Smith v. Miami-Dade et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 25-22286-CIV-SMITH/D’ANGELO
TARIK SMITH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MIAMI-DADE, et al.,
Defendants.
______________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON EMERGENCY MOTIONS
FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND MOTION TO DISMISS
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss Claims Against
Unserved Defendants Without Prejudice filed on December 18, 2025 (DE 89), Plaintiff’s
Emergency Petition for Temporary Restraining Order to Bar Enforcement of State Warrant and
Related Administrative Actions filed on January 5, 2026 (DE 95), and Plaintiff’s Supplemental
Emergency Notice of Imminent Enforcement Risk and Request for Immediate Action filed on
January 6, 2026 (DE 97).1 In the motions for temporary restraining order Plaintiff requests that
the Court issue a temporary restraining order enjoining Defendants from: (1) executing or
enforcing any arrest warrant arising from a state traffic matter, (2) arresting, detaining, or
incarcerating Plaintiff based on the warrant, or (3) enforcing or maintaining any driver’s license
suspension or related administrative action derived from the state traffic matter (DE 95 at 2). On
January 13, 2026 the Court issued an Order directing Plaintiff to submit supplemental briefing to
1 This case was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for all pre-trial, non-dispositive
matters and for a Report and Recommendation on any dispositive matters (DE 101).
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fix the deficiencies in the motions for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) by January 20, 2026
(DE 104). Plaintiff did not file any supplemental briefing.
I. 	EMERGENCY MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
A. Legal Standard
To obtain a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65, the moving party must demonstrate: “(1) [that he has] a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits; (2) that irreparable injury will be suffered if the relief is not granted; (3) that
the threatened injury outweighs the harm the relief would inflict on the non-movant; and (4) that
entry of the relief would serve the public interest.” Schiavo ex. rel Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d
1223, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
Moreover, when a party is seeking emergency relief from the Court, he must comply with
the Local Rules for the Southern District of Florida, which require that the motion, among other
requirements, detail the nature of the emergency, state the date by which a ruling is necessary and
why, and include a certification before the signature block stating:
After reviewing the facts and researching applicable legal principles, I certify that
this motion in fact presents a true emergency (as opposed to a matter that may need
only expedited treatment) and requires an immediate ruling because the Court
would not be able to provide meaningful relief to a critical, non-routine issue after
the expiration of seven days. I understand that an unwarranted certification may
lead to sanctions.
S.D.F.L. Local Rule 7.1(d).2
B. Discussion
As an initial matter, Plaintiff has failed to fully comply with the Local Rules for emergency
relief. Neither of Plaintiff’s motions specify a date by which a ruling is necessary and why, nor
2 In its prior Order Providing Instructions to Pro Se Litigant, the Court informed Plaintiff that he
must comply with all applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rules for the Southern
District of Florida (DE 48).
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do they include the required emergency certification before the signature block. Nor is the need
for emergency relief clear from the motion. For example, Plaintiff states, “A state warrant exists
from a traffic-matter that predates this federal filing[,]” and “[a]lthough issued earlier, the
warrant’s continued existence and enforceability create a standing and ongoing risk of arrest and
detention . . .” (DE 95 at 1). 	Plaintiff acknowledges that he has been aware of the alleged
outstanding warrant for some unknown period of time, but he does not state how long or that any
circumstances have changed. So, it is unclear why Plaintiff requires emergency relief now. See
Spimerica Access Sols., LLC v. Palazzani Industrie, S.P.A., No. 23-23222-CIV, 2023 WL
5748160, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 2023) (“[T]he Court’s review of the materials in this case reveals
that the Defendant’s alleged scheme has been unfolding for some time, and that [the moving party]
has known about it since at least August 2, 2023 . . . thus undermining the latter’s claim that this
is a true emergency.”); see also ECO Glob. Sales Grp., Inc. v. ECO Tabs Gauteng (PTY) Ltd., No.
25-61132-CIV, 2025 WL 2829584, at *4 (S.D. Fla. June 17, 2025) (holding the emergency motion
did not describe a “true emergency” because the plaintiff had known about the issue for almost
five years before the emergency motion was filed). Therefore, due to the lack of facts regarding
the circumstances and timing of the alleged arrest warrant, the Court does not have sufficient
information to determine if a true emergency exists warranting expedited relief.
