FLAME-BEY v. WEXFORD OF INDIANA, LLC et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
YOHAN BIC FLAME-BEY, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:21-cv-01986-SEB-TAB
)
MOORE Clerk's Entry of Default entered on
11/18/2024,
)
)
)
Defendant. 	)
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR AWARD OF DAMAGES
This matter relates to the default judgment previously entered against Defendant
Samuel Moore ("Mr. Moore"), a former officer at the New Castle Correctional Facility, on
the issue of his liability to Plaintiff Yohan Bic Flame-Bey ("Mr. Flame-Bey") for allegedly
confiscating and destroying and/or losing Mr. Flame-Bey's legal and religious documents,
in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Now before the
Court is Mr. Flame-Bey's Second Motion for Award of Damages, which reflects Mr. Flame-
Bey's request for $23,694.77 in compensatory and punitive damages, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Dkt. 255. That motion shall be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Dkt.
255.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 outlines the two stages of a default proceeding:
"the establishment of the default, and the actual entry of a default judgment." In re Catt,
368 F.3d 789, 793 (7th Cir. 2016). The "effect of an entry of default (step one) is that 'upon
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default, the well-pleaded allegations of a complaint relating to liability are taken as true.' "
VLM Food Trading Intern., Inc. v. Ill. Trading Co., 811 F.3d 247, 255 (7th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Dundee Cement Co. v. Howard Pipe & Concrete Prods., Inc., 722 F.2d 1319, 1323
(7th Cir. 1983)) (internal alterations omitted). Entry of default judgment (step two)
establishes, as a matter of law, that the defendant is liable to the plaintiffs on each cause of
action alleged in the complaint. e360 Insight v. The Spamhaus Project, 500 F.3d 594, 602
(7th Cir. 2007). By contrast, the plaintiffs' mere allegations of damages are "not deemed
true"; rather, "[t]he district court must . . . conduct an inquiry . . . to ascertain the amount
of damages with reasonable certainty." In re Catt, 368 F.3d at 793 (internal citations
omitted). Such an inquiry may be accomplished without a hearing, if "the amount is
liquidated or capable of ascertainment from definite figures contained in the documentary
evidence or in detailed affidavits." Dundee Cement Co., 722 F.2d at 1323.
DISCUSSION
We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and circumstances as
they are detailed in the Amended Complaint and our summary judgment order, dkt. 125,
218, and thus proceed to our analysis below.
When a state actor is found liable for violating an individual's constitutional rights,
§ 1983 "may authorize an award of damages" encompassing "compensation for intangible
emotional harm and even nominal damages where no actual injury occurs." Manley v. Law,
889 F.3d 885, 890 (7th Cir. 2018), reh'g denied (June 8, 2018). "Compensatory damages in
§ 1983 cases are ordinarily determined according to the principles derived from the
common law of torts," which includes damages for "out-of-pocket loss and other monetary
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harm" as well as for "personal humiliation, mental anguish, and suffering." Hagge v. Bauer,
827 F.2d 101, 109 (7th Cir. 1987) (citation modified). The party seeking an award for
compensatory damages must adduce actual proof of his injuries. Id. (citation modified).
Compensatory damages are concerned with "actual, not imagined, damages," and courts
may "reduce an award not supported with proof." Id.
Punitive damages may also be available to a prevailing § 1983 litigant. Smith v.
Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 35 (1983). "Punitive damages are appropriate when the defendant acted
wantonly or willfully or was motivated in his actions by ill will or a desire to injure."
Hendrickson v. Cooper, 589 F.3d 887, 894 (7th Cir. 2009). The purpose of punitive
damages is to "punish blameworthy behavior and deter defendants from committing future
bad acts—the more reprehensible a defendant's conduct and the more easily a defendants
can conceal violations, the higher the punitive damages." Beard v. Wexford Health Sources,
Inc., 900 F.3d 951, 953 (7th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). Our assessment of punitive
damages includes consideration of "the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the
ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, and any civil penalties that punish
similar behavior." Id. at 953–53.
In this case, Mr. Flame-Bey has itemized his request for compensatory damages as
follows:
• 	$5,000 for the entry of judgment against him in Flame-Bey v. Mitchell, No. 1:19-
cv-04067-SEB-MJD, dkt. 67 (S.D. Ind. May 26, 2021) (entry of final judgment)
(hereinafter "Flame-Bey I");
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• 	$5,000 for the entry of judgment against him in Flame-Bey v. Rewerts, No. 1:19-cv-
04153-JRS-MJD, dkt. 74 (S.D. Ind. May 25, 2021) (entry of final judgment)
(hereinafter "Flame-Bey II");
• 	$976.00 for the cost of replacing the trial transcript in State of Indiana v. Smith, No.
