In the Matter of Dennis A. Perry

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
IN RE: DENNIS A. PERRY CIVIL ACTION
CASE NO. 23-5265
c/w 23-5266
23-5341
25-304
25-305
25-865
SECTION: “G”(2)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are Bankruptcy Appellants Dr. William Alden, Perry Associates, LLC,
Crescent City Property Redevelopment Association, LLC, Crescent City Medical Services, Inc.,
Private Connection Auto, LLC, 4330 State Street Drive, LLC, and 1100 South Jefferson Davis
Parkway, LLC’s (collectively, the “Alden Entities”) consolidated appeals from the United States
Bankruptcy Court’s Orders adjudicating a Reconventional Demand filed by Debtor Dennis A.
Perry’s (“Perry”) bankruptcy case.1 Also pending before the Court are Perry’s cross-appeals2 and
the Alden Entities’ Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.3 The Court has consolidated all of
the appeals,4 and the issues have been thoroughly briefed by the parties. Considering the briefs
filed by the parties, the record and the applicable law, for the reasons that follow, the Court affirms
the Bankruptcy Court’s Orders in part and reverses in part. The Bankruptcy Court’s Orders are
1 Case Nos.: 23-5265, 23-5266, 23-5341, 25-304, 25-305, 25-865. Case No. 23-5341 is an appeal filed by
Darryl Fish. Fish has not filed an appellate brief.
2 Case No. 25-304, Rec. Doc. 7; Case No. 25-305, Rec. Doc. 6.
3 Rec. Doc. 24.
4 Rec. Doc. 14.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 1 of 46

2
reversed to the extent that they find the Reconventional Demand only asserted fraud and Louisiana
Unfair Trade Practices Act (“LUTPA”) claims against Dr. Alden individually. The case is
remanded to the Bankruptcy Court for additional proceedings on: (1) whether any of the Alden
Entities should be held jointly liable with Dr. Alden for fraud or violations of LUTPA and (2)
whether Perry is entitled to attorneys’ fees incurred in successfully defending against the Alden
Entities’ appeals and, if so, the proper amount of those fees.
I. Background
On November 30, 2020, Perry filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code.5 In response to the filing, the Alden Entities filed seven Proofs of Claim related
to the multiple business and personal ventures between Perry and the Alden Entities.6 A state court
case the Alden Entities filed against Perry and Perry’s business, Deals on Wheels, LLC, was also
removed to the Bankruptcy Court (the “Adversary Proceeding”).7 Perry filed affirmative defenses
to the Adversary Proceeding and a Reconventional Demand against the Alden Entites raising
claims of fraud and violations of LUTPA.8 Perry also filed objections to the seven Proofs of Claim9
and a motion to terminate the joint venture agreements and trigger the sale provisions therein.10
These disputes concern numerous loans and joint venture agreements between Perry and Dr.
Alden.
5 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 1.
6 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Proofs of Claim Nos. 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32.
7 Bankr. Case No. 21-1002, Rec. Doc. 1.
8 Bankr. Case No. 21-1002, Rec. Docs. 20, 30-1.
9 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Docs. 69, 71, 73, 75, 77, 81, 83, 156.
10 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 79.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 2 of 46

3
From March 28, 2022 through April 5, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court held a trial on liability
in Perry’s main bankruptcy case and the claims alleged in Adversary Proceeding.11 Prior to trial,
all parties agreed that the issue of damages would be bifurcated and determined at a second trial
after the Bankruptcy Court’s determination of liability.12 The Bankruptcy Court issued an Original
Memorandum Opinion and Order on September 1, 2023.13 On September 12, 2023, the Alden
Entities filed notices of appeal, which were allotted to this Court.14 Perry then filed a motion to
amend the judgment, and the Bankruptcy Court issued an Amended and Superseding
Memorandum Opinion and Order on November 21, 2023 (the “Liability Opinion”).15
Dr. Alden claimed the joint venture agreements gave him ownership interests in several
pieces of property that Perry claimed to be part of his bankruptcy estate: (1) a rental home located
at 4021 9th Street in Marrero, Louisiana; (2) an empty lot located at 4025 Westbank Expressway
in Marrero, Louisiana; (3) a rental home located at 3065 South Palm Drive in Slidell, Louisiana;
(4) a rental home located at 3303 Bonfouca Drive in Slidell, Louisiana; and (5) 27420 Sampson
Drive in Lacombe, Louisiana.16 The Bankruptcy Court found that the Alden Entities had no
11 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 460.
12 Id.
13 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 400. The original opinion did not rule on the claims Perry raised in
the Reconventional Demand.
14 Case No. 23-5265 (filed by appellants Perry Associates, LLC, Crescent City Property Redevelopment
Association, LLC, Crescent City Medical Services, Inc., Private Connection Auto, LLC, and William W. Alden on
September 12, 2023); Case No. 23-5266 (filed by appellants Perry Associates, LLC, Crescent City Property
Redevelopment Association, LLC, Crescent City Medical Services, Inc., Private Connection Auto, LLC, and William
W. Alden on September 12, 2023); Case No. 23-5341 (filed by appellant Darryl Fish on September 15, 2023); Case
No. 23-5343 (filed by appellant David Edward Cook on September 15, 2023, and voluntarily dismissed on April 15,
2024).
15 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 433.
16 Id.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 3 of 46

4
ownership interest in the two properties located in Marrero.17 With respect to the Palm Drive,
Bonfouca, and Sampson properties, the Bankruptcy Court ordered that the properties be sold,
pursuant to the terms of the joint venture agreements, with the proceeds from the sale of each
property to be divided equally between Perry and Perry Associates.18
The Bankruptcy Court also sustained six claim objections filed by Perry and disallowed six
Proofs of Claim filed against the estate in Perry’s bankruptcy case.19 The Bankruptcy Court
sustained in part and overruled in part Perry’s objection to Proof of Claim No. 31, filed by Dr.
Alden, and allowed a general unsecured claim against the estate in the amount of $6,700.20 The
Bankruptcy Court further sustained in part and overruled in part Perry’s objection to Proof of Claim
No. 32, filed by Dr. Alden, and allowed a general unsecured claim against the estate in the amount
of $12,000.21 These rulings also resolved the claims asserted by the Alden Entities in the Adversary
Proceeding.22 The Bankruptcy Court ruled in favor of Perry on all counterclaims raised in his
Reconventional Demand.23 The Bankruptcy Court found that Dr. Alden was liable to Perry for
fraud and violations of LUTPA.24
17 Id. at 55–57.
18 Id. at 54–55.
19 Id. at 59–60. Specifically, the Bankruptcy Court disallowed the following proofs of claim: (1) Proof of
Claim No. 22 filed by Darryl Fish; (2) Proof of Claim No. 25 filed by Dr. Alden; (3) Proof of Claim No. 26 filed by
Dr. Alden; (4) Proof of Claim No. 27 filed by Private Connection Auto, LLC; (5) Proof of Claim No. 28 filed by
Private Connection Auto, LLC; and (6) Proof of Claim No. 29 filed by Crescent City Property Redevelopment
Association, LLC.
20 Id. at 60.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 61.
23 Id. at 61–62.
24 Id.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 4 of 46

5
The trial on damages was held before the Bankruptcy Court on April 15 and 16, 2024.25
This Court administratively closed the original appeals pending ruling by the Bankruptcy Court on
the outstanding damages issues.26 On January 28, 2025, the Bankruptcy Court issued a ruling on
the outstanding damages issues (the “Damages Opinion”).27 The Bankruptcy Court awarded
damages in favor of Perry and against Dr. Alden in the amount of $586,752.36 for Dr. Alden’s
violations of LUTPA.28
Thereafter, the Alden Entities filed two new appeals, both related to the Bankruptcy Court’s
January 28, 2025 Order.29 Perry filed post-trial Motions to Amend the Damages Opinion, and the
Bankruptcy Court’s Judgment became final on April 22, 2025, after the Bankruptcy Court denied
Perry’s final motion.30 On May 8, 2025, Perry and Deals on Wheels, LLC, filed two Notices of
Cross Appeal.31 All of the appeals were reopened and consolidated by this Court on May 19,
2025.32 All appeals arise from the original bankruptcy proceeding and the bifurcated trial, which
resulted in the Liability Opinion, Damages Opinion, and denials of reconsideration.
The Alden Entities filed their appellant brief on August 18, 2025.33 On that same day, the
25 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 510.
26 Case No. 23-5265, Rec. Doc. 12; Case No. 23-5266, Rec. Doc. 12; Case No. 23-5341, Rec. Doc. 8.
27 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 616.
28 Id. at 22.
29 Case Nos. 25-304, 25-305.
30 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 665.
31 Case No. 25-304, Rec. Doc. 7; Case No. 25-305, Rec. Doc. 6.
32 Rec. Doc. 14.
33 Rec. Doc. 23.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 5 of 46

6
Alden Entities also filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction.34 Perry filed an opposition
to the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction on August 26, 2025.35 The Alden Entities filed a
reply brief on September 1, 2025.36 Perry filed an opposition to the appellant brief and a cross-
appeal brief on September 17, 2025.37 The Alden Entities filed a reply brief on October 1, 2025.38
The Alden Entites filed an opposition to the cross-appeal brief on October 15, 2025.39 Perry filed
a cross-reply brief on October 29, 2025.40
II. Issues Raised on Appeal
A. The Original Appeals by the Alden Entities
1. The Alden Entities’ Arguments in Support of Original Appeals
The Alden Entities raise four issues in these consolidated appeals. First, the Alden Entities
contend the Bankruptcy Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Perry’s LUTPA claims
because Perry did not have standing to bring those claims against Dr. Alden.41
Second, the Alden Entities argue that the Bankruptcy Court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over Perry’s LUTPA claims because the claims were prescribed or perempted at the
time of the Reconventional Demand.42 These first two arguments are also the bases of the Alden
34 Rec. Doc. 24.
35 Rec. Doc. 25.
36 Rec. Doc. 26.
37 Rec. Doc. 27.
38 Rec. Doc. 28.
39 Rec. Doc. 32.
40 Rec. Doc. 33.
41 Rec. Doc. 23 at 32.
42 Id.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 6 of 46

