Flanks v. City of New Orleans et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
RAYMOND FLANKS
VERSUS
THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS et al.
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 23-6897
SECTION: “G”(4)
ORDER AND REASONS
This litigation arises from Plaintiff Raymond Flanks’s (“Plaintiff”) wrongful conviction
for first-degree murder in 1985. Plaintiff names as Defendants the City of New Orleans; Jason
Williams, in his official capacity as Orleans Parish District Attorney; Anne Kirkpatrick, in her
official capacity as Superintendent of the New Orleans Police Department; John Dillmann, in his
individual capacity; and John/Jane Does #1-20 in their individual capacities.1 Plaintiff brings a
claim against Jason Williams in his official capacity as the District Attorney for Orleans Parish
(“Williams”) under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York.2 Plaintiff
alleges the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office (“OPDA”) secured his wrongful conviction
in violation of his constitutional rights by withholding material exculpatory evidence in violation
of OPDA’s obligations under Brady v. Maryland.3
Before the Court is Williams’s Motion for Summary Judgment.4 Williams does not move
for summary judgment on the issue of whether a Brady violation occurred.5 Even assuming that a
1 See Rec. Doc. 27.
2 Id. at 51. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
3 Rec. Doc. 27 at 4–5. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
4 Rec. Doc. 66.
5 Rec. Doc. 66-1 at 2.
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Brady violation occurred, Williams argues that Plaintiff’s claims against OPDA still fail because
Plaintiff cannot present competent evidence to show: (1) that OPDA’s policymaker, then District
Attorney Harry Connick (“Connick”), adopted and implemented an unconstitutional policy
concerning Brady disclosures; (2) that Connick acted with deliberate indifference to the rights of
criminal defendants; or (3) that Connick’s conduct directly caused the alleged suppression of
evidence in Plaintiff’s criminal case.6 Plaintiff opposes the motion, arguing that he has put forth
sufficient evidence to support Monell liability under three distinct theories.7
For the reasons discussed in more detail below, there are facts in dispute precluding
summary judgment on the Monell claim brought against Williams. Plaintiff has not presented
sufficient evidence to show that OPDA maintained an official policy in violation of Brady.
However, the amount and similarity of Brady violations occurring under Connick’s tenure,
combined with other circumstantial evidence of a pervasive culture of indifference to Brady, is
sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude there was a custom of withholding exculpatory witness
testimony within OPDA and that Connick had constructive and/or actual notice of the practice.
The same facts are enough for a reasonable juror to find OPDA failed to train, supervise, and
discipline its employees regarding their obligations under Brady, and that these failures amounted
to deliberate indifference to the “known or obvious” risk that criminal defendants’ rights would be
violated. A reasonable juror could also find that the custom of Brady violations was the moving
force behind Plaintiff’s claimed constitutional violation. Accordingly, having considered the
motion, the memoranda in support and opposition, the record, and the applicable law, the Court
denies the motion.
6 Id. at 2–6.
7 Rec. Doc. 91.
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I. Background
In May 1985, a jury found Plaintiff guilty of first-degree murder in the death of Martin
Carnesi (“Mr. Carnesi”).8 This was Plaintiff’s second trial after the first trial in August 1984
resulted in a mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a verdict.9 At both trials, Mr. Carnesi’s
wife, Faye Carnesi (“Mrs. Carnesi”), testified to the circumstances of her husband’s death,
including identifying Plaintiff as the suspect who shot her husband.10
According to the Amended Complaint, Mr. Carnesi was shot by the Actual Perpetrator
(“Actual Perpetrator”) on December 17, 1983, in a robbery gone wrong.11 At the time, Mr. Carnesi
was walking Mrs. Carnesi to her car that was parked in front of their home.12 After Mr. Carnesi
was shot, Mrs. Carnesi threw her purse at the Actual Perpetrator and ran away.13 Initially, Mrs.
Carnesi represented that the Actual Perpetrator was a Black man in his late twenties, about 5’10”
and 150 pounds, with a medium build, brown skin, and a light mustache.14 Mrs. Carnesi also
reported that the Actual Perpetrator was wearing a shower cap and sped off in an aged, light blue
car.15 Approximately a week after the crime, NOPD detectives, including Dillmann, visited Mrs.
Carnesi at her home and showed her a photo lineup for identification.16 Mrs. Carnesi narrowed it
8 Rec. Doc. 27 at 12–13.
9 Id. at 11–12.
10 Id. at 12–13.
11 Id. at 8–9.
12 Id. at 9.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 11.
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down to two photos, Plaintiff and one other individual.17 Dillmann then suggested to Mrs. Carnesi
that Plaintiff was the perpetrator.18
Mrs. Carnesi testified before the grand jury and identified Plaintiff as the perpetrator, based
on her identification of him when Dillmann suggested that Plaintiff was the perpetrator.19 Mrs.
Carnesi testified that the Actual Perpetrator had a “little white blotch on the side of his cheek, a
little white mark, like discolored looking,” but rationalized her selection of Plaintiff from the photo
lineup because she “didn’t think they showed the side of his face with that mark in the photo.”20
Plaintiff’s first trial began on August 28, 1984.21 Mrs. Carnesi identified Plaintiff and
testified that the car he was arrested in resembled the car she saw fleeing the scene.22 OPDA
prosecutors also presented testimony from an NOPD technician who testified that Mr. Carnesi was
shot with the same gun as the gun in Plaintiff’s possession.23 This first trial resulted in a hung
jury.24 After the first trial, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms conducted independent
ballistics testing and determined that neither the bullets used to kill Mr. Carnesi nor the casing
found at the scene matched Plaintiff’s gun.25 At the second trial, Mrs. Carnesi testified that she
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 12.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
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“knew ‘it was him’” and also testified that Dillmann did not suggest to her who to identify during
the photo lineup.26 The jury returned a guilty verdict for first-degree murder at this second trial.27
Nearly 37 years later, on November 17, 2022, Plaintiff’s first-degree murder conviction
was vacated.28 At the November 17, 2022 exoneration hearing, the “OPDA stated that ‘the State
agrees that Mr. Flank’s [sic] conviction was obtained in violation of Brady v. Maryland’ because
‘the State failed to disclose … materials [that] are favorable, and under circumstances of the State’s
case against Mr. Flank[s], material.’”29 Plaintiff notes OPDA specifically “acknowledged that
‘there is a reasonable likelihood that had [Mrs. Carnesi’s] prior testimony been disclosed, it could
have affected the judgment of the jury’ and ‘defense counsel would have been able to present a
compelling case that Mrs. Carnesi was innocently mistaken when presented with the wrong
suspect, that Mr. Flank[s] did not resemble[] the perpetrator, and that the car he was arrested in
did not fit the one at the crime scene.’”30
Plaintiff brings a Monell claim against Williams in his official capacity as the District
Attorney for Orleans Parish.31 Plaintiff alleges that “throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s,
OPDA maintained policies and customs that promoted, facilitated, and condoned misconduct by
prosecutors and other OPDA employees and agents, including concerning the suppression of
exculpatory and favorable evidence to criminal defendants and their counsel.”32 Plaintiff further
26 Id.
27 Id. at 13.
28 Id. at 14.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 51.
32 Id. at 19.
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alleges OPDA’s policymakers maintained a policy, custom, or pattern and practice of condoning
official misconduct, including by failing to train, supervise, and discipline prosecutors.33
According to Plaintiff, because he and his counsel “were not aware of the NOPD records showing
inconsistencies between Mrs. Carnesi’s initial description of the Actual Perpetrator and Mr.
