Robins v. Aberdeen Golf & Country Club, Inc et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 24-81213-CIV-SINGHAL
LORI ROBINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
WATERFORD
AT ABERDEEN ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
________________________________________/
ORDER
Plaintiff 	Lori 	Robins 	has 	sued 	Waterford 	at 	Aberdeen 	Association, 	Inc.
(“Waterford”), 	a 	homeowners’ 	association 	(“HOA”). 	She 	alleged 	that 	Waterford
discriminated and retaliated against her under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et
seq. (“FHA”) and the Florida Fair Housing Act, § 760.20 et seq., Florida Statutes (2025)
(“FLFHA”). Robins moved for summary judgment on her discrimination claims and partial
summary judgment on her retaliation claims. (“Plaintiff’s Motion”) (DE [77]). Waterford
moved for partial summary judgment as to damages. (“Defendant’s Motion) (DE [83]).
Both motions are fully briefed and ripe for review. Because both motions raise both
questions of law decidable now by this Court and questions of fact for the jury, this Court
grants summary judgment in part and denies in part both motions.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is visually impaired. (Robins’ Depo. (DE [85-1] 100:6-101:18)); (DE [111-
2]). She purchased a home in Waterford, a subdivision of Aberdeen Golf & Country Club.
(DE [111] 8, ¶ 18). In her application to purchase the home, she indicated her vision
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disability. See e.g., (Topf Depo. (DE [85-3] 36:9-16). As a result of her disability, she is
unable to access websites without using her screen reader software. (DE [85-2] ¶ 4(m)).
On December 9, 2022, Robins sent Waterford a brief email stating that its website was
not accessible, and she requested a large font copy of the HOA’s information. (DE [85-
18]). On October 4, 2024, after she filed this lawsuit (DE [1]), Plaintiff informed Waterford
that the website of its property manager, GRS Management Company, was inaccessible.
(DE [85-11]). She also renewed a previous request that the inaccessible gate lock for the
swimming pool be replaced with an accessible one. Id.
After this, Robins engaged in a lengthy e-mail discussion with Waterford’s property
manager regarding alternative accommodations for tasks normally completed using the
GRS website, since she could not access it. On October 22, 2024 she requested that
Waterford mail her a copy of the ACH transaction form, so that she could pay her HOA
fees via direct deposit, as well as a copy of the welcome packet. (DE [111-5]). On October
25, 2024, Nichole Ware, who worked for GRS, wrote back that the ACH form and
welcome letter were previously mailed to Robins. Id. On October 25, 2024, Robins wrote
that she could not read the packet and requested one in larger font. She also asked that
all written correspondence be sent in an accessible format of Arial 22. Id. On November
5, 2024, Robins reiterated her need for a mailed copy of the ACH form. Id. Later that
same day, Ware wrote that “[t]his was addressed during our last conversation and revised
welcome letter in large print was sent to you via email in the font you requested. I am
attaching again here.” Id. Also on that same day, Robins wrote back that she does not
have a printer and wanted a physical form and unstamped return envelope. Id. On
November 7, 2024, Ware wrote that “[i]t has been mailed to your address.” Id.
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On 	November 	18, 	2024, 	Robins 	emailed 	a 	letter 	to 	Ware, 	requesting 	an
accommodation for submitting work orders. (DE [85-25]). Instead of trying to submit
letters through the inaccessible website, Robins requested, among other things, that she
be allowed to email work orders to GRS. Id. Ware wrote back that she had received the
request. (DE [111-6]).
In her lawsuit, Robins has raised retaliation claims along with her discrimination
claims. She claims that as a result of her accommodation requests, Waterford ignored
her unrelated maintenance requests, refused to inform her of life-threatening safety
hazards, and ignored residents’ efforts to harass and threaten her. (DE [29] ¶¶ 273-76).
Both Robins and Waterford moved for partial summary judgment, which are before the
Court today.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant 	to 	Federal 	Rule 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	56(a), 	summary 	judgment 	“is
appropriate only if ‘the movant shows that there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S.
650, 656–57 (2014) (per curiam) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a));1 see also Alabama v.
North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 344 (2010). “By its very terms, this standard provides that
the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there
be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–
48 (1986). An issue is “genuine” if a reasonable trier of fact, viewing all the record
evidence, could rationally find in favor of the nonmoving party in light of his burden of
1 The 2010 Amendment to Rule 56(a) substituted the phrase “genuine dispute” for the former “‘genuine
issue’ of any material fact.”
