Neville v. The Salvation Army National Corporation et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
RILEY NEVILLE Plaintiff
v. Civil Action No. 3:25-cv-227-RGJ-RSE
THE SALVATION ARMY NATIONAL
CORPORATION, ET AL.
Defendants
* * * * *
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Terri Neville moves [DE 55] for leave to file an intervening complaint in this case under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 24(a) or 24(b). Defendants The Salvation Army USA Southern
Territory (“Southern Territory”) and The Salvation Army Kentucky and Tennessee Division (“K/T
Division”) (collectively “Defendants”) responded [DE 61], and Terri Neville replied [DE 63].
Plaintiff Riley Neville and Defendants submitted a proposed agreed order requesting
dismissal of this action with prejudice. [DE 56]. Terri Neville filed her objections to the proposed
agreed order of dismissal [DE 59]. Defendants responded [DE 60], and Terri Neville replied [DE
62].
These matters are ripe for adjudication. For the reasons below, Terri Neville’s motion to
file an intervening complaint is DENIED, Riley Neville and Defendants’ proposed agreed order
of dismissal [DE 56] is GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
I. BACKGROUND
Riley Neville was a minor involved in the Salvation Army when she alleges a Salvation
Army employee, Joel Collier (“Collier”), began to groom and sexually abuse her. [DE 46 at 644–
50]. Riley Neville contends that in February 2017 Collier, as the Divisional Music Director for
Southern Territory, began a texting relationship with her and sent graphic sexual text messages.
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[Id. at 645–46]. Riley Neville contends that this practice escalated over the next four years “to the
point that [Collier] was telling her what type of sexual acts he expected from her when she turned
eighteen.” [Id. at 647]. Riley Neville alleges that Collier first physically abused her in summer
2019, when she was seventeen years old, and that the physical abuse escalated after she turned
eighteen. [Id. 650–51]. As a result of the continued abuse, she attempted to take her own life in
December 2020 and February 2021. [Id. at 651, 653].
Riley Neville originally brought this suit against Southern Territory and K/T Division,
asserting negligence; negligent hiring, supervision, and retention; fraudulent misrepresentation;
fraudulent omission; aiding and abetting human trafficking; negligent/intentional infliction of
emotional distress; and breach of fiduciary duty.1 [DE 1-1 at 27–36].
In the United States, the Salvation Army is comprised of four separate regional corporate
entities, including Southern Territory. [DE 46 at 640]. Riley Neville contends that another of those
entities, Eastern Territory, had placed Collier’s name on its territorial registry, which was intended
to identify individuals determined to be a danger to children. [Id. at 641–42]. Riley Neville alleges
that around 2015, Collier applied for a position with Southern Territory. [Id. at 642–43]. After
learning that Collier was in the Eastern Territory’s registry, Southern Territory removed him from
the registry, and, despite knowledge of his prior sexual texts with a minor female, hired him as the
Divisional Music Director, a position that tasked him with “leading faith-based music ministry
programs, attending music camps, and serving as a leader in Defendant K/T Division’s band and
chorus.” [Id.]. Southern Territory made the decision to remove Collier from the registry even
though “[t]he Eastern Territory strongly disagreed with this decision and warned the Southern
1 Riley also initially named The Salvation Army National Corporation (“Salvation Army National”) as a
defendant. [DE 1-1 at 12]. The Court granted Salvation Army National’s motion to dismiss Riley’s claims
against it for lack of personal jurisdiction. [DE 43].
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Territory not to hire Collier.” [Id. at 643]. Riley Neville alleges that her pastor, Sara Orozco, and
her youth pastor, Candell Rainey, both filed Safe from Harm complaints against Collier for his
behavior with Riley Neville, but K/T Division did not follow up on either complaint. [Id. at 649–
50]. Riley Neville also alleges that her parents reported Collier’s abuse to Defendants in April
2021. [Id. at 653].
On April 22, 2026, Defendants filed a third-party complaint against Terri Neville, Riley
Neville’s mother and an employee of Southern Territory. [DE 48 at 684]. Defendants alleged that
Terri Neville failed to report her concerns about Riley Neville and Collier’s relationship to
Defendants and permitted Riley Neville to use “concealable communication methods, such as
Snapchat, to engage in private communications with Collier” which, Defendants contend was a
“circumvention of established safety policies[.]” [Id. at 692]. Accordingly, Defendants argued, if
they were found liable for any harm to Riley Neville, they were entitled to “have [their] liability
determined in accordance with the principles of comparative fault under KRS 411.182 and to seek
contribution and/or indemnity from Terri Neville[.]” [Id. at 693]. On May 26, 2026, Defendants
voluntarily dismissed their third-party complaint against Terri Neville before she answered it. [DE
54].
