Ziogas v. Conn et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
BENJAMIN LEE ZIOAGAS
Plaintiff,
vs.
DANIEL CONN, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 3:23-CV-756-MAB
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Benjamin Lee Ziogas’ Motion for Leave
to Amend Complaint (Doc. 134), Defendant Michelle Carbaugh’s Motion for Summary
Judgment for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies (Doc. 139), Defendants Seth
Quertermous and Zechariah Perroquet’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of
Exhaustion (Doc. 146), and several supplemental motions related to those three motions
(Docs. 152, 153, 158, 159). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to
Amend Complaint is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part (Doc. 134) and all other
pending motions are DENIED as MOOT (Docs. 139, 146, 152, 153, 158, 159).
1. Background and Procedural History
Plaintiff filed this civil rights action in March 2023 for alleged deprivations of his
constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1). Plaintiff’s original Complaint
(Doc. 1) and his First Amended Complaint (Doc. 25) were both dismissed without
prejudice (see Docs. 16, 30), such that this action is currently proceeding upon Plaintiff’s
Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 31).
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Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants were deliberately
indifferent in treating his ruptured ulcer (Id.; see also Doc. 40).1 More specifically,
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff began experiencing
abdominal pain, constipation, blood in his stools, and vomiting while housed in
segregation at Menard Correctional Center in March 2022 (Doc. 40, p. 2). Plaintiff
submitted numerous sick call requests and saw Nurse Reva on March 15, 2022 (Id.). She
informed Plaintiff that he was on a waiting list to be seen by a nurse practitioner, but the
waitlist was months long (Id.). Plaintiff alleges his symptoms worsened over the next day
and he asked Defendant Quertermous for treatment, but Defendant Quertermous walked
away without assisting him (Id.; see also Doc. 92).2
Plaintiff was released from segregation on March 18, 2022, and requested medical
attention from another correctional officer (Doc. 40, p. 2). In response, Jane Doe Nurse #1
stopped by Plaintiff’s cell and was informed by Plaintiff of his symptoms (Id.). That nurse
indicated she would come back later, but she failed to do so (Id.). Thereafter, at
approximately 3:00 p.m., Plaintiff spoke with a correctional officer, John Doe #5, and
requested medical care (Id.). However, that correctional officer did not provide Plaintiff
with a definitive answer to his request for care (Id.).
1 The Court’s background summary will focus upon the allegations and parties that will be discussed
throughout this Order. It does not discuss all the details or the entirety of Plaintiff’s allegations. These
additional details as to the entirety of Plaintiff’s allegations are contained in Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint (Doc. 31) and the corresponding Merit Review Order (Doc. 40).
2 Defendant Quertermous was substituted for the John Doe #3 identified in Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint on December 19, 2024 (Doc. 92).
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Later that day, at approximately 9:00 p.m., Plaintiff asked for medical attention
from Defendant Carbaugh, a nurse, as she was conducting medication rounds (Id. at pp.
2-3).3 Defendant Carbaugh ignored Plaintiff’s request for medical attention and continued
down the gallery (Id. at p. 3). Approximately two hours later, Plaintiff spoke with
Defendant Perroquet and again relayed his concerns (Id.).4 Defendant Perroquet also
failed to provide Plaintiff with assistance and instead walked away (Id.).
In the early morning on March 19, 2022, Plaintiff emailed a relative and asked them
to contact Menard to relay his request for medical care (Id.). At approximately 10:00 a.m.
that same morning, a Jane Doe #3 visited Plaintiff’s cell to examine him (Id.). Plaintiff
described his symptoms which included severe abdominal pain, vomiting, an inability to
eat or drink, difficulty breathing, a bloated abdomen, a rapid heart rate, and fever (Id.).
Jane Doe #3 immediately referred Plaintiff to a nurse practitioner, who examined him
and referred him to an outside hospital (Id.). At the hospital, Plaintiff was diagnosed with
a ruptured ulcer in his small intestine and underwent emergency surgery (Id.).
