USA v. Torres et al

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
CARLOS NICHOLAS TORRES,
JESSICA MARIE MEKOSCH,
Defendants.
Case No. 4:25-cr-00061-DCN
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Defendant Jessica Mekosch’s Motion to Suppress (Dkt. 78),
Defendant Carlos Torres’s Motion to Suppress (Dkt. 79), and Mekosch’s Joinder to Torres’s
Motion (Dkt. 98). In her Motion, Mekosch focuses on Miranda warnings, and a purportedly
invalid waiver of said rights. In his Motion, Torres argues the Government relied on stale
and uncorroborated information to obtain “ping warrants,” and then exceeded the bounds
of the warrants it obtained. Mekosch later joined Torres’s Motion regarding the ping
warrant. The Government opposes all Motions. Dkt. 104.
The Court held oral argument on December 9, 2025, and took the matters under
advisement. Dkt. 117. Upon review, and for the reasons outlined below, the Court
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2
GRANTS in PART and DENIES in PART Mekosch’s Motion to Suppress and DENIES
Torres’s Motion to Suppress and Mekosch’s Joinder in the same.
II. BACKGROUND
In June 2024, an Idaho State Police confidential source (“CS1”) informed Detective
Mark Hulet that Torres obtained approximately five pounds of methamphetamine per week
from a source in Utah. Torres either traveled to Utah himself to pick up the drugs or
arranged for others to deliver the drugs to him. In July 2024, CS1—at law enforcement’s
direction—conducted a controlled purchase of 56.12 grams of methamphetamine from
Torres.
On August 5, 2024, Detective Hulet observed Torres conduct a brief hand-to-hand
exchange of a small package which, based upon his training and experience, he believed
to be consistent with narcotics trafficking.
On August 16, 2024, East Idaho Crime Stoppers received, and then submitted to law
enforcement, an anonymous tip that Torres was selling drugs in Idaho Falls, Idaho. The
tipster identified Torres’s girlfriend, Jessica Mekosch, as assisting him in transporting drugs
from Arizona and California to Idaho, explained Torres drove a newer white Kia, and that
he and Mekosch lived in the Pine Shadow/Shadow Canyon apartments in Idaho Falls.
Surveillance confirmed that Torres drove a 2021 white Kia registered to him and further,
that he resided with Mekosch at the Shadow Canyon apartments. Detective Hulet also
confirmed Torres’s phone number through subscriber information and confirmed AT&T
was the service provider.
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Based upon the aforementioned information, Detective Hulet sought a warrant for
real-time prospective location information (“ping data”) on Torres’s phone. Dkt. 79-1, at
1–3. Bannock County Magistrate Judge David K. Penrod issued a daytime warrant on
October 29, 2024. Id. at 4. The warrant was served on AT&T on October 31, 2024, and the
Drug 	Enforcement 	Administration 	and 	Idaho 	State 	Police 	began 	receiving 	ping
notifications on Torres’s phone on November 4, 2024.
Beginning November 13, 2024, ping data placed Torres’s phone in Power County,
Idaho, and then near Pendleton, Oregon. By November 14–15, Torress appeared to be in
the Seattle, Washington area. On November 16, Hulet observed Torres returning from
Washington to Pocatello, Idaho, in a white Kia. Mekosch was also observed following
Torres in a Chevy Malibu—a configuration consistent with “decoy car” tactics sometimes
used by drug traffickers to evade law enforcement.
On December 3, 2024, ping data and physical surveillance showed Torres and
Mekosch at a residence in Chubbuck, Idaho. That residence was known to law enforcement
as being associated with individuals in the drug community. Between December 4–8,
Torres’s phone again pinged near Seattle before returning to Idaho on December 9–10. A
second confidential source (“CS2”) communicated to law enforcement that Torres and his
associates traveled to Washington or Oregon to pick up methamphetamine and that
Mekosch frequently acted as a decoy driver while travelling. CS2 also reported seeing
Torres with several gallon-sized bags of methamphetamine.
