Ferrell v. K.B. Custom Ag Services LLC et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
ESTATE OF JACOB WILLIAM
FERRELL, by and through James Eric
Ferrell, Administrator, and S.F.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
KB CUSTOM AG SERVICES LLC and
KYLE D. BEAUCHAMP,
Defendants.
Case No. 23-2384-DDC
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
In May 2023, Jacob William Ferrell died because of injuries he sustained in a traffic
accident. Mr. Ferrell’s vehicle collided with a truck operated by an employee of defendant KB
Custom Ag Services LLC. After the accident, plaintiffs—the Estate of Jacob William Ferrell (by
and through its administrator) and S.F. (Mr. Ferrell’s minor daughter)—filed this wrongful death
and survival action against KB Custom and its sole owner, Kyle D. Beauchamp. Doc. 1 at 1–2, 4
(Compl. ¶¶ 5, 6, 24). Plaintiffs asserted various negligence claims against defendants under
theories of respondeat superior, direct negligence, negligence per se, and negligent entrustment.
Doc. 78 at 11 (Pretrial Order ¶¶ 4.a.i–iv).
Now, the parties have reached a settlement. They filed a Joint Motion Requesting a
Hearing for Approval of Minor Settlement, Wrongful Death Settlement, and Apportionment of
Settlement Funds (Doc. 109). The court conducted a hearing on the motion on October 20, 2025,
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and took the motion under advisement the same day. The court now grants the motion and
approves the parties’ settlement, for reasons explained below.
I. 	Findings of Fact
The court, after reviewing the parties’ submissions and hearing the testimony presented at
the hearing, finds as follows:
1. 	Jacob William Ferrell died as a result of injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident
that occurred in Seward County, Kansas on May 12, 2023. Doc. 78 at 2 (Pretrial
Order Stipulations ¶ 2.a.4).
2. 	Mr. Ferrell was not married at the time of his death but was engaged to LaTristae
Torres. Id. at 3 (Pretrial Order Stipulations ¶ 2.a.7).
3. 	Mr. Ferrell’s sole heir, S.F., is a minor. Id. at 2 (Pretrial Order Stipulations ¶ 2.a.1,
6); Doc. 109 at 1.
4. 	Ms. Torres is S.F.’s mother and natural guardian. Doc. 78 at 3 (Pretrial Order
Stipulations ¶ 2.a.7).
5. 	On September 3, 2025, the court appointed David Rebein as guardian ad litem for
S.F. in these proceedings. Doc. 101.
6. 	Nationwide Agribusiness Insurance Company insured defendants at the time of the
accident under a policy which provided bodily-injury coverage, with a limit of $1
million per incident.
7. 	Defendants deny any liability for Mr. Ferrell’s suffering and death. But plaintiffs and
defendants have represented to the court that they wish to settle and compromise
plaintiffs’ claims against defendants arising out of the accident fully and finally.
8. 	The parties thus have entered into a Settlement Agreement and Release.
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9. 	Plaintiffs have agreed to settle any and all claims arising out of the accident that they
have or may have against defendants for a total of $2,875,000, consisting of the
following payments:
a. 	$1,000,000 paid by Nationwide to Athene Qualified Assignment Corporation
to purchase a structured settlement in accordance with Sections 104a2 and 130
of the Internal Revenue Code, due 14 days after the court issues this Order.
b. 	$64,329.51 paid by KB Custom to Athene Qualified Assignment Corporation
to purchase a structured settlement in accordance with Sections 104a2 and 130
of the Internal Revenue Code, due 14 days after the court issues this Order.
c. 	$20,000 paid by KB Custom to LaTristae Torres to aid in purchasing a vehicle
for the benefit of S.F., due 14 days after the court issues this Order. Ms.
Torres will contribute her own funds to the purchase, as well, to account for
her personal use of the vehicle.
d. 	$915,670.49 paid by KB Custom to the DeVaughn James Client Trust
Account, due 14 days after the court issues this Order.
e. 	$450,000 paid by KB Custom on or before September 30, 2026, in the
following manner: $270,000 to fund future periodic payments for the benefit
of S.F. through an approved life company—determined at the time of
funding—and $180,000 made payable to DeVaughn James Injury Lawyers
Client Trust Account.
f. 	$425,000 paid by KB Custom on or before September 30, 2027, in the
following manner: $255,000 to fund future periodic payments for the benefit
of S.F. through an approved life company—determined at the time of
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funding—and $170,000 made payable to DeVaughn James Injury Lawyers
Client Trust Account.