7
Entities’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction.43
Third, the Alden Entities assert that the Bankruptcy Court erred in finding that all of Perry’s
damages were caused by Dr. Alden.44 The Alden Entities cite inconsistencies in Perry’s testimony
to support their argument that the Bankruptcy Court erred in finding Perry to be a “generally
credible” witness.45 The Alden Entities contend that the other lay witnesses who testified during
the trial did not have any knowledge of Perry’s financial difficulties, his floundering car business,
his IRS debts, or the fact that Dr. Alden loaned Perry money.46 The Alden Entities also argue that
the Bankruptcy Court erred in crediting the testimony of Patrick Gros, an expert in accounting and
financial analysis.47 According to the Alden Entities, Gros’s testimony was speculative, biased,
inconsistent, used improper methodology, used improper calculations, and was borderline
hypothetical.48 For these reasons, the Alden Entities contend that the Bankruptcy Court erred in
ruling that Perry suffered any damages because of Dr. Alden, much less the $586,752.36 in LUTPA
damages awarded.49
Fourth, the Alden Entities assert that the Bankruptcy Court erred in finding that Dr. Alden
committed fraud and/or forgery.50 The Alden Entities contend that the Bankruptcy Court erred in
43 Rec. Doc. 24.
44 Rec. Doc. 23 at 32.
45 Id. at 33–42.
46 Id. at 42–45.
47 Id. at 45.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 55.
50 Id.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 7 of 46

8
crediting the opinions of Perry’s handwriting expert over the Alden Entities’ handwriting expert.51
2. Perry’s Arguments in Opposition to Original Appeals
Perry responds to each of the Alden Entities’ arguments. First, Perry contends he has
standing to bring his claim against Dr. Alden under LUTPA as relief is available to “any person”
and not limited in standing to “consumers and competitors.”52 Alternatively, Perry contends that
he and Dr. Alden became business competitors under the Joint Venture Agreements when Dr.
Alden refused to sell the properties as required by the Joint Venture Agreements.53
Second, Perry contends that prescription was interrupted due to Dr. Alden’s ongoing
commission of fraud against Perry.54 According to Perry, at the time the bankruptcy case was filed
Dr. Alden was actively committing fraudulent and deceptive acts against Perry by: (1) continuing
to maintain ownership and control over the Westbank Expressway Lot with a forged Quit Claim
Deed; (2) continuing to maintain control over the 9th Street property by using the forged
Procuration and 9th Street Joint Venture Agreement; (3) refusing to release the Collateral
Mortgage after being paid in full and using that fact to leverage control over Perry to force him to
renovate Palm without compensation; and (4) refusing to sell the joint venture properties over
which he maintained full control despite the existence of the joint venture agreements.55 Perry
points out that all of the documents that the Bankruptcy Court concluded were forgeries were
51 Id. at 56–58.
52 Rec. Doc. 27 at 44–46.
53 Id. at 46.
54 Id. at 47.
55 Id. at 41–42, 48–52.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 8 of 46

9
attached to Dr. Alden’s proofs of claim as a means to recoup funds from Perry.56 By continuing to
assert the forged documents as a basis for recovery, Perry argues that Dr. Alden continues to violate
the statute and prescription was thus interrupted.57
Third, Perry argues his emotional and financial damages were caused by Dr. Alden.58 Perry
contends that the evidence established that Dr. Alden: (1) committed fraud and forgery to deprive
Perry from the use of his properties; (2) refused to release the Collateral Mortgage encompassing
Perry’s home and other properties; (3) filed two state court actions against Perry in different
forums; and (4) forged documents that stopped Perry from evicting Darryl Fish from the 9th Street
property.59 Perry contends that the Bankruptcy Court correctly held that he suffered damages at
the hands of Dr. Alden.60 Perry submits that the awarded damages should have been higher than
$586,752.36 based upon Dr. Alden’s outrageous behavior.61
Fourth, Perry contends that the evidence established that Dr. Alden committed fraud and
forgery.62 Perry points out that the Bankruptcy Court considered the testimony and reports filed by
the two competing expert witnesses and concluded that Perry’s expert witness’s methodology and
conclusions were correct.63 Perry argues that the Bankruptcy Court’s findings were supported by
56 Id. at 51.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 52–53.
59 Id. at 53.
60 Id. at 58.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 59.
63 Id.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 9 of 46

10
the record.64
3. The Alden Entities’ Arguments in Further Support of Original Appeals
The Alden Entities reiterate each of their four arguments in reply. First, the Alden Entities
contend the subject matter jurisdiction issue is properly raised in the motion to dismiss.65 Second,
the Alden Entities contend that the Bankruptcy Court did not have jurisdiction over the LUTPA
claims because Perry did not have standing to raise those claims and the claims were prescribed.66
Third, the Alden Entities assert that the Bankruptcy Court erred in finding that all of Perry’s
damages were caused by Dr. Alden.67 The Alden Entities assert that the Bankruptcy Court clearly
erred in accepting the opinion of Perry’s expert, Patrick Gros, that Perry suffered $586,752.36 in
LUTPA damages.68 Fourth, the Alden Entities assert that the Bankruptcy Court erred in finding
that Dr. Alden committed fraud and/or forgery.69
B. Cross-Appeal by Perry
1. Perry’s Arguments in Support of Cross-Appeal
Perry raises five issues in the cross-appeal. First, Perry argues that he sought damages on
his fraud claim, and the Bankruptcy Court erred in finding that the Reconventional Demand solely
sought damages under LUTPA.70
Second, Perry asserts the Bankruptcy Court erred in failing to find that the Alden Entities
64 Id. at 59–61.
65 Rec. Doc. 28 at 5–7.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 7.
68 Id. at 12–16.
69 Id. at 17–20.
70 Rec. Doc. 27 at 26–32.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 10 of 46

11
were jointly and severally liable with Dr. Alden for fraud and resulting damages under LUTPA
and state law.71 Perry contends that Dr. Alden committed the fraud acting through his wholly
owned limited liability companies and those companies cannot use the corporate veil as a “shield”
to the damages arising from Dr. Alden’s fraud.72
Third, Perry argues that the Bankruptcy Court erred in awarding only nominal damages in
the amount of $5,000 for his emotional distress.73 Although the Bankruptcy Court acknowledged
that “the testimony of family and friends corroborated Perry’s own testimony regarding the
emotional distress and suicidal ideation he suffered,” the Bankruptcy Court awarded modest
damages because “Perry did not seek medical help or receive medical attention for emotional
problems.”74 According to Perry, a medical expert is not required to establish emotional damages
if the negligence complained of is within the realm of an ordinary lay person to understand.75
Fourth, Perry contends the Bankruptcy Court erred in failing to award him attorneys’ fees
and costs through the end of the trial, and instead only awarded fees and costs qualified prior to
actual trial date.76 Perry contends that a recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs is mandatory upon
the finding of a LUTPA violation.77
Fifth, Perry asserts he should be awarded cost and attorneys’ fees incurred in this appeal.78
71 Id. at 32.
72 Id. at 33.
73 Id. at 35–36.
74 Id. at 36.
75 Id. at 36.
76 Id. at 38.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 39.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 11 of 46

12
He asserts that a plaintiff who is awarded damages and attorneys’ fees in an action under the
LUTPA and then successfully defends an appeal of that action, is entitled to additional fees
incurred in the connection with the appeal.79
2. The Alden Entities’ Arguments in Opposition to Cross-Appeal
The Alden Entities respond to each of Perry’s arguments. Addressing Perry’s first
argument that the Bankruptcy Court failed to award damages for fraud, the Alden Entities point
out that the only relief sought for the fraud claim was declaratory relief, which was awarded by the
Bankruptcy Court.80
Second, the Alden Entities assert that it was appropriate for the Bankruptcy Court not to
find the Alden Entities jointly and severally liable with Dr. Alden.81 The Alden Entities point out
that only three of these six entities are even identified in Perry’s brief: Perry Associates, LLC,
Crescent City Property Redevelopment Association, LLC, and Crescent City Medical Services.82
Thus, the Alden Entities submit Perry’s argument regarding the remaining three entities (Private
Connection Auto, LLC, 4330 State Street Drive, LLC, and 1100 South Jeff Davis, LLC) is
waived.83 With respect to the three entities named, the Alden entities assert that the Bankruptcy
Court granted Perry’s requests for declaratory relief as to those entities.84
Third, the Alden Entities contend that the $5,000 award for pain and suffering should not
79 Id.
80 Rec. Doc. 32 at 11.
81 Id. at 15.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 16.
84 Id. at 16–17.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 12 of 46

13
be increased.85 The Alden Entities point out that Perry has failed to offer any relevant caselaw or
quantum of prior general damage awards as guidance.86 The Alden Entities assert it was well
within the Bankruptcy Court’s vast discretion to award Perry $5,000.00 for his untreated “mental
suffering.”87
Fourth, the Alden Entities argue that the Bankruptcy Court appropriately denied the
Motions to Amend the Judgment, which sought to increase the award of attorneys’ fees and costs.88
The Alden Entities point out that Perry does not even discuss what amount in attorneys’ fees and
costs he is seeking.89
Fifth, the Alden Entities contend that Perry should not be awarded attorneys’ fees and costs
for the cross-appeal.90 To the extent that this Court reverses any of the Bankruptcy Court’s
findings, the Alden Entities assert Perry is precluded from an additional award of attorneys’ fees.91
3. Perry’s Arguments in Further Support of Cross-Appeal
Perry reiterates each of his prior arguments in the reply brief. First, Perry reasserts his
argument that the Bankruptcy Court erred in concluding that Perry’s Reconventional Demand only
sought damages under LUTPA.92 To the contrary, Perry asserts that the Reconventional Demand
identifies Dr. Alden’s liability for the commission of fraud under Paragraphs 85–91 and
85 Id. at 19.
86 Id. at 20.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 21.
91 Id.
92 Rec. Doc. 33 at 4.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 13 of 46

