Wheeler v. Mayo, et al.

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE - 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
SHAWN WHEELER,
Plaintiff,
v.
ZACHARY MAYO and SPIRIT LAKE
POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Defendants.
Case No. 2:25-cv-00510-AKB
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY
SCREENING JUDGE
The Clerk of Court conditionally filed Plaintiff Shawn Wheeler’s Complaint because of
Plaintiff’s status as an inmate and in forma pauperis request. A “conditional filing” means that a
plaintiff must obtain authorization from the Court to proceed. Upon screening, the Court must
dismiss claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).
Having reviewed the record, the Court concludes that the Complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, the Court enters the following Order directing
Plaintiff to file an amended complaint if Plaintiff intends to proceed.
1. Standards of Law for Screening Complaints
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint fails to state a claim for relief under
Rule 8 if the factual assertions in the complaint, taken as true, are insufficient for the reviewing
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court plausibly “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
To state an actionable claim, a plaintiff must provide “enough factual matter (taken as true)
to suggest” that the defendant committed the unlawful act, meaning that sufficient facts are pled
“to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal [activity].” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’
or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 US. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
The Court liberally construes the pleadings to determine whether a case should be
dismissed for a failure to plead sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory or for the
absence of a cognizable legal theory. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim,
however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable factual and legal basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885
F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)), superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
2. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is an inmate in the Kootenai County Jail. The events giving rise to Plaintiff’s
claims occurred before or during Plaintiff’s arrest.
Plaintiff alleges that, in July 2025, Defendant Zachary Mayo, a police officer with the Spirit
Lake Police Department, drove his police car in front of Plaintiff while Plaintiff was riding his
bicycle. Compl., Dkt. 3, at 2. Plaintiff then crashed into the car, injuring his head, back, and ankle.
Mayo allegedly got out of the police car, grabbed Plaintiff’s backpack, and “threw [Plaintiff] and
[his] bike to the ground.” Id.
Plaintiff claims that Mayo’s actions constituted excessive force in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. He sues Officer Mayo and the Spirit Lake Police Department.
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3. Discussion
Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court will, however,
grant Plaintiff 28 days to amend the Complaint. Any amended complaint should take into
consideration the following.
Plaintiff brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights statute. To state a
plausible civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the Constitution
or created by federal statute proximately caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state
law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). A defendant causes a constitutional
deprivation within the meaning of § 1983 “if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s
affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the
deprivation.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
That is, governmental officials generally are not liable for damages in their individual
capacities under § 1983 unless they personally participated in the alleged constitutional violations.
Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“[E]ach
Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own
misconduct.”). Section 1983 does not allow for recovery against an employer or principal simply
because an employee or agent committed misconduct. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045.
To bring a § 1983 claim against a local governmental entity such as the Spirit Lake Police
Department, a plaintiff must allege that the execution of an official policy or unofficial custom
inflicted the injury of which the plaintiff complains, as required by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.
of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Under Monell, the requisite elements of a §
1983 claim against such an entity are the following: (1) the plaintiff was deprived of a
constitutional right; (2) the entity had a policy or custom; (3) the policy or custom amounted to
deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the policy or custom was the
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moving force behind the constitutional violation. Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty., 237 F.3d 1101,
1110–11 (9th Cir. 2001). An entity also “may be held liable under § 1983 when the individual who
committed the constitutional tort was an official with final policy-making authority” or when “such
an official ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.”
Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1250 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled in part on
other grounds by Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1069 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
An unwritten policy or custom must be so “persistent and widespread” that it constitutes a
“permanent and well settled” practice. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1970)). “Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on
isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency
and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino
v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996).
Claims of excessive force during the course of an arrest are analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fourth Amendment
requires that officers use only an amount of force that is “objectively reasonable in light of the
facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.”
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).1 “Not every push
or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the
Fourth Amendment,” and whether an officer’s use of force was objectively reasonable is based on
the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 396 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
1 Although the excessive force reasonableness standard is an objective test, it must not be confused with
the standard for negligence claims under state law, as negligence is not actionable under § 1983. See
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2472 (2015) (“[L]iability for negligently inflicted harm is
categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process.”) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986).
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This “reasonableness” standard requires “balancing the nature and quality of the intrusion
on a person’s liberty with the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Davis v. City of Las
Vegas, 478 F.3d 1048, 1053–54 (9th Cir. 2007). First, the “quantum of force” must be assessed.