10. The following chart captures plaintiffs’ settlement apportionment request:
Date of fund distribution: 	Payable to: 	Amount:
Within 14 days of
this Order
1) Athene Qualified
Assignment Corporation
2) LaTristae Torres
3) DeVaughn James Client
Trust Account
4) Total
1) $1,064,329.51
2) $20,000
3) $915,670.49
4) $2,000,000
On or before
September 30, 2026
1) Approved life company,
determined at time of
funding
2) DeVaughn James Client
Trust Account
3) Total
1) $270,000
2) $180,000
3) $450,000
On or before
September 30, 2027
1) Approved life company,
determined at time of
funding
2) DeVaughn James Client
Trust Account
3) Total
1) $255,000
2) $170,000
3) $425,000
After considering the parties’ submissions, the testimony given at the settlement hearing,
and counsels’ insightful comments, the court decides the apportionment of the wrongful death
settlement is proper, the settlement is in S.F.’s best interest, and the attorneys’ fees are
reasonable. The court explains these conclusions, below, starting with the wrongful death
settlement apportionment.
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II. 	Wrongful Death Settlement
As a federal court sitting in diversity, the court “appl[ies] the substantive law of the
forum state, Kansas.” Cohen-Esrey Real Estate Servs., Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 636 F.3d
1300, 1302 (10th Cir. 2011). Plaintiffs assert this action under the Kansas Wrongful Death Act.
The Act identifies the court’s role in a Kansas wrongful death settlement. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-
1905. The full text of § 60-1905 provides:
The net amount recovered in any such action, after the allowance by the judge of
costs and reasonable attorneys fees to the attorneys for the plaintiffs, in accordance
with the services performed by each if there be more than one, shall be apportioned
by the judge upon a hearing, with reasonable notice to all of the known heirs having
an interest therein, such notice to be given in such manner as the judge shall direct.
The apportionment shall be in proportion to the loss sustained by each of the heirs,
and all heirs known to have sustained a loss shall share in such apportionment
regardless of whether they joined or intervened in the action; but in the absence of
fraud, no person who failed to join or intervene in the action may claim any error
in such apportionment after the order shall have been entered and the funds
distributed pursuant thereto.
The Kansas Wrongful Death Act thus requires the court to apportion the recovery after
conducting a hearing. Id. It provides that the court should allow costs and reasonable attorneys’
fees for plaintiffs’ counsel. Id. And the Act directs the court to apportion the recovery among
the heirs in proportion to the loss sustained by each one. Id.; see also Flowers v. Marshall, 494
P.2d 1184, 1187 (Kan. 1972) (explaining that the statute “provides for an apportionment among
the heirs of any amount recovered to be made by the trial court according to the loss sustained by
each”).
The Kansas Wrongful Death Act allows recovery of damages for the following kinds of
loss: “(1) mental anguish, suffering, or bereavement; (2) loss of society, companionship,
comfort, or protection; (3) loss of marital care, attention, advice, or counsel; (4) loss of filial care
or attention; (5) loss of parental care, training, guidance, or education; and (6) reasonable funeral
expenses for the deceased.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1904 (quotation cleaned up). This statute thus
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allows the court to apportion both pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses. Turman v. Ameritruck
Refrigerated Transp., Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450–55 (D. Kan. 2000); see also Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 60-1903 (describing damages the court or jury may award in a wrongful death action).
Pecuniary damages in a wrongful death action are those that “‘can be estimated in and
compensated by money.’” Turman, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 453 (quoting McCart v. Muir, 641 P.2d
384, 391 (Kan. 1982)). Pecuniary damages “‘should be equivalent to those pecuniary benefits or
compensation that reasonably could have resulted from the continued life of the deceased.’” Id.
(quoting McCart, 641 P.2d at 391). In Kansas, pecuniary damages “include losses of such things
as marital or parental care, services, training, advice, and financial support.” Id. Kansas law
“recognizes no limit on pecuniary damages recoverable in certain personal injury and wrongful
death actions.” Sleeth v. Sedan City Hosp., 317 P.3d 782, 791 (Kan. 2014).
Applying the Kansas Wrongful Death Act, the court begins by evaluating how the
parties’ settlement agreement apportions the recovery. Then, before assessing the
reasonableness of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees, the court pauses to address Kansas’s requirements
for a settlement involving a minor child. After ascertaining that the settlement is in S.F.’s best
interests, the court returns to the question of attorneys’ fees.
