QUARTERMAN v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE USDA AND THE COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION CCC, et al.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATHENS DIVISION
JAMES QUARTERMAN, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 3:25-cv-161-TES
ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT
On December 12, 2025, Defendants United States Department of Agriculture
(“USDA”), Commodity Credit Corporation (“CCC”), and Brooke Rollins, in her official
capacity as USDA Secretary and CCC Chairman (collectively the “Government”), filed a
Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 32] Plaintiffs James Quarterman, Felecia Quarterman, and
Nicole Quarterman’s Amended Complaint [Doc. 30] on multiple grounds.
BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff James Quarterman originally filed this action against Defendants
in the Court of Federal Claims on July 14, 2025. [Doc. 1]. On September 29, 2025,
however, the Court of Federal Claims transferred the case to the Middle District of
Georgia on the grounds that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. [Doc. 7]. Plaintiff
James Quarterman then sought leave to amend his Complaint to add his wife, Felecia
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Quarterman, and his daughter, Nicole Quarterman, as additional plaintiffs in this suit
on October 16, 2025. [Doc. 12]. Accordingly, this Court granted Mr. Quarterman’s
Motion for Leave [Doc. 12] and instructed Plaintiffs to “immediately file [the] Amended
Complaint.” [Doc. 13]. Plaintiffs, however, failed to do so.
A motions hearing was held on December 3, 2025. At this hearing, the Court
directed Plaintiffs to file their Amended Complaint by December 5, 2025. [Doc. 29]. The
Court gave Plaintiffs specific instructions to file the Amended Complaint they had
attached as an exhibit to their Motion for Leave to Amend. [Doc. 12-1]. While Plaintiffs
filed an Amended Complaint on December 5, 2025, Plaintiffs ignored the Court and
filed an Amended Complaint [Doc. 30] that was, in fact, quite different from both the
proposed (and approved) amendment [Doc. 12-1] and the original Complaint [Doc. 1]
that had already been presented to the Court.
Nevertheless, the Government filed the current motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’
Amended Complaint [Doc. 30], which the Court finds to be the operative pleading in
the case. See Hoefling v. City of Mia., 811 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 2016). Plaintiffs have
argued that “officials from the USDA and CCC intentionally discriminated against
them based on race and their roles as [b]lack [c]ounty [c]ommittee [m]embers when
denying their farm loan application.” [Doc. 30, p. 2]. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that
“[t]his denial was accompanied by procedural violations, including failure to notify
[them] of an incomplete application and not issuing a loan number as required by
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regulations.” [Id.]. Plaintiffs further allege that “[a]s a direct result of this discriminatory
denial, the plaintiffs lost the opportunity to fulfill a multi-million-dollar contract,
suffered substantial financial losses, and [were] ultimately compelled to sell their farm.”
[Id.].
To bolster their allegations, Plaintiffs state that they “sought a USDA/CCC farm
loan to support a lucrative contract with Spice World for organic garlic production” and
that “[Plaintiff] Nicole Quarterman’s eligibility was pre-approved by the Georgia FSA
Farm Loan Program Chief based on her classified status, and the application was
processed with direct involvement from USDA officials.” [Id. at pp. 3–4]. Plaintiffs then
allege that former FSA Farm Loan Manager Megan Stanley then denied the loan
application and allegedly “made statements indicating intentional discrimination based
on race and position as a [b]lack [c]ounty [c]ommittee [m]ember.” [Id. at p. 4]. Plaintiffs
argue that evidence of such misconduct includes “official emails, administrative
findings, and direct admissions of bias.” [Id.]. According to Plaintiffs, this denial “was
based on arbitrary grounds, including ‘unacceptable credit’ and alleged disqualification
due to military status, contrary to USDA regulations and pre-approval.” [Id.]. As a
result, Plaintiffs claim that they “lost the ability to fulfill a multi-million-dollar contract
with Spice World, suffered significant financial losses, and were forced to sell their
farm.” [Id.].
In a Memorandum of Law in Support of Amended Complaint that was filed as
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an attachment to Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that they have claims
arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
Fifth Amendment, and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act & Regulation B [Doc. 30-1, pp.
