Ellis v. Alatary et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROMNEY ELLIS,
Petitioner,
v.
ACTING WARDEN, FCI GREENVILLE,
Respondent.
Case No. 3:25-CV-2032-NJR
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:
Pending before the Court is the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 filed by Petitioner Romney Ellis on November 6, 2025. (Doc. 1). Ellis also moved
to amend his petition on November 20, 2025 (Doc. 8), which the Court now grants.
Respondent, Acting Warden of FCI Greenville, filed a response on December 8, 2025.
(Doc. 13). For the reasons set forth below, the Petition is denied.
B ACKGROUND
Ellis is serving a 13-month sentence at FCI Greenville within the Bureau of Prisons
(“BOP”) for violating the terms of his supervised release. (Doc. 13-2). Ellis’s initial Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) argued that he was eligible to receive First Step Act
and Second Chance Act time credits that were not being applied to his sentence by the
BOP. He also argued that the BOP improperly determined he was ineligible for
confinement at a Residential Reentry Center (“RRC”) or home confinement (“HC”) prior
to his release due to a pending charge in the State of Indiana. As relief, Ellis asked the
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Court to order the BOP to remove the “Pending Charge Exclusion” so that he could
immediately be released to an RRC or HC.
On November 20, 2025, Ellis filed a motion for leave to amend his petition, stating
that his release date had been corrected. (Doc. 8). As a result, he now seeks only the
removal of the Pending Charge Exclusion so that he can be released to an RRC or HC.
(Id.). Ellis’s projected release date is December 27, 2025. (Id.).
Respondent filed an opposition on December 8, 2025. (Doc. 13). Respondent argues
that Ellis did not exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his Petition, as Ellis
himself acknowledged in his initial filing. (Id.). For this reason alone, the Petition should
be dismissed. (Id.). Even if Ellis had exhausted his administrative remedies, however, the
BOP correctly determined: (1) that Ellis is ineligible for RRC or HC consideration because
he had not earned enough First Step Act time credits; and (2) the existence of a pending
criminal charge in state court was likely to result in community arrest, such that RRC or
HC placement was not appropriate. (Id.).
Ellis did not file a reply brief.
DISCUSSION
A petitioner may bring a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge the execution
of his sentence. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973); Valona v. United States,
138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A motion seeking relief on grounds concerning the
execution but not the validity of the conviction and sentence—for example, a motion
contending that the prison unlawfully deprived a prisoner of good time credits . . . falls
into the domain of § 2241.”). The Attorney General, acting through the BOP, calculates a
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defendant’s sentence “as an administrative matter when imprisoning the defendant.”
United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 335 (1992). An inmate can challenge the calculation
of his sentence, including the application of time credits, in a Section 2241 petition. Setser
v. United States, 566 U.S. 231, 244 (2012).
Section 2241 does not contain an express exhaustion requirement. Nevertheless,
“a district court is entitled to require a prisoner to exhaust the administrative remedies
that the BOP offers before it will entertain a petition.” Kane v. Zuercher, 344 F. App’x 267,
269 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Clemente v. Allen, 120 F.3d 703, 705 (7th Cir. 1997) (“we review
a claim concerning the computation of a sentence only after administrative remedies have
been exhausted”)); see also Richmond v. Scibana, 387 F.3d 602, 604 (7th Cir. 2004) (“A
common-law 	exhaustion 	rule 	applies 	to 	§ 	2241 	actions 	. 	. 	. 	.”). 	“Exhaustion 	of
administrative remedies requires complete exhaustion, even if the appeals process results
in the denial of the requested relief.” Beam v. Sproul, No. 3:24-CV-02255-GCS, 2025 WL
1359903, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 2025) (citing Greene v. Meese, 875 F.2d 639, 641 (7th Cir.
1989)). Where a petitioner complains that errors have been made with respect BOP
policies and calculations, “it is the BOP that must be given the first opportunity to correct
any such errors.” Id.
To exhaust administrative remedies, a federal prisoner must first file an informal
complaint with institution staff. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.13(a). If the complaint is not resolved
informally, a prisoner must file an administrative remedy request on a BP-9 form at the
institution where he is incarcerated. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(a). If the prisoner is unsatisfied
with the warden’s response to his BP-9, he may submit an appeal to the Regional Director
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on a BP-10 form within 20 days. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). If the prisoner is unsatisfied
with the Regional Director’s response, he may submit an appeal on a BP-11 form to the
BOP’s Office of General Counsel within 30 days. Id.
Here, Ellis admits that he did not exhaust his administrative remedies. He claims
that he sent a letter to the Regional Director, the Warden, and the BOP Director on
September 22, 2025, via certified mail. However, he did not submit a BP-9, BP-10, or BP-
11 form because the length of time it would take to complete the process would cause
him irreparable harm. He also alleges that his Unit Team would deliberately delay the
administrative remedies process. Finally, Ellis states that he has been told the BOP’s
decision is final; therefore, administrative exhaustion would be futile. As a result, he
argues, the exhaustion requirement should be waived.
The Court disagrees. Ellis sent a letter to the Warden, the Regional Director, and
the Director for the BOP on September 22, 2025, but he did not file his Petition until
November 6, 2025. That means, for about two and a half months, Ellis took no action to
attempt to exhaust his claim. “A prisoner cannot manufacture exigency by tarrying.”
Richmond, 387 F.3d at 604 (rejecting a claim of futility exception when the delay was the
petitioner’s own fault). Ellis may be correct that the BOP’s initial decision is final, but he
also may be mistaken. See Kane, 344 F. App’x at 269. Either way, he must first go through
the administrative exhaustion process. See Richmond, 387 F.3d at 604 (“instead of asking
judges to guess, prisoners must give it a go”).
“Petitioners citing futility ‘face a heavy burden’ because they must demonstrate
that there is ‘no reasonable prospect’ that they could obtain any relief from that agency.”
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Beam, 2025 WL 1359903, at *2 (quoting Gonzalez v. O’Connell, 355 F.3d 1010, 1016-17 (7th
Cir. 2004). Because Ellis has not shown that the available remedies gave him “no
reasonable prospect” of obtaining relief, the Court declines to find that administrative
exhaustion would have been futile.
CONCLUSION
Ellis did not exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing his petition.
Therefore, his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Docs. 1, 8) is
DISMISSED without prejudice.
If Petitioner wishes to appeal this Order, he must file a notice of appeal with this
Court within 60 days of the entry of judgment. F ED. R. A PP . P. 4(a)(1)(B). If Petitioner
chooses to appeal, he will be liable for the $605.00 appellate filing fee irrespective of the
outcome of the appeal. See F ED. R. A PP . P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger,
547 F.3d 724, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2008). If Petitioner files a motion for leave to appeal in forma
pauperis, he must include in his motion a description of the issues he intends to present
on appeal. See F ED. R. A PP . P. 24(a)(1)(C).
It is not necessary for Petitioner to obtain a certificate of appealability from this
disposition of his § 2241 petition. Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 638 (7th Cir. 2000).
The Clerk’s Office is DIRECTED to enter judgment and close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 	December 19, 2025
____________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
Chief U.S. District Judge
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