James J. Imburgia

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WESTERN DIVISION
In re:
James J. Imburgia,
Debtor.
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Bankruptcy No. 20-80743
Chapter 7
Judge Lynch
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The Debtor moves pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) to avoid the judgment lien
of creditor Warner Contracting, LLC (“Warner”) on the Debtor’s interest in his
residence in Loves Park, Illinois. (ECF No. 25, the “Motion.”) Debtor asserts a
homestead exemption of $15,000 under 735 ILCS 5/12-901, as permitted by section
522(b)(3)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, to argue that Warner’s lien impairs his
exemption. Warner objects to the Motion and denies its judgment lien impairs the
exemption. The Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the Motion. As discussed
below, after careful consideration of the weight and credibility of the testimony of the
witnesses and the other evidence presented, the Court finds that the Debtor failed to
meet his burden of demonstrating that the judgment lien impairs the homestead
exemption.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL FINDINGS1
James Imburgia filed his chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on April 13, 2020. The
Debtor’s bankruptcy schedules list the real property located at 2109 Margaret Drive,
Loves Park, Illinois (the “Residence”) as his residence, and value of his interest in the
property to be $60,000. The Residence is encumbered by a mortgage loan from U.S.
Bank Home Mortgage of $48,837.00. It is not disputed that Debtor holds a 100%
ownership in the Residence. Nor is his assertion that he holds a homestead exemption
of $15,000 under 735 ILCS 5/12-901, as permitted by section 522(b)(3)(A) of the
Bankruptcy Code. Four months after commencing this case, Mr. Imburgia received
his chapter 7 discharge, and the case was closed on August 17, 2020. On Debtor’s
1 The following findings, together with those set out in the “Discussion” below, set forth the Court’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052.
To the extent any findings of fact constitute conclusions of law, they are adopted as such, and to the
extent that any conclusions of law constitute findings of fact, they are adopted as such.
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motion, the Court reopened the case on July 30, 2025, to permit the Debtor to bring
this motion to avoid a judgment lien on the Residence. (ECF No. 31.)
Before the petition date, Warner obtained a judgment against the Debtor from
the Circuit Court of the 17th Judicial Circuit (Winnebago County, Illinois) for non-
payment of certain repair work it performed on the Residence. Following a bench
trial, the state court awarded Warner judgment for breach of a written contract in
the amount of $29,070.45, plus costs of $363.25. Warner caused the memorandum of
judgment to be recorded with the Winnebago County Recorder on March 27, 2020.
(Cr. Ex. A.) It is not disputed that the liens of U.S. Bank for the secured first mortgage
and Warner were the only liens recorded on the Residence as of the petition date.
Section 522(f)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to avoid the fixing of
a judicial lien “on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien
impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection
(b) of this section.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1). The Debtor now seeks to avoid Warner’s lien
pursuant to section 522(f). He contends that Warner’s lien impairs his homestead
exemption.
Warner opposes the Motion. The judgment creditor does not dispute the U.S.
Bank mortgage lien or the Debtor’s eligibility to claim the homestead exemption,
arguing instead the value of the Residence on the petition date to be about $135,000
and, consequently, that its lien does not impair the exemption. As such, the parties’
dispute centers on the value of the Residence. If the value is shown to be great enough
that the Debtor has equity to cover both the lien and the homestead exemption, then
the lien cannot be said to “impair” that exemption. If not, the judgment lien shall be
avoided.
The Court held an evidentiary hearing at which the Debtor, the owner of
Warner, and two realtors called by Warner, all testified. Although neither realtor is
a licensed appraiser, they were accepted as experts without objection and their
reports were admitted into evidence on the stipulation of the parties. The Debtor and
Warner also stipulated to the admission of several pictures of the Residence, a copy
of Warner’s memorandum of judgment and the 2019 Winnebago County tax
assessment for the Residence.
The Debtor concedes that if the value of the Residence exceeded $92,837.37 as
of the petition date, then Warner’s lien does not impair his homestead exemption.
