ROBINSON v. MERITAGE HOSPITALITY GROUP, INC. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
KENYATTA ROBINSON, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:23-cv-01867-SEB-KMB
)
QFRM2, LLC, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES
Presently pending before this Court is Plaintiff Kenyatta Robinson's ("Plaintiff") Motion for
Attorneys' Fees pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1927. [Dkt. 63.] 	For the reasons explained below, the
Court finds that Defendants’ delay in issuing the settlement payment in this case does not constitute
conduct that “unreasonably and vexatiously” multiplied these proceedings within the meaning of
18 U.S.C. § 1927. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.
I. 	RELEVANT BACKGROUND
This is an employment case based on allegations that Plaintiff experienced discrimination
and other unlawful conduct while employed at Defendants’ restaurant in 2022. 	[Dkt. 1.] 	On
January 15, 2025, the Court held a Settlement Conference in this case. 	[Dkt. 57.] 	At the
conference, the Parties reached an agreement in principle to resolve the case. 	[Dkt. 57.] 	On
January 21, 2025, the Court issued a Minute Entry confirming the same, vacating all case
management deadlines, and directing the Parties to file a stipulation of dismissal within thirty days.
[Dkt. 57.]
Counsel for the Parties then exchanged drafts of and finalized a written settlement
agreement after the Settlement Conference (the "Settlement Agreement"). [Dkts. 63-2; 63-3.] On
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February 6, 2025, Plaintiff executed the Settlement Agreement and returned it to Defendants
together with the necessary tax forms. 	[Dkts. 63-5; 63-6.] The Settlement Agreement required
Defendants to issue payment to Plaintiff within thirty days of full execution of the Settlement
Agreement. 	[Dkt. 64-1.] 	The Parties dispute the exact due date of that payment, but any
disagreement on that is immaterial because they agree that under either deadline, Plaintiff did not
receive timely payment under the Settlement Agreement.
On March 13, 2025, Plaintiff moved to enforce the Settlement Agreement, contending that
Defendants’ failure to pay warranted the Court's enforcement of the Settlement Agreement,
sanctions in the form of fee-shifting pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and all interest and penalties
accruing on a litigation-funding loan Plaintiff had obtained. 	[Dkt. 58.] 	Defendants opposed
Plaintiff's motion, attributing the delay to a serious personal matter of counsel and the departure of
prior counsel. [Dkt. 59.] Plaintiff replied, [dkt. 60], but while briefing was underway, Defendants
issued settlement checks and filed a Notice of Performance advising the Court that payment had
been made in full pursuant to the Settlement Agreement. [Dkt. 61.] On April 22, 2025, the Court
denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce as moot because of Defendants’ compliance. [Dkt. 62.] The
Court invited Plaintiff to file a renewed motion after meeting and conferring with counsel for
Defendants if any request for relief was outstanding. [Dkt. 62.]
On May 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed the present Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, seeking $2,000
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. [Dkt. 63.] Defendants oppose the motion, [dkt. 64], and Plaintiff
did not file a reply. Thus, the matter is now ripe for the Court's review and decision.
II. 	APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD
Plaintiff may recover attorneys’ fees only if such recovery is authorized by contract or
statute. 	Starstone Ins. SE v. City of Chi., 133 F.4th 764, 768 (7th Cir. 2025). 	Here, Plaintiff
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invokes 28 U.S.C. § 1927 as the sole basis for his request. That statute permits a court to sanction
an attorney “who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously” to
satisfy the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred as a result. 28 U.S.C. §
1927.
The Seventh Circuit has made clear that 28 U.S.C. § 1927 is "clearly punitive and thus
must be construed strictly." Knorr Brake Corp. v. Harbil, Inc., 738 F.2d 223, 226 (7th Cir. 1984);
Globaltap, LLC v. Cantwell & Cantwell, No. 16 C 4395, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114331, 2018 WL
3190823, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2018). 	Conduct amounts to “unreasonably and vexatiously”
multiplying proceedings if it is undertaken in bad faith. Dal Pozzo v. Basic Mach. Co., Inc., 463
F.3d 609, 614 (7th Cir. 2006). 	Bad faith may be shown either subjectively, such as when an
attorney acts with intent to harass, delay, or knowingly pursue frivolous claims, or objectively,
such as when an attorney engages in conduct so reckless or indifferent to the orderly processes of
justice that it effectively burdens the proceedings. Id; In re TCI, Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 445 (7th Cir.