14
subsequently requests damages based upon fraud in Paragraphs 106–109.93 Perry contends that
Paragraph 105 merely identifies LUTPA as an additional, alternative award for damages and
attorneys’ fees.94 He asserts that Paragraph 105 does not limit the requested recovery to damages
solely under LUTPA.95
Second, Perry reiterates that the Bankruptcy Court erred in failing to hold that the Alden
Entities are jointly and severally liable for damages with Dr. Alden.96 Perry contends that all of the
entities are owned solely by Dr. Alden and all of these entities filed Proofs of Claim in the
bankruptcy case.97 Because Dr. Alden engaged in fraud as the sole/managing member of each
entity, Perry contends that the entities should be found jointly and severally liable with Alden for
fraud without the necessity of piercing the corporate veil.98 Additionally, because the Bankruptcy
Court found that Dr. Alden violated LUTPA, Perry submits that Dr. Alden had to be acting in his
capacity of a business owner during the commission of the fraud.99
Third, Perry argues that the award for emotional distress should be increased from $5,000
to somewhere between $50,000 and $100,000.100 Perry asserts Dr. Alden’s actions were extortive,
outrageous, and abhorrent, and as such, violated the LUTPA.101 Perry cites an opinion by the
93 Id. at 5.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 6.
97 Id. at 8.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 10.
100 Id. at 12.
101 Id.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 14 of 46

15
Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit affirming an award of $100,000 in non-pecuniary
damages for a LUTPA violation.102
Fourth, Perry asserts that the attorneys’ fees and costs should be increased from
$209,496.04 to $242,101.04 for work performed in preparation for trial.103
Fifth, to the extent that Perry is successful in his defense of Dr. Alden’s appeal, he asserts
that he should be awarded additional attorneys’ fees for this appeal, the amount of which is to be
determined at a later date.104
III. Jurisdiction
The Court has jurisdiction to hear these consolidated appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1), which authorizes appellate review of final orders, judgments and decrees of a United
States Bankruptcy Court.105 In appeals from bankruptcy courts, district courts sit as an appellate
court.106
IV. Standard of Review
A district court reviews a bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law de novo, findings of fact
for clear error, and mixed questions of law and fact de novo.107 A district court may affirm, reverse
or modify a bankruptcy court’s ruling, or remand the case for further proceedings.108
102 Id. at 12 (citing Gahdhi v. Sonal Furniture and Custom Draperies, LLC, 49,959–CA (La. App. 2 Cir.
7/15/15), 192 So. 3d 783).
103 Id. at 13.
104 Id. at 14.
105 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
106 In re Lopez, 897 F.3d 663, 668 (5th Cir. 2018).
107 In re Nat’l Gypsum Co., 208 F.3d 498, 504 (5th Cir. 2000).
108 While this language no longer appears in Rule 8013 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, “logic
still compels the same conclusion with respect to the appellate powers of the District Court.” In re Jones v. Pennymac
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 15 of 46

16
V. Discussion
A. Issues Raised in the Original Appeals
The Alden Entities raise four arguments in their original appeals. Each argument is
addressed in turn.
1. Standing to Bring a LUTPA Claim
First, the Alden Entities contend the Bankruptcy Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over Perry’s LUTPA claims because Perry did not have standing to bring those claims against Dr.
Alden.109 Perry contends he has standing to bring his claim against Dr. Alden under LUTPA as
relief is available to “any person” and not limited in standing to “consumers and competitors.”110
Alternatively, Perry contends that he and Dr. Alden became business competitors under the Joint
Venture Agreements when Dr. Alden refused to sell the properties as required by the Joint Venture
Agreements.111
Dr. Alden raised the standing issue for the first time on March 5, 2025, in opposition to
Perry’s Motion to Amend Judgment, which was filed by Perry in response to the Damages Opinion
after the Alden Entities had already filed multiple appeals of the Liability Opinion.112 During the
hearing on that motion, the Bankruptcy Court declined to rule on the standing issue because the
Liability Opinion was already on appeal.113 Because standing is an essential component of federal
Loan Servs., LLC, No. 24-200, 2025 WL 786524, at *2 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2025).
109 Rec. Doc. 23 at 32.
110 Rec. Doc. 27 at 44–46.
111 Id. at 46.
112 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 636 at 5–8.
113 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 648.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 16 of 46

17
subject matter jurisdiction, the lack of standing can be raised at any time by a party or by the
Court.114 Therefore, the Court considers this issue, even though it was raised after the Liability
Opinion was on appeal.
In LUTPA, the Louisiana legislature declared it to be unlawful to engage in “unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or
commerce.”115 Because of the broad sweep of this language, “Louisiana courts determine what is
a LUTPA violation on a case-by-case basis.”116 The Louisiana Supreme Court has consistently
held that in establishing a LUTPA claim, a plaintiff must show that “the alleged conduct offends
established public policy and is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially
injurious.”117 “[T]he range of prohibited practices under LUTPA is extremely narrow,” as LUTPA
prohibits only fraud, misrepresentation, and similar conduct, and not mere negligence.118
Moreover, conduct that offends established public policy and is unethical is not necessarily a
violation under LUTPA.119 The Fifth Circuit has instructed that LUTPA does not provide an
alternate remedy for simple breaches of contract and held that “[t]here is a great deal of daylight
114 Sample v. Morrison, 406 F.3d 310, 312 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Sommers Drug Stores Co. Emp. Profit
Sharing Trust v. Corrigan, 883 F.2d 345, 348 (5th Cir. 1989)).
115 La. Rev. Stat. § 51:1405.
116 Keith E. Andrews, Comment, Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act: Broad Language and Generous
Remedies Supplemented by a Confusing Body of Case Law, 41 Loy. L. Rev. 759, 762 (1996) (hereinafter “Andrews”).
117 Cheramie Servs., Inc. v. Shell Deepwater Prod., 09–1633, p. 11 (La. 4/23/10), 35 So. 3d 1053, 1059.
118 Id.; Andrews, 41 Loy. L. Rev. at 763.
119 See, e.g., Cheramie Servs., 09–1633 at p. 12, 35 So. 3d at 1060 (“[O]nly egregious actions involving
elements of fraud, misrepresentation, deception, or other unethical conduct will be sanctioned based on LUTPA.”);
Vermilion Hosp., Inc. v. Patout, 05–82, p. 6 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/8/05), 906 So. 2d 688, 693 (noting that not all violations
of the Louisiana Code of Ethics give rise to a cause of action under LUTPA and that persons aggrieved by such
violations of the code of ethics are permitted to file a complaint with the Louisiana Board of Ethics or seek remedies
under other statutes).
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 17 of 46

18
between a breach of contract claim and the egregious behavior the statute proscribes.”120
In the Liability Opinion, the Bankruptcy Court found that a LUTPA right of action is
available to “any person, natural or juridical, who suffers an ascertainable loss as a result of another
person’s use of unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce,” and thus no special relationship is a prerequisite to such a
cause of action.121 Based on the evidence presented at trial, the Bankruptcy Court found “the
fraudulent actions taken by Dr. Alden, including but not limited to his forgeries of documents
designed to strip Perry of his ownership of properties without Perry’s knowledge or consent, reach
the level of egregiousness that is sanctionable” under LUTPA.122 Therefore, the Bankruptcy Court
concluded that Perry had demonstrated that Dr. Alden employed “unfair methods of competition
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce” and thus found
Dr. Alden to be liable under LUTPA.123
On appeal Dr. Alden primarily relies on two cases decided by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to argue that Perry did not have standing to raise the LUTPA claim.
In Orthopedic Sports Injury Clinic v. Wang Labs, Inc., the Fifth Circuit held that businesses who
are not competitors do not have standing to bring a claim under LUTPA.124 In a subsequent
opinion, the Fifth Circuit held that “LUTPA’s private right of action is limited to direct consumers
120 Turner v. Purina Mills, Inc., 989 F.2d 1419, 1422 (5th Cir. 1993).
121 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 433 at 58 (quoting Cheramie Servs., 09–1633 at p. 6, 35 So. 3d at
1057).
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 922 F.2d 220, 225–26 (5th Cir. 1991).
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 18 of 46

