RODRIGUEZ v. BEASLEY et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION
HJALMAR RODRIGUEZ, JR., 	:
:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: 	Case No. 7:24-cv-25-WLS-AGH
:
Warden JACOB BEASLEY, et al., 	:
:
Defendants. 	:
________________________________
ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court for preliminary screening is Plaintiff’s second amended
complaint (ECF No. 40) and Defendant Moody, Nurse Practitioner Seleska, and Jane
Doe Nurses’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 58) Plaintiff’s second amended complaint.
For the reasons stated below, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s newly asserted claims
against Defendants Lewis and Sauls for deliberate indifference to a serious medical
need, 	official 	capacity 	claims 	against 	Defendants 	Beasley, 	Lewis, 	Sauls, 	the
Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Corrections1 (“GDC”) for violations of
the of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and the
Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), 29 U.S.C. § 794, and claims against the GDC for violation
of the ADA and RA proceed for further factual development but that the remainder
of Plaintiff’s newly asserted claims be dismissed. It is also recommended that Moody,
Seleska, and Does’ motion to dismiss be granted solely on Plaintiff’s claim for
1 The current Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Corrections is Tyrone Oliver. Therefore,
where Plaintiff makes allegations against the Commission of the GDC, the Court will construe it as a
claim against Commissioner Oliver.
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declaratory and injunctive relief but otherwise denied.
BACKGROUND
The Court received Plaintiff’s original complaint (ECF No. 1) on April 8, 2024,
and his first amended complaint (ECF No. 12) on July 10, 2024. 	Following
preliminary screening, the following claims were allowed to proceed for further
factual development: (1) a claim against Defendants Raymond Moody and Warden
Shawn Emmons for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need by failing to
ensure that he received his medication for an eye injury; (2) a claim against
Defendant Diana Searcy for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need by
denying him medication on one occasion; (3) a claim against Searcy for retaliation
after Plaintiff threatened to file grievances against her; (4) a claim against Defendant
Tawann Newsom for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need by withholding
Plaintiff’s medication; (5) a claim against Newsom for excessive force by holding
Plaintiff on the prison yard without food, water, or medication, spraying him with a
chemical spray, and then refusing to allow him to decontaminate himself after being
sprayed; (6) a retaliation claim against Newsom after Plaintiff threatened to file
grievances against Searcy; (7) a claim against Defendant Daniel Smith for deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need by refusing to allow Plaintiff to have his
medication; (8) a claim against Smith for failure to intervene in Newsom’s use of
excessive force against Plaintiff; (9) a claim against Defendant Warden Beasley for
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need by refusing to allow Plaintiff to be
fitted for a prosthetic eye; (10) a retaliation claim against Beasley for transferring
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Plaintiff from Valdosta State Prison (“VSP”) to Smith State Prison (“SSP”) after
Plaintiff refused to drop a grievance; and (11) a claim against Beasley, in his official
capacity, for violation of the ADA by denying Plaintiff placement in a transitional
center. Order & R. 34-35, Sept. 18, 2024, ECF No. 15.
The Court dismissed the following claims: (1) a claim against Beasley for
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need in relation to the occasion when
Plaintiff was held in the yard; (2) an equal protection claim against Beasley; (3) claims
against Jane Doe Nurses for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical
needs; (4) denial of due process claims against Defendants Unit Manager Walker and
Warden Brian Adams; and (5) a denial of access to courts claim.2 Id. at 15; Order 2,
9, Aug. 26, 2025, ECF No. 62 (adopting recommendation).
On January 23, 2025, while the case was stayed due to the bankruptcy of
Wellpath, LLC—Moody’s employer—the Court received Plaintiff’s second amended
complaint (ECF No. 40). 	Following the lifting of the stay (ECF No. 53), the Court
accepted Plaintiff’s second amended complaint as the operative complaint, concluding
he was entitled to file it as a matter of right. 	Order 2, Aug. 19, 2025, ECF No. 59.
The Court directed Beasley, Emmons, Searcy, and Newsom to file an answer to the
second amended complaint, which they did on September 2, 2025 (ECF No. 63). Prior
to the Court’s order, Defendant Moody, Nurse Practitioner Seleska, and Jane Doe
Nurses had already filed their motion to dismiss (ECF No. 58) the second amended
2 Plaintiff raised state law claims against Nurse Practitioner Seleska in his first amended complaint,
but he voluntarily dismissed those prior to the Court’s screening. 1st Am. Comp. 3, 28, ECF No. 12;
Pl.’s Voluntary Dismissal, ECF No. 13.
