Jensen (ID 2100211417) v. Zmuda et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
JOSHUA JENSEN,
Plaintiff,
v. 	CASE NO. 25-3192-JWL
JEFF ZMUDA, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff brings this pro se civil rights action. 	Plaintiff is incarcerated at the Lansing
Correctional Facility in Lansing, Kansas (“LCF”). The Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in
forma pauperis. On October 7, 2025, the Court entered a Memorandum and Order to Show Cause
(Doc. 5) (“MOSC”) granting Plaintiff until November 6, 2025, in which to respond and show good
cause why this matter should not be dismissed for the reasons set forth in the MOSC.
Plaintiff has failed to respond to the MOSC by the Court’s deadline. The Court’s MOSC
was mailed to Plaintiff at his address of record at LCF. The mail was returned, noting that Plaintiff
refused delivery of the MOSC. 	(Doc. 7.) 	Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d) provides that
orders are served according to Rule 5(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 77(d). Rule 5(b) provides that a paper is
served by “mailing it to the person’s last known address—in which event service is complete upon
mailing.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C); see also Elrod v. Swanson, 478 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1260 (D.
Kan. 2007) (finding that Rule 5(b)(2)(C) was complied with and stating that the court’s
administrative procedures provide that pro se filers will receive orders of the court by first class
mail, and rejecting request by prisoner to receive court orders by certified mail).
Plaintiff alleges that he is bringing a class action based on diversity of citizenship. (Doc. 1,
at 1.) Plaintiff’s claims are based on the lack of tablets for inmates at LCF. Plaintiff’s purported
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class consists of all current and former LCF inmates. Id. at 2. Plaintiff claims that the Kansas
Department of Corrections (“KDOC”) is required by regulation to provide tablets for all inmates,
citing IMPP 10-142. Id. at 6. Plaintiff alleges that inmates entering LCF are put on a four-month
waiting list to receive a tablet. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the tablets are the inmates’ only chance to
learn and rehabilitate. Id. Plaintiff names as defendants the KDOC and Jeff Zmuda, Secretary of
Corrections. For relief, Plaintiff seeks “$150 per day.” Id.
The Court found in the MOSC that Plaintiff did not indicate whether or not he has received
a tablet, and it is well-settled that a § 1983 claim must be based on the violation of Plaintiff’s
personal rights and not the rights of someone else. Archuleta v. McShan, 897 F.2d 495, 497 (10th
Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). The Court found that even if Plaintiff is on the waiting list and has
not received a tablet, he has not established a constitutional right to a tablet. 	In Bass v. Battle,
when the prisoner returned his tablet and sought a replacement tablet, he was told that he was on
the waiting list and that there were no replacement devices available. 	Bass v. Battle, 2025 WL
1168896, at *1 (N.D. Ind. 2025). 	The plaintiff in Bass argued that he was entitled to a tablet
“because he paid for one and pursuant to departmental policy that makes tablet devices available
to all inmates.” Id. The court held that a “violation of departmental policy alone is not sufficient
to state a constitutional claim.” Id. (citing Felton v. Brown, 129 F.4th 999, 1088 (7th Cir. 2025)
(“Violations of state law, however, do not automatically establish a federal constitutional claim.”));
see also Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322, 1329 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(holding prisoner must establish that violation of a prison policy necessarily stated a constitutional
violation).
In denying relief, the court in Bass stated that “[t]he court is unaware of any constitutional
right to a tablet device.” Id. Other courts have also found that “[i]tems such as radios, televisions,
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and video games are luxuries and, as such, are not required by the Constitution.” Drennon v. Idaho
Bd. of Corr., 2025 WL 1359870, at *7 (D. Idaho 2025) (citing see, e.g., James v. Milwaukee
County, 956 F.2d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 1992) (denial of television does not constitute a cognizable
civil rights claim); Murphy v. Walker, 51 F.3d 714, 718, n. 8 (7th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (same);
Gladson v. Rice, 862 F.2d 711, 713 (8th Cir. 1988) (same); Montana v. Commissioners Court, 659
F.2d 19, 23 (5th Cir. 1981) (“The claims relating to the usage of radio and television were properly
dismissed as frivolous. These claims do not pertain to federal constitutional rights.”); Manley v.