(ECF No. 44 at 3.) After carefully weighing the testimony and evidence presented,
the Court finds that the Debtor failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the
lien impairs his exemption. Accordingly, the Motion must be denied.
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II. JURISDICTION
The district court has “original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under
title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a). In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), the district court
has referred this and all other cases under title 11 to this Court. N.D. Ill. R. 40.3.1(a).
A motion to avoid a judicial lien originates under the Bankruptcy Code, only arises
in a bankruptcy case and is expressly a core proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1),
(b)(2)(A) & (K);
In re Propst, 637 B.R. 489, 493 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2022). The Motion is
within the constitutional authority of the bankruptcy courts to enter final orders.
Propst, 637 B.R. at 493 (citing
Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 475 (2011)). The
parties also indicated their consent to the authority of this Court to enter final orders
and judgments in this proceeding.
III. DISCUSSION
In Illinois, “a lien on real estate is created when a ‘transcript, certified copy or
memorandum of the judgment’ is filed in the office of the county recorder where the
real estate is located.”
In re Marriage of King, 208 Ill. 2d 332, 346-47 (2003) (quoting
735 ILCS 5/12-101). While the discharge acts as an injunction forbidding collection
on most pre-petition debts “as a personal liability of the debtor,” 11 U.S.C. § 524(a),
the discharge generally does not prevent enforcement of a lien against collateral
owned by the debtor and subject to that lien. “Security interests and other liens often
pass through bankruptcy unaffected,” unless modified or avoided pursuant to the
Bankruptcy Code.
In re Kleynerman, 93 F. 4th 1071, 1073 (7th Cir. 2024) (citing
Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 83 (1991)).
Three elements must be shown to avoid a lien under section 522(f): “(1) a lien
must have fixed on an interest of the debtor in property, (2) the lien must impair an
exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under § 522(b), and (3) the
lien must be a judicial lien—with the debtor bearing the burden of each element.”
In
re Jaffe, 932 F.3d 602, 605 (7th Cir. 2019). The parties do not dispute that the Debtor
owns the Residence, Warner’s judgment lien fixed on his interest pre-petition, the
lien is a judicial lien,2 and the Debtor is entitled to assert a homestead exemption in
the property. The only dispute is whether Warner’s lien “impairs” that exemption.
The Bankruptcy Code clarifies that:
2 A “judicial lien” is a “lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process
or proceeding.”
City of Chi. v. Mance (In re Mance), 31 F.4th 1014, 1018 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting 11
U.S.C. § 101(36)).
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a lien shall be considered to impair an exemption to the extent that the
sum of –
(i) the lien;
(ii) all other liens on the property; and
(iii) the amount of the exemption that the debtor could claim if
there were no liens on the property;
exceeds the value that the debtor’s interest in the property would have
in the absence of any liens.
11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A). Here, like in
Willett v. Appeal of Nat’l Capital Mgmt., LLC
(In re Willett), “to avoid impairing the exemption, the [value of the Debtor’s
ownership interest in the property] had to exceed the amount of the exemption (in
this case, $15,000) plus all liens on the property.” 544 F.3d 787, 790 (7th Cir. 2008).
The Debtor bears the burden of proving each element of section 522(f)(1) except the
creditor bears the burden of challenging the validity of the asserted exemption as not
properly claimed.
In re Bowens, 656 B.R. 883, 889 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2024) (citing Fed.
R. Bankr. P. 4003(c) (“In a hearing under this Rule 4003, the objecting party has the
burden of proving that an exemption was not properly claimed.”)).
See also, e.g., In re
Schoonover, 331 F.3d 575, 578 (7th Cir. 2003) (as opposed to Rule 4003(b)’s provisions
for objection to claim of exemption, Rule 4003(d) generally places “the onus of
contesting a lien on debtors”).
