USA v. Nunez et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
RAMON NUNEZ,
Defendant.
Case No. 3:16-CR-30136-NJR-1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Defendant Ramon Nunez has filed a second motion for compassionate release from
prison under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step Act of 2018. (Doc. 220).
Mr. Nunez is serving a 240-month sentence for his participation in a drug conspiracy in which
he also conspired to transfer a firearm to an illegal alien. (Docs. 6, 146). He argues that his
age-related medical concerns, rehabilitation, and eligibility under the First Step Act constitute
extraordinary 	and 	compelling 	circumstances 	justifying 	his 	release. 	(Doc. 	220). 	The
Government filed a response in opposition. (Doc. 222). After considering the parties’ briefs
and exhibits, the Court denies Mr. Nunez’s motion.
B ACKGROUND
In 2018, Mr. Nunez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent
to distribute methamphetamine and cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § § 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(A) and knowingly transferring a firearm to an illegal alien in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(d)(5)(A). Law enforcement had identified Nunez as the leader of a drug trafficking
organization that distributed drugs and firearms across the country from a base in California
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using semi-trucks with trap compartments. (Doc. 146 pp. 7-8). Before sentencing, the
Probation Department calculated his advisory Guideline range to be 324-405 months of
imprisonment. (Id. at p. 13; Doc. 191 p. 14). On September 25, 2018, the undersigned sentenced
Mr. Nunez to a below-guidelines term of 240-months imprisonment, with a five-year term of
supervised release to follow. (Doc. 181).
On May 5, 2022, Mr. Nunez moved for a reduction in sentence, citing the combination
of certain medical conditions and the exigencies of the COVID-19 pandemic. (Doc. 201). In
denying the motion, the Court observed that Mr. Nunez had been fully vaccinated against
COVID-19 and that his medical conditions did not rise to the level of extraordinary and
compelling reasons for release. (Doc. 211). The Court also held that the factors set out in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weighed against release:
The undersigned already noted that “a significant period of incarceration is
called for here in light of the amount of drugs and the extensive and
sophisticated nature of the conspiracy.” (Doc. 191, p. 36). Further, Nunez has
not even served half of his 240-month sentence. (Doc. 204, p. 16). Reducing his
sentence would fail to reflect the seriousness of his crime, promote respect for
the law, or provide just punishment for the offense. The Court also fears his
short incarceration would be insufficient to deter Nunez from future criminal
conduct or to protect the public from further crimes. Simply put, after
considering the § 3553(a) factors, Nunez’s request for compassionate release
must be denied.
(Id. at p. 3).
Mr. Nunez, who is now 69 years old, presently resides at FCI Oakdale II in Louisiana
and is scheduled to be released from BOP custody on December 3, 2032. See BOP Inmate
Lookup, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2026). He filed a request for
compassionate release with the warden of his prison on February 3, 2025. (Doc. 220 p. 6). He
then filed the present motion in this Court on April 7, 2025. (Id.).
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D ISCUSSION
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), a district court “may not modify a term of imprisonment
once it has been imposed” unless an exception applies. See Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S.
817, 819 (2010). One exception allows a court to grant an inmate compassionate release if the
inmate meets certain requirements. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). A federal prisoner may
bring a motion for compassionate release after exhausting the administrative remedies
provided by the BOP. Id. Mr. Nunez appears to have exhausted his administrative remedies
(Doc. 220 p. 6), and the Government does not raise exhaustion as a defense. See United States
v. Sanford, 986 F.3d 779, 782 (7th Cir. 2021) (explaining that exhaustion is “an affirmative
defense, not a jurisdictional prerequisite, so the government will lose the benefit of the
defense if it fails to properly invoke it.”).
The Seventh Circuit has described a two-step process for evaluating a prisoner’s
motion for compassionate release. First, “the prisoner must identify an ‘extraordinary and
compelling’ reason warranting a sentence reduction.” United States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th 569, 576
(7th Cir. 2021). Second, “[u]pon a finding that the prisoner has supplied such a reason,”
a court “consider[s] any applicable sentencing factors in § 3553(a) as part of determining what
sentencing reduction to award the prisoner.” Id. The reduction also must be “consistent with
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” United States v. Black,
131 F.4th 542, 544 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting 18 § 3582(c)(1)(A)).
Mr. Nunez first argues that his medical circumstances constitute extraordinary and
compelling reasons for release. His motion does not specify what those conditions are, but
he does refer to “age related health decline.” (Doc. 220). The Government helpfully attached
to its response Mr. Nunez’s recent medical records from his time in BOP custody. The records
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indicate that Mr. Nunez suffers from angina pectoris, hypertension, and prediabetes.