Fordice, 945 F. Supp. 132, 136–37 (D. Miss. 1996) (“[T]here is simply no right to television while
incarcerated . . . 	[S]uch items are luxuries, and any allowance of them in prisons is merely an
altruistic act on the part of the Department of Corrections.”); see also Rawls v. Sundquist, 929 F.
Supp. 284, 291 (M.D. Tenn. 1996), aff’d, 113 F.3d 1235 (6th Cir. 1997) (no equal protection
violation where death row inmates were denied satellite television because that denial “is within
the wide-ranging discretion granted to prison administrators and does not impinge the Inmate
Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights”); Schloss v. Ashby, 2011 WL 4804868, *4 (C.D. Ill. 2011)
(“Humane treatment means the adequate provision of life’s basic necessities, not luxuries such as
gaming consoles and other electronic equipment.”); Belton v. Singer, 2011 WL 2690595 (D.N.J.
July 8, 2011) (unpublished) (sexually violent predator civil detainees have no First or Fourteenth
Amendment right to use memory sticks, flash drives, thumb drives, external drives, data storage
devices, X-box Elite, Play Station 3, or Wii gaming system); Hedgepeth v. Bartow, 2010 WL
2990807 (W.D. Wis. July 27, 2010) (no First Amendment right to possess video games or game
systems)). 	“Access to photos, messages, music, and electronic copies of documents are similar
luxuries.” Drennon, 2025 WL 1359870, at *7; see also Fortman v. Richwine, 2025 WL 619147,
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at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2025) (“In essence, what Fortman is demanding is unlimited access to a tablet, but
that is not a constitutional right.”).
The Court found in the MOSC that Plaintiff has also failed to state a claim regarding court
access. Plaintiff has not alleged that he was denied access to certain materials, but only that there
is a waiting list to obtain a tablet. See Lipscomb v. Global Tel Link, 2024 WL 4403996, at *2 (7th
Cir. 2024) (noting that the court could not tell whether plaintiff alleged an outright denial of access
to religious materials or instead whether his complaint was that the tablet did not contain the
materials he expected it to contain). The right to access the courts does not guarantee inmates the
right to a law library or to legal assistance, but merely to “the means for ensuring ‘a reasonably
adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the
courts.’” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350–51 (1996) (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817,
825 (1977)). 	The right to access the courts is “only [the right] to present . . . grievances to the
courts,” and does not require prison administrators to supply resources guaranteeing inmates’
ability “to litigate effectively once in court” or to “conduct generalized research.” Id. at 354, 360.
It is well-established that a prison inmate has a constitutional right of access to the courts.
However, it is equally well-settled that in order “[t]o present a viable claim for denial of access to
courts, . . . an inmate must allege and prove prejudice arising from the defendants’ actions.”
Peterson v. Shanks, 149 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343, 349 (1996) (“The requirement that an inmate . . . show actual injury derives ultimately
from the doctrine of standing.”). The Court found in the MOSC that any claim regarding a lack
of court access is not plausible, considering that Plaintiff has filed fourteen cases in this Court
since July 14, 2025.1
1 See Case Nos. 25-3134; 25-3178; 25-3179; 25-3180; 25-3181; 25-3182; 25-3191; 25-3192; 25-3193; 25-3194; 25-
3195; 25-3211; 25-3212; and 25-3213.
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The MOSC provides that “[f]ailure to respond by the deadline may result in dismissal of
this matter without further notice for failure to state a claim.” (Doc. 5, at 8.) Plaintiff has failed
to respond by the Court’s deadline and has failed to show good cause why this matter should not
be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that this matter is dismissed for
failure to state a claim.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated November 7, 2025, in Kansas City, Kansas.
S/ John W. Lungstrum
JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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