Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
REA K.1
Plaintiff,
vs.
COMMISSIONER of SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
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Civil No. 3:25-cv-00289-GCS
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
SISON, Magistrate Judge:
In accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff, through counsel, seeks judicial
review of the final agency decision denying his application for Disability Insurance
Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). 2
PROCEDURAL H ISTORY
On June 27, 2022, Plaintiff filed an application for SSI alleging a disability onset
date of January 1, 2021. Initially, the claim was denied on July 28, 2023, and again, upon
reconsideration on June 3, 2024. After holding an evidentiary hearing via telephone on
December 5, 2024, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denied the application on
1 	Plaintiff’s full name will not be used in this Memorandum & Order due to privacy
concerns. See FED. R. CIV. P ROC. 5.2(c) and the Advisory Committee Notes thereto.
2 	This case was assigned to the undersigned for final disposition upon consent of
the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). See (Doc. 17).
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January 2, 2025. (Tr. 17-26). On February 12, 2025, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s
request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the final agency decision subject to judicial
review. (Tr. 1). Plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies and filed a timely complaint
with this Court.
I SSUE RAISED BY PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff raises the following issue: The Commissioner erred as a matter of law by
failing to evaluate the credibility of Plaintiff’s sworn hearing testimony.
A PPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
“The [SSA] provides benefits to individuals who cannot obtain work because of a
physical or mental disability.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 98 (2019) Disability is the
inability “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months.” Stephens v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A)); Cain v. Bisignano, 148 F.4th 490, 496 (7th Cir. 2025).
To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ considers the following five
questions in order: (1) Is the claimant presently unemployed? (2) Does the claimant have
a severe impairment? (3) Does the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of
specific impairments enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the claimant unable to perform
his former occupation? and (5) Is the claimant unable to perform any other work? See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520.
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An affirmative answer at either step 3 or step 5 leads to a finding that the claimant
is disabled. A negative answer at any step, other than at step 3, precludes a finding of
disability. The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps 1–4. Once the claimant shows
an inability to perform past work, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show
the claimant’s ability to engage in other work existing in significant numbers in the
national economy. See Sevec v. Kijakazi, 59 F.4th 293, 298 (7th Cir. 2023); Fetting v. Kijakazi,
62 F.4th 332, 336 (7th Cir. 2023) (citations omitted).
It is important to recognize that the scope of judicial review is limited. “The
findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Accordingly, this Court is not tasked
with determining whether or not Plaintiff was, in fact, disabled at the relevant time, but
whether the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and whether any
errors of law were made. See Jarnutowski v. Kijakazi, 48 F.4th 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2022)
(citations omitted). The Supreme Court defines substantial evidence as “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek,
587 U.S. at 103; Pufahl v. Bisignano, 142 F.4th 446, 454 (7th Cir. 2025) (citations omitted).
In reviewing for “substantial evidence,” the entire administrative record is taken
into consideration, but this Court does not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide
questions of credibility, or substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ. Pufahl, 142
F.4th at 454 (7th Cir. 2025) (citations omitted). While judicial review is deferential, it is not
abject; this Court does not act as a rubber stamp for the Commissioner. See Stephens, 888
F.3d at 327 (citations omitted).
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THE D ECISION OF THE ALJ
The 	ALJ 	followed 	the 	five-step 	analytical 	framework 	described 	above. 	He
determined that Plaintiff had not worked at the level of substantial gainful activity since
June 28, 2022, the application date. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe
impairments: Gilbert’s syndrome, Ehlers-Danlos syndrome, endocrine disorder, obesity,
depression, anxiety, and gender dysphoria (Tr. 19).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) “to
perform light work except “they can occasionally climb ramps, and stairs, and never
climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. They can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch,
and crawl. They can perform work that occasionally requires exposure to hazards such
as 	unprotected 	heights 	and 	moving 	machine 	parts. 	They 	can 	frequently 	handle
bilaterally. They can concentrate sufficiently to perform simple tasks for two hours a time
without breaks, redirection, or reminders to stay on task. They can frequently interact
with supervisors, co-workers, and the public. They can work in an environment that may
require adapting to infrequent, simple, changes in the workplace.” (Tr. 21). Thus, the ALJ
found Plaintiff was not disabled.
