Adams v. Landry, et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
AMY ADAMS 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NUMBER: 21-2153
ASHLEIGH LANDRY ET AL 	SECTION: B (4)
OPINION
Plaintiff pro se Amy Adams presents a second motion to amend her original and first
amended complaints against defendant Ashleigh Landry, individually and in her official capacity
as principal at Lockport Middle School, Lafourche Parish, Louisiana. Rec. Doc. 95. Through her
counsel, plaintiff’s initial complaints alleged constitutional and various state claims arising from
defendant’s sexual relationship with plaintiff’s now-deceased minor child, T.M.T, while a student
at Landry’s school and in her custody pursuant to a provisional custody agreement between
plaintiff and the child’s father. See Rec. Docs. 1 and 50. Defendant opposes the second motion to
amend complaint to substitute heirs. Rec. Doc. 97
The original complaint, filed on November 19, 2021, was dismissed without prejudice to
allow plaintiff an opportunity to seek an amendment addressing deficiencies in her federal based
claims, including among other factual issues whether cited illegal activities occurred in connection
with school duties or on school property.1 Rec. Doc. 46. The facts and analysis of deficiencies of
federal claims in the original complaint against defendant Landry are adopted here from the order
and reasons issued on May 4, 2022. Id.
Again, through counsel, plaintiff filed the first amending complaint alleging Landry’s use
of TMT’s student file containing his “challenging personal history” was done to gain custody and
1 While supplemental jurisdiction over state claims was rejected, it was noted that if leave to amend is
allowed, the state law claims would be reinstated. Rec. Doc. 46, p. 2.
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constituted an act “under color of state law”. The amendment also alleged that Landry “had sexual
relations with TMT on the property of Lockport Middle School at least once in early 2020”. Rec.
Doc. 50 at 5. Defendant’s second motion to dismiss was denied by finding “[b]cause pf Landry’s
two-fold roles as both legal guardian and principal, plaintiff’s complaint plausibly pleads that
Landry’s collective actions exploited her “power and status” to manipulate TMT, and that she
pursued TMT both during school hours and on school grounds”. Rec. Doc. 68; citing Doe v. Rains
Cnty. Indep. Sch. Dist., 66 F.3d 1402, 140607 (5th Cir. 1995).2
Upon TMT reaching the age of majority, plaintiff counsel eventually reported on
September 19, 2024 that TMT is making himself available for this case. 	Rec. Doc. 84-1, p. 2.
Defense counsel states “…custody records from the 17th Judicial District Court for Lafourche
Parish indicate that T.M.T. was born on September 16, 2005, which means that T.M.T. reached the
age of majority in September of 2023.” 	Unfortunately, TMT died in a vehicular accident on
November 27, 2024. (Rec. Doc. 91 at p. 2). 	However, counsel and TMT’s mother Amy Adams
thereafter developed a conflict with each other leading to the withdrawal of counsel’ s
representation of TMT and the surviving heirs, “at least his mother and a sister”. Rec. Doc. 92.
Defendant argues that movant pro se has not explained why she waited over a year to
prosecute claims via substitution from when TMT reached majority in September 2023 until
February of 2025, to dismiss their attorney. Defendant specifically argues the absence of
compliance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 25 and particularly the Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure article 801 requirement for either an affidavit of death and heirship or a judgment
of possession.
2 Thereafter, upon parties’ joint requests, the trial on the merits was continued twice due to a related state
court criminal proceedings against Landry (Rec. Docs. 73 and 75), her subsequent incarceration, and the unavailability
of TMT since reaching the age of majority (Rec. Docs. 84 and 85).
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FRCP Rule 25 provides that, upon the death of a party to litigation, a court can order
substitution of a “proper party.” Martin v. Edwards, CV 19-44, 2021 WL 981605, at *2 (E.D. La.
Mar. 16, 2021). Under FRCP 25 (a)(1), if the motion for substitution is not made within 90 days
after service of a statement noting the death, the action by or against the decedent must be
dismissed.” 	Because the Rule does not define proper party, we look to Louisiana law for
guidance.3
In this action filed under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 Louisiana substantive inheritance laws controls
the issue of survival of the cause of action through application of the procedural requirements
under FRCP 25 (a)(1). Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 589–90; 98 S.Ct. 1991, 1995 (1978)
citing Smith v. Dooley, 591 F. Supp. 1157, 1166 (W.D. La. 1984), aff'd, 778 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.
1985);
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 801 describes the proper party for substitution
as the deceased party's “legal successor.” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. CA 10-
866, 2012 WL 1247213, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 13, 2012) (Duval, J.). A legal successor is determined
depending on whether or not succession is under administration. Martin v. Edwards, CV 19-44,
2021 WL 981605, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 16, 2021). Id. If succession has been opened, the legal
successor is the succession representative appointed by a state court. Id. If, however, succession
has yet not been opened, the legal successors are the heirs and legatees of the deceased. Id.