49G03-1109-FA-063851 (Marion Sup. Ct. filed on Sept. 7, 2011);1
• 	$634.00 for the cost of replacing the trial transcript in State of Indiana v. Flame, No.
49G03-1109-FA-064634 (Marion Sup. Ct. filed on Sept. 13, 2011);
• 	$372.00 for the cost of replacing the trial transcript in State of Indiana v. Smith, No.
49G03-1109-FA-065179 (Marion Sup. Ct. filed on Sept. 12, 2011);
• 	$231.32 for the cost of replacing pre-trial transcripts in the three aforementioned
state criminal cases;
• 	$100.00 for the replacement of religious materials; and
• 	$381.45 for the cost of legal mail and medical records associated with this litigation.
Damages Relating to Flame-Bey I & II Legal Documents
In 2019, Mr. Flame-Bey initiated two civil rights lawsuits in this district (Flame-
Bey I and II, respectively) relating to perceived deficiencies in the quality of his medical
treatment during his time as an inmate at the Pendleton Correctional Facility. Flame-Bey
Aff. ¶ 3, dkt. 256-1. In early December 2020, the defendants in Flame-Bey II moved for
summary judgment, No. 1:19-cv-04153-JRS-MJD, dkt. 60, 64 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 2, 2020), as
1 In some of Mr. Flame-Bey's underlying state-court criminal proceedings, he is referred to by the
name "Vincent Smith."
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did the Flame-Bey I defendants approximately one month later in January 2021, No. 1:19-
cv-04067-SEB-MJD, dkt. 59 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 8, 2021).
On March 9, 2021, as the summary judgment motions pended, Mr. Flame-Bey
witnessed Mr. Moore "take possession of two cardboard boxes" containing, inter alia,
drafts of his summary judgment responsive briefs as well as corresponding designations of
evidence. Flame-Bey Aff. ¶¶ 1, 6, dkt 256-1. Despite Mr. Moore's assurances that Mr.
Flame-Bey's litigation materials would be mailed to the appropriate court, Mr. Flame-Bey
later discovered that neither set of his summary judgment materials had been mailed and/or
docketed. In May 2021, both summary judgment motions were granted in the defendants'
favor, without the benefit of any response from Mr. Flame-Bey. Flame-Bey I, No. 1:19-cv-
04067-SEB-MJD, dkt. 66 (S.D. Ind. May 26, 2021) (order granting defendants' motion for
summary judgment); Flame-Bey II, No. 1:19-cv-04153-JRS-MJD, dkt. 73 (S.D. Ind. May
25, 2021) (order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment). Mr. Flame-Bey avers
that judgment was entered against him in each lawsuit "as a result of [his] failure to respond
. . . . " Flame-Bey Aff. ¶ 11, dkt. 256-1.
When Mr. Flame-Bey's deposition was taken during an earlier phase in this
litigation, he testified that he had discovered the entry of judgment against him in both
cases in June 2021, when he received a copy of the Flame-Bey II order and checked the
status of both cases online through LexisNexis. See Flame-Bey Dep. 42:17–44:16, dkt.
176-2 (testifying that "the first of June 2021" "might have been" when he received notice
of the Flame-Bey II decision). Although Mr. Flame-Bey considered moving for relief from
judgment in Flame-Bey I and II, he concluded that such a motion was unlikely to succeed
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and ultimately chose not to pursue any avenue of relief in those cases. See id. at 44:17–
46:18.
With regard to the instant motion for damages, Mr. Flame-Bey contends that
$10,000 is a reasonable compensatory award for the judgments entered against him in
Flame-Bey I and II, since he "estimate[s] each case would have reached a reasonable award
of $5,000 each." Flame-Bey Aff. ¶ 12, dkt. 256-1.