On December 20, 2024, Hulet applied for a 60-day extension of the original ping
warrant, incorporating the November–December observations in his application. Bannock
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County Magistrate Judge Anson L. Call approved the extension on Torres’s phone and
authorized a similar warrant for prospective location data on Mekosch’s phone.
Between December 31, 2024, and January 2, 2025, ping data placed both phones in
Las Vegas, Nevada. On January 3, 2025, Torres’s phone appeared near Jackpot, Nevada,
and Hulet observed the Kia and Malibu returning from Nevada toward Idaho Falls.
On January 8, both phones again pinged in Jackpot, Nevada, then Twin Falls, Idaho,
before returning to Pocatello and Idaho Falls. Throughout January, officers intermittently
surveilled Torres and his associates, including observing multiple visits to residences
associated with drug trafficking.
On January 23, 2025, CS2 attempted to arrange a controlled introduction between
Torres and an undercover officer, but Torres did not appear. On January 30, 2025, law
enforcement conducted a controlled narcotics purchase from co-defendant Michelle
Wallace. Torres and another co-defendant, Justin Crabtree, were observed in the area in the
white Kia. Detectives subsequently obtained a search warrant for Torres’s vehicle.
Separately, on February 1, 2025, Idaho State Police stopped Mekosch’s car pursuant
to 	a 	warrant. 	In 	an 	initial 	pre-Miranda 	exchange, 	Mekosch 	admitted 	having
methamphetamine and a firearm in the vehicle. Mekosch was arrested and taken to the
police station. There, Mekosch provided a written Miranda waiver and was interviewed
for approximately 35 minutes. During the interview, Mekosch made multiple statements
implicating herself and Torres in drug trafficking. Mekosch was then released.
On February 3, 2025, a third confidential source (“CS3”) reported that Torres and
Crabtree were flying to Las Vegas to obtain drugs. Ping data confirmed Torres’s phone at
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5
the Idaho Falls Airport. Between February 3 and 7, Torres’s phone pinged at locations
across Nevada and California as well as near St. George, Utah.
On February 7, Hulet began surveilling Torres in northern Utah. Ping data and
physical observation showed Torres, Crabtree, and co-defendant Cheri Ritter traveling
together in three vehicles, two of which were rentals. The group returned to Pocatello and
stopped at Torres’s mother’s residence. CS3 reported seeing approximately 50 pounds of
methamphetamine at Torres’s mother’s residence that day.
Based on the February travel, the ping data, and CS3’s information, officers
obtained a warrant to search the Chevrolet Malibu rental car. At approximately 12:51 p.m.
on February 7, 2025, Detective Ryan Anthony stopped Torres in Pocatello and arrested
him. The Malibu was searched pursuant to the warrant and yielded cash, identification
documents, marijuana, approximately 42 grams of cocaine, and roughly 45 pounds of
methamphetamine.
Later that day, officers obtained and executed a warrant at Torres’s apartment at
1325 Hoopes Avenue, in Idaho Falls, Idaho, where they recovered a handgun, drug
paraphernalia, 	marijuana, 	cocaine, 	suspected 	fentanyl 	pills, 	methamphetamine, 	and
Torres’s cellphone (later searched under a separate warrant).
On February 25, 2025, a federal grand jury returned a five-count indictment alleging
that Torres and Mekosch, along with others, engaged in a methamphetamine trafficking
conspiracy and that Torres possessed methamphetamine with the intent to distribute. See
generally Dkt. 2.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6
Mekosch recently moved to suppress her statements to law enforcement alleging
her Miranda waiver was invalid. Dkt. 78. Torres then moved to suppress the evidence
gleaned from the ping warrants on two grounds: first, that the data used to obtain the
warrants was stale and uncorroborated, and second, that law enforcement exceeded the
scope of the warrant and the subsequent extension. Dkt. 79. Mekosch later joined Torres’s
Motion as to the ping warrants. Dkt. 98.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Seach and Seizure
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of individuals “to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646 n.4 (1961) (quoting U.S. Const. amend IV). The Fourth
Amendment “does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely
proscribes those which are unreasonable.” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991).