On July 20, 2026, Terri Neville moved for leave to file an intervening complaint pursuant
to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 24(a) or 24(b). [DE 55 at 716]. Terri Neville’s proposed
intervening complaint alleges that Defendants fired Terri Neville in retaliation for her report of
Collier’s abuse of Riley Neville. [DE 55-1 at 724]. Terri Neville also contends that Defendants’
allegations in their third-party complaint caused her emotional and reputational harm and were
defamatory. [Id. at 724–25]. Terri Neville articulates eight counts against Defendants based on
these actions: (1) negligence, (2) defamation, (3) violation of the Kentucky Whistleblower Act, (4)
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malicious prosecution, (5) abuse of process, (6) retaliation, (7) intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and (8) punitive damages. [Id. at 727–30].
On July 21, 2026, Riley Neville and Defendants submitted a proposed agreed order of
dismissal. [DE 56]. This Court determined that because Terri Neville, who had appeared as a third-
party defendant, had not agreed to the stipulation of dismissal, dismissal could only be entered by
the Court on terms the Court considers proper pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2).
[DE 58 at 737].
II. TERRI NEVILLE’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN INTERVENING
COMPLAINT
A. Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), the “court must permit anyone to intervene
who . . . claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action,
and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the
movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent the interest.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). To satisfy this rule, the Sixth Circuit requires an applicant show that: “1)
the application was timely filed; 2) the applicant possesses a substantial legal interest in the case;
3) the applicant’s ability to protect its interest will be impaired without intervention; and 4) the
existing parties will not adequately represent the applicant’s interest.” Blount-Hill v. Zelman, 636
F.3d 278, 283 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394, 397–98 (6th Cir. 2011));
see also Providence Baptist Church v. Hillandale Comm., Ltd., 425 F.3d 309, 315 (6th Cir. 2005)
(“We have adopted a rather expansive notion of the interest sufficient to invoke intervention of
right.”) (internal quotations omitted). Each element is mandatory, so a failure to satisfy any
element will defeat intervention. Blount-Hill, 636 F.3d at 283.
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) governs permissive intervention: “On timely motion,
the court may permit anyone to intervene who: (A) is given a conditional right to intervene by a
federal statute; or (B) has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question
of law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1).
For intervention under either Rule 24(a) or 24(b), the proposed intervenor “bears the
burden of establishing that they either have the right or should be permitted to intervene.” United
States v. J&A Tax Servs., LLC, No. 24-10560, 2026 WL 2318348, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 10,
2026) (citing United States v. Michigan, 424 F.3d 438, 443 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Michigan, No. 23-1944, 2025 WL 764613, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 11, 2025)).
B. Discussion
1. Intervention As a Matter of Right
Terri Neville argues that the Court should permit her to intervene as a matter of right
pursuant to Rule 24(a) because her “claims arise out of the same events and circumstances that
form the basis of . . . Riley Neville’s claims against the Defendants.” [DE 55 at 717].
“Specifically,” Terri Neville elaborates, these shared circumstances are that Riley Neville “claims
she was sexually abused at the hands of the [Defendants] and their employee, and that after Terri
Neville reported the abuse and exploitation of her daughter, the Defendants retaliated” against
Terri Neville. [DE 63 at 755]. Terri Neville argues that “[a]lthough Defendants have dismissed
their Third-Party Complaint against her, the allegations against Terri Neville have already been
made in this litigation” and, as a result, Terri Neville “will be unable to protect her own interests
or obtain relief from the harm caused by those allegations” without intervention. [DE 63 at 755;
see also DE 55 at 717].
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To intervene as a matter of right pursuant to Rule 24(a), Terri Neville must identify a
“substantial legal interest in the case.” Blount-Hill, 636 F.3d at 283. The mere fact that some of
Terri Neville’s claims arise out of the same events and circumstances that form the basis of Riley
Neville’s claims against Defendants does not satisfy this requirement. While Terri Neville asserts
that her “interests will be impaired” if she is not able to intervene, she does not describe at all how
her interests will be impaired. [DE 63 at 754–55; see also DE 55 at 717]. Terri Neville emphasizes
that Defendants’ allegedly defamatory statements were made during this litigation, but she has not
identified any reason why her defamation claims or any of her other claims could not be brought
against Defendants as an independent suit, nor can the Court identify any. [See DE 55 at 717; DE
63 at 754–55]. Because Terri Neville fails to articulate a “substantial legal interest,” she is unable
to establish the requirements to intervene as a matter of right pursuant to Rule 24(a). See Blount-
Hill, 636 F.3d at 283 (“[F]ailure to satisfy any one of the elements will defeat intervention under
[Rule 24(a)].”).