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint also raised numerous allegations against
the prison healthcare system for the delay in his treatment (Id.). In summary, Plaintiff
alleged Wexford Health Sources, Inc., the IDOC’s Director, Menard’s Warden, the
3 Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint initially listed Nurse Carbaugh as Jane Doe Nurse #2 (see Doc. 31
at p. 8). Nurse Pstorisca was then substituted for Jane Doe Nurse #2 in January 2025 (Doc. 95). However,
Plaintiff subsequently learned that Jane Doe Nurse #2 was Defendant Carbaugh and therefore, Plaintiff
ultimately substituted Defendant Carbaugh for Nurse Pstorisca in March 2025 (Doc. 109).
4 Defendant Perroquet was substituted for the John Doe #6 identified in Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint on July 25, 2024 (Doc. 68).
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Healthcare Unit Administrator, and Wexford’s President and Vice President, were all
aware of the harm caused by the healthcare system’s inadequacies (Id. at pp. 3-5).
The Court conducted a preliminary review of Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A in March 2024 (Doc. 40). That Merit Review
Order permitted Plaintiff to proceed on the following claim:
Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
John Doe #3 [Quertermous], John Doe #5, John Doe #6
[Perroquet], and Jane Doe Nurse #2 [Carbaugh] for failing to
obtain Ziogas prompt treatment for his ruptured ulcer.
(Doc. 40 at pp. 5-9). Conversely, the Court’s Merit Review Order dismissed Daniel Conn,
Cheri Laurent, Robb Jeffreys, Anthony Wills, Angela Crain, John Doe #1, and John Doe
#2 without prejudice due to Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim against those individuals
(Id.). Similarly, the Court dismissed Jane Doe #1 and John Doe #4 without prejudice due
to Plaintiff’s failure to include any allegations against those individuals (Id. at p. 6, fn. 2).
In addition, the Court dismissed Wexford without prejudice because Plaintiff neither
listed Wexford as a Defendant in his case caption nor included sufficient allegations to
raise a claim against Wexford (Id. at p. 7). Finally, to the extent Plaintiff sought to raise
challenges against other aspects of care at Menard, the Court found those allegations
were unrelated and failed to state a claim (Id. at pp. 8-9).
Thereafter, as discussed in footnotes 2-4, Plaintiff ultimately identified and
substituted: (1) Defendant Quertermous for John Doe #3, (2) Defendant Perroquet for
John Doe #6, and (3) Defendant Carbaugh for Jane Doe Nurse #2 (see Doc. 109). However,
the Court dismissed John Doe #5 without prejudice because Plaintiff failed to identify
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that unknown Defendant by April 1, 2025, as ordered (see Doc. 126; see also Doc. 109 at
pp. 2-3).
Consequently, the Court entered an Initial Scheduling Order on April 10, 2025,
which set a deadline of June 6, 2025, for Plaintiff to file a motion to amend, and a deadline
of July 11, 2025, for Defendants to file any exhaustion-based dispositive motions. Plaintiff
timely filed the instant Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint on June 3, 2025 (Doc. 134).
Notably, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint also included attachments
containing his Proposed Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 134-1) and a memorandum of
law in support of his motions (Doc. 134-2). Defendants did not file a response in
opposition to Plaintiff’s motion.
Meanwhile, on July 10, 2025, Defendant Carbaugh timely filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies (Doc. 139). Plaintiff
filed a response in opposition on July 24, 2025 (Doc. 145), and Defendant Carbaugh filed
a reply in support less than two weeks later (Doc. 147). Meanwhile, after being granted
an extension of time (see Doc. 142), Defendants Perroquet and Quertermous timely filed
their Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Exhaustion (Doc. 146).
Pertinently, when granting Plaintiff’s motion for extension of time to respond to
Defendants Perroquet and Quertermous’ motion, the Court also observed that neither of
Defendants’ summary judgment motions included a Rule 56 summary judgment notice
(see Doc. 149). As a result, the Court provided Plaintiff with an appropriate Rule 56 Notice
and granted Plaintiff an extended period of time to respond to Defendants Perroquet and
Quertermous’ motion (Id.). The Court also considered Plaintiff’s response to Defendant
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Carbaugh’s motion and found that it substantially complied with Rule 56 and SDIL Local
Rule 56.1 (Id.). Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution, the Court allowed Plaintiff
to request leave to amend his Response to Defendant Carbaugh’s motion if he believed
he was prejudiced by the lack of notice (Id.).