4–6]. Plaintiffs have included several cursory allegations in support of their claims,
including the assertions that they have sufficiently alleged “intentional discrimination
based on race and color, supported by direct and circumstantial evidence,” “that the
discriminatory denial of the farm loan constitutes a regulatory taking of their property
interest in the Spice World contract, without just compensation,” and that
“discrimination in a credit transaction based on race and protested status” was in direct
violation of “ECOA and Regulation B.” [Id. at pp. 5–6].
On December 12, 2025, the Government filed its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’
Amended Complaint. [Doc. 30]. On December 29, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their response.
[Doc. 31]. The Government requested an extension to reply under Local Rule 6.2 on
January 5, 2026. [Doc. 34]. That request was granted the same day, ultimately giving
the Government until January 26, 2026, to file a reply. Clerk’s Granting of Extension,
No. 3:25-cv-00161-TES (M.D. Ga. Jan. 5, 2026). Because the Court feels that the issues
presented have been briefed in a manner that allows the Court to “clearly determine
from the record before it the relative legal positions of the parties so as to obviate the
need for the filing of opposition,” the Court issues this Order without the need for
consideration of the Government’s forthcoming reply brief. See LR 7.7, MDGa.
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LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procured 12(b)(6)
When ruling on a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), district
courts must accept the facts set forth in the complaint as true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 572.
A complaint survives a motion to dismiss only if it alleges sufficient factual matter
(accepted as true) that states a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. McCullough v.
Finley, 907 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79
(2009)). In fact, a well-pled complaint “may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that
actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and
unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (citations omitted).
Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 does not require detailed factual
allegations, it does require “more than [ ] unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation[s].” McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1333 (citation omitted). To decide
whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, district courts are instructed to use a
two-step framework. Id. The first step is to identify the allegations that are “no more
than mere conclusions.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). “Conclusory allegations are
not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. (citation omitted). After disregarding the
conclusory allegations, the second step is to “assume any remaining factual allegations
are true and determine whether those factual allegations ‘plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
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Furthermore, a complaint attacked by a 12(b)(6) motion is subject to dismissal
when it fails to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “A plaintiff must plead more than labels
and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”
McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1333 (internal quotations omitted); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555. “To be sure, a plaintiff may use legal conclusions to structure his complaint, but
legal conclusions ‘must be supported by factual allegations.’” McCullough, 907 F.3d at
1333 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). While courts, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, must
take all factual allegations in the complaint as true; they are not bound to accept a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Courts must “identify
conclusory allegations and then discard them—not ‘on the ground that they are
unrealistic or nonsensical’ but because their conclusory nature ‘disentitles them to the
presumption of truth.’” McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681).
The issue to be decided when considering a motion to dismiss is not whether the
claimant will ultimately prevail, but “whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence
to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other
grounds by Davis v. Scheuer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984). The factual allegations in a complaint
“must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and cannot
“merely create[] a suspicion of a legally cognizable right of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
545, 555. Finally, complaints that tender “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
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enhancement’” will not survive against a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (alteration in original). Stated differently, the
complaint must allege enough facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
will reveal evidence” supporting a claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
The standard for proceeding under Rule 12(b)(1), however, is different. An action
may proceed in this Court only if federal subject matter jurisdiction exists. Lifestar
Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. United States, 365 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 2004).“When a
defendant properly challenges subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) the
district court is free to independently weigh facts, . . . no presumptive truthfulness
attaches to a plaintiff’s allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not
preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of the jurisdictional issue.”
Turcios v. Delicias Hispanas Corp., 275 F. App’x 879, 880 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotations omitted) (citing Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 925 (11th Cir. 2003)).
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may be based upon either a facial or a factual challenge to
the complaint. McElmurray v. Consol. Gov’t of Augusta–Richmond Cnty., 501 F.3d 1244,
1251 (11th Cir. 2007). If the defendant raises a facial attack, the district court may only
look to see if the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction,
taking the facts alleged as true. See id. Factual attacks challenge the existence of subject
matter jurisdiction in fact, and the district court may consider matters outside of the
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pleadings. Id. In such an instance, the district court may dismiss based on the complaint,
either alone, or supplemented by undisputed facts, its resolution of disputed facts, or
both. See id.; see also Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding
that “the existence of [subject-matter] jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings,
and matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits, are considered”
and “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s allegations”) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). “In the face of a factual challenge to [subject-matter]
jurisdiction, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove that jurisdiction exists.” OSI, Inc. v.