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complaint. 	On September 26, 2025, the Court granted (ECF No. 67) Plaintiff a
twenty-one day extension to respond to the motion to dismiss, and he filed his
response (ECF No. 68) on October 16, 2025.3 Defendant Moody, Nurse Practitioner
Seleska, and Jane Doe Nurses’ motion to dismiss is ripe for review, which the Court
will consider in conjunction with a preliminary screening of Plaintiff’s second
amended complaint.
DISCUSSION
I. 	Preliminary Screening of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint
As noted, the Court previously concluded that Plaintiff was entitled to file his
second amended complaint as a matter of right. 	Nevertheless, it is still subject to
review and possible dismissal under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”),
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 	Therefore, the Court will now conduct a review of Plaintiff’s
second amended complaint.
A. 	Preliminary Screening Standard
When conducting preliminary review, “[p]ro se filings are generally held to a
less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys and are liberally construed.”
Carmichael v. United States, 966 F.3d 1250, 1258 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
Still, the Court must dismiss a complaint filed pro se if it is “frivolous or malicious,”
3 Although the Court received Plaintiff’s response on November 14, 2025, he signed it on October 16,
2025. Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss 6, ECF No. 68. “Under the prison mailbox rule, a pro se prisoner’s
court filing is deemed filed on the date it is delivered to prison authorities for mailing.” United States
v. Glover, 686 F.3d 1203, 1205 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Unless there is
evidence to the contrary, like prison logs or other records, we assume that a prisoner’s motion was
delivered to prison authorities on the day he signed it.” Id.
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“fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
A claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Miller
v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). On preliminary
review, the Court may dismiss claims that are based on “indisputably meritless legal”
theories and “claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” 	Id. (citations
omitted). 	A claim can be dismissed as malicious if it is knowingly duplicative or
otherwise amounts to an abuse of the judicial process. Daker v. Ward, 999 F.3d 1300,
1308, 1310 (11th Cir. 2021) (affirming dismissal of duplicative complaint “in light of
[prisoner’s] history as a prolific serial filer”).
A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not include “sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Factual allegations [in a complaint] must be enough to raise
a right to relief above the speculative level[.]” 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations
omitted). 	In other words, the complaint must allege enough facts “to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” supporting a claim. 	Id.
at 556. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555).
B. 	Claims Previously Dismissed
Plaintiff’ second amended complaint largely incorporates the claims raised in
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his first amended complaint, including those that the Court dismissed. 	These
dismissed claims include: (1) a claim against Beasley for deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need in relation to the occasion when Plaintiff was held in the yard;
(2) claims against Jane Doe Nurses for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious
medical needs; and (3) denial of due process claims against Unit Manager Walker and
Warden Brian Adams. 2d Am. Compl. 4, 13-16, ECF No 40. Plaintiff adds no factual
allegations to these claims sufficient for the Court to reconsider its earlier dismissal.
Therefore, the Court recommends that these re-asserted claims again be dismissed.4
Obviously, the claims previously allowed to proceed and re-asserted in the second
amended complaint may proceed.
C. 	Newly Asserted Claims
In addition to the previously asserted claims, Plaintiff also added new claims
and new parties. These include ADA/RA official capacity claims against Beasley for
failing to place him in housing or a facility appropriate for someone with his disability
and for not providing him with a prosthetic eye. 	2d Am. Compl. 19-20, 31-32. 	In
addition, Plaintiff asserts claims against new parties Dr. Sharon Lewis, the GDC
medical director, and Randy Sauls, the assistant commissioner of health services. Id.
at 5, 16-18. Plaintiff alleges that Lewis and Sauls were deliberately indifferent to a
serious medical need by refusing to provide him with a prosthetic eye following the
4 Plaintiff includes Nurse Practitioner Seleska in the caption and mentions her in the second amended
complaint, but he does not identify her as a defendant in the body of the complaint or state any claims
against her. Therefore, the Court does not interpret Plaintiff’s second amended complaint as seeking
to re-assert claims against her.
