Horne v. Levine Cava

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 26-cv-20273-ALTMAN
LAVENSTON LAMON HORNE,
Plaintiff,
v.
DANIELLA LEVINE CAVA,
Defendant.
____________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
On January 22, 2026, the Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 5], asking us “to
dismiss [the] Plaintiff La Venston Lamont Horne’s Complaint with prejudice.” Id. at 1 (citing State
Court Complaint [ECF No. 1-2]). Our Local Rules require that, “[f]or all motions, except motions
served with the summons and complaint, each party opposing a motion shall serve an opposing
memorandum of law no later than fourteen (14) days after service of the motion. Failure to do so may
be deemed sufficient cause for granting the motion by default.” S.D. F LA . L.R. 7.1(c)(1). On February
11, 2025, several days after this 14-day response period expired, we granted Horne additional time to
respond and ordered that he “must respond to the Motion to Dismiss by February 13, 2026.” Order
to Show Cause [ECF No. 8] at 1. We also warned Horne that, “[i]f, by [February 13, 2026], the Plaintiff
hasn’t responded, we’ll grant the Motion to Dismiss by default.” Ibid. Despite our warnings and our
explicit instruction to comply by February 13, 2026, Horne has neither responded to the Motion to
Dismiss nor filed a motion for extension of time. See generally Docket.
Horne’s failure to respond, standing alone, is sufficient for us to grant the Motion to Dismiss
by default. See, e.g., Weeks v. Braddy, 2023 WL 2610290, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2023) (Altman, J.)
(“Because Weeks didn’t file a Response, we grant the Defendants’ motions by default.”); Augusme v.
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Carlton, 2022 WL 10042943, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2022) (Altman, J.) (“Augusme didn’t file a
response opposing or otherwise objecting to the Motion to Dismiss—which gives us grounds to grant
the Motion by default.”). Dismissal is also appropriate under F ED . R. CIV . P. 41(b) because Horne
failed to comply with our Order to Show Cause. See Jacobs, 685 F. App’x at 827 (“Furthermore, we
cannot say the district court abused its discretion by dismissing Jacob's action with prejudice under
Rule 41(b). The district court extended the deadline once and warned Jacobs twice that if she failed to
comply with the court-ordered deadline, her action would be dismissed. Despite being forewarned,
Jacobs did not file her amended complaint on April 27, 2016.”); see also Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533,
1535 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The court’s power to dismiss is an inherent aspect of its authority to enforce
its orders and insure prompt disposition of lawsuits.”).
We recognize (of course) that Horne is proceeding pro se and that courts “should show leniency
to pro se litigants not enjoyed by those with the benefit of a legal education.” GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of
Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998). Still, for two reasons, we conclude that dismissing
Horne’s Complaint by default, and without prejudice, is the proper outcome here.
First, Horne’s pro se status is not an excuse to ignore or miss important deadlines. “Despite
construction leniency afforded to pro se litigants, we nevertheless have required them to conform to
procedural rules.” Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002). A pro se litigant, in other words,
must “comply with procedural rules, including applicable filing deadlines.” Brandau v. Warden, FCC
Coleman-Medium, 476 F. App’x 367, 369 (11th Cir. 2012); see also Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1104
(11th Cir. 1999) (“Liberal construction [for pro se litigants] does not mean liberal deadlines.”). Here,
not only did Horne initially fail to comply with Local Rule 7.1(c)(1)’s clear directive that he file a
response in opposition within fourteen days, but he also failed to respond or file a motion for
extension of time by February 13, 2026, after being explicitly ordered to do so. See Order to Show
Cause. And Horne cannot use his pro se status to evade our deadlines. See Pierre v. Florida, 2023 WL
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5507727, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2023) (Bloom, J.) (“Failure to comply with [Local Rule 7.1(c)(1)]
gives the Court sufficient cause to grant the motion by default. Petitioner’s pro se status does not excuse
his failure to comply with this rule.” (cleaned up)).
Second, we’ve already given Horne additional time to respond—a courtesy we wouldn’t have
extended to a counseled party. Although Horne’s response was due on February 5, 2026, we ordered
him to respond by February 13, 2026, and he then still had an additional three days to file his response
(by February 16, 2026), under F ED . R. CIV . P. 6(d), because “service [was] made [by mailing the Motion
to the person’s last known address].”1 We needn’t wait indefinitely for a response that may never
come.
Accordingly, we hereby ORDER and ADJUDGE as follows:
1. 	The Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 5] is GRANTED by default.
2. 	The Removed Complaint [ECF No. 1] is DISMISSED without prejudice.
3. 	The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case. All pending deadlines and hearings
are TERMINATED, and any pending motions are DENIED as moot.
DONE AND ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on February 18, 2026.
_________________________________
ROY K. ALTMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc: 	counsel of record
Lavenston Lamont Horne, pro se
1 Because February 16, 2026, was a legal holiday, Horne’s response deadline was extended to “the end
of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.” F ED . R. CIV . P. 6(a)(1)(C).
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