3 Martin v. Edwards, CV 19-44, 2021 WL 981605, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 16, 2021)(Stating that Courts are split
on whether to apply state law or federal law in determining proper parties for substitution. See, e.g., Janvey, 2014 WL
12834493, at *3 (“[A] number of courts interpreting Rule 25 to include distributees within the term “successors” have
done so without any reference to state law.”); Washington v. Louisiana, No. CIV.A. 11-334-BAJ, 2013 WL 4048561,
at *2 (M.D. La. Aug. 9, 2013) (“[I]n order to qualify as a proper substitute plaintiff for his deceased wife, Mr.
Washington must qualify as either successor or representative of his wife's estate.”); Blassingill v. Reyes, No. 3:17-
CV-3415-B (BH), 2018 WL 4922442, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No.
3:17-3415-B (BH), 2018 WL 4913881 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2018) (applying Texas law to determine proper parties for
substitution). Under federal law, a proper party is one who qualifies as a successor, a representative, or a distributee.
See, e.g., Washington, 2013 WL 4048561, at *2; McSurely v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1985); In re
Baycol Prod. Litig., 616 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 2010).
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Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art 801 specifies;
“When a party dies during the pendency of an action which is not extinguished
by his death, his legal successor may have himself substituted for the deceased
party, on ex parte written motion supported by proof of his quality.” The code
article defines “legal successor” as, inter alia, “[t]he survivors designated in
Article 2315.1 of the Civil Code, if the action survives in their favor.” La. C.C.
art. 2315.1 provides a hierarchy of persons entitled to maintain a survival action. (Emphasis
added)
Coleman v. Anco Insulations, Inc., No. CV 15-821-BAJ-EWD, 2017 WL 1496932, at *2 (M.D.
La. Apr. 21, 2017).
Article 801’s “proof of quality” requirement has been interpreted to include an affidavit of
death and heirship or a judgment of possession. See Coleman at *2 quoting Kemper v. Don
Coleman, Jr., Builder, Inc., 746 So. 2d 11, 15 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1999). In Austrum v. City of Baton
Rouge, 252 So. 2d 434, 438 (La. 1973), the Louisiana Supreme Court approved substitution of the
heirs of the decedent as plaintiffs based on “an ex parte written motion supported by a duly
notarized affidavit of two persons as to the death and heirship of the deceased.” Coleman at *2
quoting, Austrum v. City of Baton Rouge, supra; citing, Konneker v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New
Orleans, 703 So. 2d 1341, 1343 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1997).
Additionally, Louisiana article 2315.1 (A)(2) provides the survivor right of action for a
deceased child shall be vested in “[t]he surviving father and mother of the deceased, or either of
them if he left no spouse or child surviving.” (Emphasis added). The same article later states:
“[f]or purposes of this Article, a father or mother who has abandoned the deceased during
his minority is deemed not to have survived him. Abandonment is presumed when the
father or mother has left his child for a period of at least twelve months and the father or
mother has failed to provide for the child's care and support, without just cause, thus
demonstrating an intention to permanently avoid parental responsibility.”
Id. at (E).
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Here, Amy Adams claims survivorship status while the alleged father has neither appeared
in this action nor has a reason been offered for his nonjoinder. See FRCP 19 (b)(c).
Arguably, both alleged parents have a vested right for survival damages as beneficiaries of
TMT’s estate, including damages in this action. Unless shown otherwise, they should thereby be
joined in this federal Civil Rights action in order to provide relief between the parties in one
lawsuit, avoiding multiple lawsuits, duplicative work, extra expenses, and possible inconsistent
results. FRCP 19 (a)(1)(A).
Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that no later than March 30, 2026 movant Amy Adams
must submit the following:
1. 	An affidavit of death and heirship or a judgment of possession to support designation as
legal successor in substitution as plaintiff for decedent TMT;
2. 	A motion and supporting documentation for joinder of TMT’s alleged father Jerry Truxillo,
or as an alternative, reasons why his joinder is not feasible or otherwise obtainable.
Failure to timely comply with this order or seek within the foregoing date an extension
for compliance will lead to dismissal of this case.
TMT’s sister Kalie Truxillo also seeks to be added as party claimant. 	Rec. Doc. 95.
However, under Louisiana substantive law, her parents would outrank her and exclude her
recovery in this federal action. See La. Civ. Code art. 2315.1; La. Civ. Code art. 2315.2; and Carter
v. Cain, No. CV 17-201-SDD-RLB, 2019 WL 846053, at *3 (M.D. La. Feb. 21, 2019) (Decedent’s
mother’s claim excluded the decedent’s siblings from recovering.).
Therefore, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the current motion (Rec. Doc. 95) is denied
to the extent that it seeks an amendment to the complaint by adding Kalie Truxillo as a plaintiff
herein.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the instant motion seeking to add an unrelated
wrongful death claim is denied. That state law claim arises from a vehicular accident that led to
TMT death. It has not been shown to arise from the same facts as the instant federal Civil Rights
claim under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The latter claim arises from a sexual relationship between TMT
and the defendant, not a vehicular accident.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 16th day of March 2026
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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