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partial removal of his left eye.5 	Id. at 18. 	He also asserts official capacity claims
against them under the ADA/RA for failing to provide him with a prosthetic eye. Id.
at 5, 31-32. 	Plaintiff also asserts new claims against the GDC for deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need for failing to fit him with a prosthetic eye and
ADA/RA claims for denying him placement in a transitional center, failing to place
him in housing or a facility appropriate for someone with his disability, and for not
providing him with a prosthetic eye. 	Id. at 4, 19-20, 31-32. 	Plaintiff also names
Commissioner Oliver as a defendant in his official capacity on his ADA/RA claims for
denying him placement in a transitional center and failing to place him in housing or
a facility appropriate for someone with his disability. Id. at 4, 19-20. Plaintiff added
Unit Manager Martin—who he alleges is also the ADA coordinator at SSP—on his
ADA/RA claim related to failure to place him in housing or a facility appropriate for
someone with his disability. 2d Am. Compl. 5, 24, 32-33. Finally, Plaintiff asserts a
claim against Beasley, the GDC, and Commissioner Oliver for deliberate indifference
to his safety by failing to control violence in GDC prisons, including SSP. Id. at 21-
29, 33.
1. 	Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need
Plaintiff alleges that Lewis and Sauls were deliberately indifferent to a serious
medical need by refusing to provide him with a prosthetic eye following the partial
removal of his left eye. Id. at 18, 31. He also seems to assert this claim against the
GDC. Id. at 31. Plaintiff alleges that Lewis and Sauls refused to provide a prosthetic
5 The Court previously allowed a deliberate indifference claim against Beasley for failure to provide a
prosthetic eye to proceed for further factual development. Order & R. 34-35, Sept. 18, 2024.
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and have “discontinued all appointments to do so.” Id. at 18. The Court previously
allowed a deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claim against Beasley for
failure to provide a prosthetic to go forward, and for similar reasons, the Court allows
Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against Lewis and Sauls to go forward.
However, the Eleventh Amendment provides immunity to the GDC for suits brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and in any event, the GDC is not a “person” subject to suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	See Hagan v. Ward, 	No. 5:22-cv-00107-TES, 2022 WL
1632158, at *3-5 (M.D. Ga. May 23, 2022); Bell v. Ward, No: 5:22-CV-143-TES-CHW,
2022 WL 2022 WL 1463773, at *2 (M.D. Ga. May 9, 2022). 	Therefore, Plaintiff’s
deliberate indifference claim against the GDC must be dismissed.
2. 	ADA and RA Claims
Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall,
by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.”6 	42 U.S.C. § 12132. 	The RA provides: “No
otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely
by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance[.]” 	29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 	Both laws apply to activities
provided in Georgia state prisons. 	See Penn. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206,
6 A disability is defined as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). “[M]ajor life activities include, but are not limited to,
. . . walking [and] standing [.]” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
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210 (1998) (“State prisons fall squarely within the statutory definition of ‘public
entity.’”); Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1081 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing
Yeskey, 254 U.S. at 211). 	Except for a federal funding requirement in the RA, both
laws follow the same standards, and cases that apply to the ADA also apply to the
RA. Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1305 & n.2 (11th Cir. 2000).
To state a claim under the ADA or RA,
a plaintiff generally must prove (1) that he is a qualified individual with
a disability; (2) that he was either excluded from participation in or
denied the benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities,
or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that
the exclusion, denial of benefit, or discrimination was by reason of the
plaintiff’s disability.
Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1083. In addition to proving these elements, a Plaintiff seeking
compensatory damages must show that a defendant acted with discriminatory intent.
McCullum v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys., 768 F.3d 1135, 1146-47 (11th Cir. 2014).
“[A] plaintiff may demonstrate discriminatory intent through a showing of deliberate
indifference.” 	Liese v. Indian River Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 345 (11th Cir.
2012). 	Deliberate indifference “occur[s] when the defendant knew that harm to a
federally protected right was substantially likely and failed to act on that likelihood.”
Id. at 344 (internal quotation marks omitted). 	Moreover, a Plaintiff may establish
that a public entity discriminated against him by showing that it “refused to provide
a reasonable accommodation” despite his request for accommodation or despite the
obviousness of the need for an accommodation. 	Medina v. City of Cape Coral, 72 F.
Supp. 3d 1274, 1277-78 (M.D. Fla. 2014).
The Court previously allowed Plaintiff to proceed on a claim against Beasley
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in his official capacity for violation of the ADA by denying Plaintiff’s placement in a
transitional center. Order & R. 32-33, Sept. 18, 2024. Plaintiff now seeks to add the
GDC and the Commissioner Oliver in his official capacity as defendants on this claim.