2. Permissive Intervention
Terri Neville argues that, in the alternative, this Court should exercise its discretion to allow
her to intervene pursuant to Rule 24(b). [DE 55 at 717–18; DE 63 at 755–56]. She argues that her
claims share “both common questions of law and fact with those present in the underlying action”
and “arise in large part from the same conduct of the Defendant[s] that forms the basis of Riley
Neville’s claims.” [DE 63 at 755]. Terri Neville does not, however, identify any specific common
questions of law or fact between her and Riley Neville’s claims. [See DE 55 at 717–18; DE 63 at
755–56]. She further argues that her claims “arise directly from Defendants’ Third-Party
Complaint and their allegations that she allowed the risk that . . . Riley Neville would be subjected
to sexual abuse or exploitation.” [DE 55 at 718].
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While Terri Neville argues that her claims arise out of the allegations made by Defendants
in their third-party complaint, these claims are no longer at issue in this case, as Defendants had
already voluntarily dismissed their claims against her before she moved to file an intervening
complaint. [See DE 54].
Some of Terri Neville’s claims—particularly those based on her report to Defendants—
arise from the same narrative that Riley Neville describes in her amended complaint. Riley Neville
contends that her parents, upon learning of Collier’s actions, “immediately reported it to the
Salvation Army” in April 2021 [DE 46 at 653]. Terri Neville’s claims for violation of the Kentucky
Whistleblower Act and retaliation also require showing that she reported Collier’s abuse. [DE 55-
1 at 723, 727, 729].
Terri Neville’s report is, however, largely peripheral to Riley Neville’s claims, if at all
relevant to them. This Court has already dismissed Riley Neville’s negligence and negligent hiring,
retention, and supervision claims to the extent that those claims rely on incidents that occurred
after March 27, 2020, Riley Neville’s eighteenth birthday. [DE 43 at 632]. Terri Neville’s report
also does not appear to be meaningfully at issue for any of Riley Neville’s other claims: her
fraudulent misrepresentation claim depends on representations made by Defendants during the
summers of 2018 and 2019 [DE 46 at 658–60], her fraudulent omission claim focuses on
Defendants’ duty to disclose pursuant to “mandatory reporting laws that are designed to protect
the safety of minors” [DE 46 at 661], and her negligent/intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim focuses on Defendants’ breaches of their duties in hiring Collier for a role involving minors
[DE 46 at 661–62].
Terri Neville’s proposed intervening complaint would also significantly expand the scope
of this case. Her claims arise out of either her report and Defendants’ retaliation (Counts 3 and 6)
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or Defendants’ third-party complaint (Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7). [DE 55-1 at 727–29]. Terri
Neville’s complaint would bring into focus her report, currently only peripheral to Riley Neville’s
claims, and expand the scope of this case to also encompass Defendants’ alleged acts in retaliation.
Additionally, most of her claims and allegations center on Defendants’ knowledge and intent in
filing their third-party complaint. These claims, which allege that Defendants made the third-party
complaint “without any reasonable basis” and for “an ulterior purpose,” would go well beyond
questions about Defendants’ actions from 2015 to 2021 relating to Collier and instead require
factual determinations as to Defendants’ intentions in this litigation. [Id. at 728].
Because Terri Neville’s claims have few factual or legal questions overlapping with Riley
Neville’s claims and because her claims would dramatically expand the scope of this case, the
Court declines to exercise its discretion under Rule 24(b) to allow her to intervene.
Since Terri Neville fails to articulate a “substantial legal interest” to intervene under Rule
24(a) and this Court declines to allow her to intervene under Rule 24(b), her motion for leave to
file an intervening complaint is DENIED.
III. PROPOSED AGREED ORDER OF DISMISSAL
A. Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) authorizes dismissal of an action at the plaintiff’s
request by court order, on terms that the court considers proper. Rule 41(a)(2) usually involves a
plaintiff seeking to dismiss an action without prejudice, and a dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) is
without prejudice unless the order states otherwise. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2); Smoot v. Fox, 340
F.2d 301, 302 (6th Cir.1964) (“[Rule 41(a)(2)] contemplates the dismissal by plaintiff of an action
without prejudice[.]”); see, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. La Bestia Constr. Ltd. Liab. Co., No.
