ROSS v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
WILLIAM E. ROSS, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 2:25-cv-00260-JPH-MJD
)
STATE OF INDIANA, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT AND DIRECTING
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff William E. Ross is a prisoner currently incarcerated at Wabash
Valley Correctional Facility ("Wabash Valley"). He filed this civil action alleging
violations 	of 	his 	due 	process 	rights 	and 	violations 	of 	the 	Americans 	with
Disabilities Act ("ADA") and Rehabilitation Act ("RA"). Because the plaintiff is a
"prisoner," 	this 	Court 	must 	screen 	the 	complaint 	before 	service 	on 	the
defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (c).
I. Screening Standard
When screening a complaint, the Court must dismiss any portion that is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). To
determine whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same
standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 2020).
Under that standard, a complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
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(2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The
Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a "less stringent
standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers." Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720
(7th Cir. 2017).
II. The Complaint
The Court accepts Mr. Ross's factual allegations as true at the pleading
stage but not his legal conclusions. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ("we must take all
of the factual allegations in the complaint as true," but "we 'are not bound to
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation'") (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).
The complaint names as defendants (1) the State of Indiana; (2) the
Indiana 	Attorney 	General; 	(3) 	the 	Warden 	of 	Reception 	Diagnostic 	Center
("RDC"); 	(4) 	the 	Warden 	of 	Wabash 	Valley; 	(5) 	an 	unidentified 	"medical
professional" at RDC; (6) an unidentified "medical professional" at Wabash
Valley; (7) an unidentified "classification professional" at RDC; (8) an unidentified
"classification professional" at Wabash Valley; (9) an unidentified "director of
classification" 	at 	Wabash 	Valley; 	(10-11) 	two 	unidentified 	"law 	library
professionals" at Wabash Valley; (12) an unidentified "grievance specialist" at
Wabash Valley; and (13) an unidentified "grievance specialist supervisor" at
Wabash Valley. Mr. Ross is seeking compensatory and punitive damages and
injunctive relief.
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Mr. Ross's complaint states that his right arm has been amputated below
the elbow and that he has a prosthetic. Mr. Ross was incarcerated in the
Reception Diagnostic Center from March 1 to April 1, 2024, after which he was
transferred to Wabash Valley. Because of his disability, Mr. Ross requested an
accommodation in the form of extra time in the law library in order to type legal
documents. An accommodation was granted that allowed Mr. Ross "to be placed
on two count letters for Law Library Services." Dkt. 1 at 5. This accommodation
was in place between April and July 2024. In July 2024, Mr. Ross was given a
job as a law library clerk.
In February 2025, Mr. Ross lost his law library job for at least 90 days. In
March 2025, Mr. Ross again requested an accommodation "to be placed on two
count letters for Law Library Services" in connection with a state court appeal
he was pursuing. Id. Mr. Ross was told that no special accommodation would be
provided 	and 	that a 	clerk 	could 	assist 	him, 	which 	Mr. Ross 	did 	not 	find
acceptable. Mr. Ross grieved this issue, which was denied in April 2025.
Mr. Ross filed this action on June 5, 2025. He also filed a preliminary
injunction motion, requesting that he be allowed "two count letters a week and
four count letters a week for deadline filings" and also that he be provided with
"a keyboard for upper extremity amputees." Dkt. 3 at 1.
The Court takes judicial notice of the docket of the Indiana Court of
Appeals, which indicates that Mr. Ross unsuccessfully attempted to pursue four
different appeals in 2025. First, in Ross v. Gibson Law Office, No. 24A-CT-02799,
Mr. Ross's appeal was dismissed on February 4, 2025, because he was not
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appealing a final judgment or appropriate interlocutory order. Second, in Ross
v. Gibson Law Office, No. 25A-CT-00896, Mr. Ross's appeal was dismissed on
July 18, 2025, because he did not timely file an appellant's brief. This was after
the Court of Appeals had extended Mr. Ross's deadline to file a brief to June 23,
2025 (i.e., after Mr. Ross filed this action). Third, in Ross v. State of Indiana, No.
25A-PC-00349, Mr. Ross's appeal was dismissed on April 22, 2025, again
because he was not appealing a final judgment or appropriate interlocutory order
in his state post-conviction proceedings. Fourth, in Ross v. State of Indiana, No.
25A-PC-01732, Mr. Ross's appeal was dismissed, because it appeared a motion
for relief from judgment in his state post-conviction proceeding was still pending.
III. Discussion of Claims
Although a plaintiff need not plead legal theories in a complaint, see Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a), Mr. Ross has identified the theories he wishes to use—violations
of his due process rights and his statutory rights under the ADA and RA. Where
a pro se litigant has expressly stated the legal theory or theories he wishes to
pursue, the district court is not required to analyze whether the allegations in
the complaint might state a claim under a different legal theory. See Larry v.
Goldsmith, 799 F. App'x 413, 416 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Clancy v. Office of Foreign
Assets Control of U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 559 F.3d 595, 606-07 (7th Cir. 2009)).
Thus, the Court analyzes Mr. Ross's claims only under the theories he has
identified.
Applying the screening standard to the factual allegations in the complaint
certain claims are dismissed while other claims shall proceed as submitted.
