Moctezuma Macias v. Henkey et al

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND O RDER - 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
EDGAR AGUSTIN MOCTEZUMA
MACIAS,
Petitioner,
v.
BRIAN HENKEY, Field Office
Director of Enforcement and
Removal Operations, Salt Lake City
Field Office, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; KENNETH
PORTER, Acting Director of the
Boise U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement Field Sub-Office;
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security;
PAMELA BONDI, U.S. Attorney
General; MICHAEL
HOLLINGSHEAD, Sheriff of
Elmore County,
Respondents.
Case No. 1:25-cv-00741-BLW
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Petitioner Edgar Agustin Moctezuma Macias’s Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. 1) and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
(Dkt. 2). Mr. Moctezuma entered the United States without authorization in 1997
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and resides in Caldwell, Idaho. He was taken into custody by Immigration and
Customs Enforcement on December 29, 2025, while on his way to work, and is
being detained without bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1225. He argues that his mandatory
detention under § 1225 violates the Immigration and Nationality Act.
For the reasons explained below, the Court will grant the Motion and order
Mr. Moctezuma’s immediate release from custody. The Court will also order
Respondents to file a response to the Petition within seven days.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Moctezuma is a national of Mexico who has lived in the United States
since 1997. Dkt. 1 ¶ 17. He currently resides in Caldwell, Idaho. Id. He has three
U.S. citizen children and no criminal history. Id. He was taken into custody on
December 29, 2025, and is currently detained at the Elmore County Detention
Center in Mountain Home, Idaho. Id. ¶¶ 1, 17.
This dispute is one of many recent cases to result from a policy shift by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Executive Office of Immigration
Review (EOIR). Historically, noncitizens potentially subject to immigration
detention could be detained under two possible statutes. 8 U.S.C. § 1225 applied to
noncitizens “seeking admission into the country”—in other words, those
apprehended at or near the border—and did not allow for a bond hearing. But
noncitizens already established in the United States were detained under 8 U.S.C.
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§ 1226, which provides for discretionary detention with bond hearings to allow the
release of detainees who do not pose a danger to the community or flight risk. See
Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2017). This statutory scheme
reflects a longstanding distinction between noncitizens who reside in the United
States—who have constitutional due process rights—and those who have not yet
entered. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
Since July 2025, DHS has attempted to eliminate this distinction. On July 8,
2025, ICE issued “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants
for Admission,” instructing that all persons who entered without inspection be
subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), regardless of when they
were apprehended or how long they have resided in the United States. On
September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) issued a precedential
decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), holding
that immigration judges lack authority to conduct bond hearings for individuals
who entered without admission, as they are deemed “applicants for admission”
subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Mr. Moctezuma filed this habeas petition on December 31, 2025,
challenging his detention and seeking either immediate release or a bond hearing.
Dkt. 1. He also filed an emergency motion for temporary restraining order. Dkt. 2.
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LEGAL STANDARD
The standard for issuing a TRO is “substantially identical” to the standard
for issuing a preliminary injunction. Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush &
Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2001). To obtain relief, the plaintiff must
show that (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) he will likely suffer
irreparable harm without preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in his
favor, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
ANALYSIS
This Court, like dozens of district courts across the country, has already and
repeatedly held that ICE cannot subject individuals like Mr. Moctezuma, who
already reside in the United States, to mandatory detention under § 1225.1 For this
reason, the analysis will be fairly brief. The Court will first consider potential
1 See, e.g., Quijada Cordoba v. Knight, 1:25-cv-00605, 2025 WL 3228945 (D. Idaho Nov. 19,
2025); Villafana Rodriguez v. Knight, 1:25-cv-00600, 2025 WL 3228285 (D. Idaho Nov. 19,
2025); Alvarez Ortiz v. Freden, No. 25-CV-960, 2025 WL 3085032, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 4,
2025); Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz, No. 25-cv-12664, 2025 WL 2809996 (D. Mass. Oct. 3,
2025); Romero v. Hyde, No. 25-11631, 2025 WL 2403827, at *13; Lepe v. Andrews, No. 1:25-
CV-01163, 2025 WL 2716910 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025); Jimenez v. FCI Berlin, Warden, No.
25-cv-326, 2025 WL 2639390 (D.N.H. Sept. 8, 2025); Hasan v. Crawford, No. 1:25-cv-1408,
2025 WL 2682255 (E.D. Va. Sept. 19, 2025); Alejandro v. Olson, No. 1:25-CV-02027, 2025 WL
2896348, at *8 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 11, 2025); Covarrubias v. Vergara, No. 5:25-CV-112, 2025 WL
2950097, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2025); Hyppolite v. Noem, No. 25-CV-4304, 2025 WL
2829511 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2025); Barrera v. Tindall, No. 3:25-cv-241, 2025 WL 2690565
(W.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2025); Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025); Mosqueda v. Noem, No. 5:25-cv-02304, 2025 WL 2591530 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 8, 2025).
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jurisdictional issues before turning to the TRO factors.
