In Re: Whitney Oil & Gas LLC

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CIVIL ACTION
IN RE WHITNEY OIL & GAS CO. 	NO: 22-3015
SECTION “H”
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Petitioner Whitney Oil & Gas LLC’s Motion for
Attorney’s Fees and Costs (Doc. 104). 	For the following reasons, Petitioner’s
Motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
On the morning of September 27, 2021, Claimant Kerri Espadron, a
production operator for Petitioner Whitney Oil & Gas, LLC (“Whitney Oil”),
and Wyatt Boone, a production operator from Quality Process Services, LLC
(“QPS”), departed in the field boat M/V LIL RED to check wells. Boone
subsequently drove the boat into a well jacket, injuring Espadron. Whitney Oil
filed this action for limitation or exoneration of liability for the accident.
Espadron filed a claim in the limitation action against Whitney Oil and
brought a third-party claim against QPS for his injuries. QPS filed a claim in
the 	limitation 	action, 	asserting 	that 	Whitney 	Oil 	owed 	it 	defense 	and
indemnity for Espadron’s claims pursuant to the Master Service Agreement
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(“MSA”) between the parties. Prior to trial, Espadron settled his personal
injury claim. This Court held a bench trial on August 13, 2025 on QPS’s
indemnity claim against Whitney Oil. On September 22, 2025, the Court
entered a Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, holding that the MSA was
non-maritime 	and 	therefore 	the 	Louisiana 	Oilfield 	Anti-Indemnity 	Act
(“LOAIA”) applied to preclude QPS from enforcing the indemnity provision in
the MSA. It found therefore that Whitney Oil did not owe defense, indemnity,
or insurance coverage to QPS for the claims of Espadron. The Court entered
judgment the next day. On September 26, 2025, QPS filed a Notice of Appeal.
On October 7, 2025, Whitney Oil filed the instant Motion for Attorney’s
Fees and Costs. Whitney Oil argues that, as the prevailing party, it is entitled
to attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the MSA. QPS opposes.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Whitney Oil seeks attorney’s fees pursuant to section 9.4 of the MSA,
which states:
If any action at law or in equity is necessary to enforce or interpret
the terms of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled
to its reasonable attorney’s fees, court costs, and costs of litigation,
in addition to any other remedy to which that party may be
entitled.1
In light of the MSA’s plain language, QPS does not dispute Whitney Oil’s
entitlement to attorney’s fees under the MSA. Instead, it argues (1) that
Whitney Oil’s claim for attorney’s fees is prohibited by LOAIA, (2) that
Whitney Oil’s motion is procedurally defective, and (3) that the interests of
1 Doc. 107-1.
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justice favor deferring ruling on this motion. This Court will consider each
argument in turn.
A. LOAIA
First, QPS argues that the attorney’s fee provision of the MSA is void
under LOAIA. LOAIA provides that:
Any provision contained in, collateral to, or affecting an agreement
pertaining to a well for oil, gas, or water, or drilling for minerals .
. . 	is void and unenforceable to the extent that it purports to or
does provide for defense or indemnity, or either, to the indemnitee
against loss or liability for damages arising out of or resulting from
death or bodily injury to persons, which is caused by or results
from the sole or concurrent negligence or fault (strict liability) of
the indemnitee . . . .2
QPS 	points 	out 	that 	LOAIA 	nullifies 	any 	provision 	that 	requires
indemnification where there is any negligence or fault on the part of the
indemnitee. In Tanksley v. Gulf Oil Corp., the Fifth Circuit held that LOAIA
nullified 	an 	indemnity 	agreement 	where 	there 	was 	no 	finding 	that 	the
indemnitee was free from fault because of a settlement.3 QPS argues therefore
that LOAIA precludes Whitney Oil’s claim for attorney’s fees where its pre-
trial settlement of Mr. Espadron’s personal injury claims foreclosed a judicial
determination that Whitney Oil was free from fault. QPS argues that the
attorney’s fee agreement in the MSA is, “for all intents and purposes, one for
contractual indemnity arising out of a personal injury claim for which there
has been no judicial determination—due to Whitney Oil’s choice to settle the
personal injury claim against it—that Whitney Oil is free from fault.”4 It
2 LA. REV. S TAT. § 9:2780.
3 Tanksley v. Gulf Oil Corp., 848 F.2d 515, 517 (5th Cir. 1988).
4 Doc. 106.
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argues therefore that LOAIA precludes enforcement of the attorney’s fees
provision.