Consequently, the “touchstone” of a court’s analysis under the Fourth Amendment “is
always ‘the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular government invasion
of a citizen's personal security.’” Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,108–109 (1977)
(quoting Terry, v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). “[T]here is no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search (or seize) against the invasion
which the search (or seizure) entails.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
Though “[t]he Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly precluding the
use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands,” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 906 (1984), the exclusionary rule is “a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7
Fourth Amendment 	rights 	generally 	through 	its 	deterrent 	effect,” 	United 	States 	v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). Under the exclusionary rule, “illegally seized
evidence” cannot be used “against the search victim in a criminal trial.” Id. at 350; see also
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963).
B. Miranda
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. In Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966), the Supreme Court held the Fifth Amendment’s
prohibition against compelled self-incrimination requires that a criminal defendant must
be advised: (1) he has the right to remain silent; (2) anything he says can be used against
him in a court of law; (3) he has the right to the presence of an attorney; and (4) if he cannot
afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to questioning if he so chooses. With
respect to the right to an attorney, a criminal defendant must be warned he has the right to
consult with counsel both before and during questioning. People of Territory of Guam v.
Snaer, 758 F.2d 1341, 1342–43 (9th Cir. 1985).
Though the Supreme Court does not require a “verbatim recital of the words of the
Miranda opinion,” the warning must reasonably convey to a suspect his rights as Miranda
requires. California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359–60 (1981). When a suspect is subjected
to a custodial interrogation without first being advised of his rights, “Miranda dictates that
the answers received be presumed compelled and that they be excluded from evidence at
trial in the State’s case in chief.” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 317 (1985).
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Mekosch’s Motion To Suppress
In her Motion, Mekosch asked the Court to suppress statements she made: (1) during
the initial traffic stop, and (2) later at the police station. At oral argument, the Government
agreed not to use any of Mekosch’s statements from the traffic stop. Accordingly, those
statements are suppressed, will not be allowed at trial, and Mekosch’s Motion is Granted
to that extent. The Court will focus next on Mekosch’s second argument.
Mekosch 	contends 	“the 	government 	cannot 	show 	that 	[she] 	knowingly 	and
intelligently waived her Miranda rights nor can the government show that any such waiver
was voluntary” prior to her interview with Detective Hulet at the police station. Dkt. 78-1,
at 5. The Court disagrees.
“For a waiver of rights to be valid it must be voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
given. Whether there has been a valid waiver depends on the totality of the circumstances,
including the background, experience, and conduct of defendant.” United States v.
Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir.), amended, 416 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2005)
(citation modified).
In this case, prior to her questioning with Detective Hulet, Mekosch was provided
with a written warning explaining her rights under Miranda. Dkt. 104, at 3. Detective Hulet
also testified—with corroborating audio evidence—that in addition to providing the written
document, he verbally advised Mekosch of her rights (by reading the written document).
Dkt. 115, at 27; Exhibit 1006. Mekosch then signed the waiver with Detective Hulet as the
witness. Dkt. 104, at 3.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9
Nothing in the record, including briefing and oral argument, indicates Mekosch’s
waiver was not voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly given. The best Mekosch can
assert is that she was emotionally upset during the interview and that Detective Hulet knew
she was involved with drugs. But neither of these facts, standing alone, are sufficient to
rebuff Detective Hulet’s testimony that he had no reason to think Mekosch did not
understand the Miranda warnings.1 	Even taking Mekosch’s position as true does not
negate the waiver. Mekosch could have been emotional and a former/current drug user and
still provide an adequate wavier of her rights. Nothing in the record or testimony undercuts
such a conclusion.
Mekosch has not provided any meaningful evidence to support her argument that
she did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive her rights. The Court, therefore,
finds her waiver was valid and any statements made to Detective Hulet after she signed the
waiver will not be suppressed.