Flanks’s appearance, the NOPD records showing a string of similar crimes with a consistently
described perpetrator, or Mrs. Carnesi’s grand jury testimony regarding the photo array and her
initial identification of Mr. Flanks,” this exculpatory material was unusable at trial.34
On January 18, 2024, Williams filed his first motion to dismiss.35 This Court denied the
motion without prejudice, granting leave to Plaintiff to amend the Complaint to “clarify certain
issues so that the Court has the information it needs to analyze whether Plaintiff has sufficiently
plead a Monell claim against Defendant Williams.”36 Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on
June 4, 2024.37 Williams then filed a Second Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim on
June 18, 2024.38 On February 28, 2025, the Court denied the motion.39
33 Id. at 15.
34 Id. at 13.
35 Rec. Doc. 15.
36 Rec. Doc. 26 at 27.
37 Rec. Doc. 27.
38 Rec. Doc. 28.
39 Rec. Doc. 44.
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On September 30, 2025, Williams filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment.40 On
October 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion.41 On November 4, 2025, Williams
filed a reply brief in further support of the motion.42
II. Parties’ Arguments
A. Williams’s Arguments in Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment
Williams does not move for summary judgment on the issue of whether a Brady violation
occurred.43 Surprisingly, considering that his office joined in the motion to vacate Plaintiff’s
conviction, Williams asserts he will present evidence at trial to show that there is no evidence
known to the State that materially undermines Mrs. Carnesi’s identification of Plaintiff as the
perpetrator.44 Nevertheless, even assuming that a Brady violation occurred, Williams argues that
Plaintiff’s claims against OPDA still fail because Plaintiff cannot present competent evidence to
show: (1) that Connick adopted and implemented an unconstitutional policy concerning Brady
disclosures; (2) that Connick acted with deliberate indifference to the rights of criminal defendants;
or (3) that Connick’s conduct directly caused the alleged suppression of evidence in Plaintiff’s
criminal case.45
Williams argues there is no evidence that OPDA had a facially unconstitutional Brady
policy, and the evidence does not show that Connick was on notice of a pervasive practice or
40 Rec. Doc. 66.
41 Rec. Doc. 91.
42 Rec. Doc. 103.
43 Rec. Doc. 66-1 at 2.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 2–6.
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custom in his office that caused repeated Brady violations.46 Williams submits that the only Brady
violations relevant in showing actual or constructive notice to Connick are those that resulted in
court findings before Plaintiff’s conviction in May 1985.47 Considered in the context of the number
of cases prosecuted, Williams asserts the Brady violations identified by Plaintiff would not have
put Connick on notice of a problem with his office’s policies.48 Williams also asserts Plaintiff
cannot prove that there were enough “very similar” Brady violations before his conviction to
provide adequate notice.49 Williams argues that none of the alleged Brady violations before
Plaintiff’s conviction involved failure to disclose grand jury testimony that was favorable to the
defense.50 Williams submits that Plaintiff cannot carry his evidentiary burden of proving that prior
Brady rulings were sufficiently similar to actually give Connick fair notice of the defects in
OPDA’s policies that led to a Brady violation in Plaintiff’s case.51
Assuming that Plaintiff can show Connick was on notice of a pattern, Williams submits
the evidence does not show Connick acted with deliberate indifference.52 Instead, Williams argues
OPDA’s official policies and practices were reasonably calculated to ensure that Brady evidence
was identified and disclosed to the defense.53 Williams presents a declaration of Diane Major, who
46 Id. at 9.
47 Id. at 10–12.
48 Id. at 12–13.
49 Id. at 17.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 18–19.
52 Id. at 19.
53 Id.
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was employed by OPDA from 1976 through at least 1988 as the grand jury reporter.54 Mrs. Major
attests that OPDA policy required her to prepare transcripts of all lay witnesses who testified before
the grand jury in indicted cases and make those transcripts available to the prosecutors who would
be trying the case.55 Williams also presents the declaration of Judge Dennis Waldron, who served
in various positions at OPDA until 1982, who confirmed that trial prosecutors were required to
review the grand jury transcripts for potentially exculpatory material that would need to be
disclosed to the defense.56 Additionally, Williams presents deposition testimony of various former
prosecutors who all testified that OPDA held weekly conferences, where one purpose was to
ascertain what discovery had been provided in the case and whether the State had satisfied its
Brady obligations.57 Williams asserts it is not enough for Plaintiff to show that more, or better,
training might have prevented the alleged constitutional violation.58 Instead, Williams argues that
Plaintiff must prove Connick was on notice “that a particular omission in [OPDA’s] training
program causes . . . employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights.”59
Finally, Williams argues that Plaintiff cannot prove the “moving force” causation element
because there is no evidence that the prosecutors who handled his case were acting pursuant to an
unconstitutional policy.60 According to Williams, there is no evidence that the prosecutors who
handled Plaintiff’s criminal case were following any specific policy causing suppression of
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 20.
57 Id. at 20–21.
58 Id. at 21.
59 Id. (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011)).
60 Id. at 22.
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exculpatory evidence—much less a policy that was intended to prevent disclosure of exculpatory
evidence.61 Moreover, Williams contends there is no evidence that the prosecutors were trained or
instructed in ways that caused them to misunderstand their Brady obligations or otherwise fail to
comply with them.62
B. Plaintiff’s Arguments in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment
In opposition, Plaintiff begins by arguing that his claim goes well beyond the theory
rejected by the Supreme Court in Thompson.63 Plaintiff argues that he has put forth sufficient
evidence to support Monell liability under three distinct theories:
(1) OPDA maintained unconstitutional policies by (a) using an improperly narrow
definition of constitutional disclosure obligations, and (b) maintaining a system for
assigning and reassigning cases in a manner that compartmentalized information
and concealed exculpatory information even from prosecutors; (2) OPDA
maintained an unconstitutional custom driven by a ‘pervasive culture of
indifference to Brady’; and (3) Harry Connick, having knowledge of multiple
instances in which prosecutors suppressed material exculpatory evidence and
presented false testimony, fostered practices constituting deliberate indifference
toward Brady violations.64
First, Plaintiff argues a reasonable juror could conclude that OPDA maintained a policy,
custom, and practice of permitting, encouraging, and condoning Brady violations.65 Plaintiff
contends the evidence shows that OPDA instructed prosecutors to follow an improperly restrictive
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Rec. Doc. 91 at 4.
64 Id. at 13.
65 Id.
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interpretation of their Brady obligations.66 Plaintiff submits that the jury should resolve the
contradictory evidence on the training prosecutors received regarding their Brady obligations.67
Plaintiff also asserts a reasonable juror could conclude that OPDA’s system for case
assignment and reassignment guaranteed Brady violations.68 Plaintiff submits that OPDA’s
policies made Brady violations inevitable by siloing the information learned by “screeners” (the
prosecutors who first evaluated cases, made charging decisions, and conducted grand jury
presentations) from the prosecutors who would try criminal cases.69 Plaintiff cites evidence to
show that screeners were not required to document witnesses’ statements or communicate any
statements to the trial prosecutor.70 Plaintiff asserts that this system guaranteed that prosecutors
who tried the case were not even required to know the substance of statements made to other
prosecutors.71 Plaintiff contends this problem was particularly acute regarding grand jury
proceedings, and he contends that OPDA’s witnesses gave conflicting testimony regarding what
testimony was transcribed and what transcripts were provided to trial prosecutors.72 Plaintiff
argues that this dysfunctional policy is especially relevant here, where both trial prosecutors claim
they were unaware of Mrs. Carnesi’s grand jury testimony.73
66 Id.
67 Id. at 15–16.
68 Id. at 16.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 16.
73 Id. at 17.
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Second, Plaintiff asserts a reasonable juror could conclude that OPDA maintained an
unconstitutional custom driven by a pervasive culture of indifference to Brady.74 Plaintiff claims
“that prosecutors were so widely permitted to violate Brady, and violated Brady so often and with
such brazenness, that OPDA effectively adopted a policy of permitting and encouraging such
violations.”75 Plaintiff states his expert, Laurie Levenson, has identified 57 cases over a period of
45 years in which a court found that OPDA’s nondisclosure of material exculpatory evidence
violated the defendant’s constitutional rights, 22 of which occurred in the 18 years prior to
Plaintiff’s conviction.76 Plaintiff also cites testimony from former OPDA prosecutors that a saying
around the office was, “it’s not Brady if the defense doesn’t know about it.”77 Plaintiff contends
that Connick adamantly opposed open discovery and specifically instructed prosecutors not to
disclose information that was not required to be disclosed by law.78 Plaintiff asserts the Brady
policy adopted by Connick in 1987 was wholly inaccurate, inadequate, and misleading.79
Plaintiff asserts he has also provided evidence of “very similar violations,” including
instances where the state did not disclose prior inconsistent statements of eyewitnesses, the fact
that a witness testified falsely, police reports and/or notes containing Brady material, evidence that
the defendant did not match the perpetrator’s characteristics or description, evidence of police or
prosecutorial misconduct, and evidence of similar crimes committed by someone else.80 Plaintiff