Mr. Flame-Bey has failed to adduce actual (never mind persuasive) proof that
$10,000 is a reasonable compensatory award for his unsuccessful lawsuits. While the loss
of one's work product can represent a strategic setback in a litigation, Mr. Flame-Bey has
failed to show how the unfavorable rulings in his prior civil cases were caused solely by
Mr. Moore's alleged misconduct. Moreover, Mr. Flame-Bey failed to undertake any post-
judgment efforts to mitigate his damages; his own deposition testimony establishes that,
though he considered seeking relief from judgment, he declined to do so. See Flame-Bey
Dep. 42:17–46:18, dkt. 176-2. Mr. Flame-Bey's $5,000 estimation of a "reasonable award"
is therefore, in our view, wholly unsubstantiated, relying entirely on nothing more than his
own barebones speculation as to an amount he thinks he could ultimately have recovered
in Flame-Bey I and II. For these reasons, we regard Mr. Flame-Bey's $10,000 estimation
as to the value of his prior cases to be speculative, excessive, and unsupported by actual
proof. Accordingly, Mr. Flame-Bey shall be awarded $25.00 for each case in which Mr.
Moore improperly disposed of Mr. Flame-Bey's summary judgment response papers, for a
total award of $50.00.
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Transcript Costs
Mr. Flame-Bey requests a sum total of $2,213.32 for the cost of pre-trial and trial
transcripts from his underlying state criminal proceedings, copies of which were allegedly
among the papers wrongfully confiscated and displaced by Mr. Moore on March 9, 2021.
In his supporting affidavit, Mr. Flame-Bey maintains that these transcripts were essential
to his pursuit of "post-conviction relief related to [his] criminal matters." Flame-Bey Aff.
¶ 14, dkt. 256-1.2 To substantiate the value of these lost papers, Mr. Flame-Bey has
submitted two letters from a Marion County court reporter (dated October 4, 2018, and
December 18, 2019, respectively) itemizing the costs associated with the production of his
trial and pre-trial transcripts. Dkt. 256-2; dkt. 256-3. Mr. Flame-Bey avers that he "was
unable to repurchase th[e]se transcripts at the time due to lack of funds," and he "still ha[s]
been unable to repurchase them." Flame-Bey Aff. ¶ 21, dkt. 256-1.
Mr. 	Flame-Bey's 	deposition 	testimony 	belies 	his 	allegation 	that 	Mr. 	Moore
confiscated the trial transcripts for all three criminal matters. Although Mr. Flame-Bey did
testify that "part of [his] transcripts were in the [two] boxes that [Mr.] Moore took," he also
reported having had seven untouched boxes of related materials. Flame-Bey Dep. 47:3–6,
dkt. 176-2. Notably, Mr. Flame-Bey also testified that "basically like half of [his] transcripts
2 Based on our review of the underlying (and publicly available) state court dockets, it appears that
Mr. Flame-Bey filed direct appeals in each of his criminal cases and has notified the Marion
Superior Court with regard to his filing a petition for post-conviction relief. State of Indiana v.
Flame, No. 49G03-1109-FA-064634 (Marion Sup. Ct. Aug. 12, 2024) (correspondence between
Mr. Flame-Bey and the Marion Superior Court re: petition for post-conviction relief).
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from" cause no. 49G03-1109-FA-0638513 "are gone," while he "still ha[s]" the transcripts
from his two other state criminal cases. Id. at 47:7–15. But see id. at 36:19–23 (recalling
that, after the March 9th incident, he had "[a]ll of his transcripts").
Based on Mr. Flame-Bey's own deposition testimony, we fail to see how an award
of $2,213.32 for the replacement of three trial transcripts is reasonable. At most, Mr. Moore
confiscated transcript materials relating to only one criminal case. Mr. Flame-Bey's award
of compensatory damages shall be reduced by $1,006.00—the cost of the trial transcripts
from Flame, No. 49G03-1109-FA-064634 (Marion Sup. Ct.) ($634.00) and Smith, No.
49G03-1109-FA-065179 (Marion Sup. Ct.) ($372.00). An award of $1207.32, reflecting
the total costs for the Smith, No. 49G03-1109-FA-063851 (Marion Sup. Ct.) trial transcript
($976.00) as well as his pre-trial transcripts ($231.32) shall be allowed. See dkt. 256-2 at
4; dkt. 256-3 at 4–5.
Religious Materials
Mr. 	Flame-Bey, 	a 	practicing 	Moorish 	American, 	requests 	$100.00 	for 	the
replacement 	of 	his 	religious 	materials, 	namely, 	a 	copy 	of 	the 	Moorish American
Constitution, "seven additional acts," and 101 questions and answers from the Moorish
Questionnaires, which he maintains were wrongfully taken from him. Flame-Bey Aff. ¶¶
29, 38–39, dkt. 256-1. Mr. Flame-Bey avers that, since the time of the loss of these
materials, he has been unable to practice his religion piously, which has impacted his
3 In his deposition, Mr. Flame-Bey referred to this criminal matter as "the Lopez case," apparently
in reference to the victim of the offenses for which he was convicted. See Flame-Bey Dep. 47:13–
15, dkt. 176-2; State of Indiana v. Smith, No. 49G03-1109-FA-063851 (Marion Sup. Ct. filed on
Sept. 8, 2011) (charging information containing victim's identity).
