USA v. Walker

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
RICHARD WALKER,
Defendant.
Case No. 23-CR-30012-SPM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
McGLYNN, District Judge:
This matter is before the Court on reconsideration of Defendant Richard
Walker’s Motion to Suppress Evidence. (Doc. 24). In addition, pending before this
Court is a Motion to Bar Waived Argument on Remand filed by Defendant Walker.
(Doc. 72). Having fully considered the issues presented, the Motion to Suppress (Doc.
24) is GRANTED; the Motion to Bar Waived Argument on Remand (Doc. 72) is
DENIED as moot.
FACTUAL B ACKGROUND
Defendant’s Motion to Suppress arises from two searches conducted at a
modular trailer home on October 28, 2022, where Defendant Richard Walker had
stayed the night before. On October 27, 2022, St. Clair County Circuit Court issued a
bench warrant for Walker’s arrest following his failure to appear on underlying state
firearm and retail theft charges. 1 (Docs. 25, 29). At the time, Walker was on
1 The factual background is largely developed from reports prepared by St. Clair County Sheriff’s
Department Investigator Xavier Blackburn (Doc. 25), and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives Special Agent Zachary Green (Doc. 29).
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monitored release with St. Clair County Probation and had purportedly removed his
ankle monitor. (Doc. 29). On October 28, 2022, law enforcement officers including St.
Clair County Sheriff’s Department Investigator Xavier Blackburn; federal Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”) Special Agent Zachary Green; and
officers with the United States Marshal Service Great Lakes Regional Fugitive Task
Force (“Great Lakes Fugitive Task Force”) executed the warrant for Walker’s arrest.
(Doc. 25; see Doc. 29; see also Doc. 29, Ex. 2). Officers arrived at a modular trailer
home located at 313 Short Street in Brooklyn, Illinois (hereinafter “Short Street
Property”), acting on information that Walker had been residing there. (Doc. 25, p. 2;
Doc. 29; see Doc. 29, Ex. 2). The Short Street property was owned by Laverne Shipp,
who lived there with her daughter, Ramona Paulette (who was Walker’s girlfriend),
and the minor son of Walker and Paulette, Walker, Jr. (Doc. 25; Doc. 29; see Doc. 29,
Ex. 2).
It is unclear at precisely what time officers arrived to execute the warrant.
Upon their arrival, law enforcement officers established a perimeter around the
residence and then knocked and announced their presence. (Doc. 29, Ex. 2). Walker,
Jr. answered the door and walked outside to speak with the officers. (Doc. 25, Ex. 1).
Blackburn and other officers asked Walker, Jr. whether anyone else was in the
residence, to which he responded he was not sure who was in the residence or not.
(Id.). Blackburn and other officers continued to announce their presence while at the
door and yelled demands into the home for Walker to come out and step outside. (Doc.
25, Ex. 1; Doc. 29, Ex. 2). Walker then appeared from within the home as if he had
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just awoken, walked to the door with his hands up, and exited the residence. (Doc.
25, Ex. 1; Doc. 29, Ex. 2). Officers arrested Walker “without incident.” (Doc. 25, Ex.
1; Doc. 29, Ex. 2). At some point following the arrest, Walker was transported to St.
Clair County Sheriff’s Department Jail. (Id.; Doc. 25, Ex. 1).
Officers with the Great Lakes Fugitive Task Force then entered the Short
Street Property to conduct a “protective sweep” wherein they purportedly searched
for other individuals within the residence. (Doc. 25, Ex. 1; Doc. 29, Ex. 2). Officers
first entered the bedroom of Walker, Jr. (the first bedroom once inside the residence)
and lifted the mattress, discovering a firearm concealed between the mattress and
box spring. (Doc. 25, Ex. 1; Doc. 29, Ex. 2). ATF Special Agent Green photographed
the firearm where it was discovered and seized it. (Doc. 29, Ex. 2). No other
individuals were located within the home. (Id.).
Following the description of Walker’s arrest and the protective sweep of the
home, Officer Blackburn states in his report that the owner of the home, Shipp, was
contacted. (Doc. 25, Ex. 1). According to Blackburn’s report, “[S]oon after Shipp,
Walker’s girlfriend-child’s mother Paulette had been notified and arrived at the
address.” (Id.). Blackburn states that “Shipp, after offices advised her of the item
found consented to an audio, video witness statement interview,” and, prior to that
interview, she had “signed a consent to search form,” expressing her apparent consent
to a search of the Short Street property.2 (Id.). Green similarly describes in his report,
following the description of the recovery of the firearm, that “While on the scene, the
2 Special Agent Green attached a copy of the consent to search form to his report, which contains
Shipp’s signature. (Doc. 29, Ex. 1).
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owner of the residence, La Verne Shipp, arrived followed by Ramona Paulette.” (Doc.
29, Ex. 2). Blackburn and Green spoke with Paulette, who informed officers that she
and Walker were the parents of the minor child who answered the door upon their
arrival. (Id.). Paulette advised that Walker had arrived the previous night and stayed
at the residence with her. (Id.). Officers learned that Paulette owned a firearm, which
was located in a locked box in her bedroom she shared with Walker and to which only
Paulette had access. (Id.). Paulette consented to allowing law enforcement to view the
firearm, and entered the residence with Green, retrieved the locked box from her
bedroom, and showed it to Green. (Id.). Green then writes that he advised Paulette
of the firearm discovered under Walker, Jr.’s mattress, to which she responded by
appearing upset. (Id.). Green writes that it was Officer Blackburn who requested and
received written consent to search the residence from Shipp. (Id.).