United States, 285 F.3d 947, 951 (11th Cir. 2002).
DISCUSSION
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1981
Section 1981 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race in the making and
enforcement of contracts. 42 U.S.C. 1981(a). Subsection (c) of Section 1981 unequivocally
provides that “[t]he rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by
nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of state law.” 42 U.S.C.
1981(c) (emphasis added). In a nutshell, Section 1981 provides a cause of action for
individuals subjected to discrimination by private actors and discrimination under color
of state law, but not federal law. See Lee v. Hughes, 145 F.3d 1272, 1277 (11th Cir. 1998).
In this case, Plaintiffs have asserted their Section 1981 claim against exclusively federal
government entities and federal officials for actions allegedly taken under color of
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federal law. There are no state actors or state laws at issue here. As such, Plaintiffs’
Section 1981 claim is easily dismissed.
B. Section 601 of Title VI
Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ Title VI claim fails as a matter of law and
must be dismissed. As is the case with each of Plaintiffs’ claims, the supporting facts
are, at best, scant. There is little to no factual support for Plaintiffs’ claim which is
mentioned in passing in the Memorandum they filed in connection with their Amended
Complaint. [Doc. 30-1, p. 5]. Such drive-by claims rarely, if ever, prevail in federal court.
Even so, Section 601 of Title VI provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on
the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. However, like § 1981,
Congress did not include federal agencies in the statutory definitions of “program
activity” and “program.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a. As such, “Title VI does not apply to
programs conducted directly by federal agencies.” Halim v. Donovan, 951 F. Supp. 2d
201, 207 (D.D.C. 2013); Walton v. Sec’y Veterans Admin., 187 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1330-31
(N.D. Ala. 2016) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims because Title VI did not apply to the VA
or the Secretary of the VA); Payne v. United States, No. 1:18-cv-2518-TWT, 2018 WL
11192916, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 13, 2018) (same); Galley and Garden, LLC, v. Guzman, No.
2:22-cv-1511-AMM, 2023 WL 12116934, at *3-4 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 16, 2023) (dismissing
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Title VI claims against the SBA because federal agencies are not liable under Title VI). In
fact, [e]ven before Congress expressly defined the terms ‘program or activity’ and
‘program’ in 1988, courts had long held that Title VI ‘was meant to cover only the
situations where federal funding is given to a non-federal entity which, in turn,
provides financial assistance to the ultimate beneficiary.’” Halim, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 207
(quoting Soberal–Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929
(1984)). In the instant case, Plaintiffs only assert their Title VI claims for the denial of
their USDA farm loan application against federal Defendants specifically excluded from
Title VI. As such, Plaintiffs’ Title VI claims must be dismissed.
C. The Takings Clause Under the Fifth Amendment
Next, Defendants posit that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause. Defendants first argue that this Court lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ takings claim. To support that argument, Defendants
point to 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), which provides that the Court of Federal Claims has
exclusive jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States for
money damages exceeding $10,000 that is “founded either upon the Constitution, or
any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express
or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in
cases not sounding in tort.” As such, a “claim for just compensation under the Takings
Clause must be brought to the Court of Federal Claims in the first instance….” Horne v.
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Dep’t of Agriculture, 569 U.S. 513, 527 (2013) (citations omitted).
There is an exception to this rule. Namely, the Court of Federal Claims’
jurisdiction cannot be invoked by a plaintiff’s inclusion of a frivolous takings claim. See,
e.g., In re Upstream Addicks & Barker (Texas) Flood-Control Reservoirs, 138 Fed. Cl. 658, 665
(2018) (“Thus, to the extent the Modens have a nonfrivolous takings claim founded
upon the Fifth Amendment, jurisdiction under the Tucker Act is proper.”). When a
court lacks jurisdiction over an action, “the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice,
transfer such action . . . to any other such court . . . in which the action could have been
brought at the time it was filed.” 28 U.S.C. 1631. “Transfer is appropriate when three
elements are met: (1) the transferring court lacks subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the case
could have been filed in the court receiving the transfer; and (3) the transfer is in the
interests of justice.” Kinney v. United States, 161 Fed. Cl. 644, 649 (2022) (quoting Brown v.