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mental health. Id. ¶ 36. In the pending motion, Mr. Flame-Bey "estimate[s] [that] the cost
to replace [his] religious materials is approximately $100.00." Id. ¶ 39.
Although Mr. Flame-Bey has broadly described the negative emotional impact he
has experienced, he has not "establish[ed] an objective basis for quantifying the loss" of
his copies of the Moorish American Constitution, seven additional acts, and 101 questions
and answers from the Moorish Questionnaires. Taliferro v. Augle, 757 F.2d 157, 162 (7th
Cir. 1985). To that end, we view his $100 estimation as excessive and unreasonable in light
of the general availability of religious texts. Absent actual proof of the costs of replacing
his religious materials, we do not view an award of $100 to be appropriate. Mr. Flame-bey
shall nonetheless be awarded $25.00 in compensatory damages for the loss of his religious
materials.
Litigation Costs
In seeking to recoup the costs of legal mail and medical records associated with this
action, Mr. Flame-Bey requests an award of $381.45. See dkt. 256-5 (fifty-five remittance
requests). Mr. Flame-Bey does not distinguish between his legal mail and medical record
expenditures, nor does he specify what costs he incurred with regard to his claims against
Mr. Moore, who is only one of more than a dozen individual defendants initially named in
this lawsuit. See dkt. 125. Because Mr. Flame-Bey is not entitled to recover the litigation
costs for unsuccessful claims bearing no discernable relation to Mr. Moore's conduct, an
award of $381.45, which reflects the sum total of his expenditures, is excessive. Thus, Mr.
Flame-Bey is not entitled to any recoverable costs relating to the prosecution of his claims
against Mr. Moore.
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Punitive Damages
Mr. Flame-Bey requests $11,000 in punitive damages relating to his lack of success
in Flame-Bey I and II; the loss of his religious materials; and profit losses from the alleged
destruction 	of 	approximately 	300 	self-composed 	songs 	that 	were 	in 	the 	boxes 	of
confiscated materials and which he intended to sell. As discussed above, punitive damages
are appropriate when a defendant has acted "wantonly or willfully or was motivated in his
actions by ill will or a desire to injure." Hendrickson, 589 F.3d at 894. Whether punitive
damages are appropriate depends on "the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the
ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, and any civil penalties that punish
similar behavior." Beard, 900 F.3d at 953–53. The degree of reprehensibility is the most
important factor. Henrickson, 589 F.3d at 894.
Here, Mr. Flame-Bey's supporting affidavit does not contain any allegations
allowing us to fairly regard Mr. Moore's conduct in this case (i.e., taking possession of two
cardboard 	boxes 	containing 	Mr. 	Flame-Bey's 	papers) 	as 	rising 	to 	a 	degree 	of
reprehensibility that warrants an award of punitive damages. Mr. Flame-Bey's request for
punitive damages shall be denied accordingly.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons detailed above, Mr. Flame-Bey's Second Motion for Award of
Damages is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Dkt. 255. Mr. Flame-Bey is
AWARDED compensatory damages in the amount of $1,282.32. His request for litigation
costs and punitive damages, however, is DENIED.
Judgment consistent with this Order shall issue accordingly.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date:
Distribution:
YOHAN BIC FLAME-BEY
148865
NEW CASTLE - CF
NEW CASTLE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY - Inmate Mail/Parcels
1000 Van Nuys Road
P.O. Box E
NEW CASTLE, IN 47362
MOORE
5734 W. County Road 450 South,
Knightstown, IN 46148
Anthony Marino Eleftheri
DREWRY SIMMONS VORNEHM, LLP (Carmel)
aeleftheri@dsvlaw.com
Bryan Findley
CASSIDAY SCHADE LLP
bfindley@cassiday.com
Joseph A. Panatera
Cassiday Schade LLP
jpanatera@cassiday.com
Eric Ryan Shouse
Lewis And Wilkins LLP
shouse@lewisandwilkins.com
12/16/2025	_______________________________
SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
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