McBride v. Housing Authority of the County of Jackson, Illinois

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SHELBY MCBRIDE
Plaintiff,
v.
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE
COUNTY OF JACKSON,
Defendant.
Case No. 25-CV-01025-SPM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
McGLYNN, District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff Shelby
McBride’s Second Motion for Attorney Fees. (Doc. 24). Having been fully informed of
the issues presented, Plaintiff’s Motion is hereby GRANTED in part.
R ELEVANT FACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court for the First Judicial Circuit in
Jackson County, Illinois, on March 18, 2025, and Defendant removed the matter to
federal court two months later. (Doc. 1, Ex. A). On August 6, 2025, this Court
remanded the matter back to the First Judicial Circuit, and Plaintiff filed a timely
Motion for Attorney Fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). (Docs. 18, 24). In that
Motion, Plaintiff requested an award of $7,975.00 for attorney fees based on a
reasonable fee calculation of $250.00/hr. for 31.9 hours. (Doc. 21, p. 9). After reviewing
the Plaintiff’s Motion, the Court determined that since the counsel for Plaintiff
worked at Land of Lincoln Legal Aid (“LOLLA”), and did not bill their clients in the
same manner as traditional law firms, that the calculation of attorney fees should be
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based on “a proportional share of the salaries of [the] attorneys handling the removal
plus related overhead costs.” (Doc. 23, p. 3 (citing Wisconsin v. Hotline Indus., Inc.,
236 F.3d 363, 368 (7th Cir. 2000))). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion was denied without
prejudice and she was provided another opportunity to request attorney fees. (Doc.
23).
On October 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed her Second Motion for Attorney Fees,
seeking an award of $13,778.87. (Doc. 24, ¶ 31). Defendant does not contest whether
attorney fees should be awarded, but rather disputes the amount sought, and the
calculations used to obtain that amount. (Doc. 25). As a result, the only issue is the
proper amount of fees to be awarded.
LEGAL S TANDARD
Under § 1447(c), when an improperly removed case is remanded back to state
court, the district court may “require payment of just costs and any actual expenses,
including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Such
fees are expressly limited to “actual outlays” and are defined as “a proportional share
of the salaries of its attorneys handling the removal plus overhead costs.” Hotline
Indus., Inc., 236 F.3d at 366–68 (citation modified). Under § 1447(c), the plaintiff
bears the burden of proving the amounts actually incurred, and the Court has
“discretion 	‘to 	tailor 	the 	documentation 	requirement’ 	according 	to 	the 	stakes
involved.” Id. at 368 (quoting Garbie v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 211 F.3d 407, 411 (7th
Cir. 2000)).
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DISCUSSION
In her Second Motion for Attorney Fees, Plaintiff seeks an award of $13,778.87.
(Doc. 24, ¶ 31). Plaintiff asserts that this request represents a proportional share of
Attorney Paul Matalonis’s salary and related overhead costs in compliance with
Hotline Industries, and that the amount reflects a $247.82 hourly rate for 55.6 hours
of work. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 35, 36). The Defendant Housing Authority argues that both the
hourly rate calculation as well as the number of hours claimed are incorrect. (Doc.
25). Beginning with the hourly rate calculation, Plaintiff asserts that the correct
amount per hour is $247.82. (Doc. 24, ¶ 34). Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not
sufficiently explained how she arrived at this number, taking particular issue with
her treatment of overhead costs. (Doc. 25, p. 4).
The Court begins by reviewing the affidavit and accompanying documentation
of Dawn Ripperda, the LOLLA Comptroller, (Id., Ex. C), to determine how Mr.
Matalonis’s hourly rate was calculated. Ms. Ripperda began by examining LOLLA’s
business records for the period of May 1, 2025, through September 30, 2025. (Id., Ex.
C, ¶ 6). She then isolated Mr. Matalonis’s salary for that timeframe, including
uncompensated benefits,1 and calculated the total to be $64,299.00. (Id., Ex. C, p. 4).
She further determined that 3.65%2 of Mr. Matalonis’s salary and benefits were
attributable to the instant matter, resulting in $2,347.10. (Id.). The Court takes no
1 Such uncompensated benefits were specifically identified as contributions made to Social Security,
Medicare, Workers Compensation, Pension, Health Insurance, Life Insurance, Dental Insurance, and
Vision Insurance. (Doc. 24, Ex. C, p. 4)
2 3.65% is the percentage of hours Mr. Matalonis spent on the instant case as compared to all other
work performed by him during the May through September window (31.9 hours out of 873.9 total).
(Doc. 24, Ex. C, p. 4)
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issue with these salary-related calculations.
Next, Ms. Ripperda engages in the same process to calculate the overhead
component. 	(See 	generally 	id., 	Ex. 	C). 	Ripperda 	identifies 	an 	overhead 	cost
attributable to Mr. Matalonis during this May through August period of $152,272.00.
(Id.). Then, she isolates 3.65%3 of this overhead cost which yields an amount of
$5,558.40, representing the proportional share of Mr. Matalonis’s overhead costs that
are 	attributable 	to 	Plaintiff 	McBride’s 	case. 	(Id.). 	Adding 	that 	figure 	to 	Mr.
Matalonis’s proportional salary of $2,347.10, Ms. Ripperda settles on $7,905.50 as the
combined proportional amount of salary and overhead costs for the McBride matter.
(Id., Ex. C, p. 5). Ms. Ripperda then divides this total by the 31.9 hours worked on the
case during the May through September period, resulting in an hourly rate of
$247.82.4 (Id.). While the Defendant argues over certain aspects of this calculation,
such as the use of GL codes as opposed to more specific identifiers of overhead costs,
the Court nevertheless concludes the method used to calculate the hourly rate was
proper, and that LOLLA’s calculation was reasonable.
Next, the Court turns to the number of hours claimed by Plaintiff. In her
Second Motion, Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Matalonis worked 55.6 hours on this matter
(Doc. 24, ¶ 32), a 23.7-hour increase from her First Motion. Two things are important
to note. First, Mr. Matalonis’s time log (Doc. 24, Ex. B), which forms the basis for the
claimed 55.6 hours, contains an arithmetic error: the entries total only 45.7 hours,
3 See supra note 2.
4 Plaintiff then multiplied this hourly rate by the number of reported hours in total (55.6) to yield the
requested $13,778.87. (Doc. 24, Ex. C, pp. 4–5).
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not 55.6. Second, the time log includes hours spent litigating Plaintiff’s First and
Second Motion for Attorney Fees. (Id., pp. 5–6). The Court may award “fees on fees,”
i.e., hours over the original 31.9, in circumstances where the opposing party acts
“overly aggressive” or “arbitrary” in contesting fees, Morjal v. City of Chicago, 774
F.3d 419, 422 (7th Cir. 2014). Considering the Defendant has challenged nearly every
aspect of the Plaintiff’s calculations, the Court determines that such an award of “fees
on fees” is appropriate. Accordingly, the Court will award Plaintiff attorney fees in
the amount of $11,325.37.5
C ONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff Shelby McBride’s Motion for Attorney
Fees (Doc. 21) is GRANTED in part. The Court awards Plaintiff attorney fees and
expenses in the amount of $11,325.37 (eleven thousand three hundred twenty-five
dollars and thirty-seven cents).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 	February 18, 2026
s/ Stephen P. McGlynn
STEPHEN P. McGLYNN
U.S. District Judge
5 45.7 hours at a rate of $247.82/hr.
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