THE EVIDENTIARY RECORD
The Court has reviewed and considered the entire evidentiary record in preparing
this Memorandum & Order. The Court finds the ALJ’s summary of the record in his
decision when compared with the point raised by Plaintiff, is sufficiently comprehensive
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except for the hearing testimony. Thus, the Court will summarize that portion of the
record.
Plaintiff was represented by an attorney, Mr. Gorsky, at the hearing in December
2024. (Tr. 37). Plaintiff is 28 years old. He graduated from high school and trade school.
He previously worked as a massage therapist but stopped due to physical limitations.
(Tr. 54). He has a driver’s license but does not own a vehicle. Driving causes him anxiety
and panic attacks. (Tr. 55, 56). He is 5’7” and weighs 214 pounds. (Tr. 54). He is a single
father and takes care of his daughter. (Tr. 45).
Plaintiff has hyper mobile Ehlers-Danlo Syndrome (“EDS”), which is a connective
tissue disorder that affects his joints. This syndrome causes joint dislocation, muscle pain,
and chronic fatigue. (Doc. 43). He also has overly sensitive eyes and very sensitive skin.
His immune system is compromised. (Tr. 43). He has constant pain in his back, hips, and
shoulders.3 (Tr. 44). He has difficulty standing or walking for extended periods. 4 During
EDS flare-ups he uses a rollator. (Tr. 46). Because of fatigue, Plaintiff has issues lifting,
3 	Plaintiff developed scoliosis within the last couple years. (Tr. 44).
4 	Without the rollator, Plaintiff can stand about 10 minutes before he starts to feel
dizzy and around 20 minutes he must sit down. (Tr. 48). He can also walk without the
rollator about 30 minutes at a slow pace before needing a break. (Tr. 49).
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carrying, and bending. (Tr. 58). Plaintiff further testified that because of the chronic
fatigue, there are days it is hard to get out of bed. (Tr. 45).
Plaintiff testified that he has Bipolar Disorder for which he is being treated. (Tr.
50).5 He experiences frequent mood swings and has problems concentrating and staying
focused because of his ADHD. (Tr. 52).
On a scale of 1 to 10, Plaintiff’s pain ranges from 5 on a good day to 9 on bad days.
(Tr. 57). He has learned to be able to do housework; he does not really cook meals and
does laundry by using the rollator to take the laundry to the laundry facility. 6 (Tr. 59, 60).
A vocational expert (“VE”) also testified. The VE testified that a person with
Plaintiff’s RFC assessment could not do Plaintiff’s past work but could do other jobs at
the light exertional level. (Tr. 65).
DISCUSSION
The Court addresses Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate
the credibility of Plaintiff’s sworn hearing testimony. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the
ALJ only referenced statements from function reports while “completely failing to
address Plaintiff’s sworn testimony regarding functional limitations.” (Doc. 16, p. 13).
The Court agrees that the ALJ did not adequately explain his assessment of Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that remand is required
for a proper evaluation of the Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms.
5 	His bipolar disorder used to be worse, but it is better now with treatment. He
recently experienced a small manic episode. (Tr. 50, 51).
6 	Plaintiff does not fold the laundry; the clothes are kept in bins. (Tr. 60).
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The ALJ is “in the best position to determine a witness’s truthfulness and
forthrightness 	. 	. 	. 	[and 	thus, 	the] 	court 	will 	not 	overturn 	an 	ALJ’s 	credibility
determination unless it is ‘patently wrong.’” Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 310–311 (7th
Cir. 2012) (quoting Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 504–505 (7th Cir. 2004)). But, when
the credibility determination rests on “objective factors or fundamental implausibilities
rather than subjective considerations [such as a claimant's demeanor], appellate courts
have greater freedom to review the ALJ's decision.” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th
Cir. 2000). When making the credibility determination, “an ALJ must adequately explain
his credibility finding by discussing specific reasons supported by the record.” Pepper v.
Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367 (7th Cir. 2013); SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 (Mar. 16, 2016)
(superseding SSR 96-7p). 7 Additionally, while an ALJ is not required to provide a
complete written evaluation of every piece of testimony and evidence, reversal and
remand is required where the ALJ “provides nothing more than a superficial analysis[.]”
Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 370 (7th Cir. 2004). As such, an ALJ cannot simply state that
an individual’s allegations have been considered or that the individual’s allegations are
not credible. Rather, the ALJ must “give[] specific reasons for [a credibility] finding,
supported by substantial evidence.” Myles v. Astrue, 582 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2009).
7 	SSR 96-7p referred to a claimant’s “credibility,” but SSR 16-3p removed that term
to “clarify that subjective symptom evaluation is not an examination of the individual’s
character.” SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at * 1 (Mar. 16, 2016). Instead, ALJs are reminded
to “consider all of the evidence in an individual’s record when they evaluate the intensity
and persistence of symptoms after they find that an individual has a medically
determinable 	impairment(s) 	that 	could 	reasonably 	be 	expected 	to 	produce 	those
symptoms,” as consistent with the regulations. Id. Under either SSR version, the outcome
of this case would be the same.
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The process for evaluating a claimant’s symptoms is organized around two major
steps. First, the claimant must provide objective medical evidence of a medically
determinable impairment or combination of impairments that reasonably could be
expected to produce the alleged symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a)-(b). Second, after
the claimant satisfies the first step, the ALJ must then evaluate the intensity, persistence,
and limiting effects of the individual’s symptoms to determine the extent to which
the symptoms limit the individual’s ability to do basic work activities. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1529(c). In evaluating allegations of pain, adjudicators are directed to consider
whether the symptoms are “consistent with the objective medical [evidence] and other
evidence in the individual’s record.” SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *2 (Mar. 16,
2016). See 	also 20 	C.F.R. 	§ 404.1529(a) 	(explaining 	that 	the 	agency 	considers 	both
“objective medical evidence and other evidence” in evaluating whether an impairment
affects activities of daily living and the ability to work).
Objective medical evidence is merely one factor to be considered, and an ALJ is
not 	free 	to 	“disregard 	an 	individual’s 	statements 	about 	the intensity, persistence,
and limiting effects of symptoms solely because the objective medical evidence does not
substantiate the degree of impairment-related symptoms alleged by the individual.” SSR
16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *5 (Mar. 16, 2016). Other factors that the ALJ should examine
include “daily activities, allegations of pain, aggravating factors, types of treatment
received and medication taken, and ‘functional limitations.’” Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d
503, 517 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2)-(4)). An ALJ may not
disregard subjective complaints “solely because they are not substantiated by objective
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medical evidence.” Hall v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 2015); Vanprooyen v. Berryhill,
864 F.3d 567, 572 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir.
2009)). See also Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751, 754 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that “[p]ain
is always subjective in the sense of being experienced in the brain.”). “[P]ain alone can be
disabling . . . [therefore] [t]estimony of severe pain cannot be disregarded simply because
it is not supported by objective medical evidence.” Stark v. Colvin, 813 F.3d 684, 688 (7th
Cir. 2016). An ALJ's “failure to adequately explain his or her credibility finding . . . is
grounds for reversal.” Minnick v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 929, 937 (7th Cir. 2015).
Here, 	the 	ALJ 	found 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	“medically 	determinable 	impairments
significantly limit the ability to perform basic work activities as required by SSR 85-28.”
