffs’ filing of a 15-page motion to remand, ECF No. 8, a 3-page motion for an extension of
time, ECF No. 18, and a 5-page motion to stay deadlines in the case, ECF No. 20. See Ballantine
v. BancorpSouth Bank, No. 2:17-CV-01441-KOB, 2018 WL 348008, at *4-5 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 10,
2018) (“While the court appreciates the thorough research [the party’s] counsel conducted, as well
as the extensive ground they covered in their Motion to Remand, it nevertheless finds that 124.4
hours is an unreasonable number of hours to bill for a motion involving such clear issues.”).
Given the nature of this case, the issues that were raised, the work that was required to seek
and obtain a remand in this case, and the duplication in the attorney work that was incurred as a
result of the removal, the undersigned recommends that the requested attorneys’ fees be reduced
by 30% (after the reduction of $4,514.00 in fees corresponding to the 6.1 hours of work billed for
that work were not incurred as a result of the removal in this case) to $46,526.55.4
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDS that
Plaintiffs’ Verified Motion to Determine Reasonable Fees, ECF No. 25, be GRANTED IN PART
4 The recommended total was calculated as follows: ($70,980.50 - $4,514.00) x 0.70 = $46,526.55.
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AND DENIED IN PART, and that Plaintiffs be awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of
$46,526.55.
Within fourteen (14) days from the date of receipt of this Report and Recommendation, the
parties shall serve and file written objections, if any, to this Report and Recommendation with the
Honorable Jose E. Martinez, United States District Judge. 	Failing to file timely objections will
bar a de novo determination by the District Judge of any issue addressed in the Report and
Recommendation, will constitute a waiver of a party’s “right to challenge on appeal the district
court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions,” and will only allow appellate
review of the district court order “for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th Cir.
R. 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d
790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989); see also Harrigan v. Metro-Dade Police Dep’t Station #4, 977 F.3d
1185, 1191-92 (11th Cir. 2020).
RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED in Chambers in Miami, Florida, this 18th day of
February 2026.
___________________________________
EDUARDO I. SANCHEZ
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
cc: 	Hon. Jose E. Martinez
Counsel of Record
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