Nelson Kapoi v. Commissioner of Social Security

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI‘I
LIONA NELSON KAPOI,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FRANK BISIGNANO,
Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
Civil No. 25‐00363 MWJS‐RT
ORDER REVERSING DECISION OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
AND REMANDING FOR FURTHER
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
INTRODUCTION
Liona Nelson Kapoi applied for Social Security disability and disability insurance
benefits. At his hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), he testified about
his significant mental health challenges and how they have limited him from work.
After the hearing, the ALJ—acting on behalf of the Commissioner—issued a written
decision rejecting Kapoi’s testimony about the severity of his mental health conditions.
In this appeal, Kapoi argues that the ALJ’s written opinion did not offer the
”specific, clear and convincing reasons” needed to properly reject a claimant’s symptom
testimony. Brown‐Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492‐93 (9th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up).
Agreeing with Kapoi’s argument, the court REVERSES the decision of the
Commissioner and REMANDS for further administrative proceedings.
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BACKGROUND
Kapoi filed his applications for Social Security disability and disability insurance
benefits on July 27, 2022, contending that he has been disabled since July 28, 2019. Dkt.
No. 10‐1, at PageID.38 (Administrative Record (AR) at 17). After his applications were
denied on the papers, he sought a hearing before an ALJ, which was held on April 4,
2024. Id.; see also id. at PageID.91‐130 (AR at 70‐109).1
At the hearing, Kapoi testified at length about the serious symptoms of his
mental health impairments—including his bipolar disorder. When asked why he had
not driven a vehicle in the last four or five years, he answered that “there are times
where I do disassociate,” and so using public transportation is “the safest way.” Id. at
PageID.104 (AR at 83). He later emphasized that he “can and still do[es] disassociate”
even when he is “on [his] meds.” Id. at PageID.116 (AR at 95).
In response to Kapoi’s attorney asking him to explain in more detail how his
bipolar disorder affects him, Kapoi answered that “[i]t’s like riding a wave that is out of
control. You’re always up, down and around.” Id. at PageID.117 (AR at 96). He
1 	Kapoi has had applications for Social Security benefits denied in prior occasions,
but the ALJ’s written decision did not rely on those prior decisions to support the
current one. See Dkt. No. 10‐1, at PageID.38‐39 (AR at 17‐18). The Commissioner
likewise does not argue that the prior denials should have any bearing on this appeal.
Dkt. No. 14. If there is a reason why the prior denials affect whether it is appropriate to
grant benefits now, the ALJ remains free on remand to explain why that might be.
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explained that he still feels this way even when taking his medications: “With the
medications, at least you have a surf board on this wave,” but “you’re still doing it.” Id.
When asked about his ability to concentrate on tasks, Kapoi responded, “I try
really hard but I don’t because I know I’m just—it’s just not gonna matter.” Id. at
PageID.119‐20 (AR at 98‐99). In response to the question of whether he could hold his
concentration for eight hours a day, five days a week, he answered, “I’d be surprised if I
could hold it for eight minutes.” Id. at PageID.120 (AR at 99).
Kapoi also explained that he has trouble being around others. As he explained,
“I feel like I’m not safe. And it’s not me from them. It’s them from me. So I tend to just
stay away. I don’t even interact with my family.” Id. As Kapoi summed it up, “I mean
I been fighting to be just a little bit okay for more than half of my life.” Id.
Two and a half months later, the ALJ issued a written decision denying Kapoi’s
applications. Id. at PageID.35‐56 (AR at 14‐35). The ALJ found that Kapoi did, indeed,
suffer from multiple severe physical and mental impairments—the latter including not
only alcohol use disorder and depressive disorder, but also bipolar disorder. Id. at
PageID.41‐43 (AR at 20‐22). The ALJ also acknowledged that Kapoi had testified about
“worsening symptoms, such as occasional verbal outbursts, disassociation, poor
concentration, and problems being around others”; that he “testified to being surprised
if he could keep concentration for even 8 minutes”; that he “also has a history of a
suicide attempt”; and that there was medical support for the conclusion that Kapoi was
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“‘volatile and labile.’” Id. at PageID.47‐48 (AR at 26‐27) (quoting B5F/8). And the ALJ
did not suggest that Kapoi was malingering—that is, feigning his conditions. Id. at
PageID.46 (AR.25). But the ALJ nonetheless concluded Kapoi could still perform full‐
time sedentary work with certain limitations. Id. at PageID.45 (AR at 24). In reaching
that conclusion, the ALJ rejected Kapoi’s testimony about the severity of his mental
health symptoms. Here is the entirety of the ALJ’s reasoning for doing so:
After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the
claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be
expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s
statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of
these symptoms are not consistent with the medical evidence and other
evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this decision.