A. Jurisdiction
Federal courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject
matter jurisdiction exists. Arbaugh v. Y&H Court, 546 U.S. 500, 501 (2006).
Though legal questions related to removal proceedings are typically beyond the
purview of district courts, this Court, and others, have consistently found
subjective matter jurisdiction when faced with virtually identical habeas
challenges. See, e.g., Quijada Cordoba, 2025 WL 3228945, at *2-4; see also
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018). Although the Court has no power to
review the removal proceedings themselves, Petitioner’s challenge to his detention
without a bond hearing is properly before the Court.
B. Temporary Restraining Order
Having determined that jurisdiction is proper, the Court now considers
whether Petitioner has met the burden for a TRO.
1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
First, Petitioner is likely to succeed in challenging his detention under
§ 1225. This prong of the TRO analysis is unusually easy because the Court has
ruled on the issue more than 15 times in the past two months. See, e.g., Quijada
Cordoba, 2025 WL 3228945, at *2 n.3. There is no need to reanalyze the statutory
question, so the Court will reproduce the most relevant part of a previous opinion:
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As countless courts have concluded, Respondents’ proposed
interpretation “(1) disregards the plain meaning of section
1225(b)(2)(A); (2) disregards the relationship between sections 1225
and 1226; (3) would render a recent amendment to section 1226(c)
superfluous; and (4) is inconsistent with decades of prior statutory
interpretation and practice.” Lepe v. Andrews, 2025 WL 2716910, at
*4 (collecting cases).
For 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply, several conditions must be met: an
“examining immigration officer” must determine that the individual is
(1) an “applicant for admission”; (2) “seeking admission”; and (3)
“not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A). Respondents’ selective reading of the statute ignores
the phrase, “seeking admission.” This “violates the rule against
surplusage and negates the plain meaning of the text.” Martinez v.
Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 218 (D. Mass. 2025) (citing United
States, ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. 419, 432
(2023)). “As numerous courts have observed, if all ‘applicant[s] for
admission’ also are ‘seeking admission,’ then the words ‘seeking
admission’ would be surplusage.” Alvarez Ortiz, 2025 WL 3085032,
at *7 (collecting cases).
If Congress did not intend to distinguish between an “applicant
for admission” and those “applicant[s] for admission” who are
“seeking admission,” it simply could have omitted the “seeking
admission” language.” But it did not. As “every clause and word of a
statute should have meaning,” this phrase, “seeking admission,” must
therefore mean something separate from “an applicant for admission.”
Polansky, 599 U.S. at 432. The use of the present participle “seeking”
implies the present action of “asking for” or “trying to acquire or
gain,” and the “entry,” as it has long been understood, implies “a
crossing into the territorial limits of the United States.” Lepe, 2025
WL 2716910, at *5 (citations omitted). “To piece this together, the
phrase ‘seeking admission’ means that one must be actively seeking’
‘lawful entry.’” Id.
While Petitioner may qualify as an “applicant for admission,”
the phrase “seeking admission” cannot reasonably be stretched to
encompass someone who entered the country years ago, established a
life here, and was living peacefully in Idaho until his arrest. At the
time of his apprehension, Petitioner was not “seeking” anything—he
was simply present in the United States.
This plain reading of § 1225 places it in harmony with § 1226
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and the overall statutory scheme. See Davis v. Michigan Dep’t of
Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989) (explaining the words of a statute
must be read in their entire context and with a view to their place in
the overall statutory scheme). The entire framework of § 1225, titled
“Inspection by immigration officers; expedited removal of
inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing,” relates to the
inspection process at or near the border: “Inspection” occurs at ports
of entry, Posos-Sanchez v. Garland, 3 F.4th 1176, 1183 (9th Cir.
2021); “expedited removal” applies to those “arriving in the United
States,” § 1225(b)(1)(A); and the provision addresses “stowaways”
discovered at borders, § 1225(a)(2).
Thus, as the Supreme Court explained, § 1225 applies “at the
Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where the Government must
determine whether an alien seeking to enter the country is
admissible.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. Nothing in this framework
contemplates interior enforcement against individuals who have
resided in the country for years.
“And just to pile on a bit,” Respondents’ construction of the
statute “would create surplusage twice over,” Polansky, 599 U.S. at
432, by rendering the recent amendment to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)
meaningless. Section 1226(c)(1)(E), added in 2025 by the Laken
Riley Act, mandates detention for any noncitizen (i) who is
inadmissible under section 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an “alien present in the
United States without being admitted or paroled,” and (ii) who “is
charged with, arrested for, convicted of, or admits” to committing
certain crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). If § 1225(b)(2)(A) already
mandates the detention of all noncitizens who have not been admitted,
as Respondents contend, then Laken Riley serves no purpose.
“This is a presumptively dubious result.” Martinez, 792 F.
Supp. 3d at 221. Courts “do not lightly assume Congress adopts two
separate clauses in the same law to perform the same work.” United
States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845, 857 (2022). Accordingly, this Court
declines to find “that Congress passed the Laken Riley Act to
‘perform the same work’ that was already covered by § 1225(b)(2).”