Second, the governmental interests at stake must be analyzed in light of the following factors:
(1) the severity of the crime for which the plaintiff was arrested; (2) whether the plaintiff posed a
threat to the safety of the officers or others; (3) whether the plaintiff was actively resisting arrest
or attempting to flee; and (4) the availability of alternative methods of subduing the plaintiff. Id.
A plaintiff cannot simply restate these standards of law in a complaint. Instead, a plaintiff
must provide specific facts supporting the elements of each claim and must allege facts showing a
causal link between each defendant and Plaintiff’s injury or damage. Alleging “the mere possibility
of misconduct” is not enough. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because Plaintiff
does not include any allegations with respect to the governmental-interest factors set forth above.
Thus, the Court cannot reasonably infer that Officer Mayo used objectively unreasonable force in
subduing Plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s claim against the Spirit Lake Police Department is implausible for an additional
reason. The allegations in the Complaint simply do not support a reasonable inference that the
police department has (or had) a policy, custom, or practice of using excessive force.
Plaintiff may attempt to remedy these deficiencies in an amended complaint.
4. Standards for Amended Complaint
If Plaintiff chooses to amend the Complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the actions
complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v.
Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227, 229 (9th Cir. 1980), abrogated on other grounds by Kay v. Ehrler, 499
U.S. 432 (1991). Plaintiff must also allege a sufficient causal connection between each defendant’s
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actions and the claimed deprivation. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045; Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740,
743 (9th Cir. 1978). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights
violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss” or to survive screening under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.
1982); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions
devoid of further factual enhancement.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
Rather, for each cause of action against each defendant, Plaintiff must state the following:
(1) the name of the person or entity that caused the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights; (2) facts showing the defendant is a state actor (such as state employment or a state contract)
or a private entity performing a state function; (3) the dates on which the conduct of the defendant
allegedly took place; (4) the specific conduct or action Plaintiff alleges is unconstitutional; (5) the
particular constitutional or statutory provision Plaintiff alleges has been violated; (6) facts alleging
the elements of the violation are met—for example, Plaintiff must allege facts satisfying the
elements of a Fourth Amendment claim; (7) the injury or damages Plaintiff personally suffered;
and (8) the particular type of relief Plaintiff is seeking from each defendant. In addition, Plaintiff
must include facts showing Plaintiff can meet the Monell requirements, if applicable (explained
above).
Further, any amended complaint must contain all of Plaintiff’s allegations in a single
pleading and cannot rely upon, attach, or incorporate by reference other pleadings or documents.
See Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[An] amended complaint
supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.”), overruled in part on
other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Hal Roach
Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the
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district court erred by entering judgment against a party named in the initial complaint, but not in
the amended complaint).
Plaintiff must set forth each different factual allegation in a separate, numbered paragraph.
The amended complaint must be legibly written or typed in its entirety, and it should be clearly
designated as the “Amended Complaint.” Plaintiff’s name and address should be clearly printed at
the top left corner of the first page of each document filed with the Court.
If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, Plaintiff must also file a “Motion to Review the
Amended Complaint.” If Plaintiff does not amend within 28 days, or if the amendment does not
comply with Rule 8, this case may be dismissed without further notice. See Knapp v. Hogan, 738
F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2013) (“When a litigant knowingly and repeatedly refuses to conform
his pleadings to the requirements of the Federal Rules, it is reasonable to conclude that the litigant
simply cannot state a claim.”).
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1. The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff has
28 days within which to file an amended complaint as described above. If Plaintiff
does so, Plaintiff must file (along with the amended complaint) a Motion to Review
the Amended Complaint. Alternatively, Plaintiff may file a Notice of Voluntary
Dismissal if Plaintiff no longer intends to pursue this case.2
2. If Plaintiff does not file a timely amended complaint, this case may be dismissed
with prejudice and without further notice for failure to state a claim upon which
2 A voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) is not a dismissal for frivolity, for
maliciousness, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and, therefore, does not count
as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Spencer v. Barajas, 140 F.4th 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2025).
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relief may be granted, failure to prosecute, or failure to comply with a Court order.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A; Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
3. Because an amended complaint is required for Plaintiff to proceed, Plaintiff’s
request for appointment of counsel (contained in the Complaint) is DENIED
without prejudice. Plaintiff may renew the request for counsel in an amended
complaint.
DATED: November 12, 2025
_________________________
Amanda K. Brailsford
U.S. District Court Judge
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