Saounera v. Chism

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CALEB SAOUNERA,
Plaintiff,
v.
NONA CHISM,
Defendant.
Case No. 25-CV-01522-SPM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
McGLYNN, District Judge:
This matter is before the Court for consideration of a Motion to Remand to
State Court filed by Plaintiff Caleb Saounera (Doc. 8). Having been fully informed of
the issues presented, the Motion to Remand is DENIED.
FACTUAL & P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND
This case concerns a motor vehicle accident that occurred on Highway 111 in
Pontoon Beach, Illinois. (See Doc. 1, Ex. A). On June 23, 2023, at approximately 6:45
A.M., Plaintiff Caleb Saounera alleges he was driving northbound on Highway 111
in a 2019 Ford Transit. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that, as he approached the intersection
of Highway 111 and Highway 162, the traffic light turned red, prompting Plaintiff to
slow to a stop. (See id.). At this time, Saounera states in his Complaint, Defendant
Nona Chism’s automobile came into contact with the rear of Plaintiff’s vehicle. (See
id.). Plaintiff brought a claim against Chism for negligence, alleging that Defendant
breached her duty to Plaintiff by failing to obey traffic laws as set forth in 625 I LL .
COMP . STAT . 5/11, resulting in “severe, permanent and progressive injuries to his left
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shoulder, spine, back, neck, and head.” (See id., Ex. A, p. 4). Plaintiff originally filed
suit in the Circuit Court of Madison County, Illinois, on June 23, 2025, seeking
damages in excess of $50,000. See Saounera v. Chism, Case No. 2025LA000798 (Ill.
Cir. Ct. 2025); (see Doc. 1, Ex. A).
Defendant Chism filed a timely Notice of Removal in this Court on July 31,
2025. (Id.) In her Answer, which she subsequently filed on August 20, 2025,
Defendant denied that she negligently breached her duty to Plaintiff and raised the
affirmative defense that Plaintiff’s own negligence contributed to Plaintiff’s injuries
such that any recovery should be reduced or barred accordingly. (See Doc. 7). On
August 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Remand. (Doc. 8). As of the date
of the issuance of this Order, Defendant has not filed a response to the Motion to
Remand.
LEGAL S TANDARD
Federal 	courts 	are 	courts 	of 	limited 	jurisdiction. 	Exxon 	Mobil 	Corp. 	v.
Allapatthah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, a federal
district court has original subject matter jurisdiction over actions involving complete
diversity between the parties and an amount 	in 	controversy 	exceeding 	$75,000,
exclusive 	of 	interest 	and 	costs. 	See 	28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1); LM Ins. Corp. v.
Spaulding Enters. Inc., 533 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir. 2008). Complete diversity means
that “none of the parties on either side of the litigation may be a citizen of the state
of which a party on the other side is a citizen.” Howell v. Tribune Ent. Co., 106 F.3d
215, 217 (7th Cir. 1997). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), a plausible allegation that the
amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold is sufficient. See Dart
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Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant may remove to federal court “any civil
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction.” The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction falls on the party
seeking removal. See Doe v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 985 F.2d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 1993).
This burden is met when a defendant supports its position by submitting competent
proof to the district court that it has subject matter jurisdiction. See McNutt v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); Chase v. Shop ‘N Save
Warehouse Foods, Inc., 110 F.3d 424, 427 (7th Cir. 1997). In the Seventh Circuit, this
requires the defendant to offer evidence which proves “to a reasonable probability
that jurisdiction exists.” Chase, 110 F.3d at 427 (citing Gould v. Artisoft, Inc., 1 F.3d
544, 547 (7th Cir. 1993). When a plaintiff challenges the amount in controversy after
a defendant’s removal, the Supreme Court states that “both sides submit proof” and
the district court will decide by a preponderance of the evidence whether the amount-
in-controversy requirement has been satisfied. Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 88; see also
Sabrina Roppo v. Travelers Com. Ins. Co., 869 F.3d 568, 579 (7th Cir. 2017). The
removal statute is strictly construed, and all doubts about jurisdiction should be
resolved in favor of remand. See Morris v. Nuzzo, 718 F.3d 660, 668 (7th Cir. 2012).
If 	at 	any 	time 	before 	final 	judgment 	the 	district 	court 	lacks 	subject 	matter
jurisdiction, the case must be remanded. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
A NALYSIS
In his Motion, Plaintiff Saounera requests that this Court remand this action
to Madison County Circuit Court on the basis that the amount-in-controversy
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requirement is not met. (Doc. 8). This Court notes that Defendant Chism failed to
respond to Plaintiff’s Motion, even after this Court sua sponte extended the deadline
for Chism to file her response. (See Doc. 16). The Local Rules for the Southern District
of Illinois state that adverse parties shall have thirty days after service of a motion
to remand to file a response. See SDIL-LR 7.1(b)(1)(A). The Local Rules also state
that “failure to file a timely response to a non-dispositive motion may be deemed
consent.1 SDIL-LR 7.1(a)(5). Notwithstanding Defendant Chism’s lack of a response,
however, this Court has an independent obligation to ensure that it has subject
matter jurisdiction. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006).
