Gonzalez v. Ibrahim et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MARIA GONZALEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
ABDIKADIR A. IBRAHIM,
MZ CARGO, INC.,
GREYHOUND LINES, INC.,
RAYMOND C. PARADISE,
AMERICANOS U.S.A., LLC.,
RYDER TRUCK RENTAL, INC.,
ILOCA SERVICES, INC.,
EVERRETT JENNINGS SHARP,
RICHARD, INC., and
RICHARD WOLFE TRUCKING, INC.,
Defendants.
Case No. 24-cv-00715-JPG
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case is before the Court on Defendant Ryder Truck Rental (“Ryder”)’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 70). Ryder asks the Court to dismiss Count 6 of Plaintiff Maria
Gonzalez’s amended complaint because it is barred by the Graves Amendment. Plaintiff filed a
response that requests the Court deny the motion and grant her leave to amend her complaint to
add a claim of negligent entrustment against Ryder (Doc. 72). Ryder filed a reply (Doc. 75).
I. 	BACKGROUND
This case arises from a motor-vehicle accident that occurred on July 12, 2023, in
Madison County, Illinois. Plaintiff alleges that she sustained injuries when a Greyhound bus
upon which she was a passenger collided with several tractor-trailers unlawfully parked along
the exit ramp to a rest area. On July 27, 2023, she filed a complaint against four defendants in the
Madison County Circuit Court. The four defendants removed the case to this Court on March 12,
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2024. On July 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint that added six defendants,
including Ryder. Count 6 of Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges that Ryder is vicariously
liable for the actions of Defendant Abdikadir A. Ibrahim (“Ibrahim”) because it “owned,
operated, leased, controlled and/or maintained” the tractor trailer that he was operating when he
“illegally parked on the exit ramp of the Silver Lake Rest Area in Madison County, Illinois.”
The undisputed facts are as follows. Ryder is engaged in the trade or business of renting
or leasing motor vehicles throughout the United States, including Illinois. On or about April 28,
2015, Ryder executed a Truck Lease & Service Agreement (“the Lease”) with Defendant DM
World Transportation (“DM World”). The transaction was part of Ryder’s ordinary leasing
operations, in which Ryder provides commercial tractors to lessees and does not control day-to-
day usage. Under the Lease, Ryder leased a 2019 Freightliner Cascadia tractor, VIN
3AKJHHDR9KSKP9922 (“the Tractor”), unit 815027, to DM World. DM World subleased or
otherwise provided the Tractor to Defendant MZ Cargo, which employed the driver, Ibrahim.
Ryder did not hire, train, supervise, or pay Ibrahim. Ryder had no knowledge or involvement
regarding Ibrahim’s route planning, rest periods, or the decision to park on a highway shoulder to
an exit ramp. Ryder did not direct Ibrahim where to park the Tractor, nor did Ryder maintain
day-to-day operational control over DM World or MZ Cargo.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. Summary Judgment Standard:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs motions for summary judgment. Summary
judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Archdiocese of Milwaukee v.
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Doe, 743 F.3d 1101, 1105 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(a)); accord Anderson v.
Donahoe, 699 F.3d 989, 994 (7th Cir. 2012). A genuine issue of material fact is not
demonstrated by the mere existence of “some alleged factual dispute between the parties,”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986), or by “some metaphysical doubt as to
the material facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
Rather, a genuine issue of material fact exists only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In assessing a
summary judgment motion, the Court views the facts in the light most favorable to, and draws all
reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Anderson, 699 F.3d at 994; Delapaz v.
Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 900 (7th Cir. 2011). However, the “favor toward the nonmoving party
does not extend to drawing inferences that are supported by only speculation or conjecture.”
Monroe v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 871 F.3d 495, 503 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
The initial summary judgment burden of production is on the moving party to show the
Court that there is no reason to have a trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986);
Modrowski v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir. 2013). Where the nonmoving party carries
the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden of production in one of two
ways. First, it may present evidence that affirmatively negates an essential element of the
nonmoving party’s case. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Second, it may point to an absence of
evidence to support an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case without submitting any
evidence. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(c)(1)(B). Where the moving party fails to meet its strict burden,
the Court cannot enter summary judgment for the moving party even if the opposing party fails
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to present relevant evidence in response to the motion. Cooper v. Lane, 969 F.2d 368, 371 (7th
Cir. 1992).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. Graves Amendment:
The purpose of the Graves Amendment is “to protect rental companies who are sued
simply because they own a vehicle that was involved in an accident.” Johnke v. Espinal-Quiroz,
No. 14-CV-6992, 2016 WL 454333, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 5, 2016). Courts have held that it
constitutes an express preemption of state laws. See Gruver v. Montesa Express, Inc., No. 1:21-
CV-1210, 2024 WL 1913113, at *11 (C.D. Ill. May 1, 2024); Guinn v. Great W. Cas. Co., No.
