Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
V.K., 	:
:
Petitioner, 	:
:
v. 	: 	Case No. 4:25-cv-262-CDL-AGH
: 	28 U.S.C. § 2241
Warden, STEWART DETENTION 	:
CENTER, et. al, 	:
:
Respondents. 	:
_________________________________
ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is Respondents’ motion to dismiss Petitioner’s
application for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF Nos. 22, 1). For the reasons
explained below, the Court withdraws its previous recommendation (ECF No. 21) and
recommends that the motion to dismiss be granted.
BACKGROUND
On November 26, 2025, the Court recommended that Petitioner’s habeas
application be granted pursuant to Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) because
he had shown post-final removal order of detention in excess of almost nine months
and because the evidence showed no significant likelihood removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future. 	R. & R. 13-14, 17-18, ECF No. 21. 	After the Court entered its
recommendation, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss, contending that Petitioner’s
habeas application has been rendered moot by his release under an order of
supervision (“OSUP”) on November 25, 2025. Resp’ts’ Mot. to Dismiss 1, ECF No. 22.
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They also request that the Court’s recommendation be withdrawn “based upon the
changed circumstances.” Id.
In response, Petitioner argues that the Court should not dismiss the petition
but instead leave its previous recommendation in place. Pet’r’s Resp. 3, ECF No. 23.
Petitioner contends that his release on an OSUP does not moot the petition because
Respondents could “redetain Petitioner for no reason” despite their previously futile
efforts to remove him. Id. at 2-3. Petitioner requests that the Court “leave in place
the recommendation for an order enjoining Respondent from re-detaining him before
providing him a hearing before an Immigration Judge” and to “enjoin[] Respondents
from 	removing 	him 	to 	any 	third 	country 	without 	first 	providing 	him 	with
constitutionally compliant procedures.” Id. at 3.
DISCUSSION
“Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to the
consideration of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” 	Soliman v. United States, 296 F.3d
1237, 1242 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing U.S. Const. art. III, § 2). “The doctrine of mootness
derives directly from the case or controversy limitation because an action that is moot
cannot be characterized as an active case or controversy.” 	Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). “[P]ut another way, a case is moot when it no longer presents a live
controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Therefore, ‘[i]f events that occur subsequent to the filing
of a lawsuit or an appeal deprive the court of the ability to give the plaintiff or
appellant meaningful relief, then the case is moot and must be dismissed.’” 	Id.
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(quoting Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 2001)).
Here, Petitioner’s release from custody under an OSUP renders his habeas
petition moot. 	He does not challenge the conditions of his supervision, and in fact,
his petition specifically requests that he be released “under reasonable conditions of
supervision.” Pet. 23, ECF No. 1. See Djadju v. Vega, 32 F.4th 1102, 1107 (11th Cir.
2022) (noting that the petitioner’s prayer for relief was satisfied where he was
released from custody under an order of supervision and did not challenge his
conditions of release).
Granted, Petitioner also argues in his petition for an order barring his
re-detention without Respondents first providing him with a hearing before an
immigration judge (“IJ”), and he later filed a motion adding an additional request
that Respondents not be allowed to remove him to a third country without first
providing adequate due process. 	Pet. 19-20; Pet’r’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. 2, ECF No.
20. 	However, contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the Court did not recommend that
Respondents be barred from re-detaining him without first providing him a hearing
before an IJ. 	Instead, the Court simply recognized that if the recommendation was
adopted and he was released from detention, the Court’s order would implicitly bar
his re-detention without there being a significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future. 	R. & R. 18 n. 5. 	The Court noted that Petitioner’s
motion was, in effect, a request that Respondents be ordered to follow the law. 	Id.
As for Petitioner’s request that Respondents be enjoined from removing him to a third
country, the Court rejected this request because it was neither a claim asserted in
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the petition, nor of the same character as those claims raised in the petition. 	Id.
(citing Kaimowitz v. Orlando, Fla., 122 F.3d 41, 43 (11th Cir. 1997)).
Petitioner argues that the petition is not moot because Respondents’ conduct
in re-detaining him without a significant likelihood of removal is “capable of
repetition, yet evading review.” Pet’r’s Resp. 1. However, even if recurrence is likely,
a case is still moot if “there would be ample opportunity for review at that time.” Al
Najjar, 273 F.3d at 1336. 	Were Respondents to re-detain Petitioner without there
being any significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, then
there would necessarily be ample time for Petitioner to file another habeas petition
and obtain review of his re-detention. 	See Pierre-Paul v. Sessions, 293 F. Supp. 3d
489, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (noting that even if the petitioner were re-detained, she
could again file a habeas petition); Villa v. Normand, No. 5:25-cv-89, 2025 WL
3188406, at *2 n.3 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 14, 2025) (rejecting petitioner’s request for a
declaratory judgment, noting that he could file a habeas petition in the future).
At 	least 	implicitly, 	Petitioner’s 	argument 	also 	implicates 	the
“voluntary-cessation” exception to the mootness doctrine. 	Under this exception, a
district court considers “whether: (i) the change in conduct resulted from substantial
deliberation or is merely an attempt to manipulate jurisdiction; (ii) the government’s
decision to terminate the challenged conduct was unambiguous, i.e., permanent and
complete; and (iii) the government has consistently maintained its commitment to
the new policy or legislative scheme.” 	Djadju, 32 F.4th at 1109. 	The Court is
certainly concerned at the circumstances behind Petitioner’s re-detention because it
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appears that the Government may have violated its own regulations. See 8 C.F.R. §
241.13.1
Nevertheless, 	assuming 	the 	voluntary-cessation 	doctrine 	applies 	in 	this
context, see Djadju, 32 F.4th at 1109, the Court notes that Respondents released
Petitioner prior to the Court entering its recommendation that he be granted habeas
relief, so it is not clear that their change of in conduct was for purpose of manipulating
jurisdiction. Resp’ts’ Ex. A, at 1, ECF No. 22-1. Therefore, the Court is not prepared
at this time to assume that Respondents will violate the law in the future and
recommend prophylactic relief based on that assumption. And again, if Petitioner is
re-detained—and he believes there is still no significant likelihood of his removal—
he can file a new habeas petition. Djadju, 32 F.4th at 1109 (noting the government’s
concession that if the petitioner was re-detained, he could bring a new habeas action).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court withdraws is previous recommendation
(ECF No. 21) and recommends that Respondents’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 22) be
GRANTED. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written
1 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 applies to individuals released on supervision because they were found to lack a
significant likelihood of removal. See generally, 8 C.F.R. § 241.13; see also Abuelhawa v. Noem, No
4:25-cv-04128, 2025 WL 2937692, at *5-6 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2025) (noting the parties’ agreement that
petitioner’s re-detention after a previous determination that there was no significant likelihood of
removal was governed by § 241.13). Section 241.13(i) provides that an individual’s supervision may
be revoked upon: (1) a finding that he violated any condition of release; or (2) for removal “if, on account
of changed circumstances, the Service determines that there is a significant likelihood that the alien
may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” The regulations also provide a specific process
for someone found to lack a likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future before revocation
of supervision. Under § 241.13(i)(3), an individual has the right to: (1) notification of the reason for
his revocation, (2) provide evidence that his removal is still not likely to occur in the reasonably
foreseeable future, and (3) an evaluation of whether the facts as shown warrant revocation.
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objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections,
within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy hereof. 	The district judge
shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the Recommendation to which
objection is made. 	All other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed for
clear error.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1,
“[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations
contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order
based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the
time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the
absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error
if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO ORDERED and RECOMMENDED, this 7th day of January, 2026.
s/ Amelia G. Helmick
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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