Here, all but one of the agreement’s terms clearly apportions all recovery to S.F., the
decedent’s sole heir, for pecuniary damages including her loss of “parental care . . . and financial
support.” Turman, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 453. The agreement contemplates the purchase of a
structured settlement from Athene Qualified Assignment Corporation for S.F.’s benefit. The
structured settlement would provide monthly payments for S.F. of $1,500 until the age of 25 and
just over $6,500 from ages 25–45. It also would provide a semi-annual college fund from ages
18–24, totaling $480,000, and lump sum payments, increasing in value every five years from
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ages 25–45. The cost of the structured settlement is a little over $1 million, with a guaranteed
payout around $4.2 million. In addition to the structured settlement, the agreement also will fund
periodic payments for S.F., starting in September 2026. These terms appropriately benefit S.F.
as the only heir who sustained a loss from Mr. Ferrell’s death. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1905.
One of the agreement’s other terms, however, arguably apportions a part of the recovery
to a non-heir, giving the court some pause. The agreement provides that defendants will pay
$20,000 to Ms. Torres for the purchase of a new vehicle. As the court noted earlier, the Kansas
Wrongful Death Act requires that a settlement distribute the recovery “in proportion to the loss
sustained by each of the heirs[.]” Id. And while a “decedent’s surviving spouse . . . qualifies as
an heir-at-law and has standing to bring a wrongful death lawsuit[,]” a fiancé does not.
Heimerman v. Rose, No. 13-2480-CM, 2014 WL 2711904, at *2 (D. Kan. June 16, 2014); see
also DeWitt ex rel. Kemper v. Frenchie’s Custom Helmets, No. 93-2332-JWL, 1994 WL 171571,
at *2 (D. Kan. Apr. 1, 1994) (“The Kansas Supreme Court has construed the term ‘heirs at law’
[in the Kansas Wrongful Death Act] to be synonymous with the term ‘heirs’ as construed under
the intestate succession laws. Under the Kansas intestate succession laws, if a decedent leaves
children and no spouse, all his property passes to his children as heirs.” (quotation cleaned up)).
Moreover, recovery in a “wrongful death action . . . is for the exclusive benefit of the heirs[.]”
Mason v. Gerin Corp., 647 P.2d 1340, 1343 (Kan. 1982) (emphasis added). So, the court
wondered how allocating $20,000 to Ms. Torres—Mr. Ferrell’s fiancé and S.F.’s mother, but not
Mr. Ferrell’s spouse—qualified as an appropriate apportionment under the Act.
At the hearing, Ms. Torres testified that she also will contribute to the vehicle’s purchase
out of her own pocket. And Mr. Rebein, guardian ad litem, added that Ms. Torres also
contemplated trading in her current vehicle to offset the cost further. So, testimony at the
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hearing clarified that the $20,000 settlement payment represents just the portion of the car
purchase that will benefit S.F. Ms. Torres herself will fund the portion of the new vehicle that
benefits her as a non-heir. Finally, the estate’s administrator—who is also S.F.’s grandfather—
testified about S.F.’s need to travel in a reliable vehicle, a need heightened by the geography in
western Kansas where S.F. and family reside. The court concludes that the $20,000 allocated to
Ms. Torres qualifies, at bottom, as a benefit to S.F.
The court thus approves the settlement’s apportionment as appropriate under the Kansas
Wrongful Death Act. Because S.F. is a minor, however, the court also must ensure that this
appropriate apportionment is in S.F.’s best interest, an issue the court takes up, next.
III. 	Minor Settlement
Kansas law treats minors “as persons under legal disability[.]” In re Est. of Wise, 890
P.2d 744, 749 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995). And so, a court must approve a settlement contract before it
can bind a minor plaintiff. Childs ex rel. Harvey v. Williams, 757 P.2d 302, 303 (Kan. 1988).
Kansas law requires courts “to exercise extensive oversight, ensuring that the injured minor’s
claims are not sold short by an agreed settlement merely outlined at a ‘friendly’ hearing.” White
ex rel. White v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 31 P.3d 328, 330 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001). Courts “‘may not
simply rely on the fact that the minor’s parents have consented to the proposed agreement.
Instead, the court must determine whether the agreement is in the minor’s best interests.’” Id.
(quoting Baugh v. Baugh ex rel. Smith, 973 P.2d 202, 205 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999)). Indeed,
Kansas cases have quoted favorably the Alabama Supreme Court’s view that a court should
approve an agreement, not because the parties agree, but “‘because it appears from the evidence
that the amount is just and fair’” and “‘conservative of the minor’s interests.’” Mo. Pac. Ry. Co.
v. Lasca, 99 P. 616, 618 (Kan. 1909) (quoting Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Hayes, 12 So. 98,
103 (Ala. 1892)).