CIV-09-1198-D, 2010 WL 4811042, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 19, 2010) (collecting cases).
The Graves Amendment states, in relevant part:
An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person (or an
affiliate of the owner) shall not be liable under the law of any State or political
subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of
the owner), for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use,
operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if–
(1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business
of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and
(2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or
an affiliate of the owner).
49 U.S.C. § 30106. In other words, under the Graves Amendment, an “owner of a motor vehicle
that rents or leases the vehicle” cannot be held liable “by reason of being the owner of the
vehicle” if two conditions are met: (1) the owner is engaged in the business of renting or leasing
vehicles, and (2) there is no proof of negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner.
Id. For the second prong, courts are split on whether the statute is an outright bar to all vicarious
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liability against a lessor or if it allows vicarious liability claims only if the lessor has acted
directly negligent. See Parker v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., No. 19-CV-374-JDP, 2020 WL 488366,
at *2 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 30, 2020) (addressing the split). However, in either scenario, Plaintiff must
show evidence of negligence on the part of Ryder. See Gruver, 2024 WL 1913113, at *11.
The Court finds that both prongs of the Graves Amendment are met. The undisputed facts
show that Ryder’s core business is the leasing and rental of motor vehicles, including
commercial tractors. Therefore, it clearly meets the first requirement. In addition, Plaintiff has
not shown any evidence of negligence on the part of Ryder. In fact, her amended complaint does
not even attempt to allege that Ryder was negligent. Her claim against Ryder hinges on the
assertion that Ryder, as owner/lessor of the Tractor, should bear liability for the alleged improper
parking of the Tractor. In short, it is a vicarious liability claim. Plaintiff acknowledges that her
amended complaint does not contain allegations of direct negligence of Ryder. But she argues
that, since it is her intention to seek leave to amend her complaint to add a claim of negligent
entrustment against Ryder, the Court should deny the motion. The Court rejects Plaintiff’s
argument.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) instructs that this Court “should freely give leave
[to amend] when justice so requires.” In other words, leave should be granted “unless there is
‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue
of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of amendment.” Ferguson v. Roberts, 11 F.3d 696,
706 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). The Court declines to
give Plaintiff leave to amend for two reasons. First, it finds that there has been undue delay. The
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Court set the final amendment deadline as November 4, 2024. After that deadline passed,
Plaintiff never moved for leave to amend. Then, six months later, she seeks to inject an
unpleaded theory through a response brief. The parties engaged in discovery for over a year
before Plaintiff filed her response brief. Therefore, she had extensive opportunity to seek leave to
add a negligent entrustment claim against Ryder. Her failure to do so is an undue delay.
Second, it concludes that the amendment would be futile. Plaintiff has not asserted facts
to show that she can state a claim for negligent entrustment. Negligent entrustment “arises where
a person entrusts an automobile to another whose incompetency is known or should be known to
the entruster and the incompetence of the person receiving the automobile causes injury to
another.” Taitt v. Robinson, 639 N.E.2d 893, 895 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). It requires Plaintiff to
show that Ryder entrusted the Tractor to Ibrahim, and at the time Ryder entrusted the Tractor to
him, it knew or should have known that he was incompetent. Plaintiff cannot establish either.
The undisputed evidence shows that Ryder did not entrust the Tractor to Ibrahim. It leased the
Tractor to DM World, which in turn permitted MZ Cargo to operate the Tractor. Plaintiff points
to numerous provisions of the Lease to establish that Ryder gave “at least implied permission to
Ibrahim to use its vehicle in a manner involving unreasonable risk of harm to others.” This
conclusion is based entirely on speculation and conjecture. However, even if the statement is
true, Plaintiff has not alleged that Ryder knew or should have known that Ibrahim was
incompetent. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot make out a claim of negligent entrustment. Since there
is no evidence of negligence on the part of Ryder, the second requirement of the Graves
Amendment is met.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
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The Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim against Ryder is barred by the Graves Amendment
because Ryder is engaged in the business of renting or leasing vehicles and there is no proof of
negligence on the part of Ryder. It declines to give Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint to add
a claim of negligent entrustment against Ryder because there has been undue delay, and the
amendment would be futile. As such, the Court GRANTS Defendant Ryder Truck Rental’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 70). The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter
judgment accordingly at the close of the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: November 24, 2025
s/ J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
United States District Judge
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