Officers subsequently entered the home and searched the bedroom Paulette
shared with Walker, where they discovered a Crown Royal bag containing suspected
marijuana, a glass smoking pipe, and VISA cards belonging to Walker’s mother. (Id.).
Under the bag was a zippered bag containing clear bags of empty capsules, two
grinders, a pill press, empty bottles, scales, and clear bags. (Id.; see Doc. 25, Ex. 1).
Next to the bags were male clothing items, where a clear knotted bag with capsules,
suspected to be fentanyl, was located between pieces of clothing. (Doc. 29, Ex. 2).
Green then showed Paulette where in the bedroom the items were located, and she
confirmed the clothing belonged to Walker. (Id.).
Following the search, and just before 10:00 AM, officers recorded a videotaped
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interview of Shipp and Paulette. (See Doc. 29, Ex. 3, 4). Paulette, when questioned by
law enforcement, informed them that she had never seen Walker with a firearm, she
was unfamiliar with the firearm discovered under her son’s mattress, and that she
was not aware of any other firearms in the residence aside from her own. (Doc. 25,
Ex. 1; see Doc. 29, Ex. 3). She further advised, when questioned, that Walker arrived
late the preceding night, around approximately 11:30 PM or 12:00 AM; that she was
not sure how he arrived and that he does not have his own vehicle; and that he stays
in the bedroom he shares with Paulette and where drug evidence was discovered.
(Doc. 25, Ex. 1; see Doc. 29, Ex. 3). Paulette and Shipp informed the officers, when
asked, that the drug evidence discovered did not belong to them, and Paulette stated
that she did not believe she had noticed signs that Walker had been dealing drugs.
(Doc. 25, Ex. 1; see Doc. 29, Ex. 3).
On February 24, 2024, a grand jury in the Southern District of Illinois returned
an Indictment charging Walker with one count of felon in possession of a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (Count I) and one count of possession with intent to
distribute a controlled substance (fentanyl) in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
841(b)(1)(C) (Count II). (Doc. 1). On March 24, 2024, the United States filed the
operative Superseding Indictment alleging the same two Counts against Walker.
(Doc. 17). On June 5, 2023, Defendant Walker filed his Motion to Suppress and a
Sealed Memorandum in Support, seeking to suppress all evidence against Defendant
on the basis that it was unlawfully obtained during the search of the modular trailer
home where Defendant was initially arrested on October 28, 2022. (Docs. 24, 25). The
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Government filed its Response on June 27, 2023. (Doc. 29).
On December 1, 2023, this Court denied Defendant Walker’s Motion to
Suppress. (Doc. 42). In its written Order, this Court found, in relevant part, that,
pursuant to Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1989), and its progeny, the officers had
conducted a lawful protective sweep of the Short Street Property following the arrest
of Walker. (See Doc. 42); see also United States v. Walker, 704 F. Supp. 3d 866, 871−72
(S.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 2023). The officers, acting on “information that there were others
that could be on the premises in a confined trailer home,” acted within the scope of
the Constitution when they lifted the mattress in Walker, Jr.’s bedroom and
discovered the firearm. (Doc. 42, p. 8); Walker, 704 F. Supp. 3d at 872. The Court
reasoned that “[t]he officers involved in the search stated that they believed that a
person could hide underneath a mattress,” and that “although awkward positioning
would exist, an attack could be launched from between the mattress and box spring.”
(Doc. 42, p. 8); Walker, 704 F. Supp. 3d at 872. Even if the protective sweep had been
unlawful, this Court continued, the seizure of the firearm would still fall within the
attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule. (Doc. 42, p. 9); Walker, 704 F. Supp.
3d at 872. Officers had obtained the consent of the owner of the home, Shipp, to search
the premises, which was sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful conduct of the
protective sweep such that it provided independent legal justification to uphold the
search and seizure. (Doc. 42, pp. 10−11); Walker, 704 F. Supp. 3d at 873.
On December 18, 2023, Walker pleaded guilty to Counts I and II of the
Superseding Indictment (Doc. 45), and on March 20, 2024, he was sentenced to a term
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of imprisonment of 51 months as to each count, to be served concurrently.3 (Doc. 53).
On April 3, 2024, Walker notified this Court of his appeal to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. (Doc. 58). On July 17, 2025, the Seventh Circuit
issued its opinion reversing this Court’s denial of Walker’s Motion to Suppress and
remanding the case for further consideration of the issues. (Doc. 66, Ex. 1); see United
States v. Walker, 143 F.4th 899 (7th Cir. 2025). The Circuit Court concluded that the
warrantless search of Shipp’s residence, during which officers discovered and seized
a 	firearm 	in 	Walker, 	Jr.’s 	bedroom, 	was 	not 	reasonable 	under 	the 	Fourth
Amendment. (Doc. 66, Ex. 1, p. 10); Walker, 143 F.4th at 898. The Circuit Court held
that, even if the officers conducting the sweet had sufficiently articulable facts to
justify initiating a protective sweep, they exceeded its lawful scope when they lifted
the mattress in the son’s bedroom. (Doc. 66, Ex. 1, p. 10); Walker, 143 F.4th at 898.
The Circuit Court held that here, the United States “failed to identify anything in the
record to indicate that the officers here had reason to believe the area between the
mattress and box spring had been hollowed out such that lifting the mattress would
be ‘necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger.’” (Doc. 66, Ex. 1, pp. 10−11
(quoting Buie, 494 U.S. at 335−36)); Walker, 143 F.4th at 899. Thus, upon finding
that the protective sweep violated the Fourth Amendment, the Circuit Court next
turned to the question whether any exceptions applied such that exclusion of the
evidence would not be required pursuant to the exclusionary rule. (Doc. 66, Ex. 1, p.