In his Motion, Plaintiff argues that remand is appropriate here because he has
requested 	$50,000 	in 	damages 	in 	his 	Complaint, 	which 	does 	not 	meet 	the
jurisdictional requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Doc. 8). As noted supra, when a
plaintiff disputes the amount after a defendant’s removal, the burden falls on the
defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence facts suggesting the threshold
is met. See Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 89; Meridian Sec. Ins. Co. v. Sadowski, 441
F.3d 536, 543 (7th Cir. 2006). Proving the threshold amount can be achieved in
several ways, including with supporting calculations from the allegations in the
complaint, reference to plaintiff’s informal estimates or settlement demands, or
1 The Seventh Circuit has also stated that “failure to respond by the nonmovant as mandated by the
local rules results in an admission.” Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003). Further, while
in some courts, failure to respond to an argument may be seen as a concession (see Midwest
Generation EME, LLC v. Continuum Chem. Corp., 768 F. Supp. 2d 939, 950 (N.D. Ill. 2010)), the
Seventh Circuit has made clear that such behavior is “not necessarily a waiver, but . . . a risky
tactic.” Law v. Medco Rsch., Inc., 113 F.3d 781, 787 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Hardy v. City Optical
Inc., 39 F.3d 765, 771 (7th Cir. 1994).
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introducing affidavits from experts about the cost of satisfying plaintiff’s demands.2
See Meridian, 441 F.3d at 541–42. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit has noted that
this is “easier said than done when the plaintiff, the master of the complaint, does
not want to be in federal court and provides little information about the value of her
claims.” Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 511 (7th Cir. 2006). “In such a case,
a good-faith estimate of the stakes is acceptable if it is plausible and supported by a
preponderance of the evidence.” Id. Once a defendant has established the requisite
amount in controversy, the plaintiff can only defeat jurisdiction if it is clear to a legal
certainty that the amount does not cross the jurisdictional threshold. Id. (citing St.
Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938)); see also Brill v.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 2007) (“This standard
applies to removed cases no less than those filed initially in federal court.”) Moreover,
the amount-in-controversy requirement does not look to what actual damages will be;
the relevant question is what maximum damages could be. See Brill, 427 F.3d 446.
Here, 	Defendant 	Chism’s 	only 	submission 	in 	support 	of 	the 	amount 	in
controversy comes from her Notice of Removal. (See Doc. 1). Chism argues that the
nature of the claims Plaintiff has brought, which include “severe, permanent and
progressive injuries to his left shoulder, spine, back, neck, and head,” frequently
result in damages that exceed $75,000, exclusive of interest and cost. (Id., p. 3).
2 The Seventh Circuit has additionally noted that courts may rely on other sources in addition to
informal estimates, affidavits, and the allegations. See Schutte v. Ciox Health, LLC, 28 F.4th 850,
854 (7th Cir. 2022). Another method that a plaintiff may use to satisfy a request for remand is to
stipulate that they “will neither demand nor accept any recovery in excess of $75,000 exclusive of
costs and interest.” Workman v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 234 F.3d 998, 1000 (7th Cir. 2000); see
Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 511 (7th Cir. 2006).
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Chism’s Notice of Removal cites McCoy ex rel. Webb v. General Motors Corp. in
support of her contention that cases of this nature routinely see damages awards in
excess of $75,000. (See id. (citing 226 F. Supp. 2d 939 (N.D. Ill. 2002)). In McCoy, the
plaintiff brought a products liability claim against General Motors due to a brake
failure resulting in an auto accident. McCoy, 226 F. Supp. at 940. The complaint
alleged plaintiff suffered “lasting and permanent injuries,” along with damages
including severe pain, emotional distress, disability, lost value and enjoyment of life,
future loss of income, medical expenses, loss of normal life, disfigurement and
paralysis. Id. The Northern District of Illinois found that it was “obvious from a
common-sense reading of the complaint that Plaintiffs were seeking in excess of
$75,000 in damages.” Id. at 941. Chism additionally cites in support of removal that
various other district courts throughout the country have ruled similarly on cases
alleging permanent and/or progressive injuries. (Doc. 1 (citing Roberson v. Orkin
Exterminating Co., Inc., 770 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D. Ind. 1991); Turner v. Wilson Foods
Corp., 711 F. Supp. 624 (N.D. Ga. 1989); Lee v. Altamil Corp., 457 F. Supp. 979 (M.D.
Fla. 1978)).
Based on the information available, this Court finds that the face of the
complaint alleges damages that could plausibly exceed the threshold minimum of
$75,000. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges “severe, permanent, and progressive
injuries to his left shoulder, spine, back, neck, and head.” (Doc. 1, Ex. A). Plaintiff
further pleads that he has underwent medical treatment and continues to incur
medical expenses to treat his injuries. (Id.). Saounera also alleges that he continues
to 	endure 	“significant 	pain, 	suffering, 	and loss 	and enjoyment 	of 	life 	for the
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foreseeable future.” (Id.). While it is true that Defendant Chism has not submitted
evidence in the form of calculations or affidavits from experts as stipulated in
Meridian, it is also true that Plaintiff Saounera has not provided detailed information
about the value of potential damages. 441 F.3d at 541–42; see Oshana, 472 F.3d at
511. 	Therefore, 	Defendant’s 	good-faith 	estimate 	of 	the 	amount 	based 	on 	the
allegations in the Complaint is acceptable. Plaintiff pleaded severe injuries in his
Complaint and provided no additional detail in his Motion to Remand that would
prove with legal certainty that the value of the claim could not exceed $75,000, either
by providing additional evidence of the injuries or by disclaiming the possibility of
seeking damages more than $75,000. Given the severity of the injuries alleged, it is
plausible that the amount in controversy could well exceed $75,000. Considering the
dearth of facts on the record, this Court is satisfied that Defendant properly
established the requisite amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence
in her Notice of Removal, and that Plaintiff has not proven to a legal certainty that
the amount is below this threshold.
C ONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 8) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 	November 19, 2025
s/ Stephen P. McGlynn
STEPHEN P. McGLYNN
U.S. District Judge
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