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Here, the parties’ agreement purchases a structured settlement that not only provides a
monthly stipend for S.F. but also accounts for significant—and expensive—life events in her
future. For example, the structured settlement includes a college fund paid out over six years,
starting when S.F. turns 18. It also provides increasingly large lump sum payments, starting at
age 25, that could help S.F. pay for her wedding or her first home. The forward-looking nature
of the structured settlement serves S.F.’s long-term interest. What’s more, Mr. Rebein, S.F.’s
guardian ad litem, characterized the agreement as “extraordinary” for S.F. He noted that
plaintiffs’ counsel had a sizable constraint to contend with: defendants’ insurance policy had
capped any recovery at $1 million. To recover beyond that cap, plaintiffs’ counsel pursued—and
secured—a personal guarantee for the settlement funds that exceeded the insurance payout.
According to Mr. Rebein, securing this result required excellent lawyering. And this result
worked in S.F.’s best interest, permitting a total recovery more than double that provided by the
insurance funds alone. Mr. Rebein is an experienced trial lawyer and he’s especially experienced
in truck accidents (and accidents involving other vehicles) causing death or catastrophic injury.
Also, he knows the territory. He’s practiced in southwest Kansas cases and courts for most of
his career. His evaluation is meaningful to the court’s assignment. In sum, the court concludes
that S.F.’s claims weren’t “sold short by [the] agreed settlement[.]” White, 31 P.3d at 330. And
it approves the minor settlement.
With that conclusion, one final item of business remains for the court. Under the Kansas
Wrongful Death Act, the court must approve as reasonable the awarded attorneys’ fees. See
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1905. And, though not explicitly required, a minor settlement approval also
contemplates reasonable attorneys’ fees because the settlement amount must prove “just and
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fair” and “conservative of the minor’s interests.” Mo. Pac., 99 P. at 618 (quotation cleaned up).
The court turns to this final task, below.
IV. 	Attorneys’ Fees
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1905 “requires the district court to determine a reasonable fee for
the plaintiffs’ attorneys in a wrongful death case.” Baugh v. Baugh ex rel. Smith, 973 P.2d 202,
207 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999). “The general rule is that an attorney is entitled to the reasonable value
of services performed for the client.” Id. When deciding whether a requested fee is reasonable,
the court addresses the factors set forth in Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(a). Id.
Those factors are:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) the
likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee
customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount
involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client
or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the
lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or
contingent.
KRPC 1.5(a).
Plaintiffs’ counsel here seeks an award of attorneys’ fees representing 40% of the
recovery, after deducting expenses. In the representation contract reached between plaintiffs and
plaintiffs’ counsel, plaintiffs agreed to attorneys’ fees at this rate. And at the hearing, plaintiffs’
counsel and Mr. Rebein described the work conducted to reach the settlement, providing support
for the fee award.
The first KRPC 1.5(a) factor includes three prongs: “the time and labor required,” “the
novelty and difficulty of the questions involved,” and “the skill requisite to perform the legal
service properly[.]” Id. Addressing the time and labor required first, the court notes that
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plaintiffs’ counsel didn’t produce billing records. The court is mindful that a segment of the
practicing trial bar accepts representations on a contingent-fee basis. There is nothing nefarious
about this business model or those who choose to organize their attorney-client relationship
under it. Indeed, it permits litigants who might lack the capacity to purchase representation on a
cash basis to secure it. But still, the Kansas Supreme Court has decided that the “time and labor
required” for the job affects the reasonableness of an attorneys’ fee. Baugh, 973 P.2d at 207
(adopting KRPC 1.5(a)’s standards in context of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1905). So, the absence of
any timekeeping records hinders the court’s ability to apply this factor to this case. Plaintiffs’
counsel is the market participant who elected not to keep time records. The court thus assigns
responsibility for that decision to counsel, not plaintiffs themselves.
Counteracting the timekeeping records’ absence, Mr. Rebein testified at the hearing about
counsel’s tireless efforts on plaintiffs’ behalf. He testified that counsel worked “night and day”
to close the gap between the parties’ negotiating positions to consummate a settlement
agreement. And, as previously discussed, he identified considerable hurdles—e.g., the limited
insurance payout—that counsel overcame in reaching the current agreement. The court
interprets this testimony to speak to the time and labor required, as well as to the second prong—
the difficulty of this case.