74 Id.
75 Id. at 18.
76 Id. at 18–19.
77 Id. at 19.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 20.
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contends that OPDA has not explained what cases it believes are not sufficiently similar.81 Plaintiff
asserts Brady violations that pre-date his conviction and later came to light are relevant and
probative to show the practices and customs at OPDA during the time period before and during
his criminal proceedings.82
Third, Plaintiff contends that a reasonable juror could conclude that Connick fostered
practices constituting deliberate indifference toward Brady violations.83 Plaintiff asserts that the
evidence demonstrating that OPDA failed to train, supervise, and discipline its employees
regarding their obligations under Brady and that these failures amounted to deliberate indifference
to the “known or obvious” risk that criminal defendants’ rights would be violated.84 Plaintiff points
to the evidence discussed above: (1) evidence regarding the widespread and persistent nature of
Brady violations by OPDA in the 1970s and 1980s; (2) evidence of training, comments, and
attitudes within the office indicating a pervasive disregard for and misunderstanding of Brady; and
(3) numerous specific examples of other documented instances of such violations.85 Plaintiff
argues that Williams’s evidence regarding the statistical likelihood of a Brady violation occurring
is unpersuasive.86 Unlike excessive force claims, Plaintiff contends that Brady claims involve
concealed action (or inaction) for which there may be no documentation at all.87 Plaintiff argues if
the number of Brady violations in Orleans Parish—“the most incarcerated city in the world and
81 Id.
82 Id. at 21.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 22.
86 Id. at 23.
87 Id.
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the city with the highest number of exonerations,” and “ground zero for unfairness in the criminal
legal system,”—is insufficient, then it is difficult to see how any plaintiff could ever establish
Monell liability based on Brady violations.88
Finally, Plaintiff argues that OPDA’s policies were the moving force behind Plaintiff’s
injuries.89 Plaintiff submits OPDA is incorrect that there is not any evidence that the prosecutors
in his criminal case were trained or instructed in ways that caused them to misunderstand their
Brady obligations.90 Plaintiff contends that the prosecutors’ accounts differ as to: (1) whether
grand jury transcripts were provided to trial prosecutors; (2) what police records should have been
provided to the prosecutor and the defense; and (3) whether Brady-specific training was provided
to prosecutors in the years leading up to Plaintiff’s criminal conviction.91
C. Williams’s Further Arguments in Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment
In reply, Williams argues that the statements on OPDA’s website regarding a high number
of exonerations does not suggest that OPDA had an unconstitutional Brady policy.92 Williams
contends that Plaintiff misrepresents the testimony of former prosecutor Jim Williams, on which
Plaintiff relies to show that OPDA had an official policy of complying only with the Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure and ignoring Brady.93 While Jim Williams explained that defendants
were not routinely given discovery beyond what they were entitled to under the Louisiana Code
88 Id. at 24 (quoting Deliver Justice, OPDA, https://orleansda.com/ourwork/deliver-justice).
89 Id. at 25.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 26.
92 Rec. Doc. 103 at 2–3.
93 Id. at 3–4. Jim Williams is referred to by his full name throughout this Order to distinguish from Defendant
Jason Williams.
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of Criminal Procedure, Williams submits that Jim Williams’s testimony leaves no doubt that he
understood that defendants were also entitled to Brady material.94
Williams contends there is no evidence that OPDA had unconstitutional policies
concerning assignments of cases and taking notes of witness interviews.95 According to Williams,
Plaintiff has not identified anything that might have put Connick on notice that OPDA’s policies
with respect to grand jury testimony were inadequate to protect the rights of criminal defendants.96
Additionally, Williams submits there is no evidence that OPDA had a “persistent,
widespread practice” of withholding exculpatory evidence.97 Williams asserts “withholding
exculpatory evidence” describes a result, not a practice, which can occur for a variety of reasons.98
Williams contends that the report of Plaintiff’s expert, Laurie Levenson, should not be considered
because it makes unsupported and inaccurate assertions that Brady violations occurred in all of the
cases listed.99 Moreover, even if the report is considered, Williams points out that it establishes, at
best, two purported Brady violations per year over a 47-year period.100 According to Williams,
something that occurs in far less than one percent of cases prosecuted is clearly not a persistent or
widespread practice that is so common and well-settled as to be the de facto policy.101
94 Id. at 4.
95 Id. at 6.
96 Id. at 8.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 10–13.
100 Id. at 13.
101 Id.
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Williams contends that Plaintiff has not produced evidence showing Connick acted with
deliberate indifference.102 Williams argues that Plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish Verastique on the
ground that police excessive force incidents are known and obvious, whereas Brady violations are
hidden is both questionable as a factual matter and irrelevant.103 Williams points out that nothing
in Verastique suggests that the analysis pertains only to certain types of Monell claims.104
Regardless of whether constitutional violations are apparent and easily discovered or concealed,
Williams points out that the law does not permit municipalities to be held liable under Section1983
unless their policymakers have acted with deliberate indifference.105
Finally, Williams asserts that Plaintiff has not produced evidence showing OPDA’s
allegedly unconstitutional policies caused the Brady violation in his case.106 Williams contends
that Plaintiff has not even tried to explain how OPDA’s official policies caused the prosecutors
handling his criminal case to fail to disclose purported Brady evidence.107 Additionally, Williams
argues that Plaintiff has not explained the specific alleged deficiencies in OPDA’s training and
how the Brady violation in his case would have been avoided with better training on those issues.108
102 Id. at 14.
103 Id. at 15.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 16.
107 Id. at 17.
108 Id.
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III. Legal Standard
A. Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits
demonstrate “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.”109 To decide whether a genuine dispute as to any material fact exists, the court
considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations
or weighing the evidence.”110 All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving
party.111 Yet “unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth ‘ultimate or conclusory facts and
conclusions of law’ are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment.”112
If the entire record “could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,” then
no genuine issue of fact exists and, consequently, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.113 The nonmoving party may not rest upon the pleadings.114 Instead, the nonmoving
party must identify specific facts in the record and articulate the precise manner in which that
evidence establishes a genuine issue for trial.115
The party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of showing the
basis for its motion and identifying record evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine
109 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
110 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)).
111 Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at
150).
112 Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985); Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
113 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of
Ariz. v. Cites Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)).
114 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
115 See id.; Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998).
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issue of material fact.116 “To satisfy this burden, the movant may either (1) submit evidentiary
documents that negate the existence of some material element of the opponent’s claim or defense,
or (2) if the crucial issue is one on which the opponent will bear the ultimate burden of proof at
trial, demonstrate that the evidence in the record insufficiently supports an essential element of the
opponent’s claim or defense.”117 If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden shifts
to the nonmoving party to “identify specific evidence in the record, and to articulate” precisely
how that evidence supports the nonmoving party’s claims.118 The nonmoving party must set forth
“specific facts showing the existence of a ‘genuine’ issue concerning every essential component
of its case.”119
The nonmovant’s burden of demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact is not satisfied
merely by creating “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” “by conclusory allegations,
by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.”120 Moreover, the nonmoving
party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in its pleadings.121
B. Monell Claim
To prevail on a Monell claim, a plaintiff must show “(1) an official policy (or custom), (2)
that a policy maker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional
116 Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.
117 Duplantis v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 948 F.2d 187, 190 (5th Cir. 1991) (internal citation omitted).
118 Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871 (1994); see also Morris
v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998).
119 Morris, 144 F.3d at 380; see also Bellard v. Gautreaux, 675 F.3d 454, 460 (5th Cir. 2012).
120 Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
121 Morris, 144 F.3d at 380.
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violation whose moving force is that policy (or custom).”122 “Official policy is ordinarily contained
in duly promulgated policy statements, ordinances or regulations.”123 But a custom can be
evidenced by a “ “widespread” practice of officials or employees that, while not officially adopted
or promulgated, is “so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents
municipal policy.”124 “[E]ven a facially innocuous policy will support liability if it was
promulgated with deliberate indifference to the known or obvious consequences that constitutional
violations would result.”125 To prove deliberate indifference, a “showing of simple or even
heightened negligence will not suffice.”126 Instead, “Courts of Appeals have routinely equated
deliberate indifference with recklessness.”127
Plaintiff must additionally demonstrate actual or constructive knowledge of the official
policy or custom and that the constitutional violation’s “moving force” is that policy or custom.128
Whether the moving force behind the constitutional violation is policy or custom is proved by a
“direct causal link between the municipal policy and the constitutional deprivation.”129
122 Moore v. LaSalle Mgmt. Co., L.L.C., 41 F.4th 493, 509 (5th Cir. 2022) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
123 Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 579 (5th Cir. 2001).
124 Vardeman v. City of Houston, 55 F.4th 1045, 1052 (5th Cir. 2022).
125 Piotrowski, 237 F.2d at 579 (emphasis added).
126 Board of Cnty. Com'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997).
127 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994) (collecting cases).
