Corbin v. Warden

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
RONALD E. CORBIN,
Petitioner,
v.
SUSAN RUDOLPH, WARDEN OF FCI
GREENVILLE,
Respondent.
Case No. 3:23-cv-03867-NJR
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Petitioner Ronald E. Corbin filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking First Step Act (“FSA”) Time Credits toward the computation of
his federal sentence. (Doc. 1). For the reasons set forth below, Corbin’s petition is denied.
RELEVANT F ACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 9, 2013, Corbin was indicted in the Central District of Illinois on three
counts of aggravated bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d), two counts
of brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and
one count of attempted bank robbery. See United States v. Corbin, et al., No. 2:13-cr-20054-
SLD (C.D. Ill.) (“Criminal Case”). On December 11, 2013, he pleaded guilty on all counts
pursuant to a plea agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C).
(Criminal Case, Docs. 29, 38). As a result of the parties’ agreement, the Court sentenced
Corbin to a total term of 471 months in prison. (Id., Doc. 46). The sentence was comprised
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of concurrent 87-month terms on the bank robbery counts, a consecutive 84-month term
on one of the § 924(c) counts, and a consecutive 300-month term on the other.
Corbin previously challenged his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
His efforts were not successful. In March 2016, the Honorable James E. Shadid dismissed
a § 2255 motion filed by Corbin because he had waived the right to pursue a collateral
attack as part of his plea agreement. See Corbin v. United States, No. 15-2304, 2016 WL
1259372, at *1 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2016). On two occasions, Corbin applied to the Seventh
Circuit for leave to file a successive motion under § 2255, in order to raise a challenge that
his § 924(c) convictions should be vacated under the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson
v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), which held the statute’s so-called residual clause,
§ 924(e)(2)(B), was unconstitutionally vague. See No. 16-2817 (7th Cir.) (Doc. 5); No. 16-
4011 (7th Cir.) (Doc. 2). The Seventh Circuit dismissed both attempts. Id. Corbin filed
another § 2255 motion in the district court August 13, 2018, which the Court dismissed as
a second or successive motion. See Corbin v. United States, No. 1:18-cv-01300-JES (C.D. Ill.).
Corbin presently resides at FCI Greenville, in this district. See BOP Inmate Locator,
https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited on Mar. 16, 2026). With good conduct
time, he is scheduled to be released on May 13, 2047. Id.
Corbin filed his present petition under § 2241 on December 7, 2023. (Doc. 1). He
claims that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) should treat him as eligible for FSA time credits.
When he raised the issue administratively through the BOP, he was told that he was
ineligible because his § 924(c) conviction was a disqualifying offense. (Id. at p. 3). He avers
that the BOP has treated another inmate, Meverick Wade Player, as eligible for FSA time
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credits despite also being convicted under § 924(c). Respondent argues that Corbin
should have brought this challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
rather than as a habeas petition, and that his conviction renders him ineligible for FSA
time credits under the statute. (Doc. 17).
DISCUSSION
The First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018), authorizes the
BOP to award prisoners credit toward prerelease custody or supervised release if they
successfully complete certain prison programming. See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4). However,
the statute expressly made prisoners convicted of certain crimes ineligible for time
credits. Id. § 3632(d)(4)(D). Here, Corbin argues that the BOP has misclassified him as
ineligible.
As an initial matter, Respondent argues that Corbin cannot raise this issue through
a habeas petition. It is well-settled that “[a]fter a district court sentences a federal
offender, the Attorney General, through the BOP, has the responsibility for administering
the sentence.” United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 335 (1992). Despite this delegation of
authority, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 may be used to
challenge the fact or duration of a petitioner’s confinement, Robinson v. Sherrod, 631 F.3d
839, 841 (7th Cir. 2011); Glaus v. Anderson, 408 F.3d 382, 387 (7th Cir. 2005), or the
“execution” of the conviction and sentence, Valona v. United States, 138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th
Cir. 1998). The Seventh Circuit has drawn a distinction between specific claims seeking
release, which properly may be raised under § 2241, and claims seeking the opportunity
to be considered for release, which are, in reality, challenges to the BOP’s rules that must
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be brought under the APA. See Richmond v. Scibana, 387 F.3d 602, 605 (7th Cir. 2004). On
Respondent’s view, Corbin takes issue with the BOP’s interpretation and implementation
of the statute disqualifying him from earning FSA time credits.
As the Seventh Circuit has acknowledged, the line between those claims that must
be brought as ordinary civil cases and those that may be raised on habeas petitions is
“hazy.” Richmond, 387 F.3d at 606. At least one court in this district has held that “[t]he
calculation of a prisoner’s sentence, including the application of potential sentence
credits, can be challenged in a § 2241 petition.” Booker v. Williams, No. 21-CV-00215-JPG,
2022 WL 4314362, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2022). Conceptually, Corbin’s eligibility for time
credits could be thought to concern the execution of his sentence, so review under § 2241
would be permissible.
Fortunately, the Court need not decide the issue definitively because Corbin
would not be entitled to FSA time credits in any event. As mentioned above, the FSA
contains an enumerated list of disqualifying crimes. That list includes convictions under
§ 924(c). See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D)(xxii). Because Corbin was convicted under that
statute, he is ineligible to receive FSA time credits for participating in programming.
This is true even though Corbin was also convicted of non-enumerated offenses.
See Whitfield v. Sproul, No. 3:23-CV-02687-JPG, 2024 WL 4434086, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 7,
2024) (“If one covered offense makes an entire sentence eligible, then an offense that is
explicitly excluded from receiving time credit makes the entire sentence ineligible.