On August 26, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Response
to Defendant Carbaugh’s Motion (Doc. 153). On that same day, Plaintiff filed a motion
seeking a status update and an extension of time to file a response to Defendants
Perroquet and Quertermous’ motion (Doc. 152). On September 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed a
response to Defendants Perroquet and Quertermous’ motion (Doc. 157). Several days
later, Plaintiff filed a motion that sought to withdraw his prior request for an extension
of time (Doc. 158). Finally, on September 17, 2025, Defendants Perroquet and
Quertermous moved for an extension of time to file a reply in support of their exhaustion-
based summary judgment motion (Doc. 159).
2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (Doc. 134)
a. Standards for Leave to Amend and Rule 15
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) states that courts “should freely give leave
[to amend] when justice so requires.” In interpreting Rule 15(a), the Supreme Court of
the United States has explained that Rule 15(a)’s “mandate is to be heeded.” Foman v.
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Nevertheless, district courts can deny leave to amend
without abusing their discretion “where there is undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive,
repeated failure to cure deficiencies, undue prejudice to the defendants, or where the
amendment would be futile[.]” Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 2008)
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(emphasis added). “In the Seventh Circuit, dismissals under Fed. R. P. 12(b)(6) and §
1915A share the same standard” and “[a] Court may deny a motion to amend where it
would not survive a motion to dismiss.” Butler v. Anthony, 13-CV-01285-MJR-SCW, 2014
WL 13133659, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2014).
Additionally, when it comes to complaints filed by pro se litigants, “district courts
have a special responsibility to construe pro se complaints liberally and to allow ample
opportunity for amending the complaint when it appears that by so doing the pro
se litigant would be able to state a meritorious claim.” Kiebala v. Boris, 928 F.3d 680, 684
(7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Donald v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 95 F.3d 548, 555 (7th Cir.
1996)). See also Beal v. Beller, 847 F.3d 897, 902 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he Supreme Court
reaffirmed that ‘[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, . . . and a pro se
complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007))).
“The decision to grant or deny a motion to file an amended pleading is a matter purely
within the sound discretion of the district court.” Aldridge v. Forest River, Inc., 635 F.3d
870, 875 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
b. Analysis of Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (Doc. 134)
Plaintiff seeks leave to file his Proposed Third Amended Complaint so he may: (1)
raise a claim against Wexford, (2) raise a claim against Correctional Officer Harris, and
(3) re-assert claims against Correctional Officer John Doe #5, IDOC Director Rob Jeffreys,
Warden Anthony Wills, and Health Care Unit Administrator Angela Crain (see Doc. 134).
Plaintiff also avers that he should be permitted to file his Proposed Third Amended
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Complaint so he may raise allegations pertaining to newly discovered evidence of
esophageal erosion (Id. at p. 1).
The Court has identified several reasons to grant Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to
Amend Complaint (Doc. 134). First, Rule 15(a) and the Supreme Court both direct this
Court to freely grant leave to amend absent reasons to the contrary. See Foman, 371 U.S.
at 182. Second, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint was timely filed, and
Defendants did not file a response in opposition (see Docs. 127, 134.). Third, Plaintiff’s
motion was made early in the course of proceedings, at a point where this Court has not
yet resolved the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Finally, as will be
discussed at greater length below, two of the amendments contained in Plaintiff’s
Proposed Third Amended Complaint are not futile. For these reasons, Plaintiff will be
permitted to file his Third Amended Complaint (see Doc. 134-1).
However, the Court’s analysis does not end there as the new claims raised in
Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint are also subject to review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.5
The Court addresses each proposed amendment in turn.
