Smith v. Oceaneering Mobile Workforce LLC et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JAMES EARL SMITH, II
VERSUS
OCEANEERING MOBILE
WORKFORCE LLC ET AL.
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 23-469
SECTION "J" (3)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave of Court to File Third Amended
Complaint and to Designate this Matter as a Bench Trial (R. Doc. 72). The motion is
granted for the reasons below.
I. 	Background
Smith contracted COVID-19 while working aboard a drill ship.1 He was
hospitalized and developed permanent medical conditions from the disease.2 In
February 2023, Smith filed a Complaint for Damages (the “Original Complaint”).3 He
named 	as 	defendants 	his 	employer, 	Oceaneering 	Mobile 	Workforce 	LLC
(“Oceaneering”), and the ship owner, Diamond Offshore Drilling Inc. (“Diamond
Inc.”). The Original Complaint asserted a claim for negligence and unseaworthiness.
With respect to each claim, Smith alleged that jurisdiction was “based upon the Jones
Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, et seq., and/or the general maritime law.”4
1 R. Doc. 1.
2 Id. ¶¶ 18–23.
3 Id. at 1.
4 Id. ¶¶ 22–29.
Case 2:23-cv-00469-CJB-EJD Document 83 Filed 11/14/25 Page 1 of 8

2
Three days later, and before summons issued, Smith filed a First Amended
Complaint with Jury Demand (“First Amended Complaint”). The First Amended
Complaint restates the negligence and unseaworthiness claims and repeats that the
basis for jurisdiction is the “Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, et seq., and/or the general
maritime law.”5 The First Amended Complaint requests “a trial by jury on all issues
raised herein pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 30104, et seq.”6
Both the Original Complaint and First Amended Complaint allege that
Oceaneering is a foreign limited liability company and that Diamond is a foreign
corporation.7 The First Amended Complaint, however, adds a description of Smith’s
citizenship—i.e., 	he is 	“a 	citizen 	of 	the United States 	and residing 	in 	Ovett,
Mississippi.”8 Thus, the pleading indicates that the parties are diverse. There is,
however, no express invocation of diversity jurisdiction. Oceaneering and Diamond
Inc. answered both the Original Complaint and the First Amended Complaint in
March 2023. Oceaneering’s answers included a jury demand.9
In September 2023, Smith sought and obtained leave to amend his complaint
to add an additional defendant: Diamond Offshore, LLC (“Diamond LLC”). Like the
First Amended Complaint, the Second Amended Complaint for Damages notes the
5 R. Doc. 3, ¶¶ 23–30.
6 Id. at 31.
7 R. Docs. 1, ¶ 1, 3, ¶ 2.
8 R. Doc. 1, ¶ 1.
9 R. Docs. 11 at 5, 12 at 4. Diamond’s answers do not include a jury demand. R. Doc.
7-8.
Case 2:23-cv-00469-CJB-EJD Document 83 Filed 11/14/25 Page 2 of 8

3
citizenship of the parties but does not expressly invoke diversity jurisdiction. In the
Second Amended Complaint, Smith continued to identify the basis for jurisdiction as
the “Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, et seq., and/or the general maritime law.”10 The
Second Amended Complaint repeats Smith’s jury demand.11 In answering the Second
Amended Complaint, Oceaneering again asserted jury demand.12
Consistent with Smith and Oceaneering’s jury demands, all scheduling orders
have reflected that the case will be tried by jury.13 In October 2025, however, Smith
moved to amend his complaint to withdraw his jury demand, to strike all other jury
demands, and to designate this matter to “be tried to the Court sitting in Admiralty”
as a bench trial.14 All three defendants oppose the motion. Trial is set for October 19,
2026.15
II. 	Analysis
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39 allows Smith to withdraw his jury demand.
if the parties stipulate to a nonjury trial or if “the court, on motion or on its own, finds
that on some or all of those issues there is no federal right to jury trial.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 39(a). Defendants have not stipulated to a bench trial. Thus, the Court must
determine whether there is a right to jury trial on any of the issues raised in Smith’s
10 R. Doc. 22, ¶¶ 27, 29.
11 Id. ¶ 31.
12 R. Doc. 27 at 4. Diamond Inc. and Diamond LLC’s answer does not include a jury
demand. R. Doc. 26.
13 E.g., R. Doc. 34 at 2.
14 R. Doc. 72.
15 R. Doc. 80.
Case 2:23-cv-00469-CJB-EJD Document 83 Filed 11/14/25 Page 3 of 8

