Webb v. Illinois Department of Natural Resources et al

Page 1 of 7
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
TERRY WEBB,
Plaintiff,
v.
ERIC MANKER, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-CV-02187-SPM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
McGLYNN, District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court on an Amended Complaint (Doc. 17) and a
renewed Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (Doc. 15) filed by pro
se Plaintiff Terry Webb. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Sergeant Eric Manker,
Officer Don Schachner, and Officer Jacob Farrell of the Illinois Department of
Natural 	Resources 	Conservation 	Police 	and 	Smithton 	Police 	Officer 	Jane 	Doe
“entered a private residence without a warrant, seized Plaintiff without probable
cause, ignored Plaintiff’s invocation of counsel, and transported him without lawful
authority.” (Doc. 17, p. 2). He insists that “Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights under
the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments,” that “the Village of Smithton is
liable under Monell,” and that the Illinois Department of Natural Resource is named
as a Defendant “for declaratory and injunctive relief only.” (Id.). Webb seeks
“declaratory relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief.”
(Id.).
Case 3:25-cv-02187-SPM Document 24 Filed 02/19/26 Page 1 of 7 Page ID
#<pageID>

Page 2 of 7
R ELEVANT FACTUAL A ND P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND
Webb filed his original complaint and IFP Motion on December 15, 2025. (See
Docs. 3, 4). This Court dismissed Webb’s Complaint and denied his IFP Motion
without prejudice on December 19, 2025. (Doc. 7). Webb was ordered to file an
amended complaint and renewed IFP motion no later than January 9, 2026. (Id.).
After Webb failed to file an amended complaint by January 9, this Court dismissed
his case with prejudice on January 12, 2026 for want of prosecution. (Doc. 11). Webb
filed a Motion for Reconsideration on January 15, 2026 in which he argued that his
failure to file an amended complaint by the Court’s deadline was due to excusable
neglect. (Doc. 13). On January 15, 2026, This Court granted Webb’s Motion, reopened
this case, and ordered him to file his amended complaint and IFP motion instanter.
(Doc. 14). Webb filed the pending IFP Motion on January 29, 2026 (Doc. 15) yet
inexplicably failed to file an amended complaint. On January 30, this Court provided
a Notice of Impending Dismissal warning Webb that failure to file an amended
complaint by February 6, 2026 would result in dismissal of his case. (Doc. 16). Webb
filed the instant Amended Complaint on February 4, 2026. (Doc. 17).
A PPLICABLE LEGAL S TANDARDS
A federal court may permit an indigent party to proceed without pre-payment
of fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Nevertheless, a court can deny a qualified plaintiff
leave to file in forma pauperis or can dismiss a case if the action is clearly frivolous
or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). When assessing a motion to proceed IFP, a
district court should inquire into the merits of the plaintiff’s claims, and if the court
finds them to be frivolous, it should deny leave to proceed IFP. Lucien v. Roegner, 682
Case 3:25-cv-02187-SPM Document 24 Filed 02/19/26 Page 2 of 7 Page ID
#<pageID>

Page 3 of 7
F.2d 625, 626 (7th Cir. 1982). The test for determining if an action is frivolous or
without merit is whether the plaintiff can make a rational argument on the law or
facts in support of the claim. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Corgain
v. Miller, 708 F.2d 1241, 1247 (7th Cir. 1983). The analysis of a complaint pursuant
to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) “is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which requires the Court to
determine whether the complaint contains ‘sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Jones v. Lumpkin, No. 23-
CV-4644, 2023 WL 8879767, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2023) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation modified)) (citing Tourscher v. McCullough, 184
F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)).
When 	assessing 	the 	plaintiff’s 	complaint, 	the 	Court 	accepts 	the 	factual
allegations as true, liberally construing them in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v.
Rednour, 729 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2013). Conclusory statements and labels, however,
are not enough. Id. The complaint must allege enough facts to “state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir.
2013) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). That means “a plaintiff must do better
than putting a few words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might
suggest that something has happened to her that might be redressed by the law.”
Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010). “[I]nstead, the plaintiff
must give enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that
holds together.” Id. at 404.
Case 3:25-cv-02187-SPM Document 24 Filed 02/19/26 Page 3 of 7 Page ID
#<pageID>