In the context of section 522(f), “‘value’ means fair market value as of the date
of the filing of the petition or, with respect to property that becomes property of the
estate after such date, as of the date such property becomes property of the estate.”
Willett, 544 F.3d at 791 (quoting 11 U.S.C. 522(a)(2)). As it is uncontested that the
Residence was owned by the Debtor as of the petition date, “the filing date is the time
for valuation of an asset claimed as exempt.”
Kleynerman, 93 F.4th at 1074. In
addressing the Bankruptcy Code’s fraudulent transfer provisions in section 548,
which use the “entirely novel phrase ‘reasonably equivalent value,’” the Supreme
Court has distinguished the “well-established concept” of “fair market value,” used in
section 522.
BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537 (1994). The “market value”
of a piece of property is
the price which it might be expected to bring if offered for sale in a fair
market; not the price which might be obtained on a sale at public auction
or a sale forced by the necessities of the owner, but such a price as would
be fixed by negotiation and mutual agreement, after ample time to find
a purchaser, as between a vendor who is willing (but not compelled) to
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sell and a purchaser who desires to buy but is not compelled to take the
particular . . . piece of property.
Id. at 538 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 971 (6th ed. 1990)). Courts have further
discerned that the statutory formula used in section 522(f)(2)(A) “does not include
liquidation costs.”
In re Zavalza, No. 21-13296, 2024 Bankr. LEXIS 895, at *6 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2024) (agreeing with “majority view” that “[e]stimated liquidation
costs such as broker commissions, title costs and recording costs should not be
deducted from the fair market value of the property when calculating the extent of
the impairment” (citing
Sheth v. Affiliated Realty & Mgmt. Co. (In re Sheth), 225
B.R. 913, 919 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998))).
Noting that trial courts “enjoy considerable discretion in evaluating the
qualifications of an expert and the reliability of the proffered testimony,” the Seventh
Circuit did not disagree that “three valuation methods are generally used to
determine the fair market value of real property . . . (1) the comparable sales method,
(2) the income method, and (3) the cost method” or some combination of the three.
Lock Realty Corp. IX v. U.S. Health, LP, 707 F.3d 764, 771 (7th Cir. 2013) (discussion
in the context of a commercial lease). The comparable sales method is frequently used
in evaluating the value of residential property.
See, e.g., In re Badolato, 641 B.R. 806,
812 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2022) (“Mr. Ryan applied the ‘comparable sales methodology,’
an approach commonly utilized by expert appraisers and ‘generally accepted [as] the
best evidence of market value in cases where a court must determine the value of real
property.’” (alteration in original) (quoting	
Hawkins v. Santander Bank (In re
Hawkins), 606 B.R. 632, 643 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2019)));
Gallick v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of
Revision, No. 14 CV 007191, 2014 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 17575, at *29 (Ct. Com. Pl. Oct.
29, 2014) (“The comparable sales approach is considered especially useful for valuing
residential properties.”);
In re De Leon, No. 11-56921-ASW, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 3004,
at *41 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. July 18, 2013) (preferring sales comparison approach to
income or cost method because care facilities were “[f]or all practical
purposes . . . single family homes”);
In re Culver, No. 23-35334 (CGM), 2025 Bankr.
LEXIS 2690, at *14 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2025) (“In valuing residential real
property under New York law, the typical method used is the comparable sales
method.”). Neither party provided evidence as to the income method or cost method,
and no evidence was presented suggesting that the best use of the property was as
an income-producing property or to scrap and build.