(TR. 19). Even so, the ALJ concluded: “the undersigned finds that the claimants medically
determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms;
however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting
effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other
evidence in the record . . . .” (Tr. 22). As to Plaintiff’s hearing testimony, the ALJ merely
stated: “the claimant testified at the hearing to being 5 feet, 8 inches tall, and weighing
214 pounds. This would result in the claimant’s body mass index (BMI) to be in excess of
30, indicating obesity. The physical consultive examination performed by Dr. Lane on
May 13, 2024 also notes a BMI in excess of 30 as well. (Exhibit 16F). Obesity, by itself or
in concert with other impairments, can result in exertional and postural limitations, as
well as limitations on responding to workplace hazards. The residual functional capacity
accounts for these limitations.” (Tr. 24).
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Here, the ALJ’s subjective symptom analysis provides no connection between
Plaintiff’s symptom 	testimony 	and 	the 	objective 	medical 	evidence 	to 	support 	his
conclusion 	discounting 	Plaintiff’s statements about 	the 	intensity, 	persistence, 	and
limiting effects of his symptoms. The ALJ recited medical evidence that may fit into the
Section 1529 categories listed above but failed to discuss all the factors clearly. See (Tr. 22-
24). Further, the ALJ recounted Plaintiff’s symptoms from the function report. (Tr. 22;
Exhibit 11-E). However, the ALJ is not specific about why he did not fully credit Plaintiff’s
hearing testimony concerning any of his ailments. Instead, the ALJ relies on boilerplate
language regarding the treatment and medical records not supporting the limitations
described by Plaintiff without explaining why the records contradict his testimony
regarding his chronic fatigue and pain from Ehlers-Danlos syndrome; panic attacks, Bi-
Polar, ADHD, difficulty concentrating, needing reminders for tasks, struggling with
stress, and using a rollator during flare-ups. See, e.g., Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 645
(7th Cir. 2012) (noting that “[s]uch boilerplate language fails to inform us in a meaningful,
reviewable way of the specific evidence the ALJ considered in determining that
claimant's complaints were not credible.”) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted).
The record contains several limitations on how Plaintiff performed his daily
activities. There are portions of the record which demonstrate Plaintiff’s hearing
testimony, including Dr. Flock’s report estimating 3-4 days missed workdays per month,
the need for unscheduled breaks throughout the day, the use of mobility devices during
flairs, and that Plaintiff was not malingering. (Tr. 1475-81; Exhibit 24F). As additional
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support, there are mental health records from Costal Mental Health Center and JP Faculty
Clinic showing anxious mood, restlessness, and congruent affect. (Tr. 411-495, 700-717,
751-853,1626-1714; Exhibits 2F, 7F, 10F, and 30F). The ALJ failed to properly evaluate
Plaintiff’s testimony symptoms and that failure directly impacted the RFC and the
vocational analysis. As such, the Court finds that the ALJ erred in the manner in which
he considered Plaintiff’s subjective factors.
The ALJ’s error requires remand. “If a decision ‘lacks evidentiary support or is so
poorly articulated as to prevent meaningful review,’ a remand is required.” Kastner v.
Astrue, 697 F.3d 642, 646 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal citation omitted).
This Memorandum & Order should not be construed as an indication that the
Court believes that Plaintiff was disabled during the relevant period or that he should be
awarded benefits. On the contrary, the Court has not formed any opinions in that regard
and leaves those issues to be determined by the Commissioner after further proceedings.
CONCLUSION
The Commissioner’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s application for disability
benefits and supplemental security income is REVERSED and REMANDED to the
Commissioner for rehearing and reconsideration of the evidence, pursuant to sentence
four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of
Plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: October 28, 2025. 	_____________________________
GILBERT C. SISON
United States Magistrate Judge
Gilbert C
Sison
Digitally signed by
Gilbert C Sison
Date: 2025.10.28
14:06:17 -05'00'
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