Although claims against all three Defendants are likely duplicative, the Court will
allow the new claims against the GDC and Commissioner Oliver to proceed for
further factual development.
Plaintiff also asserts an ADA/RA claim against Beasley, Commissioner Oliver,
and Unit Manager Martin in their official capacities and against the GDC for failing
to place him in housing or a facility that is “ADA compatable” (sic). 	2d Am. Compl.
19-20, 32-23. Plaintiff alleges that his “sight has diminished to the point he has fallen
over structures like chairs, benches, and low sitting objects.” 	Id. at 20. 	He also
suggests that because of his disability he should not be housed with younger, gang-
affiliated offenders. Id. He complains generally that he should be placed in housing
or even another facility that accommodates his disability.7 Id. Plaintiff also asserts
ADA/RA claims against Beasley, Lewis, and Sauls in their official capacities and
against the GDC for failing to provide him with a prosthetic eye. Id. at 31-32.
While it is questionable whether all of Plaintiff’s complaints fall within the
scope of the ADA/RA, the Court will allow his ADA/RA claims to proceed for further
factual development at this time.
7 While an inmate generally has no right to transfer to another prison, a transfer may be necessary in
order to reasonably accommodate an inmate’s disability. See Lonergan v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 623 F.
App’x. 990, 992, 993-94 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1264, 1266 n.21 (11th Cir.
2004), vacated and superseded on other grounds, 449 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 2006)) (reversing district
court ruling “that, as a matter of law, a prisoner is never entitled to a transfer to a different prison as
a reasonable accommodation under the ADA”).
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3. 	Prison Violence Claim
Finally, Plaintiff asserts what can be described as an omnibus claim against
the GDC, Commissioner Oliver, and Beasley for deliberate indifference to safety
arising from prison violence and the threat of violence. 	2d Am. Compl. 21-29, 33.
Plaintiff cites a Department of Justice Report about violence in Georgia prisons and
alleges 	that the GDC, 	Commissioner Oliver, and Beasley have 	failed to 	take
appropriate steps to curb prison violence and have at times adopted policies that have
the 	effect 	of 	encouraging 	prison 	violence, 	including 	by 	delegating 	supervisory
authority within the prisons to other inmates. Id. Plaintiff describes violence he has
experienced or witnessed going back several years and at many different prisons,
including SSP.8 	Id. 	He also alleges that he has been housed with members of the
Gangster Disciple gang despite threats they have made to Plaintiff. Id.
For the most part, Plaintiff describes incidents several years in the past at
prisons other than SSP or fails to provide specific dates when incidents occurred. One
exception is that Plaintiff alleges that on December 17, 2024, he was moved from one
unit to another due to threats against him but was assaulted in the new unit. Id. at
24. Plaintiff states that the incident was not witnessed because no staff were present,
but he provides no other details. Id.
The Court will assume, without deciding, that Plaintiff has stated a claim for
deliberate indifference to safety arising from systemic violence in the Georgia prisons.
See, e.g., Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1234-35 (11th Cir. 2019). 	Even with
8 Ironically, one incident of prison violence cited by Plaintiff involved the death of another inmate for
which Plaintiff was convicted of manslaughter. 2d Am. Compl. 25-26.
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this assumption, and the further assumption that joinder of these claims is otherwise
proper under Rules 18 and 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court
should exercise its discretion to not allow these claims to be joined. “A district court
may, in its discretion, deny joinder even if the Rule 20(a)(2) requirements are met.”
Dorsey v. Varga, 55 F.4th 1094, 1103 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing UWM Student Ass’n v.
Lovell, 	888 	F.3d 	854, 	863 	(7th 	Cir. 	2018) 	(“A 	district 	judge 	necessarily 	has
considerable discretion in applying Rules 18 and 20.”)). 	The Court’s discretion to
permit or deny joinder is informed by the PLRA and its goals of preventing unwieldy
litigation, ensuring the payment of filing fees, and limiting prisoners’ ability to bring
frivolous cases. 	See, e.g., George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Thus,
courts have held that prisoners subject to the three-strikes provision should not be
able to circumvent that statute “by the creative joinder of actions.” Patton v. Jefferson
Corr. Ctr., 136 F.3d 458, 464 (5th Cir. 1998); see also George, 507 F.3d at 607
(“Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits, not only to
prevent the sort of morass that this 50-claim, 24-defendant suit produced but also to
ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees[.]”).
