Hachmeister (ID 2000077444) v. Williams

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
JASON WAYNE HACHMEISTER,
Petitioner,
v. 	CASE NO. 25-3112-JWL
THOMAS WILLIAMS,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by
Petitioner and Kansas state prisoner Jason Wayne Hachmeister. The operative petition in this
matter is the amended petition, filed on July 25, 2025. (Doc. 9.) This matter comes now before the
Court on Respondent’s limited Pre-Answer response, in which he raises the affirmative defense of
timeliness, and Petitioner’s reply to the Pre-Answer response. Also before the Court is Petitioner’s
motion for leave to file excess pages. (Doc. 17.) For the reasons explained below, the motion for
leave to file excess pages will be granted and this matter will be dismissed as untimely filed.
Background
In 2015, a jury in Shawnee County convicted Petitioner of first-degree murder and the
Shawnee County District Court sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole for
50 years, also called a “Hard 50.” (Doc. 9, p. 1-2.) Petitioner pursued a direct appeal, but on June
5, 2020, the Kansas Supreme Court (“KSC”) affirmed. Id. at 2; see also State v. Hachmeister, 311
Kan. 504, 505 (2020). Petitioner advises that he did not file a petition for writ of certiorari in the
United States Supreme Court. (Doc. 9, p. 3.)
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On May 25, 2022, Petitioner filed in Shawnee County District Court a motion seeking state
habeas relief under K.S.A. 60-1507. Id. The parties dispute the ultimate resolution of that case. It
is not disputed, however, that on May 29, 2025, Petitioner filed in this Court the petition for federal
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 that began this case. (Doc. 1, p. 14.)
After receiving the § 2254 petition, the Court began the initial review of it required by Rule
4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. Rule 4 requires
the Court to review a habeas petition upon filing and to dismiss it “[i]f it plainly appears from the
petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.”
Because Petitioner is proceeding pro se, the Court liberally construes the pleading during this
initial review, but it may not act as Petitioner’s advocate. See James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312,
1315 (10th Cir. 2013). “[T]he court cannot take on the responsibility of serving as the litigant’s
attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux &
Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). It “‘may not rewrite a petition to include claims that
were never presented.’” Childers v. Crow, 1 F.4th 792, 798 (10th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
During the Rule 4 review, the Court determined that a limited Pre-Answer Response
(“PAR”) was appropriate. Thus, on June 30, 2025, the Court ordered Respondent to file a PAR
limited to addressing the affirmative defense of timeliness. (Doc. 5.) Petitioner then filed a
preemptive “Motion Regarding Timeliness and Exhaustion” that contained arguments regarding
timeliness. (Doc. 8.) After obtaining an extension of time, Respondent timely filed the PAR on
September 19, 2025. (Doc. 12.)
The Court granted Petitioner time in which to file a reply to the PAR if he wished to do so.
(Doc. 13.) On September 22, 2025, Petitioner filed an “exhibit” (Doc. 15) containing arguments
in support of his motion regarding timeliness and he timely filed his reply to the PAR on October
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24, 2025. (Doc. 16.) Petitioner also filed a motion for leave to file excess pages (Doc. 17) in support
of his reply. The motion for leave to file excess pages will be granted and the Court will direct the
clerk to docket the pages currently located at Doc. 17-1 as exhibits in support of the reply to the
PAR.
Analysis
The Court has reviewed the parties’ briefing on timeliness, including Petitioner’s “Motion
Regarding Timeliness and Exhaustion” (Doc. 8); the portion of the operative petition addressing
timeliness (Doc. 9, p. 13); the PAR (Doc. 12) and exhibits thereto; the additional argument
Petitioner filed in support of his motion regarding timeliness (Doc. 15); Petitioner’s reply to the
PAR (Doc. 16); and the exhibits filed in support of that reply (Doc. 17-1). Although not every
argument will be addressed in detail in this order, the parties are assured that the Court has carefully
considered each point asserted by the parties.
This action is subject to the one-year limitation period established by the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Section 2244(d)(1)
provides:
(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The
limitation period shall run from the latest of –
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review
or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by
the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court
and made retroactively applicable to case on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could
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have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
The one-year limitation period generally runs from the date the judgment becomes “final,”
as provided by § 2244(d)(1)(A). See Preston v. Gibson, 234 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 2000).