3:23-CV-418-RGJ, 2026 WL 316549 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 15, 2026). “The primary purpose of the rule
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in interposing the requirement of court approval is to protect the nonmovant from unfair
treatment.” Grover by Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 33 F.3d 716, 718 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing
Ikospentakis v. Thalassic S.S. Agency, 915 F.2d 176, 177 (5th Cir. 1990)).
If, however, a plaintiff “moves under Rule 41(a)(2) to voluntarily dismiss its complaint
with prejudice,” in general “the district court must grant the motion.” United States v. Est. of
Rogers, No. 1:97-CV-461, 2003 WL 21212749, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 3, 2003), aff’d sub nom.
United States v. Alpha Med., Inc., 102 F. App’x 8 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Smoot, 340 F.2d at 303;
York v. Ferris State University, 36 F.Supp.2d 976, 979 (W.D.Mich.1998)) (emphasis added). The
Sixth Circuit reasoned in Smoot v. Fox that a plaintiff “could not be required to litigate . . . ‘when
he considers he has no cause of action or for any reason wishes to dismiss his action with
prejudice.’” Pedreira v. Sunrise Children’s Servs., Inc., 79 F.4th 741, 747 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting
Smoot, 340 F.2d at 303) (emphasis in original). Nonetheless, because “[m]odern litigation involves
ever-more complex configurations of parties,” this rule is not absolute: “there may be rare cases
in which dismissal with prejudice adversely affects the interests of defendants or third parties in a
way that causes them plain legal prejudice.” Id. at 750–51 (holding that even when a plaintiff
moves to dismiss with prejudice district courts should “use their discretion” and “impose terms
and conditions on dismissals as they see fit” to avoid legal prejudice).
B. Discussion
In this case, Riley Neville and Defendants submitted a proposed agreed order requesting
that this action be dismissed with prejudice. [DE 56]. This Court found that dismissal under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) was not available because Terri Neville, who appeared in
the action as a third-party defendant, had not agreed to the stipulation of dismissal. [DE 58, citing
Anderson-Tully Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 347 F. App’x 171, 176 (6th Cir. 2009)]. This Court, therefore,
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noted that “the parties’ proposed agreed order of dismissal can only be entered by court order under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2), on terms the court considers proper,” and ordered Terri Neville to file any
objection to the proposed order of dismissal. [DE 58 at 737–38].
Terri Neville “does not object to the dismissal of . . . Riley Neville’s claims against
Defendants[.]” [DE 59 at 740]. However, Terri Neville asks that “any Order of dismissal expressly
provide that the dismissal only applies to claims made by . . . Riley Neville” so as not to “prejudice,
impair, or otherwise affect Terri Neville’s right to proceed against the Defendants in this action.”
[Id.]. She asks that if the Court grants the proposed agreed order of dismissal, the Court also
“establish that [Terri Neville’s] claims remain on this Court’s docket in light of her pending Motion
to Intervene[.]” [Id.].
Because Riley Neville and the Defendants’ proposed agreed order of dismissal asks the
Court to dismiss this action with prejudice, the Court must dismiss the action unless it falls into
the category of “rare cases in which dismissal with prejudice adversely affects the interests of
defendants or third parties in a way that causes them plain legal prejudice.” Pedreira, 79 F.4th at
751. Because Defendants have agreed to Riley Neville’s proposed dismissal of her claims, their
interests are not adversely affected by dismissal with prejudice. The only question is whether Terri
Neville’s interests are adversely affected. Terri Neville’s principal concern relates to her ability to
pursue the claims in her intervening complaint in this action. Given that the Court denies Terri
Neville’s motion for leave to file an intervening complaint, this concern is mooted, and she does
not identify any other way in which dismissing this action with prejudice will adversely affect her
interests. [See DE 59 at 740; DE 62 at 750–51]. This case, therefore, does not fall into the category
of “rare” cases to which Smoot does not apply, and the Court finds dismissal with prejudice
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appropriate under Rule 41(a)(2). Pedreira, 79 F.4th at 751. Accordingly, the proposed agreed order
of dismissal is GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Having considered the parties’ filings and the applicable law, and being otherwise
sufficiently advised,
IT IS ORDERED that Terri Neville’s Motion For Leave to File an Intervening Complaint
[DE 55] is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Proposed Agreed Order of Dismissal [DE 56] is
GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The Court will enter separate judgment.
October 13, 2026
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