Plaintiff has been identified as an abusive litigant under the “three-strikes”
provisions of the PLRA, and his ability to file cases is thus limited. 	Here, Plaintiff
has taken a case that arose largely out of events at VSP involving failure to provide
medication, the use of excessive force, and retaliation and transformed it into a
freewheeling action alleging systemic prison violence not just at SSP but the Georgia
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prison system as a whole.9 	While the Court has allowed some claims for events at
SSP to proceed because they are related to his eye condition and subsequent efforts
to obtain accommodation, Plaintiff now seeks to go far beyond the scope of the original
action. It should be noted that Smith State Prison is located in the Southern District
of Georgia, and any allegations about perceived threats to his safety at SSP are more
appropriately brought in that district in a separate action. Therefore, even if Plaintiff
stated a claim for deliberate indifference to safety arising from his incarceration at
SSP, the Court should exercise its discretion and dismiss this claim without prejudice
to file a new action in the Southern District.
II. 	Defendant 	Moody, 	NP 	Seleska, 	and 	Jane 	Doe 	Nurses 	Motion 	to
Dismiss
On August 18, 2025, Defendant Moody, Nurse Practitioner Seleska, and Jane
Doe Nurses filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s second amended complaint. As noted
earlier, Plaintiff dismissed his claims against Seleska, and the Court has not
construed his second amended complaint as seeking to re-assert claims against her.
Further, the Court previously dismissed the claims against the Jane Doe defendants,
and the Court is recommending that they not be allowed to be reasserted. Therefore,
the Court will only address Defendants’ motion to dismiss as it pertains to Defendant
Moody.
Defendant Moody moves to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) Plaintiff’s
claims are barred by the statute of limitations; (2) dismissal is warranted because
9 To be clear, however, the most specific allegations concerning systemic violence arise from Plaintiff’s
experience at SSP and are related to Defendant Beasley’s conduct.
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Plaintiff has three strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); (3) Plaintiff’s second amended
complaint fails to state a claim; (4) Plaintiff failed to comply with O.C.G.A. § 9-11-
9.1(a); (5) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; (6) Plaintiff is not entitled
to punitive damages; (7) Plaintiff’s ADA/RA individual capacity claims fail; and (8)
the request for declaratory judgment and injunction is improper. 	Defs.’ Mot. to
Dismiss 1-2, ECF No. 58. 	For the reasons explained below, the Court recommends
that Defendants’ motion be granted solely as to the request for declaratory and
injunctive relief but otherwise denied.
A. 	Statute of Limitations
“A prisoner’s complaint may be dismissed . . . as time-barred if it ‘appears
beyond a doubt from the complaint itself that the prisoner can prove no set of facts
which would avoid a statute of limitations bar.’” 	Zamudio v. Haskins, 775 F. App’x
614, 615 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1163 (11th Cir.
2003)). 	“In section 1983 actions, federal courts refer typically to state law to
determine the applicable statute of limitations and tolling rules.” Id. at 615-16 (citing
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 394 (2007)). 	The Georgia statute of limitations for
personal injury is two years. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33; see also Bell v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid
Transit Auth., 521 F. App’x 862, 864 (11th Cir. 2013) (“The forum state’s statute of
limitations for personal injury actions applies to § 1983 claims, which in Georgia is
two years.”). A statute of limitations begins to run when a cause of action accrues—
in other words, when “the facts which would support a cause of action are apparent
or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.”
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Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181, 1182 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s original complaint was untimely filed
because his cause of action accrued on January 14, 2022, when an eye specialist, Dr.
Espinosa, informed Plaintiff that it was too late to save his left eye because he had
not received his medication. 	Defs.’ Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 5, ECF No. 58-1
(citing 2d Am. Compl. 8-9). 	However, according to Defendants, Plaintiff did not file
his complaint until April 8, 2024, nearly three months after the expiration of the
statute of limitations on January 14, 2024. Id.