. . . .
[T]urning to clinical signs and findings pertaining to mental health,
mental status exams during the considered period—prior to the
September 30, 2019 date last insured[ 2 ]—were typically and generally
normal, with findings that the claimant was alert and oriented to person,
place, and time, had normal mood and affect, normal behavior, normal
judgment and thought content, was well‐developed and well‐nourished,
had good eye contact, normal psychomotor activity, normal speech, well‐
organized and linear thought process, and intact insight and judgment
(e.g., B1F/6; B13F/78, 80, 92, 94, 98, 100, 102‐103, 105‐107).
2 	The “date last insured” is merely the last date on which, as a result of work
history, Kapoi could qualify for the types of Social Security benefits he sought. See
generally Dkt. No. 10‐1, at PageID.39 (AR at 18). An ALJ generally does not consider
impairments and symptoms that arise only after that date. No party here suggests that
the date last insured has any effect on the outcome of this appeal; Kapoi described
longstanding mental health symptoms that, according to him, predated September
2019.
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The alleged intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the claimant’s
mental health symptoms were not consistent with the evidence.
Id. at PageID.46‐48 (AR at 25‐27). Having thus rejecting Kapoi’s symptom testimony,
the ALJ nonetheless adopted some limitations, including that his work should be
limited to “simple, routine, and repetitive tasks,” that there should be “occasional
changes in work setting, and no production‐rate pace work,” and that there should be
only “occasional interaction with the public and frequent interaction with coworkers.”
Id. at PageID.48 (AR at 27). These limitations, to put them in concrete terms, would
require Kapoi to interact with random members of the public at work more frequently
than Kapoi felt it was safe to interact with his own family.
Based on the conclusion that Kapoi could perform sedentary work with certain
limitations, the ALJ concluded that Kapoi was not disabled within the meaning of the
Social Security Act. Id. at PageID.51 (AR at 30). And so his applications were denied.
Kapoi’s request for the Social Security Administration’s Appeals Council to
review the ALJ’s decision was also denied, id. at PageID.22 (AR at 1), making the ALJ’s
decision the Commissioner’s final decision. This timely appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Commissioner’s disability determination must be affirmed unless “it is
either not supported by substantial evidence or is based upon legal error.” Luther v.
Berryhill, 891 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2018). This standard is deferential, requiring “only
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such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 788 (9th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up).
But the court may only defer to those reasons the Commissioner—here, acting
through an ALJ—actually offers. “Long‐standing principles of administrative law
require us to review the ALJ’s decision based on the reasoning and factual findings
offered by the ALJ—not post hoc rationalizations that attempt to intuit what the
adjudicator may have been thinking.” Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219,
1225 (9th Cir. 2009). That means a district court cannot affirm the Commissioner based
merely on “what it assume[s] the ALJ to have determined,” for “meaningful review of
an administrative decision requires access to the facts and reasons supporting that
decision.” Id. at 1226; see also Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[The
court] review[s] only the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability determination
and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which [the ALJ] did not rely.”).
DISCUSSION
When the Commissioner finds that a claimant is not malingering but instead has
a severe impairment “which might reasonably produce the pain or other symptoms
alleged,” the Commissioner can “reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of
[their] symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.”
Brown‐Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492‐93 (cleaned up); see also Orn, 495 F.3d at 635.
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In this appeal, Kapoi argues that the ALJ’s written decision fell short. His
argument advances on two fronts. First, he notes well‐established Ninth Circuit
precedent holding that “[o]nce the claimant produces medical evidence of an
underlying impairment, the Commissioner may not discredit the claimant’s testimony
as to the severity of symptoms merely because they are unsupported by objective
medical evidence.” Dkt. No. 12, at PageID.2828‐29 (quoting Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d
715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998), in turn citing Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 343 (9th Cir. 1991)
(en banc)). That is because it is not appropriate for an ALJ to “effectively render a
claimant’s subjective symptom testimony superfluous by demanding positive objective
medical evidence fully corroborating every allegation within the subjective testimony.”
Id. at PageID.2829 (quoting Ferguson v. O’Malley, 95 F.4th 1194, 1200 (9th Cir. 2024), in
turn quoting Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 498 (9th Cir. 2022)).