5 Pursuant to Section 1915A, any portion of the Third Amended Complaint that is legally frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or requests money damages from an immune defendant must be
dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Here, the Court has not conducted another round of preliminary review
as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Defendants Quertermous,
Perroquet, and Carbaugh because that claim was already reviewed in the Court’s previous Merit Review
Order (see Doc. 40). Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint rewords portions of
the Second Amended Complaint related to that claim and includes additional factual allegations, the Court
has carefully reviewed those changes and finds they do not impact the Court’s prior review as to the
deliberate indifference claim against Defendants Quertermous, Perroquet, and Carbaugh.
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i. Plaintiff’s Proposed Monell Claim Against Wexford
Plaintiff seeks leave to amend so he may reassert a claim against Wexford Health
Sources, Inc. (see Doc. 134). Pertinently, Plaintiff’s previous attempt to bring a claim
against Wexford was dismissed because Plaintiff neither listed Wexford as a Defendant
in his case caption nor included sufficient allegations to raise a claim against Wexford
(Doc. 40 at p. 7). Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint will be permitted to proceed
because it corrects these deficiencies (see generally Doc. 134-1).
For one, unlike the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s Third Amended
Complaint specifically lists Wexford Health Sources, Inc., as a Defendant (compare Doc.
31 at p. 3 with Doc. 134-1 at p. 3). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint
adequately identifies Wexford (see Doc. 40 at p. 7). See Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551,
552 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Naming and serving defendants is vital. How can one defend
without first becoming a party?”).
Moreover, Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint also cures the deficiencies
previously identified in his claim against Wexford (Id.). Namely, in the Court’s prior
Merit Review Order, the Court held that Plaintiff mentioned “in conclusory fashion, that
there were cost cutting policies at Menard, but he fail[ed] to allege how those policies
affected his care.” (Id.) (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint
alleges that “Wexford knew that by cutting cost down in testing, diagnosis, and
treatments by employing only a certain amount of time, regardless of the amount of
patients waiting and needing treatment in those categories causes a delay in access to all
medical services under those categories which caused suffering in my case, and violated
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my rights.” (Doc. 134-1 at p. 13) (emphasis added).6 Therefore, Plaintiff’s Third Amended
Complaint sufficiently alleges that Wexford’s policies and practices related to cost-
cutting were the moving force behind the delay in Plaintiff receiving care and his
resulting injury. See Woodward v. Corr. Med. Services of Illinois, Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927 (7th
Cir. 2004) (“With respect to CMS, we have stated that a corporate entity violates an
inmate’s constitutional rights if it maintains a policy that sanctions the maintenance of
prison conditions that infringe upon the constitutional rights of the prisoners.”); Monell
v. Dep’t of Soc. Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (“[W]hen execution of
a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose
edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the
government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”).
For these reasons, Wexford will be added as a Defendant in this action and Plaintiff
will be permitted to proceed upon a Monell claim against Wexford that is premised upon
Wexford’s alleged cost-cutting policies, customs, or practices. See Dean v. Wexford Health
Sources, Inc., 18 F.4th 214, 236 (7th Cir. 2021) (“In short, a Monell plaintiff must show that
some municipal action directly caused him to suffer a deprivation of a federal right, and
that the municipality took the action with conscious disregard for the known or obvious
risk of the deprivation.”).
6 In comparison, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint contains a similar sentence which states, “Wexford
knew that by cutting cost down in testing and diagnostic areas supplied by Wexford, and by employing
and assigning a certain amount of personnel to work a certain amount of times causes a delay in access to
all medical services under these categories.” (Doc. 31 at p. 15). Thus, the allegations in Plaintiff’s Third
Amended Complaint differ from those in the Second Amended Complaint because Plaintiff now
specifically alleges that the harm he suffered was caused by Wexford’s cost-cutting policies.
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ii. Amending Count 1 to Include Defendant Harris
Plaintiff also seeks leave to file a Third Amended Complaint so he may add
allegations against Correctional Officer Harris and name him as a Defendant in his Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference claim raised in Count 1. Here, the Court finds
Plaintiff has raised sufficient allegations against Correctional Officer Harris to allow
Plaintiff to add Harris to his deliberate indifference claim in Count 1.
Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint alleges that he spoke to Harris at 8:00 p.m.
on March 17, 2022 (Doc. 134-1 at p. 9). He states that Harris listened to his explanation of
symptoms and “could see my suffering and knew that by protocol I required an
evaluation by medical personnel, and yet walked away with no definite answer of
options for healthcare treatment.” (Id.). Thus, similar to Plaintiff’s allegations against
Defendants Perroquet, Quertermous, and Carbaugh, here Plaintiff specifically alleged
that he spoke with Harris and sought care for his symptoms, but Harris ignored his
requests (see Doc. 40 at p. 6). “Accordingly, Ziogas has sufficiently alleged that [Harris]
acted with deliberate indifference to his need for medical care.” (Id.). See, e.g., Chatham v.
Davis, 839 F.3d 679, 684 (7th Cir. 2016) (“A medical deliberate-indifference claim requires
proof that the prisoner suffered from (1) an objectively serious medical condition to
which (2) a state official was deliberately, that is subjectively, indifferent.”).
Consequently, at this stage, Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint sufficiently
states a claim against Correctional Officer Harris for his alleged deliberate indifference.
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iii. Plaintiff’s Reasserted Claim Against John Doe #5
The Court previously allowed Plaintiff to proceed against John Doe #5 based upon
the allegations against that individual contained within the Second Amended Complaint
(see Doc. 40 at p. 6). However, the Court later dismissed John Doe #5 without prejudice
because Plaintiff failed to identify that individual by April 1, 2025, as previously ordered
(see Doc. 126; see also Doc. 109 at pp. 2-3). In fact, in the Order setting a deadline to identify
John Doe #5, the Court emphasized that Plaintiff had already reviewed photographs of
potential correctional officers and was unable to identify John Doe #5 (Doc. 109 at p. 2).
Consequently, when the Court dismissed John Doe #5 without prejudice, it was
emphasized that Plaintiff had not identified any additional, relevant information which
could lead to the identification of John Doe #5 (Doc. 126).
Crucially, nothing in Plaintiff’s instant motion explains why he should be
permitted to continue to pursue a claim against John Doe #5. Plaintiff is not seeking to
amend his complaint to either bring a new claim against John Doe #5, nor is he seeking
to amend his complaint to include additional factual allegations or details which could
lead to John Doe #5’s identification. Instead, Plaintiff merely seeks to reassert the same
claim against John Doe #5 without providing any explanation as to why the parties
should conduct another round of discovery related to the identification of John Doe #5.
Quite simply, without any explanation as to why identification discovery may differ this
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time around,7 Plaintiff provides no basis to justify the Court reversing its prior Order
dismissing John Doe #5 (see Doc. 126).
Again, the issue involving John Doe #5 was not that Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint raised insufficient allegations against him, such that amending his complaint
could cure those deficiencies. Rather, it was that discovery aimed at identifying John Doe
#5 did not prove fruitful and Plaintiff provides no reason for believing things might be
different were he permitted to raise the same claim against John Doe #5 and conduct an
additional round of identification-based discovery. See, e.g., Gonzalez-Koeneke v. West, 791
F.3d 801, 808 (7th Cir. 2015) (“A district court acts within its discretion in denying leave
to amend, either by dismissing a complaint with prejudice or by denying a post-judgment
motion, when the plaintiff fails to demonstrate how the proposed amendment would
cure the deficiencies in the prior complaint.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave
to Amend Complaint is DENIED insofar as it relates to John Doe #5.
iv. Plaintiff’s Reasserted Claims Against Jeffreys, Wills, and Crain
Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint also seeks to name and reassert claims
against IDOC Director Rob Jeffreys, the Warden of Menard – Anthony Wills, and
Healthcare Unit Administrator - Angela Crain (see Docs. 134, 134-1). Ultimately,
7 Admittedly, Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint does state that the “name of John Doe #5 is not
know[n], Menard is not a country club and inquiring about a person’s name [is] not always a good idea in
an environment such as this. Also I do not have the privileges of an attorney.” (Doc. 134-1 at p. 14).