Maldonado, 2025 WL 2374411, at *12 (quoting Taylor, 596 U.S. at
857).
Finally, Respondents’ contrary interpretation also upends
decades of settled practice without clear congressional intent. Since
IIRIRA’s enactment in 1996, DHS has consistently applied § 1226(a)
to noncitizens who entered without inspection but were apprehended
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while residing in the United States. See Rodriguez, 779 F.Supp.3d at
1260-61. Executive Branch regulations issued contemporaneously
with IIRIRA explicitly stated that noncitizens “present without having
been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as [those] who entered
without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redeter-
mination.” 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997). As the
Supreme Court has recognized, such “longstanding practice of the
government” serves as an important interpretive aid, Loper Bright,
603 U.S. at 386, adding an additional basis to refute Respondents’
interpretation.
Id. at *14-17.
2. Irreparable Harm
Petitioner will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a TRO. Petitioner’s
detention under § 1225 rather than § 1226 likely constitutes a violation of
procedural due process. See id. at *7-8. “It is well established that the deprivation
of constitutional rights unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Hernandez
v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 994 (9th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted). The Ninth
Circuit has further recognized the “irreparable harms imposed on anyone subject to
immigration detention,” including “subpar medical and psychiatric care in
ICE detention facilities, the economic burdens imposed on detainees and their
families as a result of detention, and the collateral harms to children of detainees
whose parents are detained.” Id. at 995. The grave consequences of Petitioner’s
continued detention weigh in favor of a TRO.
3. Balance of Equities and Public Interest
The final two Winter factors merge when the government is the nonmoving
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party. These factors also support a TRO. “The public has a strong interest in
upholding procedural protections against unlawful detention, and the Ninth Circuit
has recognized that the costs to the public of immigration detention are
staggering.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2025).
Conversely, Petitioner’s lack of criminal history and almost 30 years of residency
in the United States suggests that the public gains nothing from his detention. The
balance of equities likewise strongly favors Petitioner, who will be jailed
indefinitely in the absence of relief. Respondents, in contrast, do not suffer harm
“in any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations.”
Zepeda v. U.S. Immigr. & Nat. Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983).
C. Remedy
Accordingly, Petitioner has met the threshold for a temporary restraining
order. The question of the proper remedy remains. Petitioner asks the Court to
order his immediate release and to prohibit Respondents from communicating to
him without counsel or transferring him out of the District of Idaho.
A district court has equitable discretion, “as law and justice require,” for
remedying unlawful detention in a habeas petition pursuant to § 2254. See Brown
v. Davenport, 596 U.S. 118, 127-28 (2022). Despite this discretion, however, relief
“should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide
complete relief to the plaintiffs before the court.” E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v.
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Biden, 993 F.3d 640, 680 (9th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). Thus, relief “must be
narrowly tailored to remedy the specific harm shown.” Id.
In many similar circumstances, a bond hearing would be sufficient to rectify
the violation of Petitioner’s unlawful detention. See E.C. v. Noem, No. 2:25-cv-
01789, 2025 WL 2916264, at *12 (D. Nev. Oct. 14, 2025); see also Hernandez-
Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 45-46 (1st Cir. 2021). Here, however, Petitioner’s lack
of criminal history, strong family ties to the United States, and long duration of
residency all support his immediate release. In recent months, courts across the
country have ordered the release of detainees in similar situations. E.g., Lepe, 2025
WL 2716910, at *10; J.U. v. Maldonado, No. 25-cv-4836, 2025 WL 2772765, at
*10 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2025); Rosado v. Figueroa, No. 25-cv-2157, 2025 WL
2337099, at *19 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025); Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-05632, 2025
WL 1853763, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 4, 2025). As one court explained, “[w]ithout a
legitimate interest in her detention, immediate release appropriately remedies
Respondents’ violation of [Petitioner’s] due process rights through her continued
detention.” Santiago v. Noem, No. EP-25-CV-361, 2025 WL 2792588, at *13-14
(W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2025). The same is true here.
Respondents’ refusal to abandon their unlawful policy also plays into the
Court’s analysis. This Court’s orders are binding only on the individual habeas
petitioner, meaning that Respondents will presumably continue to enforce their
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interpretation of § 1225 on immigrant detainees until the Ninth Circuit issues a
binding ruling. Detainees will continue to file nearly identical habeas petitions then
sit in jail waiting for a judicial decision. This in itself represents a substantial
deprivation of liberty, and ordering a bond hearing instead of release would further
exacerbate this delay. Such an approach is not justifiable for an individual who is
not a flight risk or danger to the community.
Accordingly, the Court orders Petitioner’s immediate release from custody.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. Petitioner’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (Dkt. 2) is
GRANTED. Accordingly, Petitioner shall be immediately released from
custody.
2. Respondents shall file a response to the Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus by January 12, 2026.
3. Petitioner’s reply, if any, shall be filed no later than January 15, 2026.
DATED: January 2, 2026
_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
U.S. District Court Judge
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