3 Walker was additionally sentenced to a term of three years of Supervised Released as to Counts I
and II, to run concurrently, as well as a monetary fine of $500.00 and a special assessment of $200.00.
(Doc. 53).
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13); Walker, 143 F.4th at 899.
First, in applying the good-faith exception to the rule, the Seventh Circuit held
that the Government failed to carry its burden to show that officers acted in objective
good faith when lifting the mattress in Walker, Jr.’s bedroom. (Doc. 66, Ex. 1, p. 15);
Walker, 143 F.4th at 900. Here, the Government failed to establish that the officers
reasonably relied on binding precedent when they lifted a mattress during a
protective sweep when they lacked particularized suspicion that a dangerous person
was hiding, and was able to hide, under the mattress. (Doc. 66, Ex. 1, p. 15); Walker,
143 F.4th at 900. Next, the Circuit Court evaluated whether the attenuation
exception may prevent the exclusion of the firearm evidence and held that this Court
erred in applying this exception to conclude that the firearm may be admissible
despite the unlawful protective sweep leading to its discovery. (Doc. 66, Ex. 1, p. 16);
Walker, 143 F.4th at 900−901. The Circuit Court further held that this Court’s
conclusion that “Shipp’s consent served as an intervening circumstance between the
unlawful conduct (i.e., the protective sweep) and the evidence seized (i.e., the
firearm)” was flawed because Shipp’s subsequent consent could not have served as
an intervening circumstance or the means through which the government could have
lawfully obtained the firearm. (Doc. 66, Ex. 1, p. 17); Walker, 143 F.4th at 901.
Because the firearm was obtained during the initial unlawful search, not during the
second, purportedly consensual search, the “inevitable discovery doctrine was the
correct tool for the job.” (Doc. 66, Ex. 1, p. 17); Walker, 143 F.4th at 901 (citation
modified) (citing United States v. Cooper, 24 F.4th 1086, 1095−96 (7th Cir. 2022)).
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Here, the Seventh Circuit held that, because this Court had not evaluated this
exception to the rule nor rendered any factual findings to an assessment of whether
this exception applied, it was remanding the case to this Court to “‘examine the
circumstances as they existed just before the protective sweep to determine what
would have happened had the protective sweep never occurred.’” (Doc. 66, Ex. 1, p.
19 (quoting United States v. Cooper, 24 F.4th 1086, 1096 (7th Cir. 2022)); Walker, 143
F.4th at 902. Finally, in concluding its analysis, the Circuit Court additionally
instructed this Court to, on remand, determine anew whether Shipp’s consent
justified the second search of the home. (Doc. 66, Ex. 1, p. 20); Walker, 143 F.4th at
902.
On August 8, 2025, the Notice of Issuance of Mandate was filed in this Court.
(Doc. 66). The parties appeared for a Status Conference held on August 28, 2025, and
this Court subsequently ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing limited
to resolving the outstanding issues as set forth by the Seventh Circuit in its opinion:
(1) whether the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule applies to the
search and seizure of the firearm; and (2) whether Laverne Shipp’s consent provided
independent legal justification to uphold the search and seizure of the controlled
substance contraband in Ramona Paulette’s bedroom. (Doc. 69). The Court scheduled
an Evidentiary Hearing for the matter for October 9, 2025. (See id.). Walker objected
to the hearing. (Doc. 71). On September 8, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion to Bar
Waived Argument on Remand, arguing that the Government should be barred from
arguing in its supplemental brief that the firearm would have inevitably been
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discovered because it previously failed to present evidence or make argument on part
of the legal analysis on that issue. (Doc. 72).
On October 1, 2025, the United States filed a Motion to Dismiss Count I of the
Superseding Indictment. (Doc. 74). The Government, as a result, stated in Response
to 	Walker’s 	Motion 	to 	Bar 	Waived 	Argument 	on 	Remand 	that, 	should 	the
Government’s Motion to Dismiss be granted, argument as to the application of the
inevitable discovery doctrine to the search and seizure of the firearm would be moot
in light of the firearm charge being dismissed. (Doc. 75). In addition, the Government
filed its Supplemental Brief on October 1 (Doc. 77) and also waived its right to present
evidence at the Evidentiary Hearing on October 9, 2025. (Doc. 76). Defendant Walker
filed his Supplemental Brief on October 2, 2025. (Doc. 78). In light of the parties
having informed the Court they did not wish to present additional evidence nor move
forward with the hearing, the Court cancelled the Evidentiary Hearing. (Doc. 79).
LEGAL S TANDARD
The Fourth Amendment provides “the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
U.S. CONST . amend. IV. The very core of the Fourth Amendment guarantee is “the
right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
government intrusion.” Caniglia v. Strom, 593 U.S. 194, 197−98 (2021) (citing Florida
v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013)). “From a constitutional standpoint, there’s no place
like home.” United States v. Corder, No. 21-CR-114-1, 2023 WL 2539030, at *5 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 16, 2023). A warrantless search of a home is presumptively unreasonable
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under the Fourth Amendment; accordingly, the government has the burden to show,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the search was reasonable under a valid
exception to the warrant requirement. United States v. Davis, 44 F.4th 685, 688 (7th
Cir. 2022) (citing United States v. McGill, 8 F.4th 617, 621 (7th Cir. 2021); see also
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014); United States v. Basinki, 226 F.3d 829,
833 (7th Cir. 2000)).
