USA v. Macbeth

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
JORDAN T. MACBETH,
Defendant.
Case No. 3:18-CR-30045-NJR-1
ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Pending before the Court are two Motions for Compassionate Release pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) filed by Defendant Jordan T. Macbeth. (Docs. 37, 39). In his
first motion, Macbeth asserts that his sentence should be reduced due to the Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022). In his second, Macbeth asks
the Court to reduce his sentence so that he can avoid placement at a halfway house, which
he believes would be disruptive to his rehabilitation. The Government opposes any
modification to Macbeth’s sentence. (Doc. 40). For the following reasons, the motions are
denied.
B ACKGROUND
On September 5, 2018, the Court sentenced Macbeth to 108 months’ imprisonment
after he pleaded guilty to a two-count indictment charging him with interference with
commerce by robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) and possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). (Docs. 31). Macbeth’s
charges arose out of his robbery of a BP gas station in Nashville, Illinois, while absent
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without leave (AWOL) from his posting in the United States Army. (Doc. 27).
Macbeth first filed a pro se Motion for Compassionate Release on October 25, 2023,
citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor and his rehabilitation while in prison.
(Doc. 37). On April 14, 2025, while his motion remained pending, he filed a second motion
seeking release. (Doc. 39). In that motion, he states that there are no halfway houses in
the Western District of Virginia, where he will complete his term of supervised release,
so he was assigned to a facility in North Carolina. He worries that his time away from
personal resources in Virginia will hamper his rehabilitation. The Government opposes
release, arguing Macbeth has not identified extraordinary and compelling circumstances
and that issues with his halfway house placement should be raised in a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In the time since Macbeth filed his motions,
he was transferred to the Raleigh Residential Reentry Management Facility in North
Carolina. See BOP Inmate Lookup, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited
February 10, 2026). He is scheduled to be released on February 12, 2026. Id.
DISCUSSION
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), a district court “may not modify a term of imprisonment
once it has been imposed” unless an exception applies. See Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S.
817, 819 (2010). One exception allows a court to grant an inmate compassionate release if
the inmate meets certain requirements. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). A federal prisoner
may bring a motion for compassionate release after exhausting the administrative
remedies provided by the BOP. Id.
The Seventh Circuit has described a two-step process for evaluating a prisoner’s
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motion for compassionate release. First, “the prisoner must identify an ‘extraordinary
and compelling’ reason warranting a sentence reduction.” United States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th
569, 576 (7th Cir. 2021). Second, “[u]pon a finding that the prisoner has supplied such a
reason,” a court “consider[s] any applicable sentencing factors in § 3553(a) as part of
determining what sentencing reduction to award the prisoner.” Id.
Macbeth offers no indication that he exhausted his request for early release
through the BOP. Nevertheless, the Government did not raise the issue in its response,
so it is not a barrier to considering Macbeth’s arguments for release. See United States v.
Sanford, 986 F.3d 779, 782 (7th Cir. 2021) (explaining that exhaustion is “an affirmative
defense, not a jurisdictional prerequisite, so the government will lose the benefit of the
defense if it fails to properly invoke it.”).
In his first motion, he cites the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor as an
extraordinary and compelling reason for a reduction in his sentence. In that case, the
Supreme Court held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)) was not a
crime of violence that would trigger the application of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). As Macbeth sees
it, Taylor applies to his combination of convictions, so he is entitled to relief.
Regardless of whether that contention is accurate, the Seventh Circuit has held on
many occasions that legal challenges to a sentence should be brought via a motion under
28 U.S.C. § 2255, not by seeking compassionate release under § 3582. See United States v.
Von Vader, 58 F.4th 369, 371 (7th Cir. 2023) (collecting cases).
Macbeth’s first motion also cites a variety of other factors, including his minimal
criminal history, his age at the time of his conviction, and his acceptance of responsibility.
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However, the Court was aware of these factors when it sentenced Macbeth initially and
does not see any basis to conclude that they now make the defendant’s circumstances
extraordinary and compelling. Cf. United States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555, 562 (6th Cir. 2021)
(“[F]acts that existed when the defendant was sentenced cannot later be construed as
“extraordinary and compelling” justifications for a sentence reduction.”).
Macbeth’s more recent motion focuses on the potentially disruptive effect to his
rehabilitation caused by his placement at a halfway house located in another state from
where he will spend his time on supervised release. He also notes that he performed well
in prison, did not have any disciplinary issues, completed educational courses, and
obtained 	a 	job 	at 	the 	prison’s 	laundry. 	The 	Court 	commends 	Macbeth 	on 	his
accomplishments. However, these reasons do not rise to the level of extraordinary and
compelling circumstances. To start, rehabilitation alone is not sufficient. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(t). 	Although 	the 	Sentencing 	Commission 	has 	stated 	that 	a 	defendant’s
rehabilitation 	may 	be 	considered 	in 	combination 	with 	circumstances, 	U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13(d), no other extraordinary circumstances are apparent on this record. The Court
is sensitive to the difficulties posed by the lack of a halfway house closer to Macbeth’s
home community, but he has not established that any hardship is of an extraordinary
character. Cf. Anduha v. United States, No. 21-00141, 2024 WL 4932770, at *6 (D. Haw.
Dec. 2, 2024) (concluding that the lack of a halfway house in Hawai’i was not an
extraordinary and compelling circumstance); see also United States v. Thomas, 181 F.3d 870,
875 (7th Cir. 1999) (affirming a district court’s denial of a sentencing departure based on
the absence of a halfway house near the defendant’s residence or place of work). The
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Court sees Macbeth’s time at the halfway house — even if somewhat inconvenient — as
an important step on his transition back to civilian life rather than a reason to terminate
his sentence early.
Macbeth has failed to demonstrate that extraordinary and compelling reasons
support a reduction in his sentence, so the Court need not consider whether the § 3553(a)
factors weigh in favor of release. See United States v. Ugbah, 4 F.4th 595, 598 (7th Cir. 2021).
His motions pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) therefore will be denied. The Court
commends Macbeth on his progress and wishes him well on his impending transition to
supervised release.
For these reasons, the Motions for Compassionate Release pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) filed by Defendant Jordan Macbeth (Docs. 37, 39) are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 	February 10, 2026
___________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge
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