128 Piotrowski, 237 F.2d at 579.
129 Id. at 580.
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IV. Analysis
This case centers around a prosecutor’s duty to disclose evidence to the defense. In Brady
v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable
to an accused [] violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”130 The prosecutor’s duty to provide
favorable evidence includes impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence.131 The prosecutor’s
duty to disclose evidence includes both evidence in its own possession and any other “favorable
evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the
police.”132 “[T]he duty to disclose such evidence is applicable even though there has been no
request by the accused.”133 To prevail on a Brady claim, a criminal defendant must show: (1) the
prosecutor suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence is favorable to the defense; and (3) the evidence
is material to guilt or punishment.134
Williams does not move for summary judgment on the issue of whether a Brady violation
occurred.135 Even assuming that a Brady violation occurred, Williams argues that Plaintiff’s claims
against OPDA still fail because Plaintiff cannot present competent evidence to show: (1) that
Connick adopted and implemented an unconstitutional policy concerning Brady disclosures; (2)
that Connick acted with deliberate indifference to the rights of criminal defendants; or (3) that
130 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
131 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985).
132 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995).
133 Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 279 (1999).
134 Miller v. Dretke, 431 F.3d 241, 245 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87).
135 Rec. Doc. 66-1 at 2.
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Connick’s conduct directly caused the alleged suppression of evidence in Plaintiff’s criminal
case.136 The Court considers each of these arguments in turn.
A. Whether Plaintiff has Presented Evidence upon which a Reasonable Juror Could
Conclude that OPDA Maintained a Policy, Custom or Practice of Permitting Brady
Violations
To succeed on a Monell claim, Plaintiff must present facts to establish Connick had actual
or constructive knowledge of an official policy, practice, or custom of similar constitutional
violations. Plaintiff argues that he has put forth sufficient evidence to support Monell liability
under three distinct theories:
(1) OPDA maintained unconstitutional policies by (a) using an improperly narrow
definition of constitutional disclosure obligations, and (b) maintaining a system for
assigning and reassigning cases in a manner that compartmentalized information
and concealed exculpatory information even from prosecutors; (2) OPDA
maintained an unconstitutional custom driven by a ‘pervasive culture of
indifference to Brady’; and (3) Harry Connick, having knowledge of multiple
instances in which prosecutors suppressed material exculpatory evidence and
presented false testimony, fostered practices constituting deliberate indifference
toward Brady violations.137
Establishing an official policy, practice, or custom can be done in one of three ways. First,
there may be a policy that is “officially adopted and promulgated” by the municipality or an official
within the municipality with policymaking authority.138 Second, there may be a “persistent,
widespread practice of city officials or employees, which, although not authorized by officially
adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly
represents municipal policy.”139 A persistent, widespread practice may include allegations that a
136 Id. at 2–6. Williams does not dispute that Connick was a policymaker.
137 Rec. Doc. 91 at 13.
138 Burge v. Par. of St. Tammany (Burge II), 336 F.3d 363, 369 (5th Cir. 2003).
139 Id.
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policymaker failed to act affirmatively, “if the need to take some action to control the agents of
the local governmental entity ‘is so obvious, and the inadequacy [of existing practice] so likely to
result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymake[r] … can reasonably be said to
have been deliberately indifferent to the need.’”140 A policymaker with policy-making authority
must have actual or constructive knowledge of the custom.141 Third, “a single decision by a policy
maker may, under certain circumstances, constitute a policy for which a municipality may be
liable.”142 In this case, Plaintiff argues that there is evidence to support a Monell claim under the
first and second options.143
1. Official Policy
Plaintiff asserts that OPDA maintained two official unconstitutional policies: (1) using an
improperly narrow definition of constitutional disclosure obligations and (2) maintaining a system
for assigning and reassigning cases in a manner that compartmentalized information and concealed
exculpatory information even from prosecutors.144
a. Alleged Policy of Instructing Prosecutors to Adopt an Improperly Narrow
Definition of Brady
Plaintiff relies on statements by two of the prosecutors in his case, Jim Williams and Bruce
Whittaker, to argue that “OPDA instructed prosecutors to follow an improperly restrictive
140 Burge v. Par. of St. Tammany (Burge I), 187 F.3d 452, 471 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting City of Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989)).
141 Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 542 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted).
142 Id. (quoting Brown v. Bryan Cnty., OK, 219 F.3d 450, 462 (5th Cir. 2000)).
143 Plaintiff does not assert a theory of “single-incident liability,” a path foreclosed in the Brady context by
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Thompson, 563 U.S. at 62–72.
144 Rec. Doc. 91 at 13.
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interpretation of their Brady obligations.”145 Plaintiff argues that this testimony suggests that
OPDA had an official policy of complying with only the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure
and ignoring the constitutional requirements of Brady. Williams contends this is an unfair
characterization of the testimony.146
During a deposition taken in the Thompson case, Jim Williams testified it was Connick’s
policy not to turn over witness statements.147 Jim Williams stated this policy was consistent with
the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, and prosecutors “were instructed to follow what the
rules of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure were.”148 Jim Williams also testified that “if a
witness got up on the stand and testified in a way that was inconsistent with his prior sworn
statement,” he would “absolutely” have to disclose that to the defense or it would be “a violation
of the Brady decision.”149 He testified that “Mr. Connick expected that all the attorneys who
worked for him knew what Brady was and they knew what it meant, and that they knew that if
there was Brady material, then it’s—you were duty bound to turn it over.”150 He stated that if
“evidence was potentially favorable to the defense but would not, in and of itself, exculpate the
defense,” he was obligated to disclose it to the defense.151 He explained that he typically would
not produce a copy of a supplemental police report to the defense “unless . . . the report contained
145 Id.
146 Rec. Doc. 103 at 3–6.
147 Rec. Doc. 91-33 at 97–98.
148 Id. at 98–99.
149 Id. at 99.
150 Id. at 113.
151 Id. at 193.
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Brady material.”152 Jim Williams further testified that OPDA did not disclose witness statements
and police reports to criminal defendants in the 1980s “on a routine basis.”153
On October 16, 2025, Jim Williams was deposed again in reference to this case. During his
recent deposition, Jim Williams testified that he could not recall ever having disclosed
supplemental reports, “dailies,” or grand jury testimony in any case.154 He further testified that he
did not discuss Brady obligations with other assistant prosecutors or supervisors when preparing
for trial:
We knew what our responsibilities were. So . . . using those words in that fashion,
no, that wouldn’t have been done. I mean, we knew. And when we would talk about
a problem, we wouldn’t say, you know, hey Joe, I’ve got a Brady problem here. It
would be, “hey, Joe, look, this witness, you know, is recanting their story; they’re
now telling a different story.” We wouldn’t say, “we’ve got a Brady problem; this
is our problem.” It would––and that would––could in effect have been a Brady
problem.155
Plaintiff also relies on an affidavit of Bruce Whittaker (“Whittaker”) to argue that
“[p]rosecutors were . . . told that grand jury testimony was always confidential and not to be
disclosed, making no exception for Brady information.”156 Whittaker attests “it would not be
normal to have transcripts of grand jury testimony available when trying a case.”157 Although he
knew that grand jury proceedings were recorded, it was his understanding that they were not
routinely transcribed as the testimony was “confidential.”158
152 Id. at 107.
153 Id. at 171.
154 Rec. Doc. 91-38 at 95–96.
155 Id. at 126–27.
156 Rec. Doc. 91 at 14.
157 Rec. Doc. 91-8 at 2.
158 Id.
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Whittaker was subsequently asked in his deposition what he would have done if he had
encountered exculpatory material in grand jury testimony, and he explained:
If I found exculpatory evidence or was aware that we possessed exculpatory
evidence, I would turn it over to the defense. If it was a grand jury, you mentioned
showing it to the judge, I might have had some hesitation because of the
confidential nature of it. But I either would’ve turned it over or I would’ve
consulted with someone in the office or I would’ve talked to the judge about it. . . .
I was well aware that despite the confidentiality of grand jury material, . . .
exculpatory evidence had to be turned over. I just would’ve wondered, how do I do
this without screwing up.159
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, he has not demonstrated that
OPDA had an official policy of instructing prosecutors to adopt an inappropriately narrow
definition of their constitutional disclosure obligations under Brady. A review of the testimony as
a whole does not support Plaintiff’s argument that prosecutors were instructed to ignore their
Brady obligations and follow a more limited disclosure obligation under Louisiana state law. Jim
Williams explained that defendants were not routinely given discovery beyond what they were
entitled to under the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure. Nevertheless, Jim Williams’s
testimony leaves no doubt that he understood that defendants were also entitled to Brady material.
While Whittaker’s affidavit suggests that grand jury testimony was “confidential,” it does
not say whether or not “confidential” grand jury testimony was disclosed when it contained Brady
material. Moreover, Whittaker’s subsequent deposition testimony suggests that he would have
understood that Brady material found in grand jury testimony would need to be disclosed.