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First, it is unclear how Mr. Ross believes his constitutional due process
rights have been violated. It may be that he believes his accommodation requests
and/or related grievances about them were not adequately or appropriately
processed. Although the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires the exhaustion of
remedy before an inmate may file suit, the Seventh Circuit has "specifically
denounc[ed] a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to an
inmate grievance procedure." Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 772 (7th Cir.
2008). "Prison grievance procedures are not mandated by the First Amendment
and do not by their very existence create interests protected by the Due Process
Clause." Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953-54 (7th Cir. 2011). The Court
cannot perceive any other possible basis for a due process claim based on the
facts Mr. Ross has alleged. Any due process claims against any defendant are
dismissed.
Second, 	any 	statutory 	claims 	against 	the 	individual 	defendants 	are
dismissed. Employees of the Indiana Department of Correction ("IDOC") are not
amenable to suit in their individual capacity under the RA or the ADA. See Jaros
v. Ill. Dept. of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794(b);
42 U.S.C. § 12131; Foley v. City of Lafayette, 359 F.3d 925, 928 (7th Cir. 2004);
Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2001)
(collecting 	authority)). 	Accordingly, 	the 	ADA 	and 	Rehabilitation 	Act 	claims
against the individual defendants in their individual capacities are dismissed.
Third, the ADA claims are dismissed. The relief provided by the ADA and
RA are coextensive and a plaintiff suing under both statutes may have only one
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recovery. Jaros, 684 F.3d at 671 (citing Duran v. Town of Cicero, Ill., 653 F.3d
632, 639 (7th Cir. 2011) (plaintiffs may have but one recovery); Calero–Cerezo v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 11 n. 1 (1st Cir. 2004) (dismissal of
ADA claim had no effect on scope of remedy because RA claim remained)). In
addition, "the analysis governing each statute is the same except that the
Rehabilitation Act includes as an additional element the receipt of federal funds,
which all states accept for their prisons." Id. For these reasons the ADA claims
are dismissed. Id.
Fourth, by accepting federal funds for its prisons, Indiana has waived
sovereign immunity from suits for damages under the RA. See, e.g., Jaros, 684
F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2012); Stanley v. Litscher, 213 F.3d 340, 344 (7th Cir.
2000). Such claims ordinarily would proceed against the IDOC as the state
agency overseeing prison operations in Indiana. See Jaros, 684 F.3d at fn.2. Mr.
Ross has not explicitly named the IDOC as a defendant in this action. He has,
however, named the State of Indiana directly. The Court concludes, in the
interests of justice, that the IDOC should be substituted as a party defendant in
place of the State of Indiana, and that Mr. Ross's claim for damages under the
RA shall proceed against the IDOC only.1 Additionally, the Court concludes that
Mr. Ross's claim for injunctive relief shall proceed against the Wabash Valley
1 Any official capacity claims for damages against any other defendants would be
duplicative of this claim and need not proceed. Mr. Ross also has failed to identify any
individual defendant by name, which is disfavored in the Seventh Circuit. See Wudtke
v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 1997). The Court takes judicial notice, however,
that Frank Vanihel is the current warden of Wabash Valley. It also is unclear how any
of Mr. Ross's claims against RDC officials could proceed, as none of his current claims
arise from the time he was there.
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Warden, Frank Vanihel, in his official capacity only, as the person most directly
responsible for purposes of carrying out any injunctive relief that might be
ordered.
The claims which shall proceed are the following: RA claims for damages
against the IDOC and for injunctive relief against Warden Vanihel in his official
capacity only. All other claims have been dismissed. If the plaintiff believes that
additional claims were alleged in the complaint, but not identified by the Court,
he shall have through 	November 	24, 	2025, 	in which to file a motion to
reconsider the screening order.
IV. Conclusion and Service of Process
The clerk is directed to substitute the Indiana Department of Correction
in place of the State of Indiana, and to add Frank Vanihel as the Warden of
Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, as defendants on the docket.
The clerk 	is 	directed to terminate Attorney General, Warden of the
Reception 	Diagnostic 	Center, 	Medical 	Professionals 	1 	and 	2, 	Classification
Professionals 1 and 2, Director of Classification, Law Library Professionals 1 and
2, Grievance Specialist, and Grievance Specialist Supervisor as defendants on
the docket.
The clerk is directed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) to issue process
to defendants Indiana Department of Correction and Warden Frank Vanihel in
the manner specified by Rule 4(d). Process shall consist of the complaint filed on
June 5, 2025, dkt. [1], applicable forms (Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver
of Service of Summons and Waiver of Service of Summons), and this Order.
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The clerk is directed to serve the Indiana Department of Correction and
Warden Vanihel electronically.
Defendants are ORDERED to respond to Mr. Ross's preliminary injunction
motion at docket 3 when they answer the complaint.
Nothing in this Order prohibits the filing of a proper motion pursuant to
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED.
Distribution:
Electronic service to Indiana Department of Correction and employee:
Warden Frank Vanihel
(At Wabash Valley Correctional Facility)
WILLIAM E. ROSS
863230
WABASH VALLEY - CF
Wabash Valley Correctional Facility
6908 S. Old US Hwy 41
CARLISLE, IN 47838
Date: 10/28/2025
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