The Residence is a ranch-style house with 1,153 square feet, 3 bedrooms,
1 bathroom, a 2.5 car garage and no basement. Mr. Imburgia, the only witness called
by the Debtor, listed the Residence as worth $60,000, which at trial he conceded to be
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the same amount he paid for it six years before. Mr. Imburgia stated that the
Residence was “a fixer upper when I bought it.” He testified that a kitchen wall had
a crack due to the installation of the porch by the prior owner, vaguely adding that
“the kitchen has a lot of problems that need to be taken care of.” But he did not
describe with any detail what those “problems” were or provide information about the
impact, if any, they had on his estimate. He also testified that the previous owner
had redone the bathroom, allegedly installing new drywall over mold. Mr. Imburgia
asserted that the mold has reappeared (it is not clear when) and he is now using
bleach as a cheap “fix” for the problem. He also testified with little elaboration that a
portion of the house had “old carpeting.” Again, he did not opine about the extent of
these conditions or even their presence as of the petition date, or estimate how they
might affect the value of the Residence in 2020.
Mr. Imburgia vaguely testified, without objection, that in 2020 he had looked
at the Zillow real estate website. He did not describe what information he obtained
from this source or suggest how Zillow is relevant to his testimony. His attorney did
not attempt to lay a foundation or argue for the admissibility of the Zillow estimate.
As a general proposition, a homeowner, who is knowledgeable about the condition of
his home, is generally competent to testify regarding its value.
In re Liss, 641 B.R.
384, 388 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2022) (accepting debtor’s lay opinion not based solely on
speculative factors where creditor failed to call any witnesses to support a competing
valuation). However, such opinions as to the ultimate monetary value of the home
are often “entitled to little weight due to their lack of knowledge of the general sales
atmosphere and of comparable sales, and their lack of training and expertise in
making adjustments between other properties and their own.”
Hegeduis v. Harris,
N.A. (In re Hegeduis), 525 B.R. 74, 81 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2015).
The Debtor was permitted to testify, over Warner’s objection, about Winnebago
County Treasurer Parcel Tax Details statements for the Residence regarding Tax
Year 2019 (payable 2020). (D. Ex. A.)3 The printout, with its recitation of the tax
calculation, includes the line: “Fair Market Value: 45330.” Without addressing the
admissibility of this statement as to the fair market value of the property, it is enough
to note that the amount stated in a tax assessment with nothing more is of very little
weight as to the issue of the property’s fair market value for purposes of this motion.
3 During cross-examination, the Debtor’s counsel also moved into evidence county property tax details
for 2019 taxes payable in 2020 for the three properties used in the market analysis prepared by
Warner’s expert: the Applewood Ln., Loves Park property (Ex. C), the Zinnia Dr., Machesney Park
property (Ex. E) and the Harvest Tr., Loves Park property (Ex. G). These exhibits also reference Tax
Year 2019. The Debtor did not present testimony how the figures for “Fair Market Value,” found at
the end of a section titled “Tax Calculation,” were compiled or what they represent.
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See, e.g., Vill. of Round Lake v. Amann, 311 Ill. App. 3d 705, 715 (2000) (“It is well
established that the determination of assessed valuation is for a different purpose
and is not a fair criterion of fair market value.”) (citing
City of Chicago v. Harrison-
Halsted Building Corp., 11 Ill. 2d 431, 439 (1957));
Ceres Terminals v. Chi. City Bank
& Tr. Co., 259 Ill. App. 3d 836, 856 (1994) (noting “desire for uniformity in order to
equalize the tax burden” is independent of market value and citing numerous cases
“unequivocal in their determinations that valuation for tax assessment purposes is
not coextensive with the valuation for determining the actual fair market value of the
property”).
As noted above, Warner presented three witnesses and offered ten exhibits at
trial.4 Scott Warner, the owner and operator of the lienholder, testified about the
construction work his company performed on the Debtor’s house between July 2017
and January 2018.
Its second witness, Julie Humpal, has been a real estate broker since 1994 and
holds a managing broker’s license. She is located in the Rockford area, conducting
her business in this part of the state and adjoining areas of Wisconsin. Warner hired
her in July 2025 to prepare a valuation report for 2019-2020. The Debtor did not
object to her presenting expert valuation testimony about the Residence. Ms. Humpal
testified she is familiar with the Residence and has reviewed extensive photographs
of the premises. She is familiar with the area which she describes as “well-
established.” However, while she typically does a “walk-through” for her personal
clients, she did not tour the Residence.