19
or to business competitors.”125
Following those decisions by the Fifth Circuit, in Cheramie Services, Inc. v. Shell
Deepwater Production, Inc. a plurality of the Louisiana Supreme Court held that LUTPA claims
are not restricted to these two groups.126 The Fifth Circuit has not directly addressed its prior
holdings since the Cheramie opinion was released. However, the Fifth Circuit has cited Cheramie
approvingly for the proposition that LUTPA grants a right of action to “[a]ny person who suffers
any ascertainable loss of money or movable property, corporeal or incorporeal, as a result of the
use or employment by another person of an unfair or deceptive method, act, or practice.”127 State
appellate courts in Louisiana have reconsidered their prior interpretations of LUTPA following the
Cheramie decision to comport with the more inclusive interpretation of the statute.128 Judges in
this district have consistently done the same.129
A federal court sitting in diversity is required to apply the law of the state, as declared by
its legislature or the state's highest court.130 The Louisiana Supreme Court’s opinion in Cheramie
125 Tubos de Acero de México, S.A. v. American Intern. Inv. Corp., Inc., 292 F.3d 471, 480 (5th Cir. 2002).
126 Cheramie Servs., Inc., 35 So. 3d at 1057 (“LUTPA grants a right of action to any person, natural or
juridical, who suffers an ascertainable loss.”).
127 Cenac v. Orkin, L.L.C., 941 F.3d 182, 194 (5th Cir. 2019). See also Sabre Indus., Inc. v. Module X Sols.,
L.L.C., No. 23-30122, 2023 WL 8676273, at *1 (5th Cir. Dec. 15, 2023) (LUTPA “grants a right of action to any
person ... who suffers an ascertainable loss as a result of another person’s use of unfair methods of competition and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.”).
128 See Jones v. Americas Ins. Co., 2016-0904 (La. Ct. App. 1 Cir. 8/16/17), 226 So. 3d 537, 544; J. A. Davis
Props., LLC v. Martin Operating P’ship, LP, 2017-449 (La. Ct. App. 3 Cir. 6/21/17), 224 So. 3d 39, 43; Prime Ins.
Co. v. Imperial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 2014-0323 (La. Ct. App. 4 Cir. 10/1/14), 151 So. 3d 670, 678; Hurricane Fence
Co., Inc. v. Jensen Metal Prods., Inc., 12-956 (La. Ct. App. 5 Cir. 5/23/13), 119 So. 3d 683, 688; Bogues v. Louisiana
Energy Consultants, Inc., 46,434 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/10/11), 71 So. 3d 1128, 1132.
129 See First Am. Bankcard, Inc. v. Smart Bus. Tech., Inc., 178 F. Supp. 3d 390, 405 (E.D. La. 2016); Max
Access, Inc. v. Gee Cee Co. of LA, Case No. 15-1728, 2016 WL 454389 (E.D. La. Feb. 5, 2016); NOLA Fine Art v.
Ducks Unlimited, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 3d 602, 612 (E.D. La. 2015); Burgers v. Bickford, Case No. 12-2009, 2014 WL
4186757, at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2014).
130 See Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 19 of 46

20
is not binding because it is a plurality opinion. Nevertheless, Cheramie is instructive to the federal
court sitting in diversity. In light of Cheramie and the well-reasoned decisions of Louisiana
appellate courts following the same, the Court finds that Perry had standing to bring a LUTPA
claim.
Louisiana law does not require that Perry be a consumer or business competitor of Dr.
Alden. Moreover, even if it did, the Bankruptcy Court made the factual finding that Dr. Alden and
Perry entered a lender/borrower relationship, which suggests that Perry was a consumer of Dr.
Alden.131 The Alden Entities also suggest that Perry’s remedy was for breach of contract, not under
LUTPA. The Alden Entities are correct that LUTPA does not provide an alternate remedy to
simple breaches of contract.132 The factual findings made by the Bankruptcy Court go beyond
simple breach of contract. The Bankruptcy Court found that Dr. Alden committed fraud, which is
the type of egregious conduct that is sanctionable under LUTPA.133 Specifically, the Bankruptcy
Court found that Dr. Alden forged documents designed to strip Perry of his ownership of properties
without Perry’s knowledge or consent.134 Therefore, the Alden Entities have not shown that the
Bankruptcy Court erred in finding that Dr. Alden was liable to Perry under LUTPA.
2. Prescription/Peremption
Second, the Alden Entities argue that the Bankruptcy Court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over Perry’s LUTPA claims because the claims were prescribed or perempted at the
131 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 433 at 58.
132 Turner, 989 F.2d at 1422.
133 Cheramie Servs., 09–1633 at p. 12, 35 So. 3d at 1060.
134 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 433 at 59.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 20 of 46

21
time of the Reconventional Demand.135 Perry contends that prescription was interrupted due to Dr.
Alden’s ongoing commission of fraud against Perry.136
Dr. Alden raised the prescription issue for the first time on March 5, 2025, in opposition to
Perry’s Motion to Amend Judgment, which was filed by Perry in response to the Damages Opinion
after the Alden Entities had already filed multiple appeals of the Liability Opinion.137 During the
hearing on that motion, the Bankruptcy Court declined to rule on the prescription issue because
the Liability Opinion was already on appeal.138
It appears that the Alden Entities waived the prescription defense. Generally, in federal
court a statute of limitations defense is waived if it is not first raised before the trial court. In
McArdle v. Dell Products, L.P., the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant waived a statute of
limitations defense by mentioning the defense in the answer, but not raising it again until the
appeal.139 The Fifth Circuit stated, “[t]o preserve an issue for appeal, ‘the litigant must press and
not merely intimate the argument during the proceedings before the district court. If an argument
is not raised to such a degree that the district court had an opportunity to rule on it, we will not
address it on appeal.’”140 Similarly, the Alden Entities did not raise the statute of limitations
defense to such a degree that the Bankruptcy Court had an opportunity to rule on it. The issue was
raised for the first time in an opposition to a Motion to Amend Judgment, which was filed in the
135 Rec. Doc. 23 at 32.
136 Rec. Doc. 27 at 47.
137 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 636 at 5–8.
138 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 648.
139 McArdle v. Dell Prods., L.P., 293 F. App’x 331, 336 n.2 (5th Cir. 2008).
140 Id. (quoting FDIC v. Mijalis, 15 F.3d 1314, 1327 (5th Cir. 1997)).
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 21 of 46

22
Bankruptcy Court long after the Liability Opinion was on appeal. For these reasons, the Court is
not inclined to rule on the merits of the prescription argument.141
The Alden Entities attempt to get around their failure to raise prescription below by arguing
that the issue is jurisdictional.142 Generally, statutes of limitation are not jurisdictional.143 The
Alden Entities have not cited any authority to support their argument that the prescription defense
is jurisdictional. Therefore, it appears that the defense was waived because it was not properly
raised before the Bankruptcy Court.
Even assuming that the Alden Entities properly preserved this argument for appeal, they
have not demonstrated that the LUTPA claim had prescribed. Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 51:1409(E) originally provided that a “private LUTPA action ‘shall be prescribed by one year
running from the time of the transaction or act which gave rise to this right of action.”’144 Despite
its plain terms, a number of courts interpreting this provision held that this one-year time period
141 Louisiana appellate courts have found that prescription can be raised for the first time on appeal. Nelson
v. Rite Aid Hdqtrs. Corp., 2002-2042 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/27/03), 873 So. 2d 16, 17. “Federal courts apply Louisiana
prescription law to diversity actions which Louisiana law governs, as ‘state statutes of limitations are considered
substantive for purposes of Erie analysis.’” Franco v. Mabe Trucking Co., Inc., 3 F.4th 788, 791 (5th Cir. 2021)
(quoting Vincent v. A.C. & S., Inc., 833 F.2d 553, 555 (5th Cir. 1987)). However, federal courts are “bound by federal
procedural rules, including those governing issue preservation.” Learmonth v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 710 F.3d 249,
256 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Huss v. Gayden, 991 So. 2d 162, 165 (Miss. 2008) (although the operation of a Mississippi
limitations defense in a federal proceeding is a matter of substantive law, the “issue of whether the defense is raised,
preserved or should be barred . . . [is] controlled by federal procedural law”). Therefore, federal procedural law governs
this issue.
142 Rec. Doc. 24-3 at 6 (“The bottom line is that regardless of the application of peremption or prescription,
Mr. Perry’s LUTPA’s claims are untimely and Mr. Perry’s right to assert a LUTPA claim was destroyed. The
bankruptcy court, as a result, lacked subject matter jurisdiction.”).
143 See Villegas v. Noem, 149 F.4th 554, 562 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575
U.S. 402, 410 (courts should conduct a “clear statement” test, under which a time bar is jurisdictional only when
“traditional tools of statutory construction . . . plainly show that Congress imbued a procedural bar with jurisdictional
consequences.”).
144 Law Indus., LLC v. Dep’t of Educ., 2023-00794 (La. 1/26/24), 378 So. 3d 3, 10 n.2 (quoting La. Rev. Stat.
§ 51:1409(E) (2006)).
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 22 of 46

23
was peremptive, rather than prescriptive.145 As a matter of law, a peremptive period may not be
renounced, interrupted, or suspended.146 Effective August 1, 2018, however, § 51:1409(E) was
amended to provide that a LUTPA cause of action “shall be subject to a liberative prescription of
one year running from the time of the transaction or act which gave rise to this right of action.”147
Following the amendment, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed an “appellate court ruling,
holding that [Section] 51:1409(E) sets forth a peremptive period rather than a liberative
prescriptive period.”148
Both the Fifth Circuit and Louisiana appellate courts have recognized that the continuing
tort doctrine applies to LUTPA claims.149 The question of what “constitutes a continuing tort is
partially ‘a conduct-based inquiry, with the court asking whether the tortfeasor perpetuates the
inquiry through overt, persistent, and ongoing acts.’”150 “‘A continuing tort is occasioned by
[ongoing] unlawful acts, not the continuation of the ill effects of an original, wrongful act.”151
“‘The continuous conduct contemplated in a continuing tort must be tortious and must be the
operating cause of the injury.’”152 “Accordingly, ‘there must be a continuing duty owed to the
145 Id. (collecting cases).
146 La. Civ. Code art. 3461.
147 Law Indus., LLC, 378 So. 3d at 10 n.2 (citing La. Rev. Stat. § 51:1409 (E)).
148 Id. at 10.
149 Caldwell Wholesale Co., L.L.C. v. R J Reynolds Tobacco Co., 781 Fed. App’x 289, 294–95 (5th Cir.
2019); Bottinelli Real Estate, L.L.C. v. Johns Manville, Inc., 2019-0619 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/27/19), 288 So. 3d 179,
187; Bihm v. Deca Sys., Inc., 2016-0356 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/8/17), 226 So. 3d 466, 489.
150 Caldwell Wholesale Co., 781 Fed. App’x at 294 (quoting Young v. United States, 727 F.3d 444, 448 (5th
Cir. 2013)) (cleaned up).
151 Id. (quoting Crump v. Sabine River Auth., 737 So. 2d 720, 728 (La. 1999)).
152 Id. (quoting Crump, 737 So. 2d at 729 n.7).
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 23 of 46