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proof. Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir. 2014). And a fact is “material”
if, “under the applicable substantive law, it might affect the outcome of the case.” Hickson
Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2004). “[W]here the material
facts are undisputed and do not support a reasonable inference in favor of the non-
movant, summary judgment may properly be granted as a matter of law.” DA Realty
Holdings, LLC v. Tenn. Land Consultants, 631 Fed. Appx. 817, 820 (11th Cir. 2015).
The Court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. SEC v. Monterosso, 756
F.3d 1326, 1333 (11th Cir. 2014). “[T]his, however, does not mean that we are
constrained to accept all the nonmovant’s factual characterizations and legal arguments.”
Beal v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 20 F.3d 454, 459 (11th Cir. 1994). To prevail on a
motion for summary judgment, “the nonmoving party must offer more than a mere scintilla
of evidence for its position; indeed, the nonmoving party must make a showing sufficient
to permit the jury to reasonably find on its behalf.” Urquilla-Diaz v. Kaplan Univ., 780 F.3d
1039, 1050 (11th Cir. 2015).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Robins has moved for summary judgment on her claims under both the FHA and
FLFHA. The FLFHA adopted the FHA’s provisions for discrimination almost verbatim,
such that a violation of the FHA will also amount to a violation of the FLFHA. Bhogaita v.
Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 765 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2014). Compare
42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(b), with § 760.23(9)(b), Fla. Stat. (2025).
As an initial matter, in her motion for summary judgment, Robins argues that she
has been discriminated against in many ways that she does not allege in her Amended
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Complaint. Each alleged failure on the part of Waterford to provide a reasonable
accommodation is a separate cause of action, and must be pled separately. See Cano v.
245 C&C, LLC, 2019 WL 11769098, at *5 (S.D. Fla. July 19, 2019) (“The separate
instances of Defendants’ alleged failure to provide a reasonable accommodation rest on
different factual foundations and must be pled separately.”). In the Amended Complaint,
Robins only alleges that Waterford discriminated against her by not providing her an
accommodation for the inaccessible website and by not modifying the pool gate lock. (DE
[29] ¶¶ 210-216). Because the Amended Complaint is the controlling pleading, this
litigation is thus limited to those two allegations of discrimination, and the Court will only
consider arguments for summary judgment related to those. Robins has raised two
arguments in her summary judgment motion that Waterford discriminated against her by
denying her accommodations for the website: that Waterford refused to send her physical
copies of the AHA form and that Waterford refused to allow her to email work orders.
(Amend. Compl. (DE [29] ¶ 212(a), (h); 212(f))).2 The Court will also consider Robins’
argument that Waterford discriminated against her by refusing her request to modify the
inaccessible pool gate lock.
A. Plaintiff’s Accommodation Claims
To succeed on a failure-to-accommodate discrimination claim under the FHA, a
plaintiff must show that the defendant “refus[ed] to make reasonable accommodations in
2 The Court declines to consider, among others, her arguments that Waterford discriminated against her by
not sending her a large-font welcome packet or emailing her notifications prior to spraying chemicals near
her home. Although Robins claims that both of these are related to her inability to access the website, the
Amended Complaint does not make allegations supporting either of these arguments. The Amended
Complaint does not plead that the welcome packet information was available on the website but
inaccessible to Robins. See (DE [29] ¶ 212). Nor does the Amended Complaint plead that community
updates or notices about maintenance like spraying were available on the website but not accessible to
Robins. See (DE [29] ¶ 212). Therefore, since these arguments are not tied to allegations made in the
controlling pleading, this Court cannot consider them.
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rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to
afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. §
3604(f)(3)(B); Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1218-19 (11th Cir.
2008).
Here, Robins is entitled to judgment on one, but not both, of her claims that
Waterford discriminated against her by refusing her accommodation request. Due to her
disability, Robins could not access Waterford’s website to pay her HOA fees or submit
work orders. (DE [85-21]; [85-26]; [29] ¶ 212(a), (f), (h)). As an accommodation, she
requested that a large-print copy of the ACH automatic withdrawal form be mailed to her.
(DE [111-5]). She also requested that she be able to email work order requests, because
she could not submit work orders via the inaccessible website. (DE [85-26]). Each of
these accommodation requests will be addressed in turn.