Page 4 of 7
“A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ and ‘a pro se complaint,
however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also Buechel v. United States, 746 F.3d
753, 758 (7th Cir. 2014). Indeed, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(f) states that “[a]ll
pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.” “Moreover, ‘[a] litigant
who appears pro se should not be treated more harshly for negligent errors than one
represented by an attorney. Otherwise, only those wealthy enough to be able to afford
an attorney would be able to insulate themselves from the consequences of an
occasional human error . . . .’” Sanders v. Melvin, 25 F.4th 475 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting
Schilling v. Walworth Cnty. Park & Plan. Comm’n, 805 F.2d 272, 277 n.8 (7th Cir.
1986)).
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” F ED. R. CIV. P.
8(a)(2). Additionally, Rule 8 requires that “[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise,
and direct.” F ED. R. C IV. P. 8(d)(1) (emphasis added). Rule 10 further requires “each
claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence . . . be stated in a separate
count or defense.” F ED. R. CIV. P. 10(b). These rules, while not setting a high bar at
the pleading stage, do require that plaintiffs abide by them at risk of pleading
themselves out of a case. That may occur “where the lack of organization and basic
coherence renders a complaint too confusing to determine the facts that constitute
the alleged wrongful conduct.” Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 798 (7th Cir. 2011);
see Mohammed v. Prairie State Legal Servs., Inc., No. 20-2419, 2021 WL 4962988, at
Case 3:25-cv-02187-SPM Document 24 Filed 02/19/26 Page 4 of 7 Page ID
#<pageID>

Page 5 of 7
*1 (7th Cir. Oct. 26, 2021) (“unintelligibility justifies dismissal.”). Further, these rules
exist “to give defendants fair notice of the claims against them and the grounds
supporting the claims.” Stanard, 658 F.3d at 797; see Intercom Ventures, LLC v.
FasTV, Inc., No. 13 C 232, 2013 WL 2357621, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 2013) (“First, a
complaint must describe the plaintiff’s claims and the ground supporting them in
‘sufficient detail to give the defendants fair notice’ of the claim alleged against
them.”).
A NALYSIS
To begin, this Court notes that once an amended pleading is filed, it supersedes
the previous pleading entirely. “The prior pleading is in effect withdrawn as to all
matters not restated in the amended pleading, and becomes functus officio.” Nisbet v.
Van Tuyl, 224 F.2d 66, 71 (7th Cir. 1955). The Seventh Circuit has held that it is
proper for a District Court to limit its analysis to the allegations raised in the
operative complaint only. See Reid v. Payne, 841 F. App’x 1001, 1003 (7th Cir. 2021);
see also Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 354 F.3d 632, 638 n.1 (7th Cir.
2004). But see Scott v. Chuhak & Tecson, P.C., 725 F.3d 772, 782–83 (7th Cir. 2013).
Unfortunately for Plaintiff Webb, his Amended Complaint (Doc. 17) contains even
fewer factual details than his previous Complaint and, therefore, does not survive
scrutiny for the same reasons as his previous Complaint. (See Docs. 1, 17). His
Amended Complaint is approximately one page long, does not provide any factual
details, does not state which claims he intends to bring against which defendants,
does not specify his entitlement to damages, and does not describe the declaratory or
injunctive relief he seeks. (See Doc. 1). Thus, Webb’s Amended Complaint fails to
Case 3:25-cv-02187-SPM Document 24 Filed 02/19/26 Page 5 of 7 Page ID
#<pageID>

Page 6 of 7
provide a short and plain statement for relief and simple, concise, and direct
allegations and fails to clearly allege how the facts underlying each claim apply to
each Defendant. See F ED. R. CIV. P. 8, 10; (Doc. 7, pp. 7–8 (citing the same)). Moreover,
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does cure any of the defects this Court raised in its
December 19, 2026 Order. (See Doc. 7, pp. 7–8). While Plaintiff Webb did submit a
properly formatted IFP Motion, he did not provide a sufficient answer to question 7
of the form. (See Doc. 15). Even if he had, the fact that his Amended Complaint fails
to state a claim means that his IFP Motion must be dismissed.
Recall that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) expressly states that “the court shall dismiss
the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal” either “is
frivolous or malicious” or “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” The
Seventh Circuit has defined “frivolous” as “lack[ing] an arguable basis either in law
or in fact.” Felton v. City of Chicago, 827 F.3d 632, 635 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Neitzke
v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)). This is certainly the case here. Moreover, this
Court is satisfied that Plaintiff Webb has had sufficient opportunities to amend his
pleadings and to litigate this case. See Williams v. United States, No. 22-3121, 2023
WL 5201740, at *2 (7th Cir. Aug. 14, 2023) (citing Zimmerman v. Bornick, 25 F.4th
491, 493–94 (7th Cir. 2022)) (“[P]laintiffs are ordinarily entitled to at least one chance
to amend their complaints after a dismissal, unless amendment would be futile.”).
Therefore, this case shall be dismissed.
C ONCLUSION
Therefore, 	Plaintiff 	Terry 	Webb’s 	Amended 	Complaint 	(Doc. 	17) 	is
DISMISSED with prejudice. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma
Case 3:25-cv-02187-SPM Document 24 Filed 02/19/26 Page 6 of 7 Page ID
#<pageID>

Page 7 of 7
pauperis (“IFP”) (Doc. 15) is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close
this case on the Court’s docket.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 5, 2026
s/ Stephen P. McGlynn
STEPHEN P. McGLYNN
U.S. District Judge
Case 3:25-cv-02187-SPM Document 24 Filed 02/19/26 Page 7 of 7 Page ID
#<pageID>