At the hearing, plaintiffs’ counsel also outlined the experts it had retained in pursuit of
plaintiffs’ claims: an accident reconstructionist, a pathologist, a cell phone expert, a
trucking/driving expert, an economist, and a toxicologist. Counsel’s efforts to retain these
experts also bears on the first KRPC 1.5(a) factor. To be sure, the sheer number of experts
retained doesn’t necessarily demonstrate a case’s difficulty or manifest an attorney’s labor or
skill. But here the court concludes counsel’s efforts in retaining experts demonstrates all three:
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difficulty, labor, and skill. That’s so because, at the hearing, plaintiffs’ counsel described the
purpose of each expert given the facts and challenges of this case. His brief overview of the
legal strategy employed when retaining each expert suggests that counsel devoted a considerable
amount of time and labor. It also reveals the difficult twists in the case and, thus, the requisite
skill to achieve a successful result. So, while the absence of billing records disfavors a finding of
reasonableness, the testimony at the hearing tempers that disfavor, tipping the scales in the
opposite direction. Other KRPC 1.5(a) factors favor a finding of reasonableness, as well.
For example, the fourth factor directs the court to assess the “amount involved and the
results” achieved. Id. The settlement amount is, in Mr. Rebein’s assessment, “extraordinary.”
And his testimony largely credited counsel’s aptitude for the results achieved. Apart from
overcoming the limited-insurance-payout difficulty already discussed, Mr. Rebein also testified
that counsel negotiated to reduce an outstanding ERISA lien by $30,000—further enhancing the
recovery available to his clients. The total settlement amount ($2.875 million) and the ERISA
negotiation also shed light on the seventh KRPC 1.5(a) factor, the “experience, reputation, and
ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services[.]” Id. Such favorable results suggest a
lawyer with notable ability and, likely, considerable experience and reputation.
The court also finds that “the fee customarily charged in this locality for similar services”
(the third factor) and “whether the fee is fixed or contingent” (the eighth factor) likewise favor
approving counsel’s fee request. Id. Plaintiffs’ counsel accepted this engagement with the risks
inherent in a contingent-fee arrangement. It was possible that counsel would invest time and
capital into the case and recover no fee. Indeed, counsel clarified at the hearing that the law firm
had fronted the cost for all six experts—along with other expenses—totaling close to $100,000.
The court’s experience with similar cases reveals that a 40% fee arrangement, though on the high
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end of fees for settling cases, is a fee sometimes charged in this locality. Indeed, this court has
approved 40% contingency fee arrangements before. See, e.g., Aiken v. Assurance Health Sys.
LLC, No. 22-2385-DDC-ADM, 2025 WL 1810014, at *5 (D. Kan. July 1, 2025) (approving 40%
contingency fee as aligning with those charged in the area); Sedlock v. Overland Park Med.
Invs., LLC, No. 19-2614-DDC, 2021 WL 1056516 at *4–5 (D. Kan. Mar. 19, 2021) (finding that
a 40% contingency fee award was reasonable given the circumstances). The court thus
concludes the 40% attorneys’ fee award contemplated by plaintiffs’ contingency-fee agreement
is reasonable in this case.
The remaining KRPC 1.5(a) factors—the second, fifth, and sixth—are neutral here.
Nothing indicates that accepting this case would preclude other employment by plaintiffs’
counsel (second factor). Relatedly, nothing suggests that the clients imposed on counsel any
extraordinary time limitations (fifth factor). On the “nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client”—the sixth factor—counsel put forth nothing indicating a prior
relationship with plaintiffs. So, nothing implies that counsel should receive a premium fee or
absorb a discounted one because of a long-standing relationship with the clients. These three
factors are neutral here.
In sum, one KRPC 1.5(a) factor tips slightly against approval for reasonable fees, four
favor approval, and the remaining three are neutral. The court thus finds that counsel’s fee
request here is a reasonable one and approves it.
V. 	Conclusion
The court concludes that the apportionment of the wrongful death settlement is
appropriate under the Kansas Wrongful Death Act. It also decides that the settlement is in the
best interests of the minor heir, S.F. And it approves plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees as reasonable.
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT plaintiffs Estate of Jacob
William Ferrell, by and through James Eric Ferrell, Administrator, and S.F. and defendants KB
Custom Ag Services LLC and Kyle D. Beauchamp’s Joint Motion Requesting a Hearing for
Approval of a Minor Settlement, Wrongful Death Settlement, and Apportionment of the
Settlement Funds (Doc. 109) is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 30th day of October, 2025, at Kansas City, Kansas.
s/ Daniel D. Crabtree
Daniel D. Crabtree
United States District Judge
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