Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
Arash AZARNEZHAD, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. 26-3073-JWL
)
Pamela BONDI, Attorney General; )
Markwayne MULLIN, Secretary, DHS; )
Todd LYONS, Acting Director, ICE; )
Sam OLSON, Field Office Director, ICE; and )
C. CARTER, Warden, FCI-Leavenworth, )
)
Respondents. )
)
____________________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Petitioner, acting through counsel, filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241, by which he challenges his detention by immigration officials. For the reasons set
forth below, the petition is hereby granted in part and denied in part. Respondents shall
release petitioner from custody, subject to an appropriate order of supervision, by April
24, 2026, and shall provide notice to this Court when that release is effected. The petition
is denied with respect to any other request for relief.
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Iran who was detained by immigration officials
after entering the United States unlawfully in October 2024. On April 7, 2025, an
immigration court ordered petitioner’s removal but granted his request for withholding of
removal, meaning that petitioner may only be removed to a country other than Iran.
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Petitioner is presently detained within this judicial district. On March 27, 2026, petitioner
filed this habeas action; the Court ordered an expedited response, and respondents have
now filed an answer, and the matter is therefore ripe for ruling.
Petitioner claims that his continued detention by immigration authorities is
improper. To obtain habeas corpus relief, petitioner must demonstrate that he is “in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” See 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). This Court has habeas corpus jurisdiction to consider the statutory
and constitutional grounds for immigration detention that are unrelated to a final order of
removal. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517–18 (2003). Specifically, petitioner claims
that his detention for more than six months has now become unreasonably indefinite, and
that his release is therefore required under the framework set forth by the Supreme Court
in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court noted that an alien must be detained during the 90-
day removal period and that the Government may continue to detain an alien after that
period or release the alien under supervision. See id. at 683 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2),
(6)). As respondents concede, petitioner’s removal period began on April 7, 2025, the date
his removal order was issued and became final (as the parties had waived appeal). See id.
§ 1231(a)(1)(B)(i). The Supreme Court held, however, that “once removal is no longer
reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by the statute.” See id.
at 699. The Court elaborated on that standard as follows:
In answering that basic question, the habeas court must ask whether
the detention in question exceeds a period reasonably necessary to secure
removal. It should measure reasonableness primarily in terms of the statute’s
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basic purpose, namely, assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of
removal. Thus, if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should
hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.
In that case, of course, the alien’s release may and should be conditioned on
any of the various forms of supervised release that are appropriate in the
circumstances, and the alien may no doubt be returned to custody upon a
violation of those conditions. . . .
We recognize, as the Government points out, that review must take
appropriate account of the greater immigration-related expertise of the
Executive Branch, of the serious administrative needs and concerns inherent
in the necessarily extensive INS efforts to enforce this complex statute, and
the Nation’s need to “speak with one voice” in immigration matters. But we
believe that courts can take appropriate account of such matters without
abdicating their legal responsibility to review the lawfulness of an alien’s
continued detention.
See id. at 699-700 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court then established a
presumptively-reasonable detention period of six months in which to accomplish removal,
after which the reasonableness of an alien’s detention should be determined as follows:
After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that
showing. And for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior
postremoval confinement grows, what counts as the “reasonably foreseeable
future” conversely would have to shrink. This 6-month presumption, of
course, does not mean that every alien not removed must be released after
six months. To the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has
been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future.
See id. at 701; see also, e.g., Anyimu v. Department of Homeland Security, 2017 WL
193180, at *2-3 (D. Kan. Jan. 18, 2017) (Lungstrum, J.) (applying this framework); Kaliku
v. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2024 WL 4854523, at *2-3 (D.
Kan. Nov. 21, 2024) (Lungstrum, J.) (same); Vargas v. Noem, 2025 WL 2770679, at *2-3
(D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2025) (Lungstrum, J.) (same).
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The Court finds that petitioner has met his burden to provide “good reason to believe
that there is no significant likelihood of [his] removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”
Petitioner has now been detained for nearly a year since his removal order, a significant
period of time beyond the six-month period deemed presumptively reasonable by the
Supreme Court. Petitioner has not been removed in that period, and respondents do not
dispute petitioner’s contention that officials never even identified any third country to
which he may be removed. Nor have officials been able to provide an approximate date
for petitioner’s removal.
The Court further finds that respondents have not rebutted that showing by
petitioner. In a declaration submitted by respondents, an immigration official states that
requests to accept petitioner were sent to three countries (Turkey, Egypt, Morocco) in June
2025, but it does not appear that any of those countries have responded to the request.
Moreover, it does not appear that any action was taken to further the removal process for
over seven months, until February 2026, when local officials asked for an update on the
pending requests. The declarant states that on April 8, 2026, petitioner’s name was
“elevated” by officials through the State Department to a different third country pursuant
to an agreement with that country to accept removed aliens, and that officials await
confirmation of acceptance. The declarant has not provided any details or history regarding
that process, however, including the likelihood of its success and the time it usually takes,
and therefore the fact that the process has been initiated does not, by itself, provide
evidence that petitioner is likely to be removed in the near future. The declarant has not
even identified the country in question, nor has he explained why the country cannot be
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named. Finally, any claim of diligence with respect to petitioner’s case is belied by the
fact that although officials are required to conduct custody reviews every 90 days, no such
determination has been completed for petitioner in the 17 months during which he has been
detained. In the absence of specific evidence showing when petitioner might actually be
removed, the Court cannot find that the Government has met its burden here.
In sum, respondents have not shown a significant likelihood that, even though
officials have failed to remove petitioner for nearly one year since his removal period began
(and for over 17 months since his detention); and even though officials took no action for
a period of over seven months, and still have not identified a potential third country for
removal; petitioner will nonetheless be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Petitioner’s detention has become unreasonably indefinite, and the Court therefore
concludes that petitioner must be released, subject to appropriate terms of supervision. See
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700. The petition is granted to that extent, and respondents are
ordered to effect petitioner’s release by April 24, 2026.
Petitioner also requests a declaration that a certain process is required before
petitioner may be removed to a third country. The Court declines to order any such relief,
and it therefore denies the petition to the extent that petitioner seeks relief other than his
release from custody. As the Court has explained in other cases (which petitioner has failed
to address), the Court declines to impose or recognize requirements for third-country
removal in light of petitioner’s membership in a class certified in another case in which
similar relief has been requested. See Manago v. Carter, 2025 WL 2576755, at *2-3 (D.
Kan. Sept. 5, 2025) (Lungstrum, J.) (citing D.V.D. v. United States Dept. of Homeland Sec.,
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778 F. Supp. 3d 355 (D. Mass.), appeal filed (1st Cir. Apr. 22, 2025), stay granted, 145 S.
Ct. 2153 (June 23, 2025)); Rustami v. Noem, 2025 WL 3760744, at *3 (D. Kan. Dec. 30,
2025) (Lungstrum, J.) (citing Manago). In addition, the Court is not persuaded that
petitioner will be unable to challenge removal once a third country has been designated.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT the petition for habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is hereby granted in part and denied in part.
Respondents shall release petitioner from custody, subject to an appropriate order of
supervision, by April 24, 2026, and shall provide notice to this Court when that release is
effected. The petition is denied with respect to any other request for relief.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 14th day of April, 2026, in Kansas City, Kansas.
/s/ John W. Lungstrum
Hon. John W. Lungstrum
United States District Judge
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