However, irrespective of this acknowledgement, Plaintiff provides no explanation as to what might be
different this time around to warrant further identification discovery.
Additionally, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint states “After extensive research, I
have figured out all names of the appropriate parties.” (Doc. 134 at p. 3). While it is difficult to square these
two seemingly conflicting statements, what is most noteworthy is that Plaintiff has neither identified John
Doe #5 in his Third Amended Complaint nor explained why additional identification discovery may prove
fruitful.
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Plaintiff’s proposed amendments do not resolve any of the deficiencies related to these
three individuals which were discussed in the Court’s prior Merit Review Order (Doc.
40). As a result, Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint fails to state a claim against IDOC
Director Jeffreys, Warden Wills, and HCUA Crain.
The Court will not go to great lengths rehashing the same points addressed in the
Courts prior Merit Review Order (see Doc. 40 at pp. 6-9). Put simply, the Court previously
found that: (1) these individuals cannot be held accountable based solely upon their
supervisory positions (Id. at p. 6); (2) they cannot be held liable simply for having
reviewed Plaintiff’s grievances (Id. at p. 8); and (3) Plaintiff failed to raise sufficient
allegations as to their personal knowledge of his specific situation (Id. at p. 7).
Significantly, nothing in Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint overcomes these
deficiencies.
It is true that Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint alleges each of these
individuals are at fault based upon their “individual participation and involvement.”
(Doc. 134-1 at pp. 25). However, Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint provides no new
allegations of what constituted that “individual participation.” Rather, the Third
Amended Complaint impermissibly relies upon the same allegations of those
individuals’ knowledge of inadequate staffing and medical care due to their knowledge
of, or involvement with, the Wexford-IDOC contract and grievance review, and their
supervisory roles (Id.). Thus, these claims fail for the same reasons as they did in the
Court’s prior Merit Review Order (see Doc. 40 at pp. 6-8).
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Additionally, as it relates to Warden Wills and HCUA Crain, the Third Amended
Complaint also alleges those two individuals were “aware of [Plaintiff’s] case on a
personal basis.” (Doc. 134-1 at p. 25). However, to support these allegations, Plaintiff
again impermissibly relies upon their role in reviewing his grievance filings (see Id.).
Admittedly, Plaintiff attempts to recharacterize Wills and Crain’s review of his
grievances as more than mere a review because those two individuals allegedly held a
briefing on one of his grievances (Id.). However, the Court does not find this line of
reasoning to be persuasive because, as Plaintiff’s own pleadings demonstrate, that
alleged briefing occurred as part of the grievance review process and was being
conducted by supervisory officials who did not treat Plaintiff (see Doc. 40 at pp. 6-8). See
also Robertson v. Walker, 25-CV-00172-SPM, 2025 WL 2605842, at *6 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2025)
(“Mere receipt of grievances from a prisoner is insufficient to establish that a prison
warden was personally involved in any deficient medical care provided to the
prisoner.”).
Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to amend his claims against these
individuals to establish their liability based upon a widespread policy or practice, his
arguments are equally unavailing. For example, Plaintiff discusses a policy of excessive
lockdowns, yet he provides no allegations that he was harmed in this situation due to
lockdowns preceding his surgery. Likewise, Plaintiff’s amendments attempt to hold these
three individuals accountable based upon the contract between Wexford and the IDOC,
yet he provides no allegations that these individuals were responsible for the allegedly
substandard care provided by Wexford. And if anything, the new claim Plaintiff has been
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permitted to proceed upon against Wexford based upon Wexford’s alleged policy of
prioritizing cost-cutting over care undercuts any argument that individuals such as the
Warden of Menard or the Director were responsible for those policies.
For all these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint
fails to state a claim against Warden Wills, Director Jeffreys, and HCUA Crain.