United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 546, 550 (2006)). Additionally, while the transferor court may
decline transfer as futile, that decision “rests within the sound discretion of the
transferor court.” Id. (quoting Spencer v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 349, 359 (2011)). In this
case, the Court of Federal Claims explicitly stated that “transfer is in the interest of
justice as at least one of [Plaintiff James Quarterman’s] claims appears to be
nonfrivolous.” [Doc. 7, p. 2].
While the Court of Federal Claims did not specify which claim it specifically
found to be potentially nonfrivolous, it does appear that the Court of Federal Claims
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found that Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment takings claim to be frivolous. See, e.g., [Doc. 5, p.
1 (“It is readily apparent that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over any of
these claims, which all stem from Mr. Quarterman’s allegations of racial
discrimination.”)]; [id. (citing Rohland v. United States, 136 Fed. Cl. 55, 68 (2018) (“To
prevail on a takings claim under the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must concede the legitimacy
of the government action that effected the taking.”))]. Here, Plaintiffs clearly do not
concede the validity of the Government’s action. See [Doc. 30-1, p. 6]. Therefore, the
Court of Federal Claims “cannot exercise jurisdiction over a takings claim premised on
unauthorized action.” Figueroa v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 488, 496 (2003); see also Short
v. United States, 50 F.3d 994, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The government action upon which
the takings claim is premised must be authorized, either expressly or by necessary
implication, by some valid enactment of Congress.”); Riviera Drilling & Expl. Co. v.
United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 395, 402 (2004) (“A well-pleaded takings claim must allege that
an authorized government action has interfered with a property owner’s enjoyment of
property.”). Accordingly, as the Court of Federal Claims appropriately concluded, it
lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ frivolous Fifth Amendment takings claims and
properly transferred the case to this court. Because the Court finds that it does have
jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs’ alleged takings claim, it DENIES the Government’s
motion as to a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
As such, the Court now turns to the questions of whether Plaintiffs’ takings claim
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survives under Rule 12(b)(6). As explained below, Plaintiffs’ pleadings are nonetheless
insufficient to support such a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
To overcome a motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs must plead facts that plausibly
suggest that they had “a property interest for purposes of the Fifth Amendment” and
that the “governmental action at issue amounted to a compensable taking of that
property interest.” Am. Pelagic Fishing Co., L.P. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). In this case, no Defendant guaranteed Plaintiffs access to or
approval of a USDA farm loan and Plaintiffs have no cognizable property interest in a
mere loan application. Additionally, the USDA’s determination to deny any such
application does not constitute a taking.
To the extent that Plaintiffs base their takings claim on their alleged contract with
Spice World, that too fails to establish that Plaintiffs had an enforceable property right
sufficient to support a takings claim. It is not clear from Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint
that they actually entered into a binding contract with Spice World. Plaintiffs failed to
attach a copy of the contract to their Amended Complaint (or incorporate one by
reference from their original complaint), nor did they necessarily plead facts sufficient
to support the existence of a binding contract or obligation with Spice World. However,
a brief review of the alleged contract attached as an exhibit to the Amended Complaint
the Court approved (but Plaintiffs did not file) reveals that it is not a “contract” at all,
but rather a nonbinding “letter of intent” by its own terms – drafted by none other than
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Mr. Quarterman himself. See [Doc. 12-12, p. 2 (“… this LOI [Letter of Intent] is not
intended as a legally binding commitment by [Spice World] …)]. Instead, it appears that
Plaintiffs’ base their supposed takings claim on hypothetical unearned profits from a
potential future contract. That is simply not enough to support a takings claim.
Even if some contract actually existed between Plaintiffs and Spice World, the
United States is not a party to any such contract. As the Court of Federal Claims has
explained, there is no taking “unless the government steps into the shoes of one of the
contracting parties[] and thus assumes the contractual rights and obligations of one of
those parties.” Century Exp. New Orleans, Inc. v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 70, 76 (2012)
(citing Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U.S. 106 (1924)). In this case, the
Amended Complaint does not allege that any Defendant had any knowledge of or
involvement in the alleged contract between Plaintiffs and Spice World, much less that
any Defendant stepped into the proverbial shoes of either party. Accordingly,
Defendants have not and could not have committed a taking.
