Sperry v. Wyandotte County, Kansas, Board of Commissioners et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
JEFFREY J. SPERRY,
Plaintiff,
v. 	CASE NO. 26-3301-JWL
WYANDOTTE COUNTY, KANSAS,
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff brings this pro se civil rights action. Plaintiff is in custody at the Lyon County
Detention Center in Emporia, Kansas. 	On August 17, 2026, the Court entered a Notice of
Deficiency (Doc. 3) (‘NOD”) granting Plaintiff until September 16, 2026, to either pay the filing
fee for this case or to submit a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. On August 26, 2026,
the Court entered a Memorandum and Order to Show Cause (Doc. 4) (“MOSC”) provisionally
granting Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and advising him that he remains obligated
to comply with the NOD by the September 16, 2026 deadline, or this case may be dismissed
without further notice. Plaintiff has filed an affidavit (Doc. 5), but he has failed to either pay the
filing fee or to submit a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis by the deadline in the NOD.
The Court also found in the MOSC that this case was subject to dismissal. 	The Court
ordered Plaintiff to show good cause why this case should not be dismissed for the reasons set
forth in the MOSC. This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s response (Doc. 6). Plaintiff’s
factual allegations and the Court’s screening standards are set forth in detail in the MOSC.
Plaintiff’s claims relate to his state criminal proceedings. 	See State v. Sperry, Case
No. WY-1995-CR-002246 (District Court of Wyandotte County, Kansas). 	Plaintiff attacks his
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1996 criminal conviction and seeks release from imprisonment.
The Court found in the MOSC that “a § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner
who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or
length of his custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973) (emphasis added). When
the legality of a confinement is challenged so that the remedy would be release or a speedier
release, the case must be filed as a habeas corpus proceeding rather than under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
and the plaintiff must comply with the exhaustion of state court remedies requirement. Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 482 (1994); see also Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 866 (10th Cir.
2000) (exhaustion of state court remedies is required by prisoner seeking habeas corpus relief);
see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (requiring exhaustion of available state court remedies). The Court
ordered Plaintiff to show good cause why his attack on his criminal conviction and request for
release should not be dismissed as improperly brought in a civil rights action.
The Court noted that an online Kansas Court Records search1 shows that Plaintiff filed a
pro se motion to set aside void judgment on December 15, 2021, in his state court criminal case.
See State v. Sperry, Case No. WY-1995-CR-002246 (District Court of Wyandotte County,
Kansas). The motion was denied on January 21, 2022. Id. Plaintiff filed a pro se notice of appeal
on February 23, 2022, and his case was affirmed with the mandate issuing on March 28, 2023. Id.
Plaintiff also seeks money damages in this case. The Court found in the MOSC that any
request for money damages would be barred by Heck. See Heck, 512 U.S. 477. Before a plaintiff
may proceed in a federal civil action for monetary damages based upon an invalid conviction or
sentence, he must show that his conviction or sentence has been overturned, reversed, or otherwise
1 https://casesearch.kscourts.gov/ (last visited August 25, 2026).
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called into question. Id. In Heck v. Humphrey, the United States Supreme Court held that when a
state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 action, the district court must consider the following:
whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity
of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless
the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated.
Id. at 487. 	In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a § 1983 damages claim that necessarily
implicates the validity of the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence is not cognizable unless and until
the conviction or sentence is overturned, either on appeal, in a collateral proceeding, or by
executive order. Id. at 486–87. The Court found in the MOSC that Plaintiff has not shown that
his 1996 conviction or sentence has been invalidated. The Court ordered Plaintiff to show good
cause why his claims for money damages in this case should not be dismissed as barred by Heck.
In his response, Plaintiff argues that “the record and the calculations presented in his 2021
motion to set aside void judgment establish that the 1996 trial proceeded after the statutory speedy-
trial deadline expired.” (Doc. 6, at 1.) He claims that the state court lost jurisdiction and therefore
his conviction and sentence resulting from the proceedings are void. Id. Plaintiff cites cases for
the proposition that a void judgment is a nullity “and may be vacated at any time.” Id. at 4 (citing
In re Marriage of Hampshire, 261 Kan. 854, 862 (1997), and In re Marriage of Welliver, 254 Kan.
801, 804 (1994)).
Plaintiff claims that Heck does not apply because Heck addresses a claim for damages
where success on the claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of an “operative” judgment, and
his judgment was a nullity from its inception. Id. at 7. The problem with Plaintiff’s argument is
that he is arguing that his judgment of conviction is void, but it has not been declared void or
vacated.
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Heck plainly states that it bars money damages where a judgment in favor of the plaintiff
would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, unless “the conviction or
sentence has already been invalidated.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added). Heck does not
state that it applies unless the plaintiff can make an argument for declaring the conviction or
sentence invalid. Heck further states that a plaintiff “must prove that the conviction or sentence
has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Id. at 486–87.
Plaintiff does not dispute that success in this case would call the validity of his conviction
into question. Plaintiff cannot show that his conviction or sentence has been invalidated by any of
the means set forth above in Heck. 	Plaintiff has not suggested that habeas relief is unavailable
through no lack of diligence on his part. See Clingerman v. City of Wichita, 2025 WL 958257, at
*4 (D. Kan. 2025) (noting the Cohen exception to Heck where habeas relief is unavailable, and
finding the exception only applies where an occurrence outside of a party’s control renders a
habeas remedy unavailable); see also Cohen v. Longshore, 621 F.3d 1311 (10th Cir. 2010).
In fact, Plaintiff attempted to declare his conviction void in state court and his motion was
denied and affirmed on appeal. Any attempt to use this Court as an avenue to appeal that decision
is invalid. 	Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts have no jurisdiction to
consider suits “that amount to appeals of state-court judgments.” Bolden v. City of Topeka, 441
F.3d 1129, 1139 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Richardson v. Title IV-D Agency, 842 F. App’x 190,
192 (10th Cir. 2021) (unpublished) (stating that “[w]hat is prohibited under Rooker-Feldman is a
federal action that tries to modify or set aside a state-court judgment because the state proceedings
should not have led to that judgment”) (quoting Mayotte v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 880 F.3d 1169,
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1174 (10th Cir. 2018) (emphasis omitted)). Plaintiff’s response fails to show good cause why this
matter should not be dismissed based on the Heck bar.
Plaintiff also asks this Court to reconsider its denial of his motion for temporary restraining
order, arguing that he has presented a likelihood of success on the merits. 	(Doc. 6, at 9–10.)
However, the Court is dismissing this case and therefore he has not shown a likelihood of success
on the merits. Any request to reconsider the denial of his motion seeking a temporary restraining
order is denied.
Plaintiff also requests leave to amend to the extent the Court concludes that any pleading
deficiency remains. Id. at 14. This case is being dismissed on the merits, and amendment would
be futile. Therefore, any request for leave to amend is denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this matter is dismissed for failure to state a claim.2
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any request for reconsideration of the Court’s denial
of Plaintiff’s motion seeking a temporary restraining order is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any request for leave to amend is denied as futile.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated October 13, 2026, in Kansas City, Kansas.
S/ John W. Lungstrum
JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
2 A dismissal based on Heck is for failure to state a claim. See Smith v. Veterans Admin., 636 F.3d 1306, 1312 (10th
Cir. 2011).
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