Second, turning to the particulars of this case, Kapoi contends that while the ALJ
here found that medical evidence supported the existence of Kapoi’s mental health
conditions, the ALJ did not offer any valid—let alone specific, clear and convincing
reasons—for rejecting his testimony about the severity of symptoms from those mental
health conditions.
The court agrees on both fronts. The first is simply an accurate recounting of
binding Ninth Circuit precedent. As to the second, although the ALJ’s written decision
remarked in passing that Kapoi’s symptom testimony was “not consistent with the
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medical evidence,” Dkt. No. 10‐1, at PageID.46 (AR at 25), and while “[c]ontradiction
with the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the claimant’s subjective
testimony,” Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008), the
decision does not identify any way in which Kapoi’s testimony actually might have
been contradicted by the medical evidence. The ALJ noted only that Kapoi’s “mental
status exams . . . were typically and generally normal.” Dkt. No. 10‐1, at PageID.48 (AR
at 27). But while these mental status exams do not offer any obvious support for Kapoi’s
testimony, the ALJ offered no explanation for why they would contradict Kapoi’s
testimony. And while it is possible the ALJ could offer some explanation for why there
is a contradiction, the court must “review the ALJ’s decision based on the reasoning and
factual findings offered by the ALJ—not post hoc rationalizations that attempt to intuit
what the adjudicator may have been thinking.” Bray, 554 F.3d at 1225.
Notably, the Commissioner himself does not argue that the ALJ’s written
decision contains adequate reasoning to explain why medical evidence contradicts
Kapoi’s testimony about the severity of his symptoms. The Commissioner’s only
argument in defense of the ALJ is that the “ALJ found evidence that [Kapoi] was not
compliant with treatment recommendations.” Dkt. No. 14, at PageID.2843‐44. Noting
that a “claimant’s ‘unexplained, or inadequately explained, failure to seek treatment or
follow a prescribed course of treatment’ can undermine his allegations about the
severity of an impairment,’” the Commissioner contends that the ALJ’s decision can be
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affirmed on the ground that Kapoi failed to explain his failure to abide by
recommended treatment here. Id. (quoting Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603‐04 (9th Cir.
1989, superseded on other grounds, 20 C.F.R. § 44.1502(a), as recognized, Smartt, 53 F.4th at
499).
But turn back a few pages to the block quote of the ALJ’s reasoning rejecting
Kapoi’s testimony about the severity of his mental health symptoms. Nowhere in that
block quote did the ALJ suggest rejection of Kapoi’s symptom testimony because he
failed to abide by recommended treatment for his mental health conditions. Kapoi’s
testimony at the hearing, indeed, reflected that he takes medication for his bipolar
disorder, but that he faces serious symptoms even while on medication. On what, then,
is the Commissioner relying for this argument? The answer reveals the weakness of the
argument: That “[a]fter a surgery on his right ankle, [Kapoi] followed up with his
treatment provider, who noted that he ‘has been severely noncompliant’ with post‐
operative instructions.” Dkt. No. 14, at PageID.2844. After detailing two other ways in
which Kapoi has not followed instructions concerning his ankle, the Commissioner
concludes that “[t]his amounted to substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s finding
that [Kapoi’s] self‐reports were not fully reliable.” Id.
Were the question on appeal whether Kapoi’s symptom testimony concerning
his ankle were properly rejected, this medical evidence might have some force. But it is
not. Kapoi focuses here on the ALJ’s rejection of his mental health symptoms. As to
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these mental health symptoms, the Commissioner offers no argument in response.
Because the court likewise sees no persuasive argument in response, a remand for
further administrative proceedings is necessary.
Kapoi makes other arguments in support of a remand. See Dkt. No. 12, at
PageID.2830‐39. But the court need not, and so does not, resolve them at this time.
Accord Hiler v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (remanding for one reason and
“declin[ing] to reach [an] alternative ground”).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s decision denying Kapoi’s
applications for Social Security disability and disability insurance benefits is
REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for further administrative proceedings
consistent with this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 25, 2026, at Honolulu, Hawai‘i.
Civil No. 25‐00363 MWJS‐RT, Liona Nelson Kapoi v. Frank Bisignano; ORDER
REVERSING DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY AND
REMANDING FOR FURTHER ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
/s/ Micah W.J. Smith
Micah W.J. Smith
United States District Judge
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