24
plaintiff and a continuing breach of that duty by the defendant.’”153
The party raising prescription ordinarily bears the burden of proof.154 “Only if prescription
is evident from the face of the pleadings will the plaintiff bear the burden of showing an action has
not prescribed.”155 “[A]ppellate courts strictly construe the statutes against prescription and in
favor of the claims that is said to be extinguished.”156
Perry filed a First Amended Answer and Reconventional Demand in the Adversary
Proceeding on August 23, 2021.157 This was the first time that Perry raised the LUTPA claims.
The Alden Entities argue that the LUTPA claims are prescribed because the last event mentioned
in the Reconventional Demand was the signing of Promissory Note No. 5 on November 24, 2017,
nearly four years earlier.158
The Bankruptcy Court concluded that Dr. Alden forged the Westbank Expressway Quit
Claim Deed, Promissory Note No. 7, the Procuration, and the 9th Street Joint Venture Agreement.
It appears that all of these documents were forged sometime in 2017, and the Quit Claim Deed was
recorded in Jefferson Parish on May 29, 2019.159 On January 29, 2021, the Alden Entities filed
seven Proofs of Claim in Perry’s bankruptcy case. As discussed in detail in the Bankruptcy Court’s
Liability Opinion, the Alden Entities relied on the forged documents to support three of their Proofs
153 Id. (quoting Crump, 737 So. 2d at 728).
154 Tr. for Melba Margaret Schwegmann v. Schwegmann Fam. Tr., 2009-968 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/14/10), 51
So. 3d 737, 742.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Bankr. Case No. 21-1002, Rec. Doc. 20.
158 Rec. Doc. 24-3 at 3–4.
159 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Proof of Claim 25-1, Part 6.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 24 of 46

25
of Claim.160 By holding these forged documents out to be valid and enforceable agreements, the
Bankruptcy Court found that Dr. Alden committed fraud against Perry and violated LUTPA.
In Bihm v. Deca Systems, Inc., the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal found a
continuing violation of LUTPA that suspended the limitations period.161 There, a corporation filed
a reconventional demand against former employees seeking damages under LUTPA arising out of
the employees’ misappropriation of funds and intellectual property.162 The Louisiana First Circuit
Court of Appeal found that the former employees had the duty to refrain from engaging in unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or
commerce.163 The court reasoned that each and every time the former employees used the data and
other trade secret information taken from the company, it constituted a separate breach of that
duty.164 Because the wrongful acts continued through the date of the litigation, the court concluded
that the LUTPA claim had not prescribed.165
Here, the Bankruptcy Court found that Dr. Alden breached a special relationship of trust
by forging documents designed to strip Perry of his ownership of properties without Perry’s
knowledge or consent.166 The Bankruptcy Court also found that Dr. Alden committed fraud against
Perry because his deception was intended to obtain an unjust advantage for Dr. Alden and to cause
160 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 433 at 41–53 (Proofs of Claim 25, 31, 32).
161 2016-0356 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/8/17), 226 So. 3d 466, 489.
162 Id. at 474.
163 Id. at 489.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 433 at 59.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 25 of 46

26
Perry to lose his ownership of certain properties.167 All of the documents that the Bankruptcy Court
concluded were forgeries were attached to the Alden Entities’ various Proofs of Claim, as a means
to fraudulently recoup funds from Perry. By continuing to assert the forged documents as a basis
for recovery against Perry, Dr. Alden continued to commit fraud against Perry and that fraud
caused Perry’s injury.168 Louisiana law creates a general legal duty not to commit fraud, and the
evidence submitted to the Bankruptcy Court established that Dr. Alden continued to violate that
duty by filing forged documents into court records to obtain an unjust advantage. The evidence
showed that Dr. Alden continued to violate LUTPA until at least January 29, 2021, when the Proofs
of Claim were filed. Therefore, the Alden Entities have not demonstrated that LUTPA claims,
which were raised less than one year later on August 23, 2021, had prescribed.
3. Damages Causation
Third, the Alden Entities assert that the Bankruptcy Court erred in finding that all of Perry’s
damages were caused by Dr. Alden.169 Specifically, the Alden Entities argue that the Bankruptcy
Court erred in crediting the testimony of Perry, other fact witnesses called by Perry, and expert
witness Patrick Gros.170
a. Perry’s Testimony
The Alden Entities cite inconsistencies in Perry’s testimony to support their argument that
167 Id. at 58. “[F]raud is defined as a misrepresentation or a suppression of the truth made with the intention
either to obtain an unjust advantage for one party or to cause a loss or inconvenience to the other.” Benton v. Clay,
48,245 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/7/13), 123 So. 3d 212, 219.
168 See Caldwell Wholesale Co., 781 Fed. App’x at 294 (“‘The continuous conduct contemplated in a
continuing tort must be tortious and must be the operating cause of the injury.’ Accordingly, ‘there must be a
continuing duty owed to the plaintiff and a continuing breach of that duty by the defendant.’”).
169 Rec. Doc. 23 at 32.
170 Id.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 26 of 46

27
the Bankruptcy Court erred in finding Perry to be a “generally credible” witness.171
The Bankruptcy Court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error.172 “A finding of fact
is clearly erroneous only if on the entire evidence, the court is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.”173 The reviewing court gives “deference to the
bankruptcy court’s determinations of witness credibility.”174 The Alden Entities argue that Perry’s
testimony was not credible because he minimized and ignored substantial other debts in his trial
testimony and blamed his financial position on Dr. Alden. The Bankruptcy Judge was well aware
of all of Perry’s debts as she presided over the Perry’s bankruptcy case since its inception in 2020.
In light of the deferential standard of review, the Bankruptcy Court’s finding that Perry was a
“generally credible and earnest witness”175 is not clearly erroneous.
b. Fact Witnesses’ Testimony
The Alden Entities contend that the other fact witnesses who testified during the trial did
not have any knowledge of Perry’s financial difficulties, his floundering car business, his IRS
debts, or the fact that Dr. Alden loaned Perry money.176 At trial, Perry offered testimony of his
girlfriend, his daughter, his cousin, his high school classmate, a former neighbor, and an
acquaintance, who all testified to changes in Perry’s demeanor due to ongoing litigation with Dr.
Alden.177 In the Damages Opinion, the Bankruptcy Court relied on this fact testimony to conclude
171 Id. at 33–42.
172 In re Duncan, 562 F.3d 688, 694 (5th Cir. 2009).
173 Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
174 Id. at 695.
175 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 616 at 4.
176 Rec. Doc. 23 at 42–45.
177 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 616 at 5–6.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 27 of 46

28
that Perry suffered “very real emotional distress and mental anguish attributable to Dr. Alden’s
fraud” and LUTPA violations.178 The Alden Entities suggest that the Bankruptcy Court should not
have relied on this testimony because the witnesses were not aware of Perry’s other substantial
debts. The Bankruptcy Court heard all of the testimony and found that Perry suffered emotional
distress and mental anguish. This factual finding was not clearly erroneous.
c. Patrick Gros’s Testimony
The Alden Entities also argue that the Bankruptcy Court erred in crediting the testimony
of Patrick Gros, an expert in accounting and financial analysis.179 According to the Alden Entities,
Gros’s testimony was speculative, biased, inconsistent, used improper methodology, improper
calculations, and was borderline hypothetical.180
Before trial, the Alden Entities filed two Motions in Limine seeking to exclude the
testimony of Gros.181 In the first motion, the Alden Entities asserted that Gros had a conflict of
interest or bias against Dr. Alden.182 According to the motion, Dr. Alden served on the board of a
non-profit, St. Francis Animal Sanctuary, which employed Gros as an accountant.183 Gros failed
to file necessary paperwork for the non-profit, causing St. Francis to lose approximately
$300,000.00 in tax exempt donations, and Dr. Alden suggested that Gros be terminated for
dereliction of duty.184 In response to the motion, Gros submitted an affidavit stating that he had
178 Id. at 18–20.
179 Rec. Doc. 23 at 45.
180 Id.
181 Bankr. Case No. 21-1002, Rec. Docs. 110, 259.
182 Bankr. Case No. 21-1002, Rec. Doc. 110.
183 Id. at 4.
184 Id.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 28 of 46

29
never personally met Dr. Alden, and although he was terminated by St. Francis in 2015 he
continued to complete the books for 2015 and prepare tax returns for 2015.185 The Bankruptcy
Court denied the motion, finding no evidence to suggest “that any sort of confidential information
about Dr. Alden personally was relayed to [Gros], such that he would have some sort of prejudice
or conflict here.”186
Federal courts have the inherent power to disqualify experts, but cases that grant
disqualification are rare.187 In disqualification cases other than those in which the expert clearly
switched sides, the Fifth Circuit has adopted a two-part test: (1) “was it objectively reasonable for
the first party who claims to have retained the expert to conclude that a confidential relationship
existed?”; and (2) “was any confidential or privileged information disclosed by the first party to
the expert?”188 “Only if the answers to both questions are affirmative should the witness be
disqualified.”189 The alleged bias of an expert witness is typically not a ground for exclusion but a
matter which goes to the weight of the opinions offered.190
The Alden Entities have not shown that the Bankruptcy Court erred in denying the first
Motion in Limine. The Alden Entities do not present any evidence to contradict the Bankruptcy
Court’s factual finding that no confidential information about Dr. Alden was relayed to Gros, such
that he would have some sort of prejudice or conflict against Dr. Alden.
185 Bankr. Case No. 21-1002, Rec. Doc. 136.
186 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 354 at 6.
187 Koch Ref. Co. v. Jennifer L. Boudreau M/V, 85 F.3d 1178, 1181 (5th Cir. 1996)
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Roake v. Brumley, 756 F. Supp. 3d 219, 238 (M.D. La. 2024) reversed on other grounds, No. 24-30706,
2026 WL 482555 (5th Cir. Feb. 20, 2026). See also Seshadri Raju, M.D., P.A. v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 17- 357, 2021
WL 1232102, at *7 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 31, 2021).
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 29 of 46