Finally, Plaintiffs have not identified a single regulatory action that would
conceivably support their argument that Defendants effected a “regulatory taking of
their property interest in the Spice World contract.” [Doc. 30-1, p. 6]. There are two
kinds of Fifth Amendment takings: physical takings and regulatory takings. Alford co-
Trustee of Lionel d. Alford Jr., and Tammy Nix Alford Revocable Trust v. Walton Cnty., 159
F.4th 844, 854 (11th Cir. 2025). A plaintiff can pursue a “regulatory taking” when the
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government “imposes regulations that restrict an owner’s ability to use his own
property.” Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U.S. 139, 148 (2021) (emphasis added). Such
restrictions or regulations “on the use of private property can qualify as a regulatory
taking if the restriction—in the Supreme Court’s words—goes too far.” Alford, 159 F.4th
at 855 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiffs have identified no regulation, restriction, or other constraint that
Defendants have placed on either Plaintiffs’ farmland or their alleged contract with
Spice World, let alone one that “goes so far” as to constitute a taking. See, e.g., Cedar
Point, 594 U.S. at 149–52 (finding that a California regulation permitting union
organizers to enter the plaintiff’s property for up to 3 hours per day, 120 days per year
was a taking requiring just compensation). Instead, Plaintiffs’ allegations are centered
around a USDA farm loan application, a totally separate transaction, that bears no
relation to the Spice World contract. Taking Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint as true, as
this Court must, it fails to sufficiently allege that Defendants restricted Plaintiffs’ ability
to use their property. Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ takings claim Rule
12(b)(6).
D. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act & Regulation B
Finally, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ ECOA claim fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted because it consists entirely of conclusory allegations of
discrimination by officials from the USDA. The ECOA makes it “unlawful for any
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creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit
transaction . . . on the basis of race.” 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a). To state a claim under ECOA,
Plaintiffs must allege that (a) they are members of a protected class, (b) they applied for
and were qualified for an extension of credit, (c) despite their qualifications they were
rejected, and (d) others outside their protected class of similar credit stature were
treated more favorably. Nicholson v. Johanns, No. CIV. A. 06-0635WSB, 2007 WL 3407045,
at *6 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 13, 2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (explaining
that courts typically analyze ECOA claims under the same analytical framework as Title
VII employment claims).
Here, Plaintiffs fail to allege sufficient non-conclusory facts to state a
plausible claim for relief. Plaintiffs allege that “officials from the USDA and CCC
intentionally discriminated against them based on race”; that “the loan application was
denied by former FSA Farm Loan Manager Megan Stanley, who made statements
indicating intentional discrimination based on race”; that “evidence includes emails,
administrative findings, and direct admissions of bias;” “the denial was based on
arbitrary grounds.” See [Doc. 30 at pp. 2–4]. Additionally, Plaintiffs also allege that
“officials from the USDA and CCC intentionally discriminated against them based on
race”; that “[their] allegations of intentional discrimination, procedural violations, and
resulting harm are sufficient to state a claim”; and that the “USDA officials denied the
loan, with direct evidence of bias and procedural violations”. See also [Doc. 30-1 at pp.
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1–2]. Plaintiffs offer no factual details to support these allegations and instead rely on
what are nothing more than textbook conclusory statements to support their claim.
They offer no additional details of how the USDA farm loan application was tainted by
improper considerations of race, what supposed statements evidence a discriminatory
motive, or why the stated grounds for denial of their application are arbitrary. Plaintiffs
furthermore fail to allege that they were otherwise qualified for the USDA farm loan or
that individuals outside of their protected class, but with similar credit statuses,
received more favorable treatment. See Arafat v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 549 F. App’x
872, 874 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of complaint because
“nowhere in [the plaintiff’s] complaint does she identify any valid comparators to
undergird her disparate treatment claims”); Jones v. Featherstone Homeowners Ass’n, No.
