Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
WAN XIN JIANG, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 26-3006-JWL
)
C. CARTER, Warden, FCI-Leavenworth; 	)
UNKNOWN DEPORTATION OFFICER; 	)
TODD LYONS, Acting Director, ICE; 	)
PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General; and 	)
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, 	)
Department of Homeland Security, 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
)
_______________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Petitioner, acting pro se, filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
by which he challenges his detention by immigration officials. 	For the reasons set forth
below, the Court grants the petition. 	Respondents shall release petitioner from custody,
subject to an appropriate order of supervision, by March 9, 2026, and shall provide notice
to this Court when that release is effected.
Petitioner is a native and citizen of China. 	Petitioner initially entered the United
States in 1990 as a lawful permanent resident. From 1997 to 2000, petitioner was convicted
several times of theft in Illinois state court. In 2004, immigration officials initiated removal
proceedings, and in 2006 an immigration judge ordered petitioner’s removal to China,
which decision was upheld on appeal. Petitioner did not depart the United States, however,
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and officials eventually took petitioner into custody on May 23, 2025. 	Petitioner is
presently detained within this judicial district. 	On January 12, 2026, petitioner filed the
instant habeas action; respondents have filed an answer to the petition, and petitioner has
filed a traverse, and the matter is therefore ripe for ruling.
Petitioner 	claims 	that 	his 	continued 	detention 	by 	immigration 	authorities 	is
improper. 	To obtain habeas corpus relief, petitioner must demonstrate that he is “in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 	See 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 	This Court has habeas corpus jurisdiction to consider the statutory
and constitutional grounds for immigration detention that are unrelated to a final order of
removal. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517–18 (2003).
Generally, when an alien is ordered removed, the removal is to occur within a period
of 90 days, referred to as the “removal period.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). This period
began for present purposes on May 23, 2025, when petitioner was taken into custody.
Specifically, petitioner claims that, after more than six months since the beginning of the
removal period, his detention has become unreasonably indefinite, and that his release is
therefore required under the framework set forth by the Supreme Court in Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court noted that an alien must be detained during the 90-
day removal period and that the Government may continue to detain an alien after that
period or release the alien under supervision. See id. at 683 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2),
(6)). 	The Court held, however, that “once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable,
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continued detention is no longer authorized by the statute.” 	See id. at 699. 	The Court
elaborated on that standard as follows:
In answering that basic question, the habeas court must ask whether
the detention in question exceeds a period reasonably necessary to secure
removal. It should measure reasonableness primarily in terms of the statute’s
basic purpose, namely, assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of
removal. 	Thus, if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should
hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.
In that case, of course, the alien’s release may and should be conditioned on
any of the various forms of supervised release that are appropriate in the
circumstances, and the alien may no doubt be returned to custody upon a
violation of those conditions. 	. . .
We recognize, as the Government points out, that review must take
appropriate account of the greater immigration-related expertise of the
Executive Branch, of the serious administrative needs and concerns inherent
in the necessarily extensive INS efforts to enforce this complex statute, and
the Nation’s need to “speak with one voice” in immigration matters. But we
believe that courts can take appropriate account of such matters without
abdicating their legal responsibility to review the lawfulness of an alien’s
continued detention.
See id. at 699-700 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court then established a presumptively
reasonable detention period of six months in which to accomplish removal, after which the
reasonableness of an alien’s detention should be determined as follows:
After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that
showing. 	And for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior
postremoval confinement grows, what counts as the “reasonably foreseeable
future” conversely would have to shrink. 	This 6-month presumption, of
course, does not mean that every alien not removed must be released after
six months. To the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has
been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future.
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See id. at 701; see also, e.g., Anyimu v. Department of Homeland Security, 2017 WL
193180, at *2-3 (D. Kan. Jan. 18, 2017) (Lungstrum, J.) (applying this framework); Kaliku
v. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2024 WL 4854523, at *2-3 (D.
Kan. Nov. 21, 2024) (Lungstrum, J.) (same); Vargas v. Noem, 2025 WL 2770679, at *2-3
(D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2025) (Lungstrum, J.) (same).
The Court finds that petitioner has met his burden to provide “good reason to believe
that there is no significant likelihood of [his] removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”
Nine months have elapsed since the start of the removal period, a significant period of time
beyond the six-month period deemed presumptively reasonable by the Supreme Court.
Moreover, 	respondents 	have 	not 	disputed 	petitioner’s 	contention 	that, 	despite 	his
cooperation (completing forms, providing information, sitting for an interview), officials
have not provided information indicating that petitioner will be removed to China in the
foreseeable future.
The 	Court 	further 	finds 	that 	respondents 	have 	not 	rebutted 	that 	showing.
Respondents’ declarant states that China requires a travel document for petitioner; that in
October 2025 the matter was presented to Chinese authorities for nationality verification;
and that once petitioner’s identity is confirmed, a travel document request will be sent to
Chinese authorities. 	The verification process remains pending, however, and neither
respondents nor declarant has provided any information concerning this delay. 	Thus,
respondents have not submitted any information or explanation concerning the likely
duration of the verification process, the likelihood that that process succeeds, the likely
duration of the subsequent document request process, or the likelihood that China will then
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grant the request for a travel document. 1 	Thus, there is no basis for a finding that
petitioner’s removal likely will occur in the reasonably foreseeable future. 2
In sum, respondents have not provided evidence that creates a significant likelihood
that, even though officials have not succeeded in removing petitioner to China in almost
nine months since they detained petitioner – and have not even received the first of two
necessary responses from Chinese authorities – petitioner will nonetheless be removed in
the reasonably foreseeable future. 	Petitioner’s detention has become unreasonably
indefinite, and the Court therefore concludes that petitioner must be released, subject to
appropriate terms of supervision. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700.
Accordingly, the Court grants the petition for habeas relief, and respondents are
ordered to effect petitioner’s release by March 9, 2026.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT the petition for habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is hereby granted. 	Respondents shall release
petitioner from custody, subject to an appropriate order of supervision, by March 9, 2026,
and shall provide notice to this Court when that release is effected.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 26th day of February, 2026, in Kansas City, Kansas.
/s/ John W. Lungstrum
Hon. John W. Lungstrum
United States District Judge
1 Perhaps these matters are routine or are likely to succeed, but neither respondents
nor declarant has provided any such information.
2 In recent cases, this Court has decried the absence of such analysis or explanation
despite the Court’s repeated complaints to that effect. 	See, e.g., Hassan v. Welsh, 2026
WL 21234, at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 5, 2026) (Lungstrum, J.).
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