Furthermore, neither of Plaintiff’s motions address the elements required for entry of a
TRO. First, in the motions, Plaintiff does not discuss whether he has a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits. See In re Gateway Radiology Consultants, P.A., 983 F.3d 1239, 1254 (11th
Cir. 2020) (“If there is no substantial likelihood of success on the merits, no injunction may be
issued.”). 	Second, Plaintiff does not state specific facts that clearly show immediate and
irreparable harm. The potential harm is unclear, and Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient facts
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regarding the circumstances and timing of the alleged arrest warrant for the Court to determine
that actual imminent injury exists. 	Blaise v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 22-20303-CIV, 2022 WL
293259, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2022) (“[I]rrepable injury must be neither remote nor speculative,
but actual and imminent”). Third, Plaintiff simply states in a conclusory fashion that the balance
of the equities favors a TRO without explaining why or how the relief would affect the non-movant
(DE 95 ¶ 7). Gayle v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc'y, No. 25-14119, 2025 WL 1183419, at *2 (S.D.
Fla. Apr. 18, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 25-14119-CIV, 2025 WL 1191734
(S.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2025) (“Plaintiff's Motion makes various conclusory statements but fails to
allege specific facts demonstrating that she meets the requirements for obtaining a TRO.”).
Similarly, Plaintiff states that public interest supports preservation of constitutional rights but does
not demonstrate how the entry of the relief would preserve constitutional rights or why (id.).
In its January 13, 2026 Order, the Court stated the elements Plaintiff must establish to
obtain his requested relief and the deficiencies in his filings. 	The Court also gave Plaintiff an
opportunity to correct these deficiencies through supplement briefing. Plaintiff’s failure to respond
to the Court’s Order counsels against a showing of true emergency and irreparable harm. Due to
these deficiencies, the motions do not satisfy the requirements needed to obtain a TRO. It is
therefore 	respectfully 	recommended 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	Emergency 	Petition 	for 	Temporary
Restraining Order to Bar Enforcement of State Warrant and Related Administrative Actions (DE
95) and Plaintiff’s Supplemental Emergency Notice of Imminent Enforcement Risk and Request
for Immediate Action (DE 97) be DENIED.
II. 	MOTION TO DISMISS
On December 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed his Motion to Dismiss Claims Against Unserved
Defendants Without Prejudice (DE 89). In his Motion, Plaintiff seeks to dismiss the defendants
that have not been served (id. ¶ 4). 	Such defendants include The State of Florida, Robert R.
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Kynoch, in his personal capacity, Kristy Nunez, in her personal capacity, Cord Byrd, in his
personal capacity, and all John and Jane Doe defendants (id. ¶¶ 1-5).3 Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(a), “the plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order by filing . . . a notice
of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment
. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a). 	Plaintiff never perfected service of process on the defendants he seeks
to dismiss from this action.4 	As such, the Motion should be liberally construed as a notice to
dismiss Defendants The State of Florida, Robert R. Kynoch, in his personal capacity only, and
Cord Byrd, in his personal capacity only, without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(a)(1). It is therefore respectfully recommended that Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss Claims
Against Unserved Defendants Without Prejudice (DE 89) be GRANTED and that the Court order
the dismissal of these Defendants pursuant to Plaintiff’s Notice under Rule 41(a).
III. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff’s
Emergency Petition for Temporary Restraining Order to Bar Enforcement of State Warrant and
Related Administrative Actions (DE 95) and Plaintiff’s Supplemental Emergency Notice of
Imminent Enforcement Risk and Request for Immediate Action (DE 97) be DENIED. It is further
respectfully 	recommended 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	Claims 	Against 	Unserved
Defendants Without Prejudice (DE 89) be GRANTED and that Defendants The State of Florida,
Robert R. Kynoch, in his personal capacity only, and Cord Byrd, in his personal capacity only, be
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
3 Kristy Nunez and the Doe defendants have already been dismissed from this action (DE 86).
4 While Plaintiff has perfected service on Defendant Cord Byrd in his official capacity, Plaintiff
seeks to dismiss Defendant Cord Byrd in his personal capacity only.
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IV. 	OBJECTIONS
The Parties will have fourteen (14) days from the date of this Report and Recommendation
to file written objections, if any, with the Honorable Rodney Smith, United States District Judge.
Failure to file objections timely shall bar the parties from a de novo determination by the District
Judge of an issue covered in this Report and shall bar the parties from attacking on appeal
unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report, except upon grounds of plain
error, if necessary, in the interest of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
140, 149 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989); 11th Cir. R. 3-1 (2016).
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED in Chambers in Miami, Florida on this 29th day of
January, 2026.
____________________________________
ELLEN F. D’ANGELO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
cc: 	Pro Se Plaintiff Tarik Smith
All Counsel of Record
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