Therefore, Plaintiff has not presented any competent summary judgment evidence to support his
argument that OPDA had an official policy of instructing prosecutors to adopt an inappropriately
narrow definition of their constitutional disclosure obligations under Brady.
159 Rec. Doc. 91-44 at 143–44.
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b. Alleged Policy for Case Assignment and Reassignment
Plaintiff also argues that OPDA had an unconstitutional Brady policy because the
prosecutors who screened cases to determine whether they should be accepted for prosecution
were typically not the same prosecutors who brought the cases to trial, and the screening
prosecutors were not required to document all statements made to them by witnesses during
interviews and relay those statements to the trial prosecutors.160
To support this argument, Plaintiff cites deposition testimony from a former prosecutor,
Timothy McElroy (“McElroy”). According to McElroy, when screening prosecutors interviewed
witnesses, they were neither required to document any witness’s statement nor required to
communicate to the trial prosecutor the substance of any witness’s statement.161 McElroy also
recognized that “what constitutes Brady information can evolve over the lifespan of a case.”162
Despite this recognition, Plaintiff argues that OPDA’s system guaranteed that the prosecutors who
tried a case were not even required to know the substance of their witnesses’ statements to other
prosecutors.163 Plaintiff contends this dysfunctional policy is especially relevant to the Brady
violation at issue here because both trial prosecutors testified they were unaware of Mrs. Carnesi’s
grand jury testimony.164
Plaintiff must show either that “‘the policy itself was unconstitutional’” or that “‘[the
policy] was adopted with deliberate indifference to the known or obvious fact’ that a specific
160 Rec. Doc. 91 at 16.
161 Rec. Doc. 91-39 at 211–12.
162 Id. at 242.
163 Rec. Doc. 91 at 16.
164 Id. at 17.
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constitutional violation would follow.”165 Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the policy of
assigning prosecutors to screen cases was facially unconstitutional. “[A] written policy is not
facially unconstitutional just because it leaves out detailed guidance that might have averted a
constitutional violation.”166 “In virtually every instance where a person has had his or her
constitutional rights violated by a city employee, a § 1983 plaintiff will be able to point to
something the city ‘could have done’ to prevent the unfortunate incident.”167 “An official, written
policy is ‘itself’ unconstitutional only if it affirmatively allows or compels unconstitutional
conduct.”168 The screening policy does not affirmatively allow or compel prosecutors to violate
Brady. Therefore, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the policy is facially unconstitutional.
Additionally, Plaintiff has not produced any evidence that Connick approved an official
policy directing screening prosecutors not to take notes of witness interviews. Instead, Plaintiff
appears to challenge the lack of an official policy requiring screeners to document witness
communications. “Liability for failure to promulgate policy . . . require[s] that the defendant acted
with deliberate indifference.”169 “A failure to adopt a policy can be deliberately indifferent when
it is obvious that the likely consequences of not adopting a policy will be a deprivation of
constitutional rights.”170 Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Brady violations were a likely
consequence of OPDA failing to adopt a policy requiring screening prosecutors to take notes.
165 Edwards v. City of Balch Springs, Tex., 70 F.4th 302, 308 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Liggins v. Duncanville,
Tex., 52 F.4th 953, 955 (5th Cir. 2022)).
166 Id. at 310.
167 City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 392.
168 Edwards, 70 F.4th at 309 (citing Doe v. United States, 831 F.3d 309, 318 (5th Cir. 2016)).
169 Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2011).
170 Id.
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Plaintiff does not cite any jurisprudence suggesting that the Constitution requires prosecutors to
document all interactions with witnesses. Therefore, Plaintiff has not presented any competent
summary judgment evidence to support his argument that OPDA’s policy of case assignments and
reassignments guaranteed Brady violations.
2. Persistent, Widespread Practice or Custom
Plaintiff also argues that OPDA had “a persistent, widespread practice’ of withholding
exculpatory evidence . . . that was ‘so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly
represents municipal policy.”171 Plaintiff claims “that prosecutors were so widely permitted to
violate Brady, and violated Brady so often and with such brazenness, that OPDA effectively
adopted a policy of permitting and encouraging such violations.”172 In response, Williams asserts
“withholding exculpatory evidence” describes a result, not a practice, which can occur for a variety
of reasons.173 Williams contends that Plaintiff has failed to explain what practice caused
exculpatory evidence to be repeatedly withheld.174 Williams does not cite any caselaw to support
his contention that “withholding exculpatory evidence” is not a practice. Therefore, the Court
rejects that argument.
To succeed on this claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that there was a “persistent,
widespread practice of city officials or employees, which, although not authorized by officially
adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly
represents municipal policy,” and proving Connick had actual or constructive knowledge of that
171 Rec. Doc. 91 at 17.
172 Id. at 18.
173 Rec. Doc. 103 at 8.
174 Id.
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custom.175 Where an alleged custom or practice “is unconstitutional on its face, it necessarily
follows that a policymaker was not only aware of the specific policy, but was also aware that a
constitutional violation will most likely occur.”176 However, where the alleged custom or practice
“is facially innocuous, establishing the requisite official knowledge requires that a plaintiff
establish that [the custom or practice] was ‘promulgated with deliberate indifference to the ‘known
or obvious consequences’ that constitutional violations would result.”177 The alleged custom or
practice at issue here––withholding exculpatory evidence––is unconstitutional on its face.
Therefore, a finding of deliberate indifference is not required. Moreover, even if a finding of
deliberate indifference is required, there are facts in dispute that would preclude summary
judgment on that issue.178
“A customary policy consists of actions that have occurred for so long and with such
frequency that the course of conduct demonstrates the governing body’s knowledge and
acceptance of the disputed conduct.”179 A plaintiff must demonstrate “a pattern of abuses that
transcends the error made in a single case.”180 Establishing a pattern “requires similarity and
specificity; ‘prior indications cannot simply be for any and all bad or unwise acts, but rather must
175 Burge II, 336 F.3d at 369.
176 Id. at 370 (quoting Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 579).
177 Id. (quoting Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 579).
178 See Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 637 (5th Cir. 2003) (“To satisfy the deliberate indifference prong, a
plaintiff usually must demonstrate a pattern of violations. . . .’”). As discussed in great detail herein, there is evidence
upon which a reasonable juror could rely to find a pattern of similar violations.
179 Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex., 614 F.3d 161, 168 (5th Cir. 2010).
180 Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d 838, 850–51 (quoting Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 582).
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point to the specific violation in question.”181 “A pattern also requires ‘sufficiently numerous prior
incidents’ as opposed to ‘isolated instances.’”182
Williams argues, to put Connick on notice of similar Brady violations, the convictions in
other cases must have been overturned before Plaintiff’s conviction, making many of the cases
Plaintiff cites irrelevant to proving notice.183 The Fifth Circuit has recognized that “[a] pattern
requires similarity, specificity, and sufficiently numerous prior incidents.”184 Brady violations that
pre-date Plaintiff’s conviction, and later came to light are relevant and probative to show the
practices and customs at OPDA during the time period before and during Plaintiff’s criminal
proceedings. “The fact that similar Brady violations continued unabated in the years after the
Brady violation in [Plaintiff’s] case, under the same policymaker, enforcing the same Brady policy,
constitutes powerful circumstantial evidence of the unconstitutional policy, practice, or custom in
place at OPDA during [Plaintiff’s] prosecution.”185 As this Court found in its prior Order denying
Williams’s motion to dismiss, “reversals occurring after a plaintiff’s conviction are relevant in
determining if there existed an unconstitutional custom in Connick’s office and if he had actual or
constructive notice of it.”186
181 Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
182 Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
183 See Rec. Doc. 66-1 at 10–12.
184 Davidson v. City of Stafford, 848 F.3d 384, 396 (5th Cir. 2017), as revised (Mar. 31, 2017) (emphasis
added). See also Thompson, 563 U.S. at 63 (“[C]ontemporaneous or subsequent conduct cannot establish a pattern of
violations that would provide ‘notice to the cit[y] and the opportunity to conform to constitutional dictates.’”).
185 Jones v. Cannizaro, No. 18-503, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13312, at *15 (E.D. La. Jan. 21, 2021).