Nothing in the case now before the Court suggests that another subsection of the statute applies to
control the date on which the one-year limitation period began. The United States Supreme Court
has held that direct review concludes—making a judgment “final”—when an individual has
exhausted his or her opportunity for direct appeal to the state courts and his or her opportunity to
request review by the United States Supreme Court. Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 119
(2009).
In this matter, the KSC issued its opinion in Petitioner’s direct appeal on June 5, 2020.
Petitioner advises that he did not file a petition for writ of certiorari. The Tenth Circuit has
explained that “if a prisoner does not file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court after [his or her] direct appeal, the one-year limitation period begins to run when
the time for filing a certiorari petition expires.” United States v. Hurst, 322 F.3d 1256, 1259 (10th
Cir. 2003). The Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States allow petitioners ninety days from
the date of entry of judgment in highest state court—in Kansas, the Kansas Supreme Court—to
seek certiorari. Sup. Ct. R. 13(1).
Contrary to Respondent’s argument in the PAR, however, this 90-day window did not
apply to Petitioner. (See Doc. 12, p. 2-3.) As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Supreme
Court temporarily allowed 150 days in which to file a petition for writ of certiorari. See Sup. Ct.
Misc. Orders dated Mar. 19, 2020 and July 19, 2021. Because this adjusted timeframe was in effect
when Petitioner could have filed his petition for writ of certiorari, he had 150 days in which to file
a petition for writ of certiorari.
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Therefore, the last day on which Petitioner could have timely filed a petition for writ of
certiorari was November 2, 2020, not September 3, 2020 as Respondent asserts in the PAR.
Petitioner did not file a petition for writ of certiorari, so on November 3, 2020, the one-year
AEDPA limitation period began to run. Under the “anniversary method” used in the Tenth Circuit,
the one-year federal habeas limitation period expired at the end the day on November 3, 2021. See
United States v. Hurst, 322 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (10th Cir. 2003). Yet Petitioner did not file his §
2254 petition until May 29, 2025. (See Doc. 1, p. 14.)
Statutory Tolling
As noted in the Court’s order allowing Petitioner time to respond to the PAR, the federal
habeas statute of limitations set forth in the AEDPA includes a tolling1 provision. (Doc. 12, p. 1.)
The tolling provision states: 	“The time during which a properly filed application for State post-
conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending
shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
In his briefing to this Court on timeliness, Petitioner largely focuses on the statutory tolling to
which he believes he is entitled during the pendency of his K.S.A. 60-1507 proceedings in state
court, which he contends is not yet final. (See, e.g., Doc. 8, p. 1-5; Doc. 9, p. 13; Doc. 15, p. 1-12;
Doc. 16, p. 1-5.) For his part, Respondent argues in the PAR that Petitioner filed his K.S.A. 60-
1507 motion in May 2022, which was “well after the federal statute of limitations had expired.”
(Doc. 12, p. 3.)
Respondent’s argument is important because the Tenth Circuit has clearly held: “Only state
1 To “toll” the federal statute of limitations means simply to pause it. See Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 10
(2014) (explaining that “[a]s a general matter, equitable tolling pauses the running of, or ‘tolls,’ a statute of limitations
. . . .”); Whitefield v. Exec. Dir. Of Colo. Dept. of Corr’s, 2024 WL 4212320, *2 (10th Cir. Sept. 17, 2024)
(unpublished) (“[T]olling can pause a ‘limitations period . . . .’”); Bevan v. Utah, 670 Fed. App’x 664, 665 (10th Cir.
Nov. 10, 2016) (unpublished) (“Tolling, of course, does not restart the clock; it only pauses it.”).
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petitions for post-conviction relief filed within the one year allowed by AEDPA will toll the statute
of limitations.” Clark v. Oklahoma, 468 F.3d 711, 714 (10th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). In other
words, if the one-year federal statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas petition expires
before a state prisoner files in state court an “application for State post-conviction or other
collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim,” the federal statute of limitations
is not tolled. The timeliness of the K.S.A. 60-1507, which is determined by state law, and whether
that action remains pending only affects the timeliness of this federal habeas action if the K.S.A.
60-1507 motion was filed within the one-year federal habeas statute of limitations. As explained
above, it was not.