A motion to suppress seeks to exclude evidence obtained in violation of a
defendant’s constitutional rights. The Supreme Court has explained that “[i]n order
to effectuate the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures, this Court long ago conferred upon defendants in federal
prosecutions the right, upon motion and proof, to have excluded from trial evidence
which had been secured by means of an unlawful search and seizure.” Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968). “[W]hen the government obtains evidence in
violation of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights, the remedy is generally the
exclusion of that evidence—and evidence that is the fruit of the illegal search or
seizure—at trial.” McGill, 8 F.4th at 624 (citing Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 237–39
(2016)). “But this rule does not apply automatically. Rather, it applies ‘only . . . where
its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs,’ and certain exceptions
to the rule have arisen accordingly.” Id. (citing Strieff, 579 U.S. at 237–39). The
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule extends to both direct and indirect products of
the unconstitutional conduct, and therefore, “in determining whether evidence is
tainted by a prior illegality, we must determine whether the evidence was come at by
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exploitation of the initially illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable
to be purged of the primary taint.” United States v. Robeles-Ortega, 348 F.3d 679, 681
(7th Cir. 2003) (citation modified) (quoting United States v. Valencia, 913 F.2d 378,
382 (7th Cir. 1990)).
One such instance where this attenuation analysis is required is where law
enforcement initially conduct an unlawful search of a home, which is then followed
by officers obtaining the individual’s consent to search the home. In that case,
“[w]here the search following the illegal entry is justified based on alleged consent,
courts must determine whether that consent was voluntary, and in addition the court
must determine whether the illegal entry tainted that consent.” Id. It is the
Government’s burden to prove voluntary consent was given by a preponderance of
the evidence standard. See United States v. Hernandez-Pineda, No. 25-CR-64, 2025
WL 2438683, at *5 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 25, 2025) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 219 (1973)). In determining whether consent justifies a warrantless search,
the court looks at whether the consenting individual had authority to consent to the
searched spaces and whether the consent was voluntarily given, rather than the
product of duress or coercion. Davis, 44 F.4th at 688 (citing United States v. Correa,
908 F.3d 208, 221−22 (7th Cir. 2018)); see also United States v. Coleman, 154 F.4th
558, 561 (7th Cir. 2025) citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968))
(stating that for consent to be valid, it must be given freely and voluntarily); United
States v. Jones, 22 F.4th 667, 676−77 (7th Cir. 2022); United States v. Contreras, 820
F.3d 255, 269 (7th Cir. 2016).
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Determining whether consent to search was given voluntarily requires a court
to analyze the totality of the circumstances. Coleman, 154 F.4th at 561 (citing United
States v. Han, 205 F.4th 986, 991 (7th Cir. 2024)). Pertinent factors to this analysis
include: (1) the age, intelligence, and education of the person who gave consent; (2)
whether she was advised of their constitutional rights; (3) how long she was detained
before giving consent; (4) whether she consented immediately or only after repeated
requests by authorities; (5) whether physical coercion was used; and (6) whether she
was in police custody at the time she gave consent. Correa, 908 F.3d at 222 (citing
United 	States 	v. 	Cellitti, 	387 	F.3d 	618, 	622 	(7th 	Cir. 	2004)). 	However, 	“‘a
determination of voluntariness does not ride on the presence or absence of a single
controlling factor,’” rather, a district court must take careful consideration of all of
the surrounding circumstances. United States v. Johnson, 495 F.3d 536, 541−42 (7th
Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. LaGrone, 43 F.3d 332, 334 (7th Cir. 1994)).
Where voluntary consent is established, the analysis turns to whether that
consent was sufficiently attenuated from the initial Fourth Amendment violation. See
Davis, 44 F.4th at 689 (citing Robles-Ortega, 348 F.3d t 681). In analyzing whether
the consent is sufficiently attenuated from the prior unconstitutional action, the
inquiry focuses on the following factors: (1) the temporal proximity of the illegal entry
and the consent, (2) the presence of intervening circumstances, and, in particular, (3)
the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Id. (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422
U.S. 	590, 	603−604 	(1975)). 	“Whether 	consent 	was 	tainted 	is 	a 	question 	of
attenuation.” Corder, 2023 WL 2539030, at *11 (citing Davis, 44 F.4th at 689; United
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States v. Conrad, 673 F.3d 728, 733 (7th Cir. 2012)). The third factor is considered
the most important factor because it is tied directly to the rationale underlying the
exclusionary rule, deterrence of police misconduct. See Conrad, 673 F.3d at 733; see
also United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 532 (7th Cir. 1997). “This factor considers
both the conduct before and after the constitutional violation.” Conrad, 673 F.3d at
733 (citing Reed, 349 F.3d at 464−65). Bad faith cuts against attenuation, as does
“actions that were otherwise coercive or calculated to cause surprise, fright, or
confusion, and actions undertaken in an effort to advance the investigation or to
embark on a fishing expedition in the hopes that it would lead to a confession or other
useful evidence.” Id. (citing Reed, 349 F.3d at 465); see Green, 111 F.3d at 523
(“Because the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to discourage police
misconduct, application of the rule does not serve this deterrent function when the
police action, although erroneous, was not undertaken in an effort to benefit the police
at the expense of the suspect’s protected rights.”) (citing United States v. Fazio, 914
F.2d 950, 958 (7th Cir. 1990).