The Court must reject Defendants’ argument. 	As previously noted, “[u]nder
the prison mailbox rule, a pro se prisoner’s court filing is deemed filed on the date it
is delivered to prison authorities for mailing.” 	Glover, 686 F.3d at 1205 (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Unless there is evidence to the contrary, like prison logs
or other records, we assume that a prisoner’s motion was delivered to prison
authorities on the day he signed it.” Id. Here, even assuming the Court agrees with
Defendants’ alleged accrual date,10 Plaintiff signed his original complaint on January
10, 2022, which was within the statute of limitations. 	Compl. 8, 31, ECF No. 1.
Further, while the long delay between the date he signed his complaint and the date
the Court’s received it raises questions, the Court cannot conclude beyond a doubt
from the complaint itself that Plaintiff did not timely deliver the complaint to prison
10 Plaintiff contends the accrual date is April 5, 2022, when he received a second opinion. Pl.’s Resp.
to Mot. to Dismiss 1.
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authorities for mailing. Apparently, the complaint was originally sent to the Court’s
old post office box before eventually being delivered to its street address.11 Compl.
Attach. 1, ECF No. 1-1. 	Evidence would need to be presented as to when Plaintiff
delivered the complaint to prison authorities and the circumstances of the mailing.
However, the Court cannot recommend dismissal based on the statute of limitations
at this stage.
B. 	Three Strikes
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s second amended complaint should be
dismissed because he has three strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Defs.’ Br. in Supp.
of Mot. to Dismiss 6-7. 	In its preliminary screening order, the Court allowed
Plaintiff’s claims to proceed despite having three strikes because he sufficiently
alleged imminent danger. 	Order & R. 7. 	Defendant Moody argues that the Court’s
imminent danger finding was limited to allegations against Beasley, and therefore,
the claims against him must be dismissed. 	Defs.’ Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 7.
However, Ҥ 1915(g) concerns only whether the filing fee must be paid up front; it
does not operate to define or limit the complaint.” 	Ellis v. Berry, 	No. 1:17-CV-171-
LJA-TQL, 2018 WL 9596399, at *2 (M.D. Ga. June 29, 2018) (citing Barber v. Krepp,
680 F. App’x 819, 822 (11th Cir. 2017)); see Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 171-72
(2d Cir. 2010) (“Nothing in the text of § 1915 provides any justification for dividing
an action into individual claims and requiring a filing fee for those that do not relate
11 Unfortunately, the copy of the envelope attached to Plaintiff’s original complaint is cut-off, and the
Court no longer has the original. There appears to be postmark date for some time in February, but
the Court cannot tell if that is when the prison authorities originally mailed the complaint or some
other date. 	Compl. Attach. 1.
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to imminent danger. All four circuit courts to consider the question have, accordingly,
found that a plaintiff filing IFP on the basis of the imminent danger exception can
proceed with all claims in her complaint, and we agree.” (citations omitted)).
C. 	Failure to State a Claim
Defendants contend that Plaintiff fails to state a claim. Defs.’ Br. in Supp. of
Mot. to Dismiss 10-13. The Court disagrees. To state an Eighth Amendment claim
for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a plaintiff must allege facts
sufficient to establish: “(1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendants’ deliberate
indifference to that need; and (3) causation between that indifference and the
plaintiff’s injury.” Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2009).
The first element is objective and requires a plaintiff to set forth a “serious
medical need,” which is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating
treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor’s attention.” 	Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir.
2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). A serious medical need can also arise if “a
delay in treating the need worsens the condition.” Mann, 588 F.3d at 1307. “In either
case, ‘the medical need must be one that, if left unattended, poses a substantial risk
of serious harm.’” Id. (quoting Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1243).
To establish the second element—deliberate indifference—a plaintiff must
plausibly allege that the defendant: (1) “was subjectively aware that the inmate was
at risk of serious harm”; (2) “disregarded that risk”; and (3) “acted with ‘subjective
recklessness as used in the criminal law.’” 	Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1255
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(11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839 (1994)). 	Subjective
awareness requires that the defendant “both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must
also draw the inference.” Rodriguez v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 508 F.3d 611, 617 (11th
Cir. 2007) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). 	“Imputed or collective knowledge
cannot serve as the basis for a claim of deliberate indifference. 	Each individual
defendant must be judged separately and on the basis of what that person knew.”
Dang ex rel. Dang v. Sheriff, Seminole Cnty. Fla., 871 F.3d 1272, 1280 (11th Cir.