In his reply to the PAR, Petitioner asks the Court to consider Hollenbeck v. Schnurr, 2025
WL 2576948 (D. Kan. Sept. 5, 2025) (unpublished). (Doc. 16, p. 3.) Petitioner asserts that
Hollenbeck “talked about the ‘federal habeas statute of limitations resumed running . . . .’” and he
argues that “[i]f the habeas statute of limitations resumed running, that means they had stopped
running. This was because of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Administrative Orders put into
place by the U.S. Supreme Court, just like the Kansas Supreme Court had done by Administrative
Order.” Id. (emphasis and all errors in original).
Petitioner’s reliance on Hollenbeck is misplaced. The one-year federal habeas statute of
limitations began running for Matthew Hollenbeck on May 30, 2019. Hollenbeck, 2025 WL
2576948, at *1. It ran until Mr. Hollenbeck filed a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion on February 24, 2020.
Id. at *2. When the K.S.A. 60-1507 proceeding became final on August 23, 2024, the federal
habeas statute of limitations resumed. Id. On the last day of the federal habeas statute of limitations,
Mr. Hollenbeck filed a second K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. Id. If the second K.S.A. 60-1507 motion
was “properly filed,” as contemplated by the federal habeas statute of limitations, it would also
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have tolled the federal habeas statute of limitations, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See id.
However, because the state district court denied the second K.S.A. 60-1507 motion as untimely, it
is not considered “properly filed.” See id. (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417
(2005)). The only portion of the Court’s order in Hollenbeck that uses the word “resumed”
explained to Mr. Hollenbeck that his
argument involving the effect of COVI-19 on his state court proceedings does not
help him because the time in which his first K.S.A. 60-1507 was pending has
already been tolled. By August 23, 2024, when Petitioner’s first K.S.A. 60-1507
motion was final and the federal habeas statute of limitations resumed running, the
Kansas state courts were no longer operating under restrictions necessitated by
COVID-19.
Hollenbeck, 2025 WL 2576948, at *4.
Liberally construing Petitioner’s reply to the PAR in this case, he appears to argue that this
language shows that the federal habeas statute of limitations was tolled for Mr. Hollenbeck because
of the COVID-19 pandemic. But that is not what the order in Hollenbeck says. Rather, the federal
habeas statute of limitations was tolled for Mr. Hollenbeck under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) because
he had a properly filed first K.S.A. 60-1507 motion pending in the state district court. The federal
habeas statute of limitations resumed when the K.S.A. 60-1507 proceedings were final. In the
present case, however, there was no point during the federal habeas statute of limitations when
Petitioner had a properly filed K.S.A. 60-1507 motion pending in the state district court. Thus,
Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) and Hollenbeck does not
help him.
In summary, for the reasons explained above, the one-year federal statute of limitations
for Petitioner to seek federal habeas relief in this Court from his 2015 murder conviction expired
on November 3, 2021. He did not file his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion until May 2022. Thus, the K.S.A.
60-1507 motion does not affect the federal habeas statute of limitations, which had already expired.
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Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling of the federal habeas statute of limitations based on his
K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.
Equitable Tolling
The order this Court issued allowing Petitioner to reply to the PAR explained that in
addition to statutory tolling:
Petitioner also may choose to argue that he is entitled to equitable tolling of
the statute of limitations. Equitable tolling is available “in rare and exceptional
circumstances,” Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 808 (10th Cir. 2000) (citation
omitted), “when an inmate diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the
failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his
control,” Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 127, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000). Circumstances that
warrant 	equitable 	tolling 	include 	“when 	an 	adversary’s 	conduct—or 	other
uncontrollable circumstances—prevents a prisoner from timely filing, or when a
prisoner actively pursues judicial remedies but files a deficient pleading during the
statutory period.” Gibson, 232 F.3d at 808 (internal citations omitted). If Petitioner
chooses to argue that he is entitled to equitable tolling, he must assert specific facts
that support the conclusion that extraordinary circumstances beyond his control
prevented him from timely filing this federal habeas petition. He must also show
that he was diligently pursuing his claims during the time he wishes this Court to
equitably toll the federal habeas statute of limitations.
(Doc. 13, p. 1-2.)
In his reply to the PAR, Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to equitable tolling. (Doc. 16,
p. 3, 5.) But even liberally construing Petitioner’s arguments on timeliness, he does not develop
that argument further. At no point does Petitioner identify a period of time during the running of
the federal habeas statute of limitations that he believes should be equitably tolled. He also does
not “assert specific facts that support the conclusion that extraordinary circumstances beyond his
control prevented him from timely filing” a federal habeas petition on or before November 3, 2021.