A NALYSIS
As an initial matter, this Court notes that the issue of whether Walker has
standing to assert Fourth Amendment challenges to the searches and seizure of
evidence at the Short Street Property has already been litigated. Both this Court and
the Seventh Circuit concluded that Walker did, in fact, have a legitimate expectation
of privacy in that residence, and thus standing to bring the Motion to Suppress. (Doc.
66, Ex. 1, p. 7); Walker, 143 F.4th at 896. As such, this Court will not revisit the
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Fourth Amendment standing analysis.
In addition, this Court notes that, in its opinion, the Seventh Circuit indicated
this Court must visit the following questions: (1) whether the inevitable discovery
exception to the exclusionary rule applies to the search and seizure of the firearm
found under Walker, Jr.’s bedroom; and (2) whether Laverne Shipp’s consent
provided independent legal justification to uphold the search and seizure of the
controlled substance contraband in Ramona Paulette’s bedroom. (Doc. 66, Ex. 1, p.
18−19); Walker, 143 F.4th at 902. Prior to filing its Supplemental Brief (Doc. 77), the
United States moved to dismiss Count I of the Superseding Indictment, the felon in
possession of a firearm charge. (Doc. 74). Thus, as to the first issue regarding
inevitable 	discovery 	of 	the 	firearm, 	the 	Court 	finds 	this 	argument 	has 	been
abandoned by the Government and no further analysis as to suppression of the
firearm is required. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Bar Waived Argument on
Remand shall be denied as moot. (Doc. 72). The Court thus begins with the primary
analysis required here: whether Laverne Shipp’s consent served as an independent
justification for the second warrantless search of the Short Street Property wherein
the drug evidence was seized.
Defendant 	Walker argued in 	both 	his 	original 	Motion 	to 	Suppress 	and
Memorandum in Support (Docs. 24, 25) and in his Supplemental Brief (Doc. 78) that
evidence of the drugs discovered during the second search of the Short Street
Property should be suppressed because the search violated his Fourth Amendment
rights. First, Walker argues suppression is appropriate because Laverne Shipp did
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not voluntarily consent to the search of her home. (Id., p. 2). Second, even if her
consent was voluntary, Walker argues that her consent was tainted by the illegal
protective sweep such that it must be suppressed. (Id., p. 3). Having raised challenges
to the drug evidence, it is now the burden of the Government to prove the evidence
was lawfully obtained. Davis, 44 F.4th at 688; see Riley, 573 U.S. at 382.
We begin with the issue of whether Laverne Shipp’s consent was voluntary. In
his Supplemental Brief, filed on October 2, 2025, Walker argues that Shipp’s consent
was coerced because law enforcement told Shipp and Paulette about the seized
firearm before asking for Shipp’s consent. (Doc. 78, pp. 2−3). Walker argues that
officers informed her of the fruits of their initial search because “[t]hey knew it would
influence the likelihood that she would consent,” thus exploiting their knowledge of
the illegally obtained firearm. (Id., p. 3). Moreover, he argues that the officers were
clearly seeking consent to search an area they had already searched, giving Shipp no
reason to withhold her consent. (Id.).
In its Supplemental Brief, filed on October 1, 2025 (one day prior to Walker’s
filing), the Government argues that “Defendant has not challenged the voluntariness
of Shipp’s consent so the only question that remains is whether the consent was
tainted by the earlier protective sweep.” 4 (Doc. 77, p. 4). Indeed, in his original
Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support (Docs. 24, 25), filed on June 5, 2023,
Walker argued that “voluntariness of the consent is only the first step,” and Shipp’s
4 In this Court’s Order establishing the parameters of supplemental briefing in this case, the parties
were ordered to submit briefs no longer than 15 pages in length and reply briefs were prohibited; the
deadline for filing supplemental briefs was October 2, 2025. (Doc. 69).
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consent could not serve as an independent legal justification for the search because
it was tainted by the initial unlawful search and seizure of the property. (Doc. 25, p.
8). In its Response to Walker’s Motion to Suppress, which it filed on June 27, 2023,
the United States argued that “[a]ssuming, for the sake of argument, that the officer’s
entry was illegal,” Shipp’s “voluntary consent was untainted by the illegal entry.”
(Doc. 29, p. 14). Thus, it appears to this Court that, prior to Defendant’s Supplemental
Brief, neither party had substantively addressed the discrete issue of whether
Laverne Shipp voluntarily consented to the second search of her home.
This 	Court 	finds 	that 	Walker’s 	argument 	that 	Shipp’s 	consent 	was
“involuntary” because it was obtained by means of informing her of the fruits of the
illegal protective sweep conflates consent with the attenuation doctrine. “Whether
consent was tainted is a question of attenuation.” Corder, 2023 WL 2539030 at *11
(citing Davis, 44 F.4th at 689). The question of voluntariness turns on an analysis of
the totality of the circumstances, including the following factors: (1) the age,
intelligence, and education of the person who gave consent; (2) whether she was
advised of their constitutional rights; (3) how long she was detained before giving
consent; (4) whether she consented immediately or only after repeated requests by
authorities; (5) whether physical coercion was used; and (6) whether she was in police
custody at the time she gave consent. See Coleman, 2025 WL 2837974 at *3 (citing
Han, 205 F.4th at 991); Correa, 908 F.3d at 222 (citing Cellitti, 387 F.3d at 622). The
presence of other forms of coercion, including through law enforcement tactics like
deception, fraud, or trickery, may also render consent involuntary. See Hernandez-
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Pineda, 2025 WL 2438683, at *5; see also Pagan-Gonzalez v. Moreno, 919 F.3d 582,
591−92 (1st Cir. 2019). Consent elicited by law enforcement officers presenting
themselves as such, but nevertheless lying about their authority or the purpose and
scope of their investigation, are particularly troublesome because citizens will
respond 	to 	law 	enforcement 	with 	a 	sense 	of 	obligation 	and 	presumption 	of
trustworthiness. See Hernandez-Pineda, 2025 WL 2438683 at *6 (citing Pagan-
Gonzalez, 919 F.3d at 592). As such, courts have found otherwise facially consensual
searches to be invalid where that consent was elicited through lies regarding the
nature or scope of their investigations. Id. (citing Pagan-Gonzalez, 919 F.3d at 592).