At trial, Ms. Humpal identified her valuation report (admitted without
objection as Cr. Ex. I) and proceeded to testify about her comparable market analysis.
She told the Court that the Residence is comparable to three 3-bedroom ranch-style
houses in the area (“in the same geographical grid” as the Residence) which sold
within a year before the petition date. The first, sold in February 2020 for $119,900,
was a slightly smaller residence with 1,023 square feet, 1.5 baths, a 2-car garage and
a basement. The second sold in July 2019 for $146,000. It had 1,153 square feet with
1.5 baths, a 2-car garage and a basement. The third was sold in May 2019 for
$134,900, with 1,120 square feet, 1.5 baths, a 2-car garage and a basement. From
these comparables, Ms. Humpal valued the Debtor’s Residence at $135,000 as of the
petition date. Although the three comparables had basements, no evidence was
4 Seven of these exhibits, Cr. Ex. B – H, consisted of photos of the Residence taken at various times.
All but Cr. Ex. D were stipulated to and admitted without objection. The Debtor’s objection to Cr. Ex.
D was sustained. Its remaining exhibits, another copy of the recorded state court judgment (Cr. Ex.
A), the market analyses of Ms. Humpal (Cr. Ex. I), and Mr. Shields’ valuation report and 17 pages of
accompanying materials (Cr. Ex. J), were admitted without objection.
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presented by any of the experts from which the Court could determine if any
adjustments were appropriate for a basement or powder room, or even whether any
adjustments were appropriate here. During her testimony, however, Ms. Humpal
stated that in her view the lack of basement may reduce potential problems for the
Residence and is not an issue for her calculation of its value. This assertion was not
examined during her cross-examination. Nor was she questioned about her opinion
that the large garage and storage space behind Residence are unique positive
features. She further testified that the Residence is in a well-established location with
nearby stores, noting that she drove through the area as recently as a few days before
trial and observed only one vacant lot.
She also testified that she never relies on Zillow. In her view, that website
tends to be inaccurate, is subject to seller influence and “is not accepted in realty.”
Finally, Ms. Humpal offered her opinion that tax assessments are not accurate
measures of property value. She explained that assessors never “match true price”
and do not “keep up” with property changes. She further opined that Warner’s
prepetition repair work would have “had a big impact” on the value of the Residence.
In August 2025, the Debtor asked Brad Shields, a licensed real estate broker
from the Rockford area, to prepare a valuation report on the Residence. (Cr. Ex. J.)
At trial, Mr. Shields told the Court that his relevant experience includes providing
“input into listing prices . . . so my clients can list a good price.” Called to testify by
Warner, and offered as an expert without objection, Mr. Shields further explained
that Mr. Imburgia had asked him to prepare a report about what the Residence could
have been marketed for in 2020. He identified Exhibit J to be his report.
Mr. Shields testified that he arrived at values ranging from $82,500 to $91,620
for his valuation of the Residence. First, he stated that based on his analysis of homes
sold in the area between 2014 and 2020, he estimated that as a general matter
property values in the area appreciated between 41% to 52% between 2014 and 2020.
Applying this average appreciation rate to the Debtor’s initial $60,000 purchase price,
Mr. Shields estimated the value of the Property as of the petition date to be around
$85,020 to $91,620. Acknowledging that he does not “usually look back five years,” he
then testified that he used 8-12 comparable local sales to arrive at a comparable sales
estimate for 2020, opining that “a sales price of $90,349.08 [is] realistic,” but that it
was his “professional opinion that the house would sell between $82,500-$87,500 in
2020.” However, he did not specify or provide details about his alleged comparable
sales either in his report or during his direct or, significantly, cross-examination by
the Debtor’s counsel. “An expert who supplies nothing but a bottom line supplies
nothing of value to the judicial process.”
