WEBSTER v. FAMILY DOLLAR STORES OF GEORGIA LLC et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
ANN WEBSTER, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:24-cv-325 (MTT)
)
FAMILY DOLLAR STORES OF 	)
GEORGIA, LLC d/b/a FAMILY DOLLAR, 	)
et al., 	)
)
)
Defendants. 	)
)
ORDER
Plaintiff Ann Webster filed this premises liability lawsuit against Family Dollar
Stores of Georgia and ten John Does for an incident that occurred at a Family Dollar
store in Macon. ECF 1-2 ¶¶ 1, 2, 4. Webster claims she suffered injuries when she
tripped and fell over a floor mat on the Family Dollar premises. Id. ¶ 4. Family Dollar
filed a motion for summary judgment and Webster did not respond. ECF 12. For the
following reasons, Family Dollar’s unopposed motion for summary judgment (ECF 12) is
GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND1
On September 24, 2023, Webster visited the Family Dollar store located at 2035
Shurling Drive in Macon, Georgia. ECF 12-4 ¶ 1; 12-2 at 41:1-4; 1-2 ¶ 4. This was her
first time at the store location. ECF 12-4 ¶ 1; 12-2 at 40:16-21. She entered the store
through the front door and did not observe the floor mat outside the entrance when she
1 These facts are drawn primarily from Family Dollar’s Statement of Material Facts (ECF 12-4) which
Webster failed to contest, but only insofar as Family Dollar’s facts are adequately supported by specific
citations to the record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2), (3); M.D. Ga. Local Rule 56.
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walked into the store. ECF 12-4 ¶ 2; 12-2 at 42:14-43:8. Webster was in the store for
approximately ten to twenty minutes and then exited through the same front door. ECF
12-4 ¶ 3; 12-2 at 49:11-50:4. She testified that the floor mat outside the entrance
“caught [her] foot and thr[ew] [her] to the cement ground.” ECF 12-4 ¶ 4; 12-2 at 50:8-
10. She did not observe the floor mat before she fell and does not remember if it was
her left or right foot that caught on the mat. ECF 12-4 ¶¶ 5, 6; 12-2 at 50:22-23, 55:6-9.
Immediately after her fall, the store manager and another individual helped Webster get
up and sit in a chair in front of the store. ECF 12-4 ¶ 7; 12-2 at 52:12-17, 53:13-21.
While seated, Webster observed the floor mat, which she later described as a “wide, big
rubber mat.” ECF 12-4 ¶¶ 7, 8; 12-2 at 54:4-11; 12-3 ¶ 20.
II. STANDARD
A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is not genuine unless, based on
the evidence presented, “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 281 F.3d 1220, 1224 (11th Cir.
2002) (quoting United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th
Cir. 1991)); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The movant may
support its assertion that a fact is undisputed by “citing to particular parts of materials in
the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits
or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
“When the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party is not
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required to ‘support its motion with affidavits or other similar material negating the
opponent’s claim[]’ in order to discharge this ‘initial responsibility.’” Four Parcels of Real
Prop., 941 F.2d at 1437-38 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).
Rather, “the moving party simply may ‘show[]—that is, point[] out to the district court—
that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.’” Id. at
1438 (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324) (alterations in original). Alternatively, the
movant may provide “affirmative evidence demonstrating that the nonmoving party will
be unable to prove its case at trial.” Id.
The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must rebut the movant’s
showing “by producing … relevant and admissible evidence beyond the pleadings.”
Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1315 (11th Cir. 2011)
(citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). The nonmoving party does not satisfy its burden “if the
rebuttal evidence ‘is merely colorable or is not significantly probative’ of a disputed fact.”
Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50). Further, where a party fails to address
another party’s assertion of fact as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), “the court may …
consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).
However, “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of
legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge … [t]he
evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be
drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
III. DISCUSSION
In Georgia, an owner or occupier of land is liable to an invitee “for injuries caused
by [the owner’s or occupier’s] failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises
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and approaches safe.” O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1. To succeed in a premises liability action, “a
plaintiff must show: (i) the existence of a defective or hazardous condition on the
premises; (ii) that the defendant had either actual or constructive knowledge of this
condition; and (iii) that the plaintiff had no knowledge of the condition, despite the
exercise of ordinary care.” Warner v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 321 Ga. App. 121, 123,
741 S.E.2d 270, 273 (2013).
Other than the mere incident of her fall, Webster has not presented any evidence
showing that the floor mat was hazardous or dangerous.2 There is no expert testimony
to suggest a design or construction flaw or evidence of prior incidents involving this floor
mat. Webster has not produced any evidence that the floor mat was curled, bunched,
wrinkled, flipped over, or otherwise presented a hazard for any length of time before she
fell. Rather, she testified that the floor mat “had to be laying flat on the ground for [her]
to walk across it.” ECF 12-2 at 54:17-18. Webster’s theory appears to be that because
she tripped and fell, the floor mat was necessarily dangerous. But “proof of a fall,
without more, does not give rise to liability on the part of a proprietor.” Drew v. Istar Fin.,
Inc., 291 Ga. App. 323, 324, 661 S.E.2d 686, 689 (2008) (internal citations omitted).
And Georgia law does not require premises to be “an absolutely smooth or level way of
travel.” Tanner v. Larango, 232 Ga. App. 599, 600, 502 S.E.2d 516, 517 (1998) (internal
citations omitted). “Without evidence of the existence of a dangerous condition, there
can be no evidence that the defendant had any knowledge of the danger, and therefore
no recovery for the plaintiff.” Metts v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 269 Ga. App. 366, 367, 604
2 Family Dollar argues that the floor mat was an open and obvious static condition, not a tripping hazard.
ECF 12-1 at 6-9. “A static condition is one that does not change and is dangerous only if someone fails to
see it and walks into it.” Gervin v. Retail Prop. Tr., 354 Ga. App. 11, 840 S.E.2d 101, 104 (2020) (citation
omitted).
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S.E.2d 235, 237 (2004). Webster’s premises liability claim thus cannot survive summary
judgment.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Family Dollar’s unopposed motion for summary
judgment (ECF 12) is GRANTED.3
SO ORDERED, this 7th day of January, 2026.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
3 The complaint alleges that “Plaintiff has a cause of action against [Family Dollar] for negligence,
negligent hiring and retention of an unsafe employee(s), respondeat superior, and all other applicable
theories of liability.” ECF 1-2 ¶ 10. Family Dollar has moved for summary judgment on Webster’s claims
for negligent hiring, training, and retention and vicarious liability to the extent they are plead (there are no
counts in the complaint) (ECF 12-1 at 11-13), and the Court agrees that the record is devoid of evidence
to support these claims.
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