4
pleadings. The answer depends on whether Smith’s pleadings demonstrate that he
elected to proceed under admiralty jurisdiction.
A plaintiff who “has a state common law cause of action that also falls within
the federal admiralty jurisdiction may elect to bring the suit either as an admiralty
action in federal court, or as a state common law action in state court or in federal
court (assuming he meets the diversity jurisdiction requirements for federal court).”
See T.N.T Marine Serv. v. Weaver Shipyards & Dry Docks, Inc., 702 F.2d 585, 587
(5th Cir. 1983). Thus, when a plaintiff with an admiralty or maritime claim sues in
federal court, he may proceed under its admiralty jurisdiction or elect to prosecute
his claim under common law if there is an alternative basis for federal jurisdiction.
To avoid ambiguity, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h) requires a plaintiff to
designate that he intends to proceed under admiralty jurisdiction.16 It states, in
relevant part: “If a claim for relief is within the admiralty or maritime jurisdiction
and also within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction on some other ground, the
pleading may designate the claim as an admiralty or maritime claim . . . .” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 9(h).
The “preferred technique is to expressly invoke Rule 9(h).” See Teal v. Eagle
Fleet, Inc., 933 F.2d 341, 345 (5th Cir. 1991) (quotations omitted). A plaintiff also may
16 “In 1966, the federal rules of civil and admiralty procedure were unified. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 9 advisory committee's notes 1966 amendment. Rule 9(h) was created so that
procedures unique to admiralty would not be abrogated by the merger.” Apache Corp.
v. Glob. Santa Fe Drilling Co., 435 F. App’x 322, 324 (5th Cir. 2011).
Case 2:23-cv-00469-CJB-EJD Document 83 Filed 11/14/25 Page 4 of 8

5
proceed in admiralty “by a simple statement in his pleading to the effect that the
claim is an admiralty or maritime claim.” T.N.T. Marine Serv., Inc., 702 F.2d at 587
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 9 advisory committee note (1966 amendment)). “There are
times, however, when a party’s claim is governed by multiple bases for jurisdiction
and it is not clear whether the party made a Rule 9(h) declaration.” Apache Corp. v.
Glob. Santa Fe Drilling Co., 435 F. App’x 322, 325 (5th Cir. 2011). When the potential
invocation of Rule 9(h) is unclear, courts “examine the totality of the circumstances,
as demonstrated by the party’s pleadings and actions, to determine whether a Rule
9(h) declaration has been made.” See id.
Defendants 	argue 	that 	Smith 	cannot 	proceed 	in 	admiralty 	because 	his
pleadings do not provide a “specific reference” or “express invocation”17 of Rule 9(h).
Fifth Circuit precedent confirms, however, that while the “preferred technique is to
expressly invoke Rule 9(h),” “a party need not make a specific reference to Rule 9(h)
in order to fall under our admiralty jurisdiction.” See Teal v. Eagle Fleet, Inc., 933
F.2d 341, 345 (5th Cir. 1991) (quotations omitted). The Original Complaint, First
Amended 	Complaint, 	and 	Second 	Amended 	Complaint 	all 	specifically 	allege
“jurisdiction based on the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, et. seq., and/or the general
maritime law.” This language is an adequate designation under Rule 9(h). See Hunt
v. Diamond Offshore Drilling, Inc., No. 01-3037, 2002 WL 1906914, at *1 (E.D. La.
17 R. Doc. 79 at 1, 4 (arguing that the complaint is “void of any specific reference” or
“express invocation” of Rule 9(h)).
Case 2:23-cv-00469-CJB-EJD Document 83 Filed 11/14/25 Page 5 of 8