(Doc. 2221 p. 5). In June 2024, he reported to health services with a complaint of chest pain
that “felt like dying.” (Doc. 222-2 p 9). The BOP provider diagnosed him with angina pectoris
and prescribed Isosorbide mononitrate to manage the condition. (Id. at p. 12). The medical
records do not include more recent complaints regarding that condition and generally show
that Mr. Nunez receives care as needed in the BOP.
Three of the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s policy statements potentially are relevant
to Mr. Nunez’s medical circumstances. First, section 1B1.13(b)(1)(B) provides that a
defendant’s serious medical or functional impairments can be an extraordinary and
compelling circumstance warranting a sentence modification. A defendant must show that
he is either “(i) suffering from a serious physical or medical condition,” “(ii) suffering from a
serious functional or cognitive impairment,” or is “(iii) experiencing deteriorating physical
or mental health because of the aging process” and that at least one of these conditions
“substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the
environment of a correctional facility and . . . he . . . is not expected to recover.” Ibid.
Second, section 1B1.13(b)(1)(C) permits a finding of extraordinary and compelling
circumstances where a “defendant is suffering from a medical condition that requires long-
term or specialized medical care that is not being provided and without which the defendant
is at risk of serious deterioration in health or death.” Ibid. Finally, section 1B1.13(b)(2) states
that extraordinary and compelling reasons for release exist if a defendant is over age 65, “is
experiencing a serious deterioration in physical or mental health because of the aging
process,” and has served at least ten years or 75 percent of their prison term, whichever is
less.
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Section 1B1.13(b)(1)(B) is not applicable here because there is no evidence that any of
Mr. Nunez’s medical conditions are affecting his ability to care for himself in prison. Section
1B1.13(b)(1)(C) likewise is inapplicable because the BOP appears to be providing adequate
medical care for Mr. Nunez’s health conditions. And Mr. Nunez does not qualify under
section 1B1.13(b)(2). Although he is more than 65 years of age, it is not clear that he is
experiencing a serious deterioration in health, and he has not yet served ten years or 75
percent of his prison term.
Mr. Nunez also cites his First Step Act eligibility as a reason for release. It is not
entirely clear what he means. Certainly, he is eligible to seek a reduction in sentence under
the First Step Act of 2018. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Government construes Mr.
Nunez’s statement as an argument that a non-retroactive change in law might warrant a
reduction in his sentence. It observes that the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Thacker generally
forecloses such arguments. See 4 F.4th at 574. Regardless, Mr. Nunez’s unadorned statement
regarding First Step Act eligibility is too vague to be an extraordinary and compelling reason
for release.
That leaves Mr. Nunez’s argument regarding his rehabilitation. He writes that he has
served approximately half of his sentence, has demonstrated exemplary conduct in prison,
and is completing rehabilitative programming and ESL coursework. He also describes a plan
to reside with his children in California upon his release. The Court commends Mr. Nunez
for his progress while in prison. However, these reasons do not rise to the level of
extraordinary and compelling circumstances. To start, rehabilitation alone is not sufficient to
warrant release. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). Although the Sentencing Commission has stated that
a defendant’s rehabilitation may be considered in combination with circumstances, U.S.S.G.
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§ 1B1.13(d), no other extraordinary circumstances are apparent on this record.
Because Mr. Nunez has failed to demonstrate that extraordinary and compelling
reasons support a reduction in his sentence, the Court need not consider whether the
§ 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of release. See United States v. Ugbah, 4 F.4th 595, 598 (7th Cir.
2021). Nevertheless, the Court incorporates by reference its previous discussion of those
factors when ruling on Mr. Nunez’s earlier motion. (Doc. 211, p. 3). His two-and-a-half years
of additional incarceration since that time do not materially alter the prior analysis. Mr.
Nunez’s motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) therefore will be denied.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Motion for Compassionate Release filed by Defendant Ramon
Nunez (Doc. 220) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 	February 12, 2026
____________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge
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