One type of deception courts have found have an impermissibly coercive effect
is where officers falsely present an urgent need for action, including in circumstances
such as where a defendant was led to believe there was a life-threatening emergency
by law enforcement agents seeking consent.5 Id. (citing United States v. Giraldo, 743
F. Supp. 152 (E.D.N.Y. 1990)). In Hernandez-Pineda, the district court found that
defendant’s consent was not voluntary given when he, in addition to his language
barrier in speaking with the officers and the fact he was detained for 10 minutes
without being advised of his constitutional rights, had been influenced by the officers’
insistence that they had to search his apartment to verify that a missing child was
not there. 2025 WL 2438683 at *7. By creating a ruse in which officers repeatedly
told him they had to check his apartment and that it was their job to do so, as opposed
5 The other type, less relevant to the facts of this case, is where consent to search is obtained by
officers who falsely claim they have a warrant or otherwise claim authority they lack. See
Hernandez-Pineda, 2025 WL 2438683 at *6 (citing Pagan-Gonzalez, 919 F.3d at 592; Bumper, 391
U.S. at 550).
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to asking for his consent, the court found that Hernandez-Pineda was under the
impression that the search of the apartment was not up to him. Id. In Pagan-
Gonzalez, the First Circuit held that consent obtained when roughly ten FBI agents
appeared at defendant’s door with the alarming news that computers in Washington,
D.C., were receiving signals or viruses from defendant’s location (a fabricated
emergency) rendered the consent involuntary. 919 F.3d at 597.
Turning to the present matter, Walker has not previously argued (either at
any point prior in the litigation or in his Supplemental Brief) that any of the facts of
this case, analyzed in accordance with the settled case law and relevant factors for
determining the voluntariness of consent, demonstrate that Shipp’s consent was not
voluntarily given. In fact, upon an examination of the record, this Court does not find
any facts to support a conclusion that Shipp’s consent was not voluntarily obtained.
The facts here demonstrate that Shipp was not detained by law enforcement nor in
custody when police sought her consent to search her home. See Correa, 908 F.3d at
222 (citing Cellitti, 387 F.3d at 622). Shipp was not only advised of her right to decline
the search, but officers took the time and procedural step of providing her a written
form for her to review and sign that clearly stated she had the right to refuse and was
foregoing the opportunity to exercise that right. See id; (see Doc. 29, Ex. 1). There are
also no facts demonstrating any physical force or threats of physical force on behalf
of law enforcement. See Correa, 908 F.3d at 222. Nor does this Court find that Shipp
was coerced by any fraud or deception. See Hernandez-Pineda, 2025 WL 2438683 at
*5 (citing Pagan-Gonzalez, 919 F.3d at 591−92). The fact that officers with the Great
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Lakes Fugitive Task Force found a firearm in her home was indeed truthful. While it
may be relevant that the officers used information of the firearm to potentially induce
her to grant them permission to reenter her home, information regarding the
discovery of the firearm does not appear to have created a false, imminent threat of
danger that coerced her consent similar to the circumstances in Hernandez-Pineda
or in Pagan-Gonzalez. See Hernandez-Pineda, 2025 WL 2438683 at *5 (citing Pagan-
Gonzalez, 919 F.3d at 591−92). Accordingly, it appears to this Court that not only was
Shipp’s consent voluntary, but that the heart of Walker’s argument, at its core,
concerns 	whether 	her 	consent 	was 	sufficiently 	attenuated 	from 	the 	unlawful
protective sweep.
Here, because the search following the unlawful protective sweep was justified
based on the consent of Shipp, the issue is whether the voluntary consent was
obtained by exploitation of the preceding Fourth Amendment violation, or instead by
means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. Davis, 44 F.4th
at 689 (citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 603; Robles-Ortega, 348 F.3d at 681). “To decide
whether 	voluntary 	consent 	was 	sufficiently 	attenuated, 	we 	use 	a 	mutli-factor
balancing test,” which includes “(1) the temporal proximity of the illegal entry and
the consent, (2) the presence of intervening circumstances, and, in particular, (3) the
purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” Id. (citing Brown 422 U.S.
603−604).
As to the first factor, the temporal proximity between the unlawful conduct
and the consent, while courts have “observed that several minutes may be insufficient
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to purge the taint of a constitutional violation,” time span alone is not dispositive.
Corder, 2023 WL 2539030 at *11. The Court “must consider the context and whether
it helps the passage of time attenuate the underlying violation. Id. at *12 (citing
Conrad, 673 F.3d at 733−34; Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 107−108 (1980)). For
example, in Corder, the district court found that while only a handful of minutes
passed between the unlawful law enforcement agent’s conduct and the subsequent
search, the defendant had not been in custody but instead was in the comfort of his
own home, able to reflect upon his circumstances. Id. In other circumstances, courts
have concluded that periods as long as two hours may or may not be sufficient to taint
the purge of a constitutional violation. See Conrad, 673 F.3d at 733 (collecting cases).