2017). 	To establish that a particular “defendant acted with ‘subjective recklessness
as used in the criminal law’” the plaintiff must allege “that the defendant was
subjectively aware that his own conduct put the plaintiff at substantial risk of serious
harm.” 	Wade, 106 F.4th at 1255. 	Even if a defendant is subjectively aware of a
substantial risk of serious harm, however, “he ‘cannot be found liable under the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause’ if he ‘responded reasonably to the risk.’” 	Id. at
1262 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844-45).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was seen on July 26, 2021, by an eye specialist,
Dr. Espinosa, who diagnosed him with panuveitis and a cataract in his left eye. 	2d
Am. Compl. 7. He prescribed three different medications, including prednisolone. Id.
The specialist told Plaintiff that the prednisolone in particular was critical because it
would get the uveitis under control so that he could perform surgery. 	Id. 	He gave
Plaintiff one bottle of each medication. Id. 	However, according to Plaintiff, when he
returned to VSP, he “repeatedly and timely requested” refills “to no avail.” 	Id.
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Further, when he did receive medication, it was only one bottle at a time. 	Id. 	As a
result, Plaintiff’s prednisolone would run out faster than he could get it refilled. 2d
Am. Compl. 7-8. Plaintiff personally informed Moody on several occasions about his
need for the prednisolone, but Defendant “showed no regard or care for this matter.”
Id. During a follow-up visit on September 20, 2021, Dr. Espinosa told Plaintiff that
because he had not been receiving his medication in a timely manner, his vision had
not improved and was “permanently gone” in his left eye. Id. at 8-9.
In 	its 	screening 	order, 	the 	Court 	concluded 	that, 	accepting 	Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, his allegations were sufficient to state a claim for deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need. Order & R. 20-21, Sept. 18, 2024. Defendants’
arguments do not convince the Court otherwise, and the Court recommends their
motion to dismiss on this ground be denied.
D. 	Failure to Comply with O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(a)
Defendants 	also 	argue 	that—to 	the 	extent 	Plaintiff 	asserts 	a 	claim 	for
professional malpractice—the second amended complaint should be dismissed for
failure to attach an expert affidavit as required by O.C.G.A. 9–11–9.1(a). 	Def.’s Br.
in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 13-14. 	However, the Court does not construe Plaintiff’s
complaint as alleging professional malpractice, and the expert affidavit requirement
only applies to claims under Georgia law for professional malpractice. Moreover, even
if Plaintiff had asserted a professional malpractice claim, which he has not, failure to
attach an affidavit would not provide a basis for dismissal. 	See McLeod v. Ingram,
No. 7:16-cv-185-HL, 2017 WL 3446024, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 10, 2017) (“The
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sufficiency of a complaint filed in federal court is judged by the standard set out in
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), which does not require the affidavit of an expert.”).
E. 	Qualified Immunity
Defendants contend they are entitled to qualified immunity for claims against
them in their individual capacities. 	Def.’s Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 14-16.
“[Q]ualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials sued in
their individual capacities as long as their conduct violates no clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 904 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted). A defendant seeking qualified immunity must show that, at the time of the
alleged wrongful acts, “he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority.”
Id. at 905. 	Once this is established, “the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show
that the grant of qualified immunity is inappropriate.” Id. To do so, a plaintiff must
“demonstrate: first, that the facts when viewed in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff establish a constitutional violation; and, second, that the illegality of the
officer’s actions was clearly established at the time of the incident.” 	Id. 	(internal
quotation marks omitted).
Defendants argue that qualified immunity shields them from liability because
there was no clearly established law at the time of the alleged conduct that a medical
provider was deliberately indifferent for providing prescription medication, “but
allegedly not in the quantity or cadence the patient wanted.” 	Def.’s Br. in Supp. of
Mot. to Dismiss 15. 	However, the issue is not whether Plaintiff was provided the
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amount of medication he “wanted” but the amount of medication prescribed. And the
law was clearly established at the time that intentionally interfering with prescribed
treatment constitutes deliberate indifference. 	Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104
(1976). Thus—at least at the pleading stage—Defendant Moody has not shown that
he is entitled to qualified immunity.
F. 	Punitive Damages
Defendants contends that Plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages because
he fails to state a claim. Def.’s Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 16. As stated above,
the Court finds that Plaintiff’s second amended complaint states a claim. Therefore,
the Court recommends that this aspect of Defendants’ motion be denied.