30
In the second Motion in Limine, the Alden Entities argued that Gros’s third supplemental
expert report, which was produced on January 30, 2024, was untimely.191 Rule 26(e)(2), which
applies in adversary proceedings in bankruptcy,192 permits supplementation of an expert report,
but “[a]ny additions or changes to [the] information must be disclosed by the time the party’s
pretrial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(3) are due.”193 Under Rule 26(a)(3), “these disclosures must
be made at least 30 days before trial.”194 The supplemental report was produced approximately
two and a half months before the April 2024 trial. The Alden Entities have not shown that the
Bankruptcy Court erred in denying the second Motion in Limine.
Further, the admission of expert testimony in violation of Rule 26(a) is subject to harmless
error analysis.195 Even assuming that a violation of Rule 26(a) occurred, the Alden Entities have
not shown that they were prejudiced by the admission of Gros’s testimony. Perry produced three
expert reports from Gros during this litigation, on February 11, 2022, January 4, 2024, and January
30, 2024, and Gros was deposed by the parties before trial. Therefore, even assuming that some
violation of Rule 26(a) occurred, the error was harmless.
On appeal, the Alden Entities also argue that Gros’s methodology was unreliable.196 Based
on Gros’s testimony, the Bankruptcy Court found that Perry suffered actual losses of $190,046 in
2017 as a result of the fraud and LUTPA violations committed by Dr. Alden.197 Gros reviewed the
191 Bankr. Case No. 21-1002, Rec. Doc. 259.
192 See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7026 (“Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 applies in an adversary proceeding.”).
193 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(2).
194 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3).
195 Primrose Operating Co. v. Nat’l Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 546, 563 (5th Cir. 2004).
196 Rec. Doc. 23 at 45.
197 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 616 at 8.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 30 of 46

31
Schedule Cs of Perry’s tax returns, finding abnormally high loss in 2017 due to losses at Perry’s
business, Deals on Wheels.198 Gros calculated the net loss in 2017 to be $235,928, whereas the
average net loss for 2014–2016 and 2018 was $45,882.199 After subtracting the average loss for
the years surrounding 2017 from the net loss experienced in 2017, Gros calculated the excess loss
for 2017 to be $190,046.200 Gros and Perry attributed those excess losses to several factors: (1)
lack of working capital from real estate transactions due to fraudulent encumbrances by Dr. Alden;
(2) redirection of time and focus from Deals on Wheels to selling immovable properties to attempt
to satisfy alleged debt owed to Dr. Alden; and (3) financial pressure from Dr. Alden related to the
payment of the NextGear Promissory Note secured by the Collateral Mortgage.201
The Bankruptcy Court accepted this uncontroverted testimony.202 The Alden Entities have
not shown that this factual finding was clearly erroneous. “[A]s a general rule, questions relating
to the bases and sources of an expert’s opinion affect the weight to be assigned that opinion rather
than its admissibility,” and should be left for the finder of fact.203 The problems the Alden Entities
cite with Gros’s testimony go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. The weaknesses
that the Alden Entities point out in Gros’s testimony are weaknesses that they also highlighted for
the Bankruptcy Court. The Bankruptcy Court was the finder of fact in this case, and the decision
to credit the testimony of Gros was not clearly erroneous.
198 Id. at 7.
199 Id. at 8.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 7.
202 Id. at 8.
203 See Primrose Operating Co. v. Nat’l Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 546, 562 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting United
States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, More or Less Situated in Leflore County, 80 F.3d 1074, 1077 (5th Cir. 1996)).
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 31 of 46

32
The Bankruptcy Court also accepted Gros’s expert opinion that Perry suffered a total loss
of $83,837 for the forced liquidation/surrendering of vehicles as a direct result of Dr. Alden’s fraud
and violations of the LUTPA.204 Due to the fraudulent encumbrances placed by Dr. Alden on
Perry’s immovable properties and pressure placed on Perry by Dr. Alden to pay alleged debts by
preparing properties to be sold, the Bankruptcy Court found Perry lost significant rental income,
which was the primary source of funding of operations at Deals on Wheels during slow sales
periods.205 Perry was then forced to liquidate or surrender twenty automobiles for below-market
value, and Gros calculated the loss of each vehicle Perry sold or surrendered at a discount by
subtracting the actual sale price of each vehicle from the upper limit of the “Fair Market Range”
from the 2024 Kelley Blue Book for each vehicle’s make and model.206
The Alden Entities take issue with this testimony because Gros did not know the condition
of the vehicles and used the “highest value of a vehicle” when calculating these damages.207 Gros
used the 2024 Kelley Blue Book valuations because the 2019 market value information was not
available. Because used cars depreciate over time, the Bankruptcy Court noted that 2024 Kelly
Blue Book valuations already reflect each vehicle’s depreciation in years since 2019.208 Dr. Alden
presented no contradictory expert evidence.209 The Alden Entities have not shown that these factual
findings were clearly erroneous.
204 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 616 at 9.
205 Id. at 8.
206 Id.
207 Rec. Doc. 52.
208 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 616 at 9.
209 Id.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 32 of 46

33
The Bankruptcy Court also assessed damages against Dr. Alden for a fraudulent lease on
Perry’s 9th Street Property.210 Perry originally leased the property to Dr. Alden’s employee, Darryl
Fish, in 2017 for a monthly rent of $350 in cash payment and $600 in monthly labor to be
performed by Fish in renovating the property.211 The Bankruptcy Court found that Dr. Alden
fraudulently executed the Second 9th Street Lease with Fish, thereby illegally encumbering the 9th
Street Property from September 1, 2019 until September 2021, when Fish vacated the property.212
With respect to damages caused by lost rent on the 9th Street Property, the Bankruptcy Court did
not credit Gros’s testimony.213 Instead, the Bankruptcy Court found the best evidence of the
amount of monthly rent a new renter would have paid is the monthly cash rent owed under the
First 9th Street Lease.214 Therefore, the Bankruptcy Court found that, due to his fraudulent acts
perpetrated against Perry related to the Second 9th St. Lease, Dr. Alden was jointly and solidarily
liable with Darryl Fish to Perry for damages in the total amount of $8,400.00, representing $350.00
per month for 24 months.215 The Alden Entities take issue with these factual findings, but they
have not shown the factual findings were clearly erroneous.
Lastly, Gros opined and the Bankruptcy Court found that Perry lost $58,050 in rent on the
vacant Westbank Expressway Lot because Dr. Alden fraudulently encumbered the lot with a
forged Quit Claim Deed.216 In 2017, Perry had the Lot listed for sale with a pending offer to
210 Id. at 9–10.
211 Id. at 9.
212 Id. at 9–10.
213 Id. at 10.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 616 at 11.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 33 of 46

34
purchase for $47,000.217 In exchange for $22,000, Perry agreed to cancel the sale and relist the Lot
for $79,500, with half of the proceeds to go to Dr. Alden.218 The Bankruptcy Court found that Dr.
Alden then forged a quit claim deed transferring the full ownership of the Lot to himself.219
In calculating Perry’s damages due to the deprivation of his ownership interest in the Lot,
Gros contacted a realtor to inquire as to rental income that could have been earned during the
period of time in which Alden usurped Perry’s ownership interest in the Lot.220 Gros concluded,
based upon the real estate agent’s opinion, that the total loss of potential income was $58,050.221
Dr. Alden argues that the comparable lots were not sufficiently similar, but he did not present any
contrary evidence. The Alden Entities have not shown that these factual findings were clearly
erroneous.
4. Factual Findings Regarding Fraud and Forgery
Fourth, the Alden Entities assert that the Bankruptcy Court erred in finding that Dr. Alden
committed fraud and/or forgery.222 As an initial matter, the Alden Entities argue that Second 9th
Street Lease, Instrument of Procuration and 9th Street Joint Venture were not properly before the
Court due to Perry’s earlier Motion to Reject the lease with Fish.223 However, Dr. Alden attached
the 9th Street Joint Venture to his Proof of Claim No. 25. Similarly, Fish attached the Second 9th
Street Lease to his Proof of Clam No. 22 filed in this case. By filing the Proofs of Claim, Dr. Alden
217 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 433 at 19.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 20.
220 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 616 at 11.
221 Id.
222 Rec. Doc. 23 at 55.
223 Id. at 55–56.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 34 of 46