5:20-CV-290-MTT, 2021 WL 5171485, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 5, 2021) (dismissing
discrimination claim on the same basis). Plaintiff’s threadbare allegations once again
fail, and the Court dismisses any claim under the ECOA and Regulation B.
E. Order from the Court of Federal Claims
As a final matter, the Court would be remiss in not addressing Plaintiffs’
continued and stubborn insistence that the Court of Federal Claims found their claims
“meritorious.” Mr. Quarterman has relentlessly asserted that the Court of Federal
Claims found their claims to be meritorious and non-frivolous in more than one filing,
despite having absolutely no evidence to support that claim. See [Doc. 20]; [Doc. 26];
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[Doc. 30]; [Doc. 33]. The Court addressed this exact issue with him at the December 3,
2025, motions hearing, giving Plaintiffs ample opportunity to show where, exactly, the
Court of Federal Claims proclaimed their claims to be “meritorious.” Unsurprisingly,
Plaintiffs failed to locate any such language.
Even so, Plaintiffs, namely Mr. Quarterman, persisted. In their Amended
Complaint, Plaintiffs claim that in its September 29, 2025, transfer order, the Court of
Federal Claims found that Plaintiffs’ claims were “non-frivolous and meritorious.”
[Doc. 30, p. 5]. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the Court of Federal Claims “held that
the factual and legal allegations presented by Plaintiffs were sufficient to defeat a
motion to dismiss under normal court discretion. This ruling confirms the substantive
merit of Plaintiffs’ claims and eliminates any founds for dismissal at this stage.” [Id.].
Similarly, in their supporting memorandum, Plaintiffs state that the Court of Federal
Claims held “that their factual and legal allegations were sufficient to defeat a motion to
dismiss” and that its “ruling supports the substantive validity of the plaintiffs’ claims at
this stage of the litigation.” [Doc. 30-1, p. 2].
As the Court explained to Mr. Quarterman in detail, these statements are
patently false. In fact, the Court of Federal Claims actually “[took] no position on the
merits of [Plaintiffs’] claim[s] . . . other than to observe that [Mr. Quarterman’s] claims
are not obviously time-barred or so facially frivolous that transfer would be futile.”
[Doc. 7, p. 2]. This sort of boilerplate transfer language did not determine Plaintiffs’
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Complaint to be so meritorious that they skip right past the Government’s motion.
Plaintiffs would have this Court believe that the Court of Federal Claims’ routine
transfer order acted as some sort of legal Monopoly card, directing them to go to
discovery, go directly to discovery, do not worry with well-pleaded allegations and do
not worry about Iqbal and Twombly. The Court expressly warned Plaintiffs about their
repeated misrepresentations to the Court at the hearing on December 3, 2025. Based on
Plaintiffs’ conduct following that hearing, it appears that Plaintiffs did not absorb that
message. Accordingly, the Court would be well within its rights to dismiss Plaintiffs’
Amended Complaint as a sanction for deliberately trying to mislead this Court,
especially after it explicitly warned them about the potential consequences. Vargas v.
Peltz, 901 F. Supp. 1572, 1581–82 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (dismissing plaintiff’s sexual
harassment suit when it was revealed plaintiff had fabricated evidence and lied at
deposition); Peerless Indus. Paint Coatings Co. v. Canam Steel Corp., 979 F.2d 685, 687 (8th
Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (“Fraud on the court is grounds for dismissal with prejudice.”);
Chemtall, Inc. v. Citi-Chem, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 1390, 1410 (S.D. Ga. 1998) (finding
defendant had engaged in abusive conduct, including lying under oath, and a lesser
sanction than dismissal would not suffice). Nonetheless, the Court declines to do so.
The insufficiency of their Amended Complaint warrants dismissal. The Court once
again warns Plaintiffs that it would be wise to curb any impulse to persistently mislead
this Court or the Eleventh Circuit in their inevitable appeal.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss [Doc. 32]. Accordingly, because Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently advance
any claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ claims
with prejudice. FRCP 12(b)(6). The Court directs the Clerk of Court to enter judgment
closing this case.
SO ORDERED, this 15th day of January, 2026.
S/ Tilman E. Self, III
TILMAN E. SELF, III, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Case 3:25-cv-00161-TES Document 39 Filed 01/15/26 Page 20 of 20