186 Rec. Doc. 44 at 25.
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Plaintiff’s expert, Laurie Levenson, has identified 47 cases187 in which a court found that
OPDA’s nondisclosure of material exculpatory evidence violated the defendant’s constitutional
rights, 22 of which occurred in the 18 years prior to Plaintiff’s conviction.188 Harrick Connick was
District Attorney from 1974 to 2003.189 Six of the cases Levenson identifies were tried after
2003.190 Therefore, 41 cases are relevant circumstantial evidence of the unconstitutional policy,
practice, or custom in place at OPDA during Plaintiff’s prosecution.191
Levenson also identifies eight additional cases where she finds that OPDA’s conduct
amounted to an admission of Brady claims, three of which predate Plaintiff’s conviction; seven
additional cases involving credible Brady claims against OPDA that were resolved on other
grounds, four of which predate Plaintiff’s conviction; and 22 additional cases in which OPDA has
subsequently admitted to a Brady violation, including three that predate Plaintiff’s conviction.192
Williams argues that Levenson’s methodology with respect to these cases is improper. This issue
187 Plaintiff’s opposition references 57 cases. Rec. Doc. 91 at 18. However, Exhibit 1 to the expert report
only lists 47 cases. Rec. Doc. 91-4.
188 Rec. Doc 91-4.
189 Rec. Doc 66-1 at 16.
190 John Duncan, Michael Anderson, Christopher Wells, Henry Bruer, Ronald Warner, Robert Jones.
The trials of Larry Hudson, Hayes Williams, Linroy Davis, and Roland Gibson pre-date the Connick
administration. Because the Brady violations were found during the Connick administration, the Court finds the cases
relevant to the issue of whether Connick had actual or constructive notice.
191 Larry Hudson, Hayes Williams, Linroy Davis, Roland Gibson, James Carney, Michael Williams, Arthur
Monroe, Norman Clark, Floyd Falkins, Errol Bernard, Gregory Bright, Earl Truvia, Norris Henderson, Calvin
Williams, Larry Curtis, Issac Knapper, William Perkins, Ronald Monroe, John Floyd, Reginald Adams, Stephen
Rosiere, Curtis Lee Kyles, John Thompson, Erin Hunter, Darryl Washington, Eugene Lindsey, Alvin Jeanmarie,
Alfred Oliver, Jerome Morgan, Daniel Rideau, Darnell Lewis, Shareef Cousin, Dan Bright, Dwight Labran, Juan
Smith, James Walker, Salvador Perez, David Mahler, Eddie Triplett, Julian Robinson, and George Lee.
192 Rec. Doc. 91-4.
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is briefed in a pending motion to exclude Levenson’s testimony. Therefore, the Court does not
consider these additional cases at this stage.
Of the 41 cases where Levenson represents a court found that OPDA’s nondisclosure of
material exculpatory evidence violated the defendant’s constitutional rights, Williams takes issue
with the case of George Lee, stating that Lee’s case actually ended in a mistrial.193 Williams also
takes issue with the case of James Walker, suggesting that Levenson’s finding of a “Brady
violation” appears to be based on comments made by the judge in the middle of a trial.194 Williams
states he is not aware of any rulings finding that Walker’s constitutional rights were violated.195
Excluding these two cases, the Court is still left with evidence of Brady violations adjudicated in
39 cases.196
Williams asserts that the evidence establishes, at best, two purported Brady violations per
year.197 According to Williams, something that occurs in far less than one percent of cases
prosecuted is clearly not a persistent or widespread practice that is so common and well-settled as
to be the de facto policy.198 As discussed above, a de facto policy must be a “persistent, widespread
193 Rec. Doc. 103 at 11. Williams also takes issue with the case of Henry Bruer, where the defendant was
acquitted at trial. Id. However, the Court has already excluded this case as the trial post-dates the Connick
administration.
194 Id. Williams takes issue with the case of Christopher Wells for this same reason. Id. However, the Court
has already excluded this case as the trial post-dates the Connick administration. Id.
195 Id. at 11–12.
196 Larry Hudson, Hayes Williams, Linroy Davis, Roland Gibson, James Carney, Michael Williams, Arthur
Monroe, Norman Clark, Floyd Falkins, Errol Bernard, Gregory Bright, Earl Truvia, Norris Henderson, Calvin
Williams, Larry Curtis, Issac Knapper, William Perkins, Ronald Monroe, John Floyd, Reginald Adams, Stephen
Rosiere, Curtis Lee Kyles, John Thompson, Erin Hunter, Darryl Washington, Eugene Lindsey, Alvin Jeanmarie,
Alfred Oliver, Jerome Morgan, Daniel Rideau, Darnell Lewis, Shareef Cousin, Dan Bright, Dwight Labran, Juan
Smith, Salvador Perez, David Mahler, Eddie Triplett, and Julian Robinson.
197 Rec. Doc. 103 at 13.
198 Id.
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practice of city officials or employees” that is “so common and well settled as to constitute a
custom that fairly represents municipal policy.”199 The reason for this, of course, is to ensure that
“a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor.”200 Requiring a
persistent, widespread practice ensures that a municipality is not held liable unless the injury is
caused by the execution of a custom made by those “whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy.”201 Repeated conduct is necessary to “demonstrate[s] the governing
body’s knowledge and acceptance of the disputed conduct.”202 Although similar, repetitive
conduct is required in order to demonstrate the municipality’s knowledge and acceptance of the
conduct, the Fifth Circuit has often stated that it has “no rigid rule regarding numerosity to prove
a widespread pattern of unconstitutional acts.”203
The Fifth Circuit’s cases suggest that whether a pattern exists depends on not only the
number of instances, but also the nature of the conduct. Williams relies on the Fifth Circuit’s recent
decisions in Verastique v. City of Dallas204 and Damond v. City of Rayville205 to argue that in the
context of the number of cases prosecuted, the Brady violations alleged would not have put
Connick on notice of a problem with his office’s policies.206
199 Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 579
200 Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
201 Id. at 694.
202 Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 168.
203 Jackson v. Valdez, 852 F. App’x 129, 135 (5th Cir. 2021).
204 106 F.4th 427 (5th Cir. 2024).
205 127 F.4th 935 (5th Cir. 2025).
206 Rec. Doc. 66-1 at 12–13.
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In Verastique, the plaintiffs alleged that a Dallas police officer, Roger Rudloff, used
excessive force while arresting them during widespread protests.207 The plaintiffs sought to hold
the City of Dallas liable under Monell, alleging that there were 19 prior complaints of misconduct
by Rudloff over 23 years.208 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the claim
on the pleadings, concluding that the other incidents were “not sufficiently similar, specific, or
numerous.”209 The Fifth Circuit found that the allegations regarding the prior incidents were
“devoid of critical factual enhancement,” including facts that would have elucidated how and why
the incidents occurred.210 Even assuming these other incidents were “sufficiently specific and
similar,” the Fifth Circuit found they were insufficient as a matter of law to “create a pattern
capable of providing constructive notice” because the incidents occurred over a 23 year time-span:
Given a constant number of incidents, a longer time span yields a lower rate of
violations—militating against constructive notice. Nineteen allegations over the
span of twenty-three years yields a mere annualized incident rate of 0.826. In other
words: Plaintiffs—at most—show that, for over two decades, Rudloff, on average,
received fewer than one accusation of misconduct per year.211
The Fifth Circuit further explained that the complaint failed to provide information “such
as department size and number of arrests” that would “provide the context necessary to evaluate
whether an alleged department-wide pattern is so obvious as to impart constructive notice.”212 The
Fifth Circuit reasoned that “[g]iven a constant number of incidents, the percentage of conduct
207 Verastique, 106 F.4th at 431.
208 Id. at 433.
209 Id. at 434.
210 Id. at 432 (“Plaintiffs, for example, cite five incidents allegedly involving a flashlight or nightstick. Some
are listed incident-by-incident. But all still remain totally devoid of critical facts. What prompted the encounters? Did
the individuals threaten Rudloff with physical harm? Were they attempting to resist arrest?”).
211 Id. at 434.
212 Id.
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supporting a pattern of illegality shrinks as the size of the police department or the number of
arrests increases.”213 “Given the departments size [3,200 officers], and absent any evidence of its
total number of arrests during the same time period,” the Fifth Circuit stated “only one conclusion
can reasonably follow: Nineteen incidents over twenty-three years does not support any inference
of a department-wide pattern of illegality.”214
More recently, in Damond v. City of Rayville, the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff failed
to adequately allege a “custom of allowing inmate-on-inmate violence by failing to separate violent
and non-violent inmates” at the Richland Parish Detention Center. 215 The Fifth Circuit noted that
the plaintiff had identified “six instances in which inmates attacked others but were later returned
to their dormitory.”216 The Fifth Circuit explained, however, that the plaintiff had “fail[ed] to
identify the jail personnel who were present for or involved in the violent incidents.”217 The Fifth
Circuit further explained that these incidents were “dissimilar to” the attack on the plaintiff, and
that they “occurred over the course of several months, were motivated by differing factors, and
took place in different locations.”218 The Fifth Circuit concluded that “[t]hese alleged incidents are
insufficient to allege a custom or policy of tolerating widespread, unprovoked violence in the
detention center or to put the officials on notice of the repeated constitutional violations.” 219
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Damond, 127 F.4th at 939.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id.