Mekosch’s Motion (Dkt. 78) is GRANTED in PART and DENIED in PART as
outlined above.
B. Torres’s Motion to Suppress and Mekosch’s Joinder
Torres contends any information gathered from the ping warrant should be
suppressed for two reasons. First, he argues the initial ping warrant was based on stale,
1 Mekosch essentially faults Detective Hulet for not asking if she was doing ok. But the flip-side is also
true: Mekosch gave no indication that she was not ok. Now, in some circumstances a person may not be
able to articulate he or she is not doing well (e.g. intoxication). But any reasonable officer would be able to
see the person was struggling. In any event, that is not the case here. Detective Hulet did not see any
evidence—and Mekosch has pointed to none—suggesting Mekosch did not understand what was happening
at the time she waived her rights.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 10
uncorroborated, information and similarly, that the extension of his warrant was based on
non-criminal information. Second, Torres asserts the Government exceeded the limits of
the warrant by retrieving data during the nighttime because the warrant was a “daytime
warrant.” The Court will address each argument in turn.
As a threshold matter, however, the Government argues, in its written closing
argument, Torres and Mekosch only have standing to contest their own ping warrants, not
each other’s. Dkt. 116, at 2. Although this issue was not addressed in pre-hearing briefing
or at oral argument, the Government is concerned that some of the Defendants’ questions
at oral argument suggested a belief that any or all defendants in this case—even those not
participating in these current motions—could object to the ping warrants for other
defendants.
The Court confirms the Government’s position: each defendant has standing to
challenge only his or her own ping warrant; there is no special standing for co-conspirators.
The Supreme Court has long held that Fourth Amendment challenges are limited to “those
whose rights were violated by the search itself, not [to] those who are aggrieved solely by
the introduction of damaging evidence” from another party. Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165, 172 (1969).
Torres had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his ping location and Mekosch
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her ping location. But neither has an expectation
of privacy vis-a-vis the other person’s ping location. Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S.
296 (2018) (explaining defendants have an expectation of privacy in historical cell-tower
records maintained by a third-party cell phone service provider for their own devices).
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In short, each defendant has standing to challenge his or her own ping warrant and
nothing more. Because the arguments are identical, however, the Court will largely address
them in tandem, separating specific arguments out as necessary.
1. 	The Ping Warrants were not based on stale, uncorroborated information.
a. 	Torres
Torres argues the information provided to the Magistrate Judge to support probable
cause for his ping warrant was stale because it was based on a single incident that occurred
months prior to when the police sought the ping warrant. Dkt. 79, at 16. Additionally, he
argues the three separate instances used by the police to support probable cause do not
constitute a pattern sufficient to justify the warrant. Id. As for corroboration, Torres argues
the information was unreliable because it came from an anonymous tip. Dkt. 79, at 17.
“Information offered to support a search warrant application becomes stale when
enough time has elapsed such that there is no longer sufficient basis to believe . . . that the
items to be seized are still on the premises.” United States v. Grant, 682 F.3d 827, 835 (9th
Cir. 2012) (citation modified). Said another way, a search warrant is not stale where there
is a “sufficient basis to believe, based on a continuing pattern or other good reasons” that
the items sought can still be recovered. United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d 1394, 1399
(citation modified). “With respect to drug trafficking, probable cause may continue for
several weeks, if not months, of the last reported instance of suspect activity.” Id.
The facts here indicate the evidence used to obtain the warrant was not stale.
Detectives received information from a confidential informant in June of 2024 that Torres
was 	either 	picking 	up 	himself, 	or 	receiving 	from 	others, 	roughly 	five 	pounds 	of
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 12
methamphetamine per week. Detectives then performed a controlled buy in July of 2024.
Law enforcement also observed a series of short interactions consistent with drug
distribution in August of 2024. Finally, police received an anonymous tip in October that
Torress was trafficking drugs.