The passage of time, or the first factor, must also be considered in light of the
second factor, the presence of intervening circumstances. See id. (citing United States
v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 464 (7th Cir. 2003). In other words, time span alone is not
dispositive but must also be considered in the context of the factual circumstances
and whether it helps the passage of time attenuate the underlying violation. Corder,
2023 WL 2539030 at *11 (citing Conrad, 673 F.3d at 733−34; Rawlings, 448 U.S.
107−08). Intervening circumstances may attenuate the initial unlawful conduct by
severing the causal connection between the violation and the discovery of the
subsequent evidence. Conrad, 673 F.3d at 734 (citing Reed, 349 F.3d at 464). “Some
cases finding this factor present have focused on the presence of a non-custodial
voluntary consent as an independent intervening event, so long as that consent was
neither obtained immediately after an illegal entry, nor obtained following an illegal
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stop, detention, or arrest.” Id. (citing United States v. Liss, 103 F.3d 617, 621−22 (7th
Cir. 1997); Robles-Ortega, 348 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Jerez,
108 F.3d 684, 695 & n. 13 (7th Cir. 1997)) (quotation modified).
In Davis, a case originally from this Court and factually similar to the case at
bar involving the same Great Lakes Fugitive Task Force, the Seventh Circuit found
that the first two factors of the attenuation analysis favored attenuation. There,
officers with the Great Lakes Fugitive Task Force executed a state court-issued
warrant for the arrest of Defendant Paige Davis at the front door of his residence.
Davis, 44 F.4th at 687. Davis was arrested just outside the front door of his residence
as he was opening the door and stepping outside to walk his dog. Id. While being
arrested, Davis advised officers that children were in the house; officers subsequently
entered the home to conduct a sweep of areas where a person might be hiding. Id.
While inside, officers found a child and a teenager, and additionally observed a .22
caliber rifle standing upright in plain view in an open bedroom closet. Id. Forty-five
minutes after the sweep concluded, while officers were still on the premises,
Antionette Ewing-Jimerson, who also lived at the residence with Davis and who
owned the home, arrived. Id. The officers obtained oral and written consent of Ewing-
Jimerson to search the home, and she acknowledged that she had been advised of her
rights pertaining to the search. Id. Ewing-Jimerson spoke with officers during the
search 	and 	volunteered 	information, 	including 	where 	Davis 	slept 	and 	her
relationship to him. Id.
On appeal, Defendant Davis argued that, while Ewing-Jimerson had authority
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to consent to the search of her home and even if her consent was given voluntarily,
her consent was tainted because it was the product of an initial, unlawful entry (the
sweep during which the firearm was purportedly observed in plain view). Id. The
Seventh Circuit thus analyzed whether the government could sufficiently show that
the illegal entry did not taint the consent given for the subsequent search. Id. at
688−89. The Court first noted that the forty-five minutes which passed between the
initial entry and Ewing-Jimerson’s voluntary consent was sufficient to support
attenuation. Id. (citing United States v. Pineda-Buenaventura, 622 F.4th 761, 776
(7th Cir. 2010). Second, the Court observed that Ewing-Jimerson was absent from
the scene during the initial entry and arrived long after the initial search, which was
a clear intervening circumstance severing a causal connection between an illegal
search and any subsequent consent. Id. (citing Robles-Ortega, 348 F.3d at 682). The
Court further reasoned, in this regard, that while police had been present at the scene
at the time Ewing-Jimerson arrived, the mere presence of officers outside the home
was not enough to find that the initial unlawful entry tainted her consent. Id. (citing
Valencia, 913 F.2d at 382).
Viewing the facts of this case in light of the foregoing, while the first factor is
not entirely conclusive, the second factor and the context of the circumstances
supports attenuation. Based on the facts as recounted by both St. Clair County
Sheriff’s Department Investigator Xavier Blackburn and ATF Special Agent Zachary
Green in their respective police reports, the chronology of events appears fairly
straightforward and is not in dispute; however, the total amount of time that passed
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is entirely unclear. (See Doc. 25, Ex. 1; Doc. 29, Ex. 2). It is established that Walker
purportedly arrived at the Short Street Property the night before around 11:30 PM
or 12:00 AM, and that police concluded their interview with Shipp and Paulette at
around 10:00 AM on October 28, 2025. (See Doc. 29, Ex. 3). However, the time between
the search and Shipp and Paulette’s arrival to the Short Street Property is not
available to this Court. The context surrounding the timeframe at issue, however, is
more conclusive and favors attenuation. Similarly to Ewing-Jimerson in the Davis
case, Shipp was not at home or present for the initial unlawful protective sweep when
it occurred; rather, when she arrived home, officers had concluded their initial
intrusion into her home and were no longer inside. See 44 F.4th at 687, 689; (Doc. 25,
Ex. 1; Doc. 29, Ex. 2). Thus, this factor slightly favors attenuation. Id. at 689 (citing
Pineda-Buenaventura, 622 F.4th at 776).
The presence of intervening circumstances also favors attenuation. Id. (citing
Robles-Ortega, 348 F.3d at 682). As established by the Seventh Circuit, the presence
of non-custodial voluntary consent may operate as an independent intervening event
where that consent was not obtained immediately after illegal entry nor obtained
following an illegal arrest or detention. Conrad, 673 F.3d at 734 (citing Liss, 103 F.3d
at 621−22; Robles-Ortega, 348 F.3d at 683; Jerez, 108 F.3d at 695 & n.13). Again,
similarly to Ewing-Jimerson in Davis, Shipp was absent from the scene during the
initial entry and arrived after that unlawful search, which here, too, operates as an
intervening circumstance. Davis, 44 F.4th at 689 (citing Robles-Ortega, 348 F.3d at
682). While police were present when Shipp arrived, as in Davis, the presence of
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officers outside Shipp’s home, on its own, is not enough to find that the unlawful
protective sweep tainted her consent. Id. (citing Valencia, 913 F.2d at 382). The fact
that Shipp was not present but instead arrived only after the first unlawful search,
coupled with the fact she voluntarily consented to the search of her home, favor
attenuation.