Waterford, via GRS,3 responded to her request for the ACH form, informing her
that it had been previously mailed to her. (DE [111-5]). Robins wrote back that she could
not read it because of the small font size, and she needed it in a larger font. Id. After
further back and forth, Robins reiterated that she wanted a large-print physical copy of
the ACH form. Id. Waterford responded that “[it] has been mailed to your address.” Id.
Ware testified that prior to the last email she had already mailed the ACH form in an
accessible font. (Dep. Nichole Ware (DE [85-5] 56:3-7). But Robins argues that she never
received the form. (DE [122] ¶ 25). Whether Waterford actually mailed the accessible
ACH form is a question of fact for the jury. Because it is a question of fact whether
3 Neither party claims that Waterford is not liable for its property manager’s decisions and communications.
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Waterford refused Robins’ request, summary judgment would be inappropriate on this
claim.
Next, Waterford indicated that it had received Robins’ request that Waterford allow
her to email work orders. (DE [111-6]). But Waterford’s property manager herself admitted
that after conferring with Waterford, and following its direction, she did not further respond
to Robins’ request. (DE [85-5] at 44-46).4 Ignoring an accommodation request after
reviewing it is legally tantamount to rejecting the request. See Bhogaita, 765 F.3d at 1286.
Waterford admitted that it never responded to this request. This is not a case where the
housing 	provider 	dilly-dallied 	before 	responding 	months 	later. 	Waterford 	never
responded. This amounted to a constructive rejection of Robins’ request.
Having determined that Waterford rejected the request, the Court must decide if
Robins’ request was necessary and reasonable. See Schwarz, 544 F.3d at 1218-19.
Considering that Robins states she was unable to access the form to submit a work order
due to her visual impairment, this accommodation appears necessary. See (DE [85-1]
115:2-5). And the request is very reasonable. All she asked is that she be able to email
the work orders directly instead of having to navigate the website. This would have been
the smallest of burdens for Waterford.
Because she has met the requirements as a matter of law, Robins is entitled to
summary judgment on her claims under the FHA and FLFHA that Waterford discriminated
against her by ignoring her request for accommodation to submit work-order requests via
email.
4 This is the same property manager who had responded to Plaintiff’s requests for a large-font ACH form,
just three weeks prior.
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B. Plaintiff’s Modification Claim
Robins next claims that Waterford discriminated against her by ignoring her
request to modify the pool lock so she could access it. But unlike a request for an
accommodation, a modification must be made at the handicapped person’s expense. §
3604(f)(3)(A) (“For purposes of this subsection, discrimination includes—a refusal to
permit, at the expense of the handicapped person, reasonable modifications of existing
premises occupied or to be occupied by such person if such modifications may be
necessary to afford such person full enjoyment of the premises . . . .”). Robins does not
claim to have offered to pay for the modification. See (DE [85-11]). Instead Robins argues
that she was never given a chance to offer to pay because Waterford never responded.
But Robins has confused the order of the parties’ obligations under the statute. Before
the Court determines whether Waterford refused the modification request, the Court must
decide if Robins properly made a modification request. And one of the requirements of a
modification request is that the handicapped person offer to pay for it oneself. See Wood
v. Briarwinds Condo. Ass'n Bd. of Directors, 2009 WL 10668944 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2009),
aff'd, 369 Fed. Appx. 1 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Wood has not alleged that he has offered to
modify or replace the pool furniture at his own expense and that Briarwinds has denied
such request. Accordingly, Wood has failed to sufficiently allege discrimination . . . .”).
See also Nichols v. Carriage House Condominiums at Perry Hall Farms, Inc., 2015 WL
4393995, at *5 (D. Md. July 15, 2015) (“Regarding the modification claim, he never states
that he will pay for the requested modification.”).