35
consented to the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court to resolve the validity and amount of his
claims. In the Amended Reconventional Demands, Perry clearly alleged that Dr. Alden committed
fraud by forging Perry’s signatures on the Procuration and the joint venture agreements.224 These
issues were properly before the Bankruptcy Court.
The Alden Entities also contend that the Bankruptcy Court erred in crediting the opinions
of Perry’s handwriting expert over the Alden Entities’ handwriting expert.225 Perry points out that
the Bankruptcy Court considered the testimony and reports filed by the two competing expert
witnesses and concluded that Perry’s expert witness’s methodology and conclusions were
correct.226 Perry argues that the Bankruptcy Court’s findings were supported by the record.227
At trial, Perry presented testimony from handwriting expert Adele A. Thonn (“Thonn”).
The Bankruptcy Court found Thonn to be a “credible, trustworthy, and earnest expert witness,
put[] great stock in her methodology, and [gave] maximum credibility to her expert reports and
testimony.”228 The Alden Entities presented testimony from handwriting expert Susan Abbey
(“Abbey”). The Bankruptcy Court found “Abbey’s testimony to be irrelevant and unhelpful and
[gave] little, if any, weight to it.”229 Because Abbey “did not compare Perry’s signature across
documents purportedly signed by Perry as Adele Thonn did,” the Bankruptcy Court found that
“Abbey’s analysis could not assist the Court in determining whether Perry in fact signed any of
224 Bankr. Case No. 21-1002, Rec. Docs. 20 at 18, 30-1 at 18.
225 Rec. Doc. 23 at 56–58.
226 Rec. Doc. 27 at 59.
227 Id. at 59–61.
228 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 433 at 8.
229 Id.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 35 of 46

36
the documents specifically.”230 The Bankruptcy Court noted that the issue was not whether the
signature on the documents belonged to Perry but whether someone “took a signature page from
one document and attached it to other documents without Perry’s consent.”231
The Bankruptcy Court, as the factfinder in this case, was in the best position to determine
the credibility of witnesses. In a “battle of the experts,” the factfinder “must be allowed to make
credibility determinations and weigh the conflicting evidence in order to decide the likely truth of
a matter.”232
Based on Thonn’s expert testimony and the fact testimony of Perry, the Bankruptcy Court
found that Perry did not sign the Westbank Expressway Quit Claim Deed, Promissory Note No. 7,
the Instrument of Procuration, or the 9th Street Joint Venture Agreement.233 The Bankruptcy Court
also found that Perry did not authorize Dr. Alden to use a preprinted copy of his signature to
execute those documents.234 Therefore, the Court found that the documents were fraudulent and
forged, with the perpetrator of the fraud being Dr. Alden.235
The Alden Entities assert that the Bankruptcy Court should not have credited this testimony
because Perry admitted that he signed the Quit Claim Deed in the Answer and Reconventional
Demand he filed while the Adversary Proceeding was still pending in state court.236 An admission
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Sugartown United Pentecostal Church Inc. v. Church Mut. Ins. Co., No. 23-30072, 2024 WL 62947, at
*7 (5th Cir. Jan. 5, 2024) (quoting Foradori v. Harris, 523 F.3d 477, 516 (5th Cir. 2008); Garner v. Santoro, 865 F.2d
629, 644 (5th Cir. 1989)).
233 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 433 at 21, 24–25, 28–30.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Bankr. Case No. 21-1002, Rec. Doc. 1-3 at 2 (“The allegations contained in Paragraph 19 of the petition
are admitted in part and denied in part. Defendant Perry admits that he received the sum of Twenty-Two Thousand
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 36 of 46

37
in an answer is usually a binding judicial admission that conclusively establishes the fact for the
purposes of that case, unless the court allows the judicial admission to be withdrawn.237 “When a
party has amended a pleading, allegations and statements in earlier pleadings are not considered
judicial admissions.”238 Here, Perry filed two Amended Reconventional Demands after the case
Adversary Proceeding was removed to the Bankruptcy Court.239 The amended pleadings clearly
allege that Dr. Alden committed fraud by forging Perry’s signatures on the Quit Claim Deed.240
The Alden Entities have not shown that the Bankruptcy Court erred in crediting Perry’s testimony
that he did not sign the Quit Claim Deed. The Alden Entities have not shown that the Bankruptcy
Court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous.
B. Issues Raised in the Cross-Appeal
Perry raises five arguments in the cross-appeal. Each argument is addressed in turn.
1. Damages for Fraud
Perry argues that he sought damages on his fraud claim, and the Bankruptcy Court erred in
finding that the Reconventional Demand solely sought damages under LUTPA.241 The Alden
Entities point out that the only relief sought for the fraud claim was declaratory relief, which was
Dollars ($22,000.00) for acquisition of property in Marrero, Louisiana and that he did sign a Quitclaim Deed which
was attached to the petition in this matter.”).
237 Martinez v. Bally's Louisiana, Inc., 244 F.3d 474, 476 (5th Cir. 2001) (“A judicial admission is a formal
concession in the pleadings or stipulations by a party or counsel that is binding on the party making them. . . . A
judicial admission is conclusive, unless the court allows it to be withdrawn.”).
238 188 LLC v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 300 F.3d 730, 736 (7th Cir. 2002).
239 Bankr. Case No. 21-1002, Rec. Docs. 20, 30-1.
240 Id.
241 Rec. Doc. 27 at 26–32.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 37 of 46

38
awarded by the Bankruptcy Court.242
In the Damages Opinion, the Bankruptcy Court found that “Perry asserted a claim for
damages, referencing only [LUTPA] as the basis for any award of damages.”243 In Paragraph 105
of the Reconventional Demand Perry alleged that “Alden’s actions complained of above violates
the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act, allowing Perry to recover treble damages and attorneys’
fees.”244 In Paragraphs 106–109, Perry also assert he is entitled to damages because “Alden’s
actions complained of above” caused financial damage, mental and emotional distress, physical
pain and suffering, inconvenience, loss of intellectual or physical enjoyment, and attorneys’
fees.245
Although a reading of the Reconventional Demand could support Perry’s argument that he
was seeking damages for all claims, he has not shown that a reversable error occurred. As the
Louisiana Supreme Court has found “[t]he purpose of tort damages is to make the victim whole.
This goal is thwarted, and the law is violated, when the victim is allowed to recover the same
element of damages twice.”246 The Bankruptcy Court awarded damages under LUTPA for loss of
profits and/or excess losses on multiple business ventures, infliction of severe psychological and
emotional distress, and attorneys’ fees.247 On appeal, Perry argues that he should have been
awarded financial damages, emotional distress damages, and attorneys’ fees due to Dr. Alden’s
242 Rec. Doc. 32 at 11.
243 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 616 at 20, n.8.
244 Bankr. Case No. 21-1002, Rec. Docs. 20 at 21, 30-1 at 21.
245 Bankr. Case No. 21-1002, Rec. Docs. 20 at 22, 30-1 at 22.
246 Bellard v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 2007-1335 (La. 4/18/08), 980 So. 2d 654, 668.
247 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 616 at 22.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 38 of 46

39
fraud.248 These are the categories of damages that were awarded under LUTPA. Perry has not
demonstrated that he proved additional categories of damages that should have been awarded for
fraud.
2. Joint and Several Liability
Second, Perry asserts the Bankruptcy Court erred in failing to find that the Alden Entities
were jointly and severely liable with Dr. Alden for fraud and resulting damages under LUTPA and
state law.249 Perry contends that Dr. Alden committed the fraud acting through his wholly owned
limited liability companies and those companies cannot use the corporate veil as a “shield” to the
damages arising from Dr. Alden’s fraud.250 The Alden Entities assert that it was appropriate for
the Bankruptcy Court not to find the Alden Entities jointly and severally liable with Dr. Alden.251
The Alden Entities point out that only three of these six entities are even identified in Perry’s brief,
and the Bankruptcy Court granted Perry’s requests for declaratory relief as to those entities.252
On April 22, 2025, the Bankruptcy Court denied Perry’s Second Amended Motion to
Amend Judgment, which sought to amend the judgment to hold all of the Alden Entities liable for
the fraud and LUTPA violations, rather than limiting that finding only to Dr. Alden.253 During the
hearing on the motion, the Bankruptcy Court noted that the Reconventional Demand alleged fraud
and forgery by Dr. Alden, individually, not against the company defendants.254 The Bankruptcy
248 Rec. Doc. 27 at 29–32
249 Id. at 32.
250 Id. at 33.
251 Rec. Doc. 32 at 15.
252 Id. at 16–17.
253 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 665.
254 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 664.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 39 of 46

40
Court also observed that the fraud and forgery were committed by Dr. Alden, but the Bankruptcy
Court acknowledged that Dr. Alden acted “on behalf of some of those entities and moved through
some of those entities.”255
Page 2 of the Reconventional Demand states that it is brought against “Dr. William Alden
and his related entities Perry Associates LLC, Crescent City Property Development Association
LLC, Crescent City Medical Services, Inc., Private Auto Connection LLC, 4330 State Street Drive
LLC, and 1100 So. Jeff Davis LLC (the ‘Alden Entities’) (William Alden and the Alden Entities
are collectively referred to as ‘Alden’)”.256 The Reconventional Demand asserts that “Alden
committed fraud” and “Alden’s actions complained of above violate[] the Louisiana Unfair Trade
Practices Act.”257
The Bankruptcy Court’s statement that the Reconventional Demand only asserted fraud
and LUTPA claims against Dr. Alden, individually, is incorrect. Paragraph 2 of the Reconventional
Demand states that it refers to the Alden Entities and Dr. Alden collectively as “Alden.” Of course,
forgery must be perpetrated by an individual. Nevertheless, if the individual is acting on behalf of
a corporation or LLC, the company and the individual may be held liable for fraud.258 The
Bankruptcy Court acknowledged that Dr. Alden acted “on behalf of some of those entities and
moved through some of those entities” when he committed the fraud. Therefore, the Bankruptcy
Court erred in finding that the Reconventional Demand only brought fraud and LUTPA claims
255 Id.
256 Bankr. Case No. 21-1002, Rec. Docs. 20 at 2, 30-1 at 2.
257 Id. at 18, 21.
258 Tubos De Acero De Mexico, SA, 292 F.3d at 479–80 (“The allegations underlying [the plaintiff’s] fraud
and conversion claims against [the corporation] and [the individual] would be identical because [the individual] was
acting for [the corporation].”).
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 40 of 46