G. 	ADA/RA Claim
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims under the ADA/RA
must fail because such claims can only be brought against a public entity or an
appropriate official in an official capacity. 	Id. at 17. 	However, the Court does not
construe Plaintiff’s second amended complaint as asserting ADA/RA claims against
Defendant Moody. Therefore, the Court recommends that Defendants’ motion in this
regard be denied as moot.
H. 	Declaratory Judgment and Claim for Injunctive Relief
Finally, Defendants argue that any claim for injunctive or declaratory relief
against them should be dismissed because Plaintiff has been transferred to another
prison and is no longer under Dr. Moody’s care. 	Id. at 17-18. Because Plaintiff has
transferred from VSP and is no longer under Dr. Moody’s care, the Court agrees that
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to the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive or declaratory relief against him, the claim
should be dismissed. See Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[A]n
inmate’s claim for injunctive and declaratory relief in a section 1983 action fails to
present a case or controversy once the inmate has been transferred.”).
SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
If this recommendation is adopted, the following claims will remain pending:
(1) a claim against Moody and Emmons for deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need by failing to ensure that he received his medication for an eye injury;
(2) a claim against Searcy for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need by
denying him medication on one occasion; (3) a claim against Searcy for retaliation
after he threatened to file grievances against her; (4) a claim against Newsom for
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need by withholding his medication; (5) a
claim against Newsom for excessive force by holding Plaintiff on the prison yard
without food, water, or medication, spraying him with a 	chemical spray, and then
refusing to allow him to decontaminate himself after being sprayed; (6) a retaliation
claim against Newsom after Plaintiff threatened to file grievances against Searcy; (7)
a claim against Smith for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need by refusing
to allow Plaintiff to have his medication; (8) a claim against Smith for failure to
intervene with Newsom’s use of excessive force against Plaintiff; (9) a claim against
Beasley, Dr. Sharon Lewis, and Randy Sauls for deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need by refusing to allow Plaintiff to be fitted for a prosthetic eye; (10) a
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retaliation claim against Beasley for transferring Plaintiff from Valdosta State Prison
(“VSP”) to Smith State Prison (“SSP”) after Plaintiff refused to drop a grievance; (11)
a claim against the GDC and against Beasley and Commissioner Oliver in their
official capacities for violation of the ADA/RA by denying Plaintiff placement in a
transitional center; (12) a claim against the GDC and against Beasley, Oliver, and
Unit Manager Martin in their official capacities for violation of the ADA/RA for
failure to place him in housing or a facility appropriate for someone with his
disability; (13) and a claim against the GDC and Beasley, Lewis, and Sauls in their
official capacities for violation of the ADA/RA for failing to provide him with a
prosthetic eye.
ORDER FOR SERVICE
Having found that Plaintiff has made colorable constitutional violation claims,
it 	is 	accordingly 	ORDERED 	that 	service 	be 	made 	on 	Defendants 	Georgia
Department of Corrections, Commissioner Tyrone Oliver, Dr. Sharon Lewis, Randy
Sauls, and Unit Manger Martin and that they file an Answer, or such other response
as may be appropriate under Rule 12, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and the PLRA. Defendants
are reminded of the duty to avoid unnecessary service expenses, and of the possible
imposition of expenses for failure to waive service pursuant to Rule 4(d).12
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s newly asserted
12 The Court previously stayed discovery pending resolution of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Order
2, Aug. 19, 2025. In order to prevent piecemeal discovery, however, the Court will not lift the stay at
this time but will wait until the newly added Defendants have filed answers and then issue a
scheduling order that sets deadlines for the completion of discovery and filing dispositive motions.
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claims against Defendants Lewis and Sauls for deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need, official capacity claims against Defendants Beasley, Lewis, Sauls, and
Commissioner Oliver for violations of the of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), 29 U.S.C. § 794, and
claim against the GDC for violation of the ADA and RA proceed for further factual
development but that the remainder of his newly asserted claims be dismissed. It is
also recommended that Moody, Seleska, and Does’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 58) be
granted solely on Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory and injunctive relief but otherwise
denied.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written
objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections,
within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy hereof. Any objection
should be no longer than TWENTY (20) PAGES in length. 	The district judge shall
make a de novo determination of those portions of the Recommendation to which
objection is made. 	All other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed for
clear error.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1,
“[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations
contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order
based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the
time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the
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absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error
if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO ORDERED and RECOMMENDED, this 1st day of December, 2025.
s/ Amelia G. Helmick
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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