The nature of the statutory language also indicates that the handicapped person
must offer to pay as part of the modification request. Unlike an accommodation request,
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where the handicapped person is requesting that the defendant take action, in a
modification 	request 	the 	handicapped 	person 	asks 	the 	defendant 	to 	allow 	the
handicapped person to take action or to pay for an action. Later in § 3604, the statute
creates an exception for rentals. A landlord “may where it is reasonable to do so condition
permission for a modification.” § 3604(f)(3)(A). This language describes the defendant’s
duties as passive—granting permission for a modification. The property defendant does
not have to actively make the modification themselves. Since the defendant does not
necessarily have to do anything but only has to approve the request, this Court reads the
statute as placing the burden on the handicapped person to make a full modification
request, including offering to pay the expenses. Merely asking the defendant to fix
something is insufficient. Until the plaintiff offers to pay, the defendant is not liable under
the FHA for ignoring or rejecting the plaintiff’s modification request. Since Robins never
claims that she offered to pay to modify the pool lock, she is not entitled to summary
judgment on this claim.
C. Plaintiff’s Retaliation Claim
Robins seeks partial summary judgment on her retaliation claim under the FHA
and FLFHA. “In order to state a cause of action for retaliation in violation of the Fair
Housing Act, a plaintiff must allege (1) that he or she engaged in protected activity, (2)
that he or she suffered adverse actions, and (3) that the adverse action was causally
related to the protected activity.” Hous. Opportunities Project For Excellence, Inc. v. Key
Colony No. 4 Condo. Assoc., Inc., 510 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1013 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (citing 42
U.S.C. 	§ 	3617). 	In 	the 	FHA 	context, 	“[r]equesting 	a 	reasonable 	accommodation
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constitutes protected activity.” Bone v. Vill. Club, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1218 (M.D.
Fla. 2016).
Robins seeks partial summary judgment for essentially the first element of this
claim—that she engaged in protected activities and that Waterford was aware of those
protected 	activities. 	Robins 	contends 	that 	her 	requests 	for 	accommodation 	were
protected activity. Whether her requests rose to protected activity—whether they were
reasonable—would generally be a question of fact for the jury. But because this Court
grants summary judgment to her FHA and FLHSA claims that Waterford discriminated
against her when she asked for the reasonable accommodation of emailing work orders,
this Court also concludes that Robins engaged in protected activity and that Waterford
was aware of it. Summary judgment is granted as to the work-order claims only. Whether
any of her other requests were protected activity is a question of fact for the jury.
D. Waterford’s Damages Summary Judgment Motion
Having addressed Robins’ motion for summary judgment, the Court turns to
Defendant’s 	cross-motion 	for 	summary 	judgment 	on 	damages. 	Waterford 	claims
entitlement to summary judgment on damages for membership fees and dues, damages
resulting from property damage, damages for diminution of value of the home, and
punitive damages. Here, the question of damages is mostly a factual one, such that it is
the province of the jury. There are significant questions of fact, such as whether any of
Robins’ property damages are barred under Waterford’s List of Responsibilities of
Waterford Homeowners Association and Waterford Homeowners. See (DE [84-5]). And
although the question of whether Waterford’s actions resulted in a diminution of Robins’
property value involves significant issues of law, none of those legal issues were raised
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by Waterford. Accordingly, the question of diminution in value is one that should go to the
jury to decide the factual issues. There are questions of fact even for punitive damages,
such as whether Waterford recklessly ignored Robins’ accommodation requests.
But there is one question of damages that the Court can resolve as a matter of
law. Waterford asks the Court to cap Robins’ damages for membership fees and dues
she paid at $700 per month.5 Defendant reached this number of $700 per month for fees
as the high end of the range to which Robins testified. (DE [85-1] 89:6-8). In her response
arguing why these damages should not be capped, Robins counters by pointing to alleged
damages unrelated to membership fees and dues. She points to property damages
resulting from alleged drainage issues. But she does not dispute that the amount of
membership fees and dues did not exceed $700 per month. Since there is no factual
dispute, the Court grants summary judgment on this issue. Robins’ damages from the
membership dues and fees she paid are capped at $700 per month. All other damages
issues should proceed to a jury.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Like many cases, this one involves both questions of law and fact. Accordingly, for
the reasons stated above, it is HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. 	Plaintiff’s Motion (DE [77]) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as
outlined in this Order.
5 More specifically, Waterford requests this Court cap her damages at $25,000.00—36 months at $700.00
per month. Although Waterford starts this 36 month date at September 2022, it is not clear at this point
when or if Robins stopped paying. Instead of creating a total sum cap, it is more expedient to just limit the
amount Robins can recover for each month that she paid. The number of months can be clarified later.
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2. 	Defendant’s Motion (DE [83]) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as
outlined in this Order.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 4th day of
February 2026.
Copies to counsel of record via CM/ECF
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