To demonstrate with another idiom: one bad apple spoils the barrel.”). Other courts in
this circuit have reached the same conclusion. See Gibson v. Lillard, No. 25-CV-00997-JPG,
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2026 WL 24994, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2026); Whitfield v. Sproul, No. 3:23-CV-02687-JPG,
2024 WL 4434086, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2024); Cruz v. F.C.I Greenville, No. 3:24-CV-00162-
GCS, 2024 WL 2273402, at *5 (S.D. Ill. May 20, 2024); see also United States v. Smith, 54 F.4th
1000, 1006 (7th Cir. 2022) (noting, in dicta, that a defendant’s § 924(c) conviction rendered
him ineligible for FSA time credits). Corbin did not file a reply brief challenging that
conclusion.
The Court is sensitive to the potentially harsh result of the outcome here. After all,
a 	portion 	of 	Corbin’s sentence 	— 	87-months 	— 	derives 	from 	his 	bank 	robbery
convictions, which are not disqualifying. A construction of the First Step Act that would
allow Corbin to earn time credits for that portion of his sentence might “incentiviz[e]
good prisoner behavior,” which “is a laudatory goal that helps to protect the health and
safety of prisoners, prison officials, and the community at large.” United States v. Barenas-
Reynoso, No. 19-00351-8, 2026 WL 265565, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 2026). Unfortunately, the
Court sees no viable path to that outcome here. As the Fourth Circuit has persuasively
explained, “[s]ection 3632(d)(4)(D) disqualifies any prisoner who is serving a sentence for
a conviction under § 924(c)” Bonnie v. Dunbar, 157 F.4th 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2025). Thus, if a
prisoner is serving a sentence for multiple convictions and only some are disqualifying,
he is not entitled to FSA time credits for any portion of his sentence. Id. Other federal
appellate courts that have considered the issue have held similarly. See Giovinco v. Pullen,
118 F.4th 527, 531 (2d Cir. 2024); Colotti v. Peters, No. 25-1191, 2025 WL 1321386, at *2 (3d
Cir. May 7, 2025); Oiler v. LeMaster, No. 24-5033, 2025 WL 1864875, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 10,
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2025); Clinkenbeard v. Murdock, No. 24-3127, 2025 WL 926451, at *1 (8th Cir. Mar. 27, 2025)
(per curiam).
It is true that the Seventh Circuit has construed other portions of the First Step Act
to benefit inmates convicted of non-covered offenses. In United States v. Curtis, a
defendant was convicted on a variety of counts, including conspiracy to possess crack
cocaine with intent to distribute, causing a death with a firearm during the conspiracy,
and carrying a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime. 66 F.4th 690, 692. The district
court imposed consecutive life sentences on several of the counts. Id. The defendant later
sought resentencing under the First Step Act. Id. at 693. The trial court held that he was
entitled to a reduction for the offenses covered by the FSA but not the other counts. Id.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that courts may adjust non-covered sentences under
the First Step Act “[i]f the district court has imposed a single, integrated sentence that
blends punishment for a covered offense with punishment for a non-covered offense.”
Id. at 694. “The operative question is whether there is reason to think that, at the time of
sentencing, the two sentences were interdependent.” Id.
From this discussion of a “single, integrated sentence,” Corbin might attempt to
argue that the trial court did not impose such a sentence in his case. Cf. Barenas-Reynoso,
2026 WL 265565, at *5 (imposing a “distinct and disaggregated” sentence on a § 924(c)
count so that the BOP would not determine that the defendant was ineligible from
earning FSA time credits as to other counts). Of course, that argument likely would not
be persuasive because Corbin’s sentence was driven by his binding plea agreement
pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C). (Criminal Case, Doc. 29).
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Corbin focuses on another argument: he reports that the BOP has determined that
inmate Meverick Wade Player is eligible for FSA time credits despite also being convicted
under § 924(c). Mr. Player was convicted by the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama on charges of “(1) bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(a) & (d) (Count One); (2) carrying or using a firearm in relation to a crime of
violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (Count Two); and (3) possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) & 924(e) (Count Three).” Player
v. United States, No. 16-8147, 2018 WL 6019462, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 16, 2018). The record
does not contain any confirmation that the BOP, in fact, determined that Mr. Player was
eligible for FSA time credits. In any event, the argument lacks merit. For the reasons set
out above, the statute clearly renders Corbin ineligible for FSA time credits because his
sentence included a disqualifying conviction, and he does not explain why a potential
error by the BOP with regard to another inmate means that he should be eligible.
See Gibson, 2026 WL 24994, at *2.
Finally, Corbin argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Davis,
588 U.S. 445 (2019), supports his position. It does not. In that case, the Court held that
§ 924(c)’s so-called residual clause was unconstitutionally vague. Davis, 548 U.S. at 448.
Corbin appears to believe that the Court’s holding affects his § 924(c) conviction. But a
challenge to that conviction generally must be brought as a motion under § 2255 — not
§ 2241. See Matlock v. Sproul, No. 22-2999, 2023 WL 2810286, at *2 (7th Cir. Apr. 6, 2023).
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CONCLUSION
Corbin has not identified any error in the BOP’s determination that he is ineligible
for FSA time credits. Accordingly, his Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of the Court is
DIRECTED to close this case and enter judgment accordingly.
If Corbin wishes to appeal this Order, he must file a notice of appeal with this
Court within 60 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). If Corbin
chooses to appeal, he will be liable for the $605.00 appellate filing fee irrespective of the
outcome of the appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger,
547 F.3d 724, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2008). If Corbin files a motion for leave to appeal in forma
pauperis, he must include in his motion a description of the issues he intends to present
on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(C).
It is not necessary for Corbin to obtain a certificate of appealability from this
disposition of his § 2241 petition. Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 638 (7th Cir. 2000).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 18, 2026
____________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge
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