41
against Dr. Alden, individually, and the Bankruptcy Court’s Orders are reversed to the extent that
they find the Reconventional Demand only asserted fraud and LUTPA claims against Dr. Alden
individually. Additional factual findings are needed on what entities, if any, Dr. Alden was acting
on behalf of when he committed the fraud and forgery. Accordingly, the Court remands the case
to the Bankruptcy Court for additional proceedings on whether any of the Alden Entities should
be held jointly liable with Dr. Alden for fraud or violations of LUTPA.
3. Emotional Distress Damages
Third, Perry argues that the Bankruptcy Court erred in awarding only nominal damages in
the amount of $5,000 for his emotional distress.259 Perry asserts that the Bankruptcy Court awarded
modest damages because Perry did not seek medical intervention, but Perry contends that a medical
expert is not required to establish emotional damages if the negligence complained of is within the
realm of an ordinary lay person’s understanding.260 The Alden Entities contend that the award
should not be increased.261 The Alden Entities point out that Perry has failed to offer any relevant
caselaw or quantum of prior general damage awards as guidance.262
“General damages are those which may not be fixed with pecuniary exactitude; instead,
they involve mental or physical pain or suffering, inconvenience, the loss of intellectual
gratification or physical enjoyment, or other losses of life or life-style which cannot be definitely
measured in monetary terms.”263 As the Louisiana Supreme Court has observed, vast discretion is
259 Rec. Doc. 27 at 35–36.
260 Id. at 36.
261 Rec. Doc. 32 at 19.
262 Id. at 19–20.
263 Jones v. Mkt. Basket Stores, Inc., 2022-00841 (La. 3/17/23), 359 So. 3d 452, 464.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 41 of 46

42
accorded to the trier of fact in fixing general damage awards.264 “This vast discretion is such that
an appellate court should rarely disturb an award of general damages.”265 “Only after a
determination that the trier of fact has abused its ‘much discretion’ is a resort to prior awards
appropriate, and then only for the purpose of determining the highest or lowest point which is
reasonably within that discretion.”266
Perry has not demonstrated that the Bankruptcy Court abused its vast discretion in fixing
the emotional distress damages award. Therefore, the Court need not resort to prior awards to
determine the highest or lowest point which is reasonably within that discretion.
4. Attorneys’ Fees Before the Bankruptcy Court
Fourth, Perry contends the Bankruptcy Court erred in failing to award him attorneys’ fees
and costs through the end of the trial, and instead only awarded fees and costs qualified prior to
the actual trial date.267 The Alden Entities argue that the Bankruptcy Court appropriately denied
the Motions to Amend the Judgment, which sought to increase the award of attorneys’ fees and
costs.268 The Alden Entities point out that Perry does not even discuss what amount in attorneys’
fees and costs he is seeking.269
Louisiana Revised Statute § 51:1409(A) provides that in the event damages are awarded to
a plaintiff in a private action under LUTPA, the court “shall award to the person bringing such
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Rec. Doc. 27 at 38.
268 Rec. Doc. 32 at 20.
269 Id.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 42 of 46

43
action reasonable attorney fees and costs.” Therefore, when a trial court awards damages under
LUTPA, an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs is mandatory.270 Louisiana appellate courts
have explained that “[t]he mandatory award of reasonable attorney fees and costs under [LUTPA]
sanctions egregious actions involving elements of fraud, misrepresentation, deception, or other
unethical conduct, and is clearly penal in nature.”271 “Where a statutory award of attorney fees is
penal in nature, the value of the attorney fee does not need to be proven.”272 Nevertheless, the
award must be reasonable.273 An appellate court should only reverse the trial court’s factual
findings relating to the reasonableness of an attorneys’ fee award when those factual findings are
“clearly wrong” or “manifestly erroneous.”274
The Bankruptcy Court awarded Perry attorneys’ fees in the amount of $209,496.04 and
costs in the amount of $17,879.92.275 Post-judgment Perry sought to increase the attorneys’ fee
award by $32,605.276 On April 22, 2025, the Bankruptcy Court denied Perry’s First Motion to
Amend Judgment, which sought to increase the attorneys’ fee award.277 During the hearing on the
270 Rincon v. Owens Collision & Repair Serv. Ctr., LLC, 2018-0383 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/21/18), 359 So. 3d
990, 1002.
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 Id. Louisiana courts consider ten factors in determining the reasonableness of attorney fees: (1) the
ultimate result obtained; (2) the responsibility incurred; (3) the importance of the litigation; (4) the amount of money
involved; (5) the extent and character of the work performed; (6) the legal knowledge, attainment, and skill of the
attorneys; (7) the number of appearances made; (8) the intricacies of the facts involved; (9) the diligence and skill of
counsel; and (10) the court’s own knowledge.
274 Quality Env’t Processes, Inc. v. IP Petroleum Co., Inc., 2016-0230 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/12/17), 219 So. 3d
349, 378, writ denied, 2017-00915 (La. 10/9/17), 227 So. 3d 833.
275 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 616.
276 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 624.
277 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 658.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 43 of 46

44
motion, the Bankruptcy Court noted that the record on damages was closed and during trial Perry
did not reserve his right to seek future fees.278 Perry has not demonstrated that the Bankruptcy
Court’s factual findings relating to the reasonableness of an attorneys’ fee award are clearly wrong
or manifestly erroneous.
5. Attorneys’ Fees on Appeal
Fifth, Perry asserts he should be awarded cost and attorneys’ fees incurred in this Appeal.279
He asserts that a plaintiff who is awarded damages and attorneys’ fees in an action under the
LUTPA and then successfully defends an appeal of that action, is entitled to additional fees
incurred in the connection with the appeal.280 The Alden Entities contend that Perry should not be
awarded attorneys’ fees and costs for the cross-appeal.281 To the extent that this Court reverses any
of the Bankruptcy Court’s findings, the Alden Entities assert Perry is precluded from an additional
award of attorneys’ fees.282
“A plaintiff who is awarded damages and attorney’s fees in an action under [LUTPA], and
then successfully defends an appeal of that action, is entitled to additional attorney’s fees incurred
in connection with the appeal.”283 Where a party does not successfully defend all of the issues
raised on appeal, Louisiana courts have declined to award additional attorneys’ fees on appeal.284
278 Bankr. Case No. 20-11986, Rec. Doc. 648.
279 Rec. Doc. 27 at 39.
280 Id.
281 Rec. Doc. 32 at 21.
282 Id.
283 River Rental Tools, Inc. v. Smith Power Sols., LLC, 2021-0716 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/15/22), 342 So. 3d 1052,
1058, writ denied, 2022-01076 (La. 10/18/22), 348 So. 3d 728 (citing Laurents v. Louisiana Mobile Homes, Inc., 96-
0976, p. 12 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/5/97), 689 So. 2d 536, 543.
284 Id. at 1058–59.
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 44 of 46

45
Moreover, “additional attorney fees may not be granted where the appellate court finds that the
amount awarded in the trial court was sufficient to compensate counsel for both the work at the
trial court and the appellate court levels.”285
Perry has successfully defended against the issues raised by the Alden Entities on appeal.
Although appellate courts have authority to award fees incurred for the cost of successfully
defending an appeal, the Fifth Circuit’s “preferred procedure is to remand for the determination of
the amount of such an award.”286 Considering that the Court is remanding the case for additional
findings on whether the Alden Entities should be held jointly liable with Dr. Alden, the Court also
remands the case to allow the Bankruptcy Court to determine in the first instance whether Perry is
entitled to attorneys’ fees incurred in successfully defending against this appeal and, if so, the
proper amount of those fees.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court affirms the Bankruptcy Court’s Orders in part
and reverses in part. The Bankruptcy Court’s Orders are reversed to the extent that they find the
Reconventional Demand only asserted fraud and LUTPA claims against Dr. Alden individually.
The case is remanded to the Bankruptcy Court for additional proceedings on: (1) whether any of
the Alden Entities should be held jointly liable with Dr. Alden for fraud or violations of LUTPA
and (2) whether Perry is entitled to attorneys’ fees incurred in successfully defending against the
Alden Entities’ appeals and, if so, the proper amount of those fees. Accordingly,
285 Fam. Care Servs., Inc. v. Owens, 45,505 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/11/10), 46 So. 3d 234, 244.
286 Catalyst Strategic Advisors, L.L.C. v. Three Diamond Cap. Sbc, L.L.C., 93 F.4th 870, 879 (5th Cir. 2024)
(internal citations omitted). See also Cajun Servs. Unlimited, LLC v. Benton Energy Serv. Co., No. CV 17-491, 2021
WL 5833967, at *1 (E.D. La. Dec. 9, 2021) (LUTPA case remanded from the Federal Circuit for a determination by
the district court of whether the appellee was entitled to attorneys’ fees incurred in defending against the appeal and,
if so, the proper amount of those fees).
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 45 of 46

46
IT IS ORDERED that the Bankruptcy Court’s Liability Opinion, Damages Opinion, and
Orders on the Motions to Amend Judgment are AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN
PART. The Bankruptcy Court’s Orders are reversed to the extent that they find the Reconventional
Demand only asserted fraud and LUTPA claims against Dr. Alden individually.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the case is remanded to the Bankruptcy Court for
additional proceedings on: (1) whether any of the Alden Entities should be held jointly liable with
Dr. Alden for fraud or violations of LUTPA and (2) whether Perry is entitled to attorneys’ fees
incurred in successfully defending against the Alden Entities’ appeals and, if so, the proper amount
of those fees.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this _____ day of March, 2026.
_________________________________
NANNETTE JOLIVETTE BROWN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
30th
Case 2:23-cv-05265-NJB-DPC Document 34 Filed 03/30/26 Page 46 of 46