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These cases suggest that the mere number of incidents must be viewed in context of the
type and frequency of the disputed conduct. It is therefore unsurprising that 19 incidents of
excessive force in Verastique, and six incidents of inmate violence in Damond, were insufficient
to demonstrate a pattern given how frequently officers use force and how often violence in jails
occurs. Plaintiff correctly points out that Brady claims are distinguishable from excessive force
claims or claims regarding inmate violence, because Brady claims necessarily involve concealed
action (or inaction) on the part of the State for which there may be no documentation at all. Given
that Brady violations are less common than police uses of force or violence in jails, Verastique and
Damond do not compel the conclusion that there is insufficient evidence to establish a de facto
custom.
As this Court previously recognized in its Order denying Williams’s motion to dismiss,
guidance from appellate courts on how many cases are enough to prove a custom and notice to the
policymaker in the Brady context is sparse. But the Thompson Court suggested 4 cases in a 10-
year period would not be enough to support notice of similar constitutional violations.220 The
Armstrong Court implied 9 cases in a 24-year period would not be enough.221 Plaintiff points to
39 cases in a 32-year period.222 Of those cases, 22 went to trial in the 17 years preceding Plaintiff’s
1985 trial.223 Plaintiff points to a much greater number of cases in similar timespans to both
Thompson and Armstrong.
220 Thompson, 563 U.S. at 62.
221 Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 278 (5th Cir. 2023).
222 The earliest case considered is Larry Hudson (December 1967 trial). The latest case considered is Juliana
Robinson (February 1999 trial).
223 Larry Hudson, Hayes Williams, Linroy Davis, Roland Gibson, James Carney, Michael Williams, Arthur
Monroe, Norman Clark, Floyd Falkins, Errol Bernard, Gregory Bright, Earl Truvia, Norris Henderson, Calvin
Williams, Larry Curtis, Issac Knapper, William Perkins, Ronald Monroe, John Floyd, Reginald Adams, Stephen
Rosiere, and Curtis Lee Kyles.
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Williams argues that the number of Brady violations is miniscule when compared to the
average number of trials and guilty pleas OPDA handled per year. According to an expert
statistician retained by Williams, between 1974 and 1985 there were approximately 522 trials and
5,175 guilty pleas on average each year.224 Therefore, Williams reasons that the proportion of
Brady violations was one in several thousand, when compared to all of the cases tried or resolved
by a guilty plea at OPDA each year.225 The Court finds the comparison of cases where a Brady
violation is adjudicated following trial to cases that resolved in a guilty plea unpersuasive. The
Fifth Circuit has recognized that generally “a guilty plea precludes the defendant from asserting a
Brady violation.”226 Therefore, it is unlikely that any Brady violation would ever come to light in
the 5,175 cases OPDA resolved on average each year through guilty pleas.
Plaintiff asserts that Brady violations are far more likely to come to light in cases where a
defendants appeal or challenge their convictions through post-conviction relief. Therefore,
Plaintiff contends the appropriate “denominator” for any statistical analysis is the number of cases
with an appeal or post-conviction proceeding. Williams responds that this argument is faulty
because a defendant would not be able to raise a Brady claim until after the purported evidence is
discovered. The Court questions how frequently (if at all) a criminal defendant would discover
that material evidence was not disclosed unless the defendant or counsel is reviewing the record
in preparation for an appeal or post-conviction relief motion? The Court has limited the Brady
224 Rec. Doc. 62-4.
225 Rec. Doc. 66-1 at 17.
226 United States v. Conroy, 567 F.3d 174, 178 (5th Cir. 2009). See also Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904
F.3d 382, 394 (5th Cir. 2018) (“[C]ase law from the Supreme Court, this circuit, and other circuits does not
affirmatively establish that a constitutional violation occurs when Brady material is not shared during the plea
bargaining process. The en banc court will not disturb this circuit’s settled precedent and abstains from expanding the
Brady right to the pretrial plea bargaining context for Alvarez.”).
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violations it is considering on summary judgment to those that were adjudicated by a court (i.e. on
appeal or in post-conviction proceedings). Therefore, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that a more
appropriate denominator would be the number of cases with an appeal or post-conviction
proceeding.
The Court also notices a pattern that of the 39 cases identified, 33 involved murder or
manslaughter.227 Four of the cases involved armed robbery and aggravated rape.228 All of those
charges are clearly serious felonies, and they are all classified as “crimes of violence” under
Louisiana law.229 The Court has not been presented with any evidence of the number of trials for
murder, manslaughter, armed robbery, and aggravated rape that OPDA handled on average per
year. But the Court questions whether this would be a more appropriate denominator.
Plaintiff has not provided the Court with any evidence of the number of appeals and post-
conviction proceedings that occurred on average per year. Although it is Plaintiff’s burden to
“provide the context necessary to evaluate whether an alleged department-wide pattern is so
227 Larry Hudson (first-degree murder), Hayes Williams (first-degree murder), Linroy Davis (manslaughter
Roland Gibson (first-degree murder), James Carney (second-degree murder), Michael Williams (second-degree
murder), Errol Bernard (second-degree murder), Gregory Bright (second-degree murder), Earl Truvia (second-degree
murder), Norris Henderson (second-degree murder), Calvin Williams (first-degree murder), Larry Curtis (second-
degree murder), Issac Knapper (first-degree murder), William Perkins (first-degree murder), Ronald Monroe (first-
degree murder), John Floyd (second-degree murder), Reginald Adams (first-degree murder), Stephen Rosiere (second-
degree murder), Curtis Lee Kyles (first-degree murder), John Thompson (attempted armed robbery and first-degree
murder), Erin Hunter (second-degree murder), Darryl Washington (manslaughter), Eugene Lindsey (second-degree
murder), Alvin Jeanmarie (second-degree murder), Jerome Morgan (second-degree murder), Daniel Rideau (first-
degree murder), Shareef Cousin (first-degree murder), Dan Bright (first-degree murder), Dwight Labran (first-degree
murder), Juan Smith (first-degree murder), Salvador Perez (first-degree murder), David Mahler (manslaughter), and
Julian Robinson (aiding and abetting second-degree murder).
228 Arthur Monroe (armed robbery), Floyd Falkins (armed robbery), Alfred Oliver (armed robbery and
second-degree kidnapping), Darnell Lewis (aggravated rape, aggravated burglary, aggravated crime against nature),
Norman Clark’s conviction for distribution of heroin and Eddie Triplett for cocaine possession are not
classified crimes of violence.
229 La. Rev. Stat. § 14:2(B).
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obvious as to impart constructive notice,”230 Williams does not cite any caselaw requiring that a
statistical analysis like the one he proposes be undertaken. Even if the Court were to require such
an analysis, one or two Brady violations out of 522 trials is sufficiently numerous for a reasonable
juror to find Connick had constructive notice of the ongoing violations. Considering the large
number of Brady violations adjudicated, Plaintiff has presented sufficient, plausible evidence upon
which a reasonable juror could find a custom of Brady violations in OPDA with Connick on
constructive or actual notice of those violations.
In addition to arguing that Plaintiff fails to present an adequate number of cases to
demonstrate constructive notice on behalf of Connick, Williams argues that the cases Plaintiff cites
are not sufficiently similar.231 However, exact similarity between cases is not mandatory to find a
policymaker was on notice of similar Constitutional violations, with the Fifth Circuit noting the
“specificity required should not be exaggerated . . .”232 Courts in this Circuit look for prior acts
that are “fairly similar to what ultimately transpired” in the case before them.233
In Thompson, as part of law enforcement’s investigation, a swatch of fabric from the
victims’ pants stained with the robber’s blood was collected and analyzed by a crime laboratory.234
The Assistant District Attorney in the case received a report from the laboratory, but failed to
disclose the report to the defendant.235 The plaintiff cited other cases where Brady violations had
occurred, but the Court explained none of those cases “involved failure to disclose blood evidence,
230 Verastique, 106 F.4th at 434.
231 Rec. Doc. 61-1 at 18.
232 Est.of Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of North Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 383 (5th Cir. 2005).