QPS’s argument, however, misses the mark. Whitney Oil “is not seeking
costs of defense of Espadron’s claims against it, but rather the costs and fees
incurred 	in 	defending 	itself 	against 	QPS’ 	cross-claim 	for 	defense 	and
indemnity, a separate and distinct contractual right under the MSA.”5 Indeed,
LOAIA’s prohibition is limited to “damages arising out of or resulting from
death or bodily injury to persons,”6 while the MSA awards attorney’s fees
“necessary to enforce or interpret” its terms.7 Mr. Espadron’s personal injury
claim did not implicate the terms of the MSA, only QPS’s claim for defense and
indemnity did. QPS cites to no case law holding that LOAIA precludes an
award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party of a contract dispute.
B. Procedural Defects
Next, QPS argues that Whitney Oil’s motion is defective because it does
not “state the amount sought or provide a fair estimate of it” as required by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2). Indeed, Whitney Oil states in its
Motion that if the Court finds that it is entitled to attorney’s fees and costs
pursuant to the MSA, the amount thereof will be submitted in a later, separate
motion to the magistrate judge with supporting documentation to be filed
under seal.
The Fifth Circuit has:
held that one of the key functions of Rule 54(d)(2) is to ensure that
parties properly notify their counterparts of their requests for
attorneys’ fees. Rule 54(d)(2) sets out the minimum requirements
5 Doc. 108.
6 LA. REV. S TAT. § 9:2780.
7 Doc. 107-1.
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needed to effectuate a valid notice of the request. The failure to file
the request would ordinarily result in a request being denied.
However, a court may deem a notification sufficient if it satisfies
the intended purposes of Rule 54(d)(2).8
In Romaguera v. Gegenheimer, the Fifth Circuit excused the untimely filing of
a Rule 54(d)(2) motion and found notification sufficient where the district court
had acknowledged the Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees in its written
reasons 	and 	indicated its 	intention 	to set 	a hearing, “thereby 	satisfying
Congress’ intended purpose under Rule 54(d)(2).”9 Here, Whitney Oil’s Motion
was timely and set forth the grounds under which it argues it is entitled to
attorney’s fees. QPS therefore received timely notice of the request. The Court
finds that QPS is not prejudiced by litigating the amount of attorney’s fees at
a later date.
C. Interests of Justice
Finally, QPS contends that, in the interest of judicial economy, the Court
should defer ruling on Whitney Oil’s Motion because a reversal will render its
motion moot. The comments to Rule 54 provide that “[i]f an appeal on the
merits of the case is taken, the court may rule on the claim for fees, may defer
its ruling on the motion, or may deny the motion without prejudice, directing
under subdivision (d)(2)(B) a new period for filing after the appeal has been
resolved.”10 This Court finds that resolution of Whitney Oil’s entitlement to
attorney’s fees is appropriate at this time given that QPS has not presented
any compelling arguments in opposition. Accordingly, the Court finds that, as
8 Romaguera v. Gegenheimer, 162 F.3d 893, 895 (5th Cir. 1998), decision clarified on
denial of reh’g, 169 F.3d 223 (5th Cir. 1999).
9 Romaguera v. Gegenheimer, 169 F.3d 223 (5th Cir. 1999).
10 FED. R. CIV. P. 54.
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the prevailing party, Whitney Oil is entitled to “reasonable attorney’s fees,
court costs, and costs of litigation” as contemplated by the MSA.11 That said,
the Court finds that judicial economy would be served by deferring a ruling on
the amount of attorney’s fees until the appeal is resolved.12
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Whitney Oil’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and
Costs is 	GRANTED. Whitney Oil shall file 	a Motion for Calculation 	of
Attorney’s Fees and Costs before the magistrate judge within 21 days of
resolution of all appeals in this matter.
11 Doc. 107-1.
12 Team Contractors, L.L.C. v. Waypoint NOLA, L.L.C., No. CV 16-1131, 2019 WL
7882130, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 18, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 16-
1131, 2020 WL 114135 (E.D. La. Jan. 10, 2020) (“The pending appeal may result in an
appellate court decision that either renders Team’s request for attorney’s fees moot or entitles
it to additional attorneys’ fees for amounts it incurs in the appeal process. If Team prevails
in the appeal in a manner that results in its entitlement to recover more attorneys’ fees and
costs, additional briefing and submission of evidence relating to the appropriate amount will
be necessary. Additionally, resolving the wide array of disputes in the already voluminous
submissions in the attorneys’ fee motion papers will require expenditure of substantial
judicial resources, not just by the magistrate judge but also by the district judge in connection
with the inevitable review necessitated by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2)
and (3). All of this effort may be wasted, depending upon the Fifth Circuit's resolution of the
appeal.”).
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New Orleans, Louisiana this 29th day of October, 2025.
____________________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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