1985). Mere negligence, without more, is insufficient to justify an order of sanctions pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1927. Kotsilieris v. Chalmers, 966 F.2d 1181, 1186 (7th Cir. 1992).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Plaintiff does not argue, and the record does not support, any contractual or statutory basis
for fee recovery.1 Rather, Plaintiff asks that the Court award him $2,000 in attorneys' fees under
28 U.S.C § 1927. [Dkt. 63.] Plaintiff's motion largely restates the timeline set forth in Plaintiff’s
prior motion, [dkt. 58], detailing the Parties’ communications following execution of the
1 To the extent the Parties dispute whether Defendants’ late payment constitutes a material breach
of the Settlement Agreement, that issue has no bearing on the present motion. Attorneys’ fees are
not recoverable as a contractual remedy under either the Settlement Agreement or any applicable
law in this case; thus, the only potential basis for recovery here is as a sanction under 28 U.S.C. §
1927.
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Settlement Agreement, [dkt. 63 at 1-5]. Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ counsel unreasonably
and vexatiously delayed the proceedings by failing to respond to repeated inquiries and to timely
issue the settlement checks, thereby forcing Plaintiff to file both the earlier enforcement motion,
[dkt. 58], and the pending motion, [dkt. 63]. Although Plaintiff admits he received the corrected
settlement payment in full, [dkt. 63 at 7], Plaintiff asks this Court to award “reasonable attorneys’
fees associated with the filing of this motion and attempts at enforcement of the settlement since
March 7, 2025, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927.” [Dkt. 63 at 7.]
Defendants oppose the motion. [Dkt. 64.] They argue that Plaintiff was paid in full within
fifteen days of the contractual deadline and contend that such a brief delay does not warrant the
sanctions Plaintiff seeks. [Id. at 2-4.] Defendants further assert that attorneys' fees are unavailable
under Indiana law or the Settlement Agreement, which expressly provides that each party is to bear
its own fees. 	[Id. at 2-3.] 	Defendants emphasize that the only fee-shifting provision in the
Settlement Agreement operates in Defendants' favor, requiring Plaintiff to reimburse Defendants
for costs incurred in the event of further legal proceedings. [Dkt. 64-1 at 5.] Finally, Defendants
contend that § 1927 sanctions are unwarranted because the delay did not result from bad faith and
was promptly corrected when brought to counsel's attention. [Dkt. 64 at 4-5.]
Plaintiff did not file a reply brief.
Because § 1927 is punitive in nature and "must be construed strictly," the Court concludes
that Defendants’ delay, though regrettable, does not reflect the bad faith required to impose
sanctions in this case. Knorr Brake Corp., 738 F.2d at 226. The record reflects that Defendants’
settlement payment was approximately fifteen days late. Plaintiff’s counsel had trouble reaching
defense counsel, which understandably caused frustration and prompted Plaintiff to file the initial
Motion to Enforce. [Dkt. 58.] But nothing in the record supports a finding that Defendants acted
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in bad faith such that statutory sanctions under § 1927 are appropriate. The delay in settlement
payment stemmed from a personal matter of Defendants' counsel and the departure of another
attorney from the case. Once Defendants' counsel became aware of the issue, he acted to correct
it and Plaintiff received full payment a little more than two weeks after the contractual deadline.
These circumstances do not show “a serious and studied disregard for the orderly process of
justice” as § 1927 requires. Bender v. Freed, 436 F.3d 747, 751 (7th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations
omitted). Thus, Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees is DENIED. [Dkt. 63.]
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys’ Fees under 28 U.S.C § 1927
is DENIED. 	[Dkt. 63.] The Parties in this case have not yet filed a stipulation of dismissal as
previously ordered by the Court, likely due to this pending motion. 	Now that all issues are
resolved, the Court sua sponte extends the Parties' deadline to file a stipulation of dismissal in this
case to November 3, 2025.
SO ORDERED.
Distribution:
All ECF-registered counsel of record.
Date: 10/27/2025
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