And he has not demonstrated that he was diligently pursuing his claims during the year in which
he could have timely filed this federal habeas matter. As noted above, the Court may not act as
Petitioner’s advocate or construct arguments for him. See James, 724 F.3d at 1315; Garrett, 425
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F.3d at 840. The Court therefore concludes that Petitioner has not shown that the federal habeas
statute of limitations in this matter should be equitably tolled.
Actual Innocence
The order allowing a reply to the PAR also explained:
Petitioner also may choose to argue that his failure to timely file this matter
should be excused because the failure to consider his claims will result in a
fundamental miscarriage of justice because he is actually innocent. This exception
to the statute of limitations is often referred to as “the actual innocence exception”
or “the actual innocence gateway” because “actual innocence ‘serves as a gateway
through which a petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a procedural bar . .
. or . . . expiration of the statute of limitations.’” See Fontenot v. Crow, 4 F.4th 982,
1030 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013)).
In this context, “[a]ctual innocence means ‘factual innocence not mere legal
insufficiency.’” O’Bryant v. Oklahoma, 568 Fed. Appx. 632, 637 (10th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998)). This is because the
actual innocence exception exists to provide an avenue to remedy “the conviction
of one who is actually innocent.” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623-24.
To benefit from the actual innocence exception to the federal habeas statute
of limitations, Petitioner is not required to conclusively exonerate himself. See
Fontenot, 4 F.4th at 1030. Rather, he must present to this Court “new reliable
evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness
accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.” See Schlup
v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995). He “must establish that, in light of [this] new
evidence, ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found
petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” House v. Bell 547 U.S. 518, 536-37
(2006) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). “[T]enable actual-innocence gateway
pleas are rare, arising only in an extraordinary case.” Fontenot, 4 F.4th at 1031.
“An actual innocence claim must be based on more than the petitioner’s
speculations and conjectures.” Taylor v. Powell, 7 F.4th 920, 927 (10th Cir. 2021).
(Doc. 13, p. 2-3.)
Petitioner briefly asserts in the operative petition that he is “actually innocent and it would
be a fundamental miscarriage of justice to not consider this petition.” (Doc. 9, p. 13.) He refers the
Court to the “Motion Regarding Timeliness and Exhaustion” for further argument, id., but that
motion contains no mention of actual innocence. (See Doc. 8.) The Court has carefully reviewed
all of the briefing Petitioner has filed regarding the timeliness of this federal habeas matter and
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concludes that, even liberally construing all of Petitioner’s arguments, he has not presented to this
Court any new reliable evidence that satisfies the high standard required to pass through the actual
innocence gateway.
Conclusion
In conclusion, for the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Petitioner did not timely
file the federal habeas petition that began this matter. The last day on which Petitioner could have
timely filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition was November 3, 2021, but he did not file his § 2254
petition until 2025. The statutory tolling provision of the federal habeas statute of limitations does
not apply because the time in which Petitioner could file a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 expired before he filed his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion in the state district court. Moreover,
Petitioner has not shown that the federal habeas statute of limitations should be equitably tolled or
that he should be allowed to proceed on his untimely petition by way of the actual innocence
gateway. Therefore, this matter must be dismissed as time-barred.
Certificate of Appealability
Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases requires a district court to issue or
deny a certificate of appealability (COA) upon entering a final adverse order. A COA may issue
only if the petitioner made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional rights. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2).
“When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds
without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA should
issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and
that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct
in its procedural ruling.”
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The failure to satisfy either prong requires the denial
of a COA. Id. at 485. The Court concludes that the procedural ruling in this matter is not subject
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to debate among jurists of reason. Therefore, the Court declines to issue a certificate of
appealability.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT the motion for leave to file excess pages (Doc.
17) is granted. The clerk is directed to docket the pages currently located at Doc. 17-1 as exhibits
in support of the reply (Doc. 16).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT this matter is dismissed with prejudice as time-
barred. No certificate of appealability will issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 	This 6th day of November, 2025, at Kansas City, Kansas.
S/ John W. Lungstrum
JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM
United States District Judge
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