Cripe v. Henkel Corp., 858 F.3d 1110, 1113
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(7th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exchange National Bank of
Chicago, 877 F.2d 1333, 1339 (7th Cir. 1989)).
See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(ii)
(expert report must include “the facts or data considered by” the expert witness in
forming his opinions). Without details on the comparative sales or the adjustments
Mr. Shields applied in reaching his opinion, the Court cannot judge the strengths or
weaknesses of the comparisons or the reasonableness of the adjustments.
Additionally, while Mr. Shields seems to ask the Court to trust his broad conclusion
that the “sales were similar,” he admitted during cross-examination that he had
never been inside the Residence.
Mr. Shields attached to his report – without explanation – what appears to be
a printout purporting to list some 182 addresses involved in real estate transactions
between 2014 to May 2020. Only five of these addresses appear to reference
properties in the same zip code as the Residence (there is no indication of distance
from the Residence, whether they share its “grid location” or even disclose the
municipality in which the addresses are found). Only one of the five addresses
indicates a closing date within one year of the petition date; two disclose 2016 closing
dates. Mr. Shields did not testify about the meaning, significance or relevance of this
attachment. In addition, Exhibit J also includes what purports to be a listing sheet
for the Residence from around 2013-2014, Winnebago County Treasurer Parcel Tax
Details (documents similar to D. Ex. A) for 2019, 2020, 2021 and 2024, and a Harlem
Township Assessor description of the property.
Mr. Shields testified that he does not believe that a “tax assessment is an
accurate estimate of value.” He criticized tax assessments as not accurate indicators
of value, observing that, in his view, tax assessors do not visit the properties, have
little information about the properties in most cases and use global numbers with a
“thin connection” with the reality for their determinations.
The Court finds Ms. Humpal’s methodology of comparing to actual sales in
2020 to be more credible for estimating value as of the petition date. Mr. Shields did
not show his averages and methodology to be accurate, reliable or appropriate, and
failed to demonstrate the general acceptance of his peculiar average appreciation
approach. For example, his appreciation method presumes that the Debtor’s purchase
price was an accurate value, that it appreciated at precisely an average amount, and
that there were no changes to the property affecting that appreciation rate.
Inconsistent with those assumptions, the record reveals that substantial work was
performed on the house during the relevant period on its roof, windows, siding, soffits
and facia. While the Debtor challenges whether he authorized all the work performed
by Warner – contending that he only authorized the roof repairs – he does not dispute
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that the repairs were made after he purchased the house and before he filed his
bankruptcy petition, work that is evidenced by the photographs received into
evidence without objection. He did not explain or suggest that his analysis takes into
consideration the “fixer upper” nature of the home when the Debtor purchased it in
2014, the extensive repairs made before the petition date or other relevant details.
Nor has he furnished any details about his downward adjustment to his own price
comparison estimates. Providing no detail on the facts or data he claimed to consider
or the downward adjustments he made to his own estimates, his testimony wholly
lacks the detail and specificity of Ms. Humpal’s valuation testimony. Mr. Shields
testimony adds little to “the bottom line.”
Warner has identified and analyzed three similar properties in the area that
sold for between $119,000 and $145,000 within a year of the petition. The Court finds
its proof to be credible and convincing. In contrast, the relevant proof presented by
the Debtor at trial was vague and speculative and failed to credibly demonstrate that
the value of the Residence was not greater than $ 92,837.37 as of the petition date.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court finds Humpal’s expert appraisal to be more reliable and credible
than the evidence presented by the Debtor as to the value of the Residence. Because
the Debtor has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the fair market
value did not exceed $92,837.37 when he commenced this bankruptcy case, he has
not met his burden of demonstrating that Warner’s judicial lien impairs the
homestead exemption to which he would be entitled. Accordingly, the Motion will be
denied.
The Court will enter an order giving effect to this decision contemporaneously
herewith.
DATE: March 31, 2026
ENTER:
__________________________________
Thomas M. Lynch
United States Bankruptcy Judge
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