6
Aug. 19, 2002) (allowing plaintiff to strike his own jury demand and that of defendant
where he pleaded “jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under the Jones Act and the
General Maritime Law”).
Further, the totality of the circumstances supports the conclusion that Smith
intended to proceed under admiralty jurisdiction. Smith filed his lawsuit in federal
court. Cf. Bodden v. Osgood, 879 F.2d 184, 186 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting that a plaintiff
filed a lawsuit in state court and did not object to defendant’s assertion of diversity
jurisdiction at the time of removal). He repeatedly identified the Jones Act and
maritime law as the basis for jurisdiction. And although his pleadings identify the
parties’ citizenship, which is diverse, there is no reference to diversity jurisdiction in
any version of his complaint. See Apache Corp, 435 F. App’x at 325 (observing that
even “if a party asserts both admiralty and diversity jurisdiction, the court will treat
the claim as though a Rule 9(h) declaration has been made”)(citing Romero v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 515 F.2d 1249, 1253 (5th Cir. 1975)). Smith’s repeated
requests for a jury trial are incongruous with his reliance on admiralty jurisdiction.
Generally, however, “merely requesting a jury trial does not change an admiralty
claim, identified as such, to a non-admiralty claim.” See Bodden, 879 F.2d at 186.
Defendants assert, citing Smith’s civil complaint coversheet, that he “pleaded
his claims pursuant to federal question, which supports a finding that Mr. Smith’s
claims were asserted at law.”18 But a cover sheet is not a pleading. See Rachal v.
18 R. Doc. 79 at 6 (citing R. Doc. 1-1).
Case 2:23-cv-00469-CJB-EJD Document 83 Filed 11/14/25 Page 6 of 8

7
Ingram Corp., 795 F.2d 1210, 1214, 1214 n.3 (5th Cir. 1986) (declining to consider the
cover sheet, which designated the lawsuit as an “Action in Admiralty under F.R.C.P.
Rule 9(h)”). The cover sheet form used by Smith confirms that it neither “replaces nor
supplements” 	the 	pleadings.19 And the 	form 	offers 	no 	checkbox 	for admiralty
jurisdiction. In cases between private parties, a plaintiff must choose between
checkboxes for federal question and diversity jurisdiction. Thus, to the extent that
the cover sheet is relevant, it supports the conclusion that Smith did not intend to
proceed under diversity jurisdiction.
Defendants’ final argument is that judicial estoppel precludes Smith from
withdrawing his jury demand and maintaining that his case is subject to admiralty
jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit has indicated, however, that when a plaintiff both
invokes admiralty jurisdiction and requests a jury, “the district court should simply
deny the [jury] request.” Bodden, 879 F.2d at 186. There is no reason to depart from
that principle in this case.
Each version of Smith’s complaint designated this matter as proceeding under
admiralty jurisdiction. Thus, although the parties requested a jury trial, neither side
has ever had a right to one. Under these circumstances, Rule 39(a) allows Smith to
withdraw his jury demand and proceed with a bench trial.
19 R. Doc. 1-1 at 2.
Case 2:23-cv-00469-CJB-EJD Document 83 Filed 11/14/25 Page 7 of 8

8
III. 	Conclusion
As explained above, Smith’s pleadings and actions demonstrate that he
elected to proceed under admiralty jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 9(h).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Leave of Court to File Third Amended
Complaint and to Designate this Matter as a Bench Trial (R. Doc. 72) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter be designated as a bench trial.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 14 th day of November, 2025.
EVA J. DOSSIER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 2:23-cv-00469-CJB-EJD Document 83 Filed 11/14/25 Page 8 of 8