This series of events illustrates the information used to obtain the ping warrant was
not stale; rather Detectives were investigating and building their case to ensure they had
sufficient evidence to present to a judge. As noted in Angulo-Lopez, in drug trafficking
cases, probable cause may continue for several weeks or months of the last reported
instance of activity because of the very nature of the crime—e.g., it is difficult to show a
pattern of conspiracy or trafficking with a single incident. 791 F.2d at 1399.
And while it is true that “an anonymous tip is insufficient to establish probable
cause” for a warrant, it is only insufficient “absent independent corroboration through
police investigation or some other indication of reliability.” United States v. Clark, 31 F.3d
831, 835 (9th Cir. 1994). See also United States v. Artis, 919 F.3d 1123, 1134-35 (9th Cir.
2019) (explaining probable cause may properly be based on unidentified informant’s tip if
it has been corroborated by law enforcement).
Here, Detective Hulet’s actions easily corroborate the anonymous tip. The tip was
specific to methamphetamine distribution, and the police had previously purchased
methamphetamine from Torres. Also, the tip specified that Torres had a girlfriend named
Jessica, that they lived in an apartment complex in Idaho Falls, and that Torres drove a
newer white Kia. Detective Hulet had watched Torres and knew that his girlfriend was
Mekosch, that they lived together, and that Torres drove a white Kia.
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In short, the information used to support Detective Hulet’s probable cause affidavit
was not stale and the anonymous tip was corroborated by other observations and evidence.
b. 	Mekosch
The warrant authorizing the ping on Mekosch’s phone did not lack probable cause
either. The information outlined above as to Torres also applies to Mekosch because: (1)
Detectives knew Mekosch was Torres’s girlfriend and they lived together, (2) CS2 told
Detectives that Mekosch would move drugs for Torres on occasion, and (3) Detectives
observed Mekosch with Torres (or in an adjacent vehicle) on numerous occasions when
Torres was known to be transporting drugs. Dkt. 98-1, at 2–3. This information was
relevant, corroborated, and sufficient to support probable cause for the ping warrant on
Mekosch’s phone.
In short, the Court finds the information used to establish probable cause for both
warrants was not stale, and the anonymous tip regarding Torres was corroborated by
Detective Hulet.
2. 	Torres’s Ping Warrant Extension and Mekosch’s Ping Warrant were based on
Criminal Information and Validly Issued.2
Torres next argues the extension of his warrant should not have issued because it
was based on non-criminal information. Dkt. 79, at 18. Specifically, Torres argue the facts
provided “do not confirm the reliability of the first warrant,” and “a trip to Seattle can be
innocuous, and common driving is not criminal.” Id. Additionally, Mekosch argues
2 Again, each defendant only has standing to challenge his or her own warrant, but because the
circumstances in this case are so intertwined—especially on this particular point—the Court will discuss
the Parties’ arguments in tandem.
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initiating the ping warrant on her phone based on these events amounts to finding criminal
what is otherwise “non-criminal driving patterns . . . .” Dkt. 98, at 3.
To begin, both Defendants severely under-emphasize the evidence against them. As
explained above, there was ample evidence to support the conclusion that Torres and
Mekosch 	were 	engaged 	in 	drug 	trafficking—controlled 	buys, 	confidential 	sources,
anonymous tips, and other law enforcement observations. While a single instance, standing
alone, may not have been sufficient to support a probable cause affidavit, when taken in
conjunction with each other, all these interactions and observations were more than enough
to support Detective Hulet’s application and Judge Call’s decision to extend the warrant or
Torress and initiate a warrant on Mekosch.
Both Defendants argue the behavior Detectives observed—specifically going to
Seattle and driving together—was innocent and cannot support the warrants. But the
Supreme Court has cautioned against looking at events in isolation or finding that events
“readily susceptible to an innocent explanation [are] entitled to no weight.” United States
v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (citation modified). Rather, Courts are to view the
“totality of the circumstances” when deciding whether seemingly innocent behavior
requires further investigation. Id. See also United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9 (1989)
(holding that factors which by themselves were “quite consistent with innocent travel”
collectively amounted to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based upon the attending
circumstances). Finally, probable cause “requires only a probability or substantial chance
of criminal activity, not an actual showing of criminal activity.” District of Columbia v.
Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018) (citation modified).
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Here, the extension of Torres’s warrant and the initiation of Mekosch’s warrant were
based on contemporaneous information from reliable confidential sources suggesting the
reason for Torres and Mekosch’s trips to Seattle was for the purpose of acquiring drugs.
Thus, while travelling to Seattle (even in different vehicles) is not criminal in isolation,
when viewed against the totality of the circumstances, it is not difficult for the Court to
find the events provided sufficient probable cause to issue the extension of Torres’s warrant
and add a warrant for Mekosch.
3. 	Execution of the Ping Warrant
Lastly, Defendants argue the ping warrants should be suppressed because both
warrants were “daytime” warrants, but Detectives received alerts on each Defendant’s
cellphone around the clock—meaning during the day and night.
Idaho Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 outlines warrants must be “served in the
daytime, unless for reasonable cause shown, the judge by appropriate provision in the
warrant authorize its execution at times other than daytime. ‘Daytime’ means the hours
between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. according to local time.” Idaho R. Crim. P. 41(d)(4)
(“Rule 41”). Because AT&T provided data to Detectives around the clock, Defendants
claim law enforcement impermissibly exceeded the scope of each warrant.
The initial problem with this argument is that Rule 41 does not explicitly define the
terms “served” and “execution.” For its part, the Government believes a warrant is
“executed” when it is “served” upon the target. In other words, so long as it serves (e.g.
“delivers” or “executes”) the warrant between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m., they have
complied. Defendants, however, appear to believe execution implies performing the task
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outlined in the warrant. Thus, while a warrant must be “served” (e.g. “delivered”) during
the day it must be “executed” during the day as well. Thus, a warrant that is “executed”
constantly, as in this case, must comply with the stricter nighttime requirements. The Court
finds the definition lies somewhere in the middle.
Subsection (d)(4) of Rule 41 initially uses the word “served” when discussing the
service of a warrant but then transitions to “executed” later in the same paragraph. This
might suggest the words are interchangeable. But such a conclusion would undercut the
distinction between daytime and nighttime warrants and the “reasonable cause” that must
be shown for the later. Furthermore, it is the Court’s experience that most warrants are for
discrete tasks, meaning a warrant is authorized to search a particular place or seize a
particular item. Thus, service and execution happen roughly around the same time—
meaning a law enforcement officer “serves” the warrant on the target and “executes” the
task (searching or seizing) at that time. Thus, unless there is good cause shown, that service
and execution—again because they happen simultaneously—must happen during the day.
Here, the situation is more nuanced. Yes, the warrants here were both titled “Day
Time Seach Warrant,” Dkt. 79-1, at 4; Dkt. 98-2, at 1, but each authorized “any and all
current, real time location information.” Id. And for a period of “60 days after execution of
this warrant.” Id.3
Detective Hulet testified the warrants were sent to, and processed by, AT&T during
3 This language supports the Government’s interpretation that “execution” is the same as “service.”
Meaning, if the Court were to accept Defendants’ definition that execution is ongoing, there would be no
way to define what 60 days after execution means—because “execution” would be constantly happening.
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the day. Dkt. 115, at 15. But it would seem impractical to limit the retrieval of “any and
all” location monitoring data to daytime hours.4
Importantly, the Court can consider the affidavit when determining the scope of the
warrant. United States v. Rettig, 589 F.2d 418, 423 (9th Cir. 1978). The circumstances
surrounding the issuance of the warrant may also be relevant. Id.
First, Detective Hulet’s affidavits did not limit his requests to daytime hours.