Consequently, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint is DENIED insofar as it
seeks to raise a claim against those three individuals.
c. Conclusion as to Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint
In summary, Plaintiff is permitted to amend his Complaint to add Defendants
Wexford Health Sources, Inc., and Correctional Officer Harris. Accordingly, this case will
proceed on the following claims:
Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Seth
Quertermous, Zechariah Perroquet, Michelle Carbaugh, and
Correctional Officer Harris for failing to obtain Ziogas
prompt treatment for his ruptured ulcer.
Count 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Wexford Health Sources, Inc., for failing to provide Plaintiff
with prompt and adequate treatment for his ruptured ulcer
due to alleged cost-cutting policies or practices that resulted
in understaffing and/or delayed treatment.
Defendants shall timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the Third
Amended Complaint and, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g), shall not waive filing a reply.
Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants need only respond to the issues
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stated in the previous Merit Review Order (Doc. 40) and in this Order. 8 In doing so,
Defendants should rely upon the count designations provided above.
3. Additional Motions and Deadlines
Defendants Carbaugh, Quertermous, and Perroquet have also filed two
exhaustion-based motions for summary judgment that are currently pending before the
Court (Docs. 139, 146). Ultimately, in light of the Court’s above ruling allowing Plaintiff
to file a Third Amended Complaint, Defendants’ exhaustion-based motions are DENIED
as MOOT (Docs. 139, 146). However, the Court’s denials are without prejudice, meaning
Defendants may file new or renewed exhaustion-based summary judgment motions after
they have answered Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint.
Thereafter, if Defendants’ answer(s) assert the affirmative defense of failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, Defendants’ motion(s) for summary judgment on the
issue of exhaustion are due within sixty (60) days of filing their answer(s) to the Third
Amended Complaint.
Finally, in light of the Court’s above rulings granting in part Plaintiff’s Motion for
Leave to Amend Complaint (Doc. 134) and denying as moot Defendants’ exhaustion-
based summary judgment motions (Docs. 139, 146), the Court DENIES as MOOT
Plaintiff’s Motion for Status and Extension of Time to File Response (Doc. 152); DENIES
as MOOT Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Response (Doc. 153); DENIES as
8 Any other claim that is mentioned in the Third Amended Complaint but not addressed in this Order
should be considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pleaded. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does
not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”).
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MOOT Plaintiff’s Motion for Status and Motion to Withdrawn Motion for Extension of
Time (Doc. 158); and DENIES as MOOT Defendants’ Motion for Extension of Time (Doc.
159).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint
is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part (Doc. 134); Defendant Carbaugh’s Motion for
Summary Judgment for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies is DENIED as
MOOT (Doc. 139), Defendants Quertermous and Perroquet’s Motion for Summary
Judgment on the Issue of Exhaustion is DENIED as MOOT (Doc. 146), and all other
related motions are DENIED as MOOT (Docs. 152, 153, 158, 159).
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to re-file the Proposed Third Amended
Complaint found at Doc. 134-1 on the docket as the operative, Third Amended
Complaint. Additionally, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to prepare the following for
Defendants Wexford Health Sources, Inc., and Correctional Officer Harris: (1) Form 5
(Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6
(Waiver of Service of Summons), and to mail these forms, along with a copy of this Order
and the Third Amended Complaint, to those Defendants in accordance with the service
procedures outlined in the Court’s previous Merit Review Order (Doc. 40 at pp. 11-12).
All Defendants, including Defendants Quertermous, Perroquet, and Carbaugh
shall timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the Third Amended Complaint
and, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g), shall not waive filing a reply. Pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants need only respond to the issues stated in the
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original Merit Review Order (Doc. 40) and in this Order’s merit review. In doing so,
Defendants should rely upon the count designations provided in this Order.
In the event Defendants Carbaugh, Quertermous, and Perroquet reassert the
affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and/or Defendants
Wexford or Harris assert the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust, Defendants’
motion(s) for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion are due within sixty (60)
days of filing their respective answer(s) to the Third Amended Complaint.
Finally, Plaintiff is once again reminded of his continuing obligation to keep the
Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court
will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not
later than 14 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply
with this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result
in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: November 13, 2025
s/ Mark A. Beatty
MARK A. BEATTY
United States Magistrate Judge
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