The third factor, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct, is
considered the most important factor because it is tied directly to the rationale
underlying the exclusionary rule, deterrence of police misconduct. Conrad, 673 F.3d
at 733; see Green, 111 F.3d at 532. The exclusionary rule is employed to ensure that
the proper incentives are in place for law enforcement officers to deter intentional
misconduct that was patently unconstitutional; in other words, the exclusionary rule
is not used where suppression would do nothing to deter police misconduct. Id. (citing
Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 232 (2011); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S.
135, 143 (2009)). “[A]ctions undertaken in an effort to advance the investigation or to
embark on a fishing expedition in the hopes that it would lead to a confession or other
useful evidence” do not support attenuation and instead support suppression Id.
(citing Reed, 349 F.3d at 465).
In Davis, the Seventh Circuit concluded that this third factor, the purpose and
flagrancy of the police misconduct, also favored attenuation. Defendant Davis argued
that the misconduct committed by the officers was the decision to initially enter the
home without a warrant. Id. at 690. The Seventh Circuit found that, here, the United
States had met its burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
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officers had “good faith reasons to go into the home and conduct a limited sweep for
individuals who might cause harm to the officers or to themselves.” Id. The search
was limited to areas where persons might be hiding, and officers did not search any
enclosed areas such as drawers or cabinets. Id. Officers were only looking for
individuals who could harm the officers who were located just outside of the home or
could harm themselves if left alone in the home. Id. Based on the facts, the Seventh
Circuit concluded that Ewing-Jimerson’s voluntary consent was sufficiently tainted
by the initial unlawful entry such that it provided a basis for the subsequent search
of the home. Id.
In contrast to the Davis Court’s holding that officers conducted a lawful limited
protective sweep of Ewing-Jimerson’s home, here, the Seventh Circuit explicitly
found that the Great Lakes Fugitive Task Force’s initial warrantless entry into the
home was unreasonable and exceeded the scope of the Fourth Amendment. (Doc. 66,
Ex. 1, p. 10); Walker, 143 F.4th at 898. The Circuit Court concluded that the officers
exceeded the scope of a protective sweep by lifting a mattress where they had no
reasonable articulable basis for concluding a person posing a threat could be hiding.
(Doc. 66, Ex. 1, p. 10); Walker, 143 F.4th at 898−99. Hence, unlike in Davis, where
the officers’ good faith basis for entering the home initially supported finding
attenuation, the absence of that good faith here on the part of the officers when
conducting the unlawful protective sweep supports finding that Shipp’s consent was
not obtained by means sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful search.
Moreover, here, this Court finds that the officers’ obtaining Shipp’s consent to
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search her home was also not done in good faith but rather operated as the next step
in their investigation in order to continue their search for contraband in Shipp’s
home. See Conrad, 673 F.3d at 733 (citing Davis, 564 U.S. at 232; Herring, 555 U.S.
at 143). At some point after the arrest of Defendant Walker, officers communicated
with Shipp and called her to the scene such that she arrived home while they were
still on the scene. (Doc. 25, Ex. 1; Doc. 29, Ex. 2). Rather than having to leave the
scene and return at a later time, or rather than swearing out an affidavit and
obtaining a judge’s signature on a judicial search warrant, instead, with Shipp
present on the scene to give consent, their work could continue without significant
pause or interruption. Moreover, it is too much of a logical stretch for this Court to
conclude that her consent was obtained by means sufficiently distinguishable from
the illegal protective sweep. Here, officers specifically informed Shipp of the fruits of
that search at the same time they sought permission to re-enter her home. Shipp
maintains, by submission of her affidavit, that the officers’ action of informing her of
the discovery of the firearm in her grandson’s bedroom impacted her decision to give
the Great Lakes Fugitive Task Force permission to search her home; she also states
they asked her to “conduct a further search of my home.” (Doc. 25, Ex. 2 (emphasis
added). She knew that officers had already been in her home and knew what they
had already found while in there. The Government, having the burden here to
establish attenuation, did not attempt to rebut this evidence or call Shipp to the
witness stand to challenge her position or credibility as a witness. The purpose and
flagrancy of the misconduct clearly cuts against attenuation here.
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Simply stated, on the whole, while indeed Shipp’s consent was voluntarily
given in writing after she was informed of her right to refuse, this Court must
conclude that the consent she gave was clearly the product of their first unlawful
search, such that it was in fact tainted by the unlawful protective sweep. The purpose
of the exclusionary rule is to discourage police misconduct, particularly where, as this
Court has found here, was undertaken in an effort to benefit the police at the expense
of Walker’s protected rights. See Green, 111 F.3d at 523. Thus, this Court concludes
suppression is warranted here.
C ONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing reasons, Defendant Richard Walker’s Motion to
Suppress (Doc. 24) is GRANTED. Defendant Walker’s Motion to Bar Waived
Argument on Remand (Doc. 72) is DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: November 17, 2025
s/ Stephen P. McGlynn
STEPHEN P. McGLYNN
U.S. District Judge
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