Second, while Hulet did not specifically outline that any of his observations occurred at
night, he did not say all occurred during the day either. And while travelling to Utah or
Nevada may be an activity that can be completed in a single day during daylight hours,
there was evidence Torres and Mekosch were travelling to California, Arizona, and
Washington. At the very least, this suggests that travel was happening more than simply
during the day.
Moreover, Detective Hulet is not a lawyer. While his language could have
potentially been more precise, the lack of specifics does not invalidate the warrant. See
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983) (noting that affidavits and warrants are
“normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and hast of a criminal investigation.
Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleading
have no proper place in this area”).
The Court does not formally decide the definition of “served” and “executed” as
4 Examples are not necessary, but it is not hard to imagine a scenario where such a rule would be illogical.
If criminal activity is afoot or law enforcement officers are in pursuit of a suspect and monitoring his or her
location and activities, it would be impractical (and potentially dangerous) to cut off the investigation at an
arbitrary hour.
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applied to Rule 41 today. However, it does find the Defendants interpretation impractical
and un-supported by the evidence.
Moreover, as applied to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, the Ninth Circuit
has held noncompliance requires suppression only where “(1) there was prejudice in the
sense that the search might not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive if the
rule had been followed, or (2) there is evidence of intentional and deliberate disregard of a
provision in the rule.” United States v. Stefanson, 648 F.2d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1981)
(citation modified). The Court finds this framework helpful as applied to Idaho Rule 41
and the circumstances of this case. There is no indication here that law enforcement would
not have received the same data and brought the same case had their search been limited
to the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. Additionally, there is no evidence to suggest the
Detectives deliberately went against a provision of the rule. At most, the rule is ambiguous.
Finally, even if the Court sought to limit the warrants in this case as Defendants
suggest, the Ninth Circuit has found that a search that began during the day and extended
into the night was permissible because the initial service occurred during the day. See, e.g.,
United States v. Woodring, 444 F.2d 749, 751 (9th Cir.1971). Accord United States v.
Joseph, 278 F.2d 504, 505 (3d Cir. 1960); United States v. McCarty, 475 F.3d. 39, 44 (1st
Cir. 2007)). Because these warrants were originally served and executed during the day, it
was permissible that they extended into the night.
Here, the ping warrants were sent to the service provider at normal business hours
during the day. Second, the affidavits requested—and the warrants authorized—“any and
all current, real time location information” for up to 60 days. Limiting the data to daytime
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 19
hours would be impractical. Third, per the suppression standard in the Ninth Circuit, the
Court finds the execution of these warrants was not prejudicial and there is no evidence to
suggest law enforcement had any intentional or deliberate disregard for Rule 41. Finally,
even assuming a limitation, it is not unreasonable for a warrant to be executed in the
daytime and then continue into the nighttime similar to Woodring, Jospeh, and McCarty.
Accordingly, the search warrants were properly executed, any data collected
pursuant to that warrant will not be suppressed, and Defendant’s Motions are denied.5
V. CONCLUSION
Although the Government conceded it will not use any of Mekosch’s statements
obtained at the scene of the traffic stop—and that information is excluded—Mekosch
waived her rights prior to her interview with Detective Hulet and any statements made
thereafter will not be suppressed.
Neither ping warrant was based on stale, uncorroborated information. The extension
of Torres’s ping warrant and the initiation of Mekosch’s ping warrant were based on
suspected criminal activity. Finally, the ping warrants were properly executed.
///
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5 Defendants make a final, passing argument that the warrants were overbroad in general. For the reasons
outlined above, the Court finds the warrants were not overboard. Each outlined the information sought, why
the information was necessary, and was limited in nature—albeit not in terms of time, but in scope.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 20
VI. ORDER
1. 	Mekosch’s Motion to Suppress (Dkt. 78) is GRANTED in PART and DENIED in
PART as explained above.
2. 	Torres’s Motion to Suppress (Dkt. 79) and Mekosch’s Joinder (Dkt. 98) are
DENIED.
DATED: January 9, 2026
_________________________
David C. Nye
U.S. District Court Judge
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