233 Id.
234 Thompson, 563 U.S. at 55.
235 Id.
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a crime lab report or physical or scientific evidence of any kind.”236 Therefore, the Supreme Court
observed those cases were not similar enough to put Connick on notice that specific training was
necessary to avoid the constitutional violation that occurred in the plaintiff’s case.237 In that case,
the only similarity between the other Brady violations and the one alleged was simply that they
were generally Brady violations.
In this case, the similarities between the instant case and the cases cited by Plaintiff are
much more apparent. In the case at hand, OPDA failed to disclose Mrs. Carnesi’s prior exculpatory
testimony. The testimony that OPDA withheld revealed Mrs. Carnesi, at one point, claimed
Plaintiff did not resemble the perpetrator of her husband’s murder and that the car Plaintiff was
arrested in did not resemble the one she saw at the scene of the crime.238 In short, the constitutional
violation in the instant case is that ODPA withheld potentially exculpatory witness testimony that
also could have been used to impeach Mrs. Carnesi.239 Of the 39 cases identified, at least 32 of the
cases involve the withholding of potentially exculpatory witness statements.240 These cases are
sufficiently similar to the instant case for a reasonable juror to conclude Connick was on notice of
the type of Brady violation that occurred in Plaintiff’s case. The Court finds that there is sufficient
evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that Connick had knowledge of and accepted the
conduct. For the plethora of reasons discussed above, there are material facts in dispute regarding
236 Id. at 62–63.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Rec. Doc. 26 at 4–5 (internal citations omitted).
240 Larry Hudson, Hayes Williams, Linroy Davis, Roland Gibson, Michael Williams, Arthur Monroe,
Norman Clark, Floyd Falkins, Errol Bernard, Gregory Bright, Earl Truvia, Norris Henderson, Calvin Williams, Larry
Curtis, Issac Knapper, William Perkins, Ronald Monroe, Stephen Rosiere, Curtis Lee Kyles, Erin Hunter, Darryl
Washington, Eugene Lindsey, Alvin Jeanmarie, Alfred Oliver, Daniel Rideau, Darnell Lewis, Shareef Cousin, Dwight
Labran, Juan Smith, Salvador Perez, David Mahler, and Eddie Triplett.
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whether there were sufficiently similar, specific, or numerous Brady violations at OPDA to put
Connick on notice of those violations.
In addition to the number of cases where Brady violations have been adjudicated, Plaintiff
cites additional circumstantial evidence of a pervasive culture of indifference to Brady. During his
recent deposition, Jim Williams testified that he heard people at OPDA “make light” by saying
things like “it’s not Brady if the defense doesn’t know about it.”241 During a deposition taken in
the Thompson case, former prosecutor John Glas also testified that he heard the phrase “It’s not
Brady . . . unless they know about it.”242 Jim Williams denied that Connick or any of the
supervisors at OPDA repeated such phrases.243 Jim Williams emphasized: “Harry Connick never
would have said anything like that ever.”244 Nevertheless, Jim Williams testified “that kind of thing
came up all the time” at OPDA.245
Plaintiff also cites evidence showing there was no mechanism for tracking or reporting
Brady violations, decreasing the likelihood that patterns of Brady violations would be promptly
identified and corrected.246 Plaintiff cites evidence suggesting that Connick adamantly opposed
any steps toward open file discovery and repeatedly resisted attempts to open up discovery for the
defense.247 Williams correctly points out that neither tracking of violations or open-file discovery
241 Rec. Doc. 91-38 at 121–22.
242 Rec. Doc. 91-31 at 146.
243 Rec. Doc. 91-38 at 124.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 122.
246 Rec. Doc. 91-4 at 23–24 (citing depositions of Harry Connick, Bridget Bane, Camille Buras, and other
OPDA employees).
247 Id. at 26 (citing depositions of Harry Connick and Bridget Bane).
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are legally required. Although this evidence would not be conclusive of an unconstitutional policy
on its own, it bolsters Plaintiff’s other evidence of a custom or practice of withholding exculpatory
evidence. Additionally, the parties dispute whether Connick’s office ever conducted any Brady
training.248 The Court cannot weigh the evidence on summary judgment. Thus, there are material
facts in dispute regarding whether OPDA conducted Brady training under Connick.
Plaintiff also points to a written Brady policy adopted by OPDA in 1987, two years after
his trial and conviction. Plaintiff argues that the policy was “wholly inaccurate, inadequate, and
misleading” because: (1) it incorrectly suggested that Brady obligations are triggered by a judicial
order issued in response to the defense’s request for disclosure; (2) did not explain what
exculpatory evidence was; and (3) referred only to “information in the possession of the State,”
without clarification that the term encompassed exculpatory evidence in the possession of both the
prosecutor and law enforcement.249 Williams argues that the written policy adopted in 1987 could
not have led to misunderstandings that resulted in an alleged failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence in advance of Plaintiff’s 1985 trial. Nevertheless, it is relevant evidence on how OPDA
viewed Brady.
Again, on a motion for summary judgment the Court must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff, as the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in his
favor.250 So construed, based on the evidence discussed above, the Court finds that a reasonable
jury could find that the Brady violation resulted from a “persistent, widespread practice of
248 Compare Rec. Doc. 66-1 at 20–21 (citing testimony from former prosecutors that Brady was discussed
during office meetings) with Rec. Doc. 91-4 at 23 (citing testimony from former prosecutors that could not recall
Brady training).
249 Rec. Doc. 91 at 19; Rec. Doc. 91-4 at 20–23.
250 Turner, 476 F.3d at 343 (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150).
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[OPDA], which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so
common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy,” and
that Connick had actual or constructive knowledge of that custom.251
3. Failure to Train
Finally, Plaintiff contends that a reasonable juror could conclude that Connick fostered
practices constituting deliberate indifference toward Brady violations.252 Plaintiff asserts that the
evidence demonstrating that OPDA failed to train, supervise, and discipline its employees
regarding their obligations under Brady and that these failures amounted to deliberate indifference
to the “known or obvious” risk that criminal defendants’ rights would be violated.253
“It is well-established that a municipality’s failure to train its [] officers can give rise to
§ 1983 liability.”254 To establish a failure to train claim, a plaintiff must show “(1) that the
municipality’s training procedures were inadequate, (2) that the municipality was deliberately
indifferent in adopting its training policy, and (3) that the inadequate training policy directly caused
the violations in question.”255 “Deliberate indifference is ‘more blameworthy than negligence’ but
less blameworthy than purposeful harm.”256 “The standard is ‘stringent’ and requires that the
supervisory actor disregarded a known consequence of his action.”257 “To satisfy the deliberate
251 Burge II, 336 F.3d at 369. Based on the same evidence of a pattern of violations, a reasonable juror would
be able to find deliberate indifference.
252 Rec. Doc. 91 at 19.
253 Id.
254 Westfall v. Luna, 903 F.3d 534, 552 (5th Cir. 2018).
255 Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 170.
256 Id. at 169 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835).
257 Id. at 169–70 (citing Southard v. Tex. Bd. of Crim. Justice, 114 F.3d 539, 551 (5th Cir. 1997)).
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indifference prong, a plaintiff usually must demonstrate a pattern of violations and that the
inadequacy of the training is ‘obvious and obviously likely to result in a constitutional
violation.’”258
Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable juror could rely to find
a pervasive pattern of Brady violations sufficient to put Connick on notice that OPDA’s policies
were constitutionally deficient. As discussed in detail above, Plaintiff cites: (1) evidence regarding
the widespread and persistent nature of Brady violations by OPDA in the 1970s and 1980s; (2)
evidence of training, comments, and attitudes within the office indicating a pervasive disregard for
and misunderstanding of Brady; and (3) numerous specific examples of other documented
instances of such violations.259 This evidence, when considered collectively, is more than sufficient
to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether OPDA’s Brady training procedures were adequate,
and whether Connick was deliberately indifferent in adopting its training policy.260
B. Whether Plaintiff has Presented Evidence that the Policy or Custom is the “Moving
Force” Behind Plaintiff’s Constitutional Violation
Finally, Williams argues that Plaintiff has not produced evidence to show OPDA’s alleged
unconstitutional policies or customs were the moving force behind the alleged Brady violation in
his case. To establish “moving force” causation, a “plaintiff must show that the municipal action
was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link
between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.”261 Critically, “[t]he causal link
‘moving force’ requirement and the degree of culpability ‘deliberate indifference’ requirement
258 Cousin, 325 F.3d at 637.
259 Rec. Doc. 91 at 22.
260 Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 170.
261 Brown, 520 U.S. at 404.
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must not be diluted, for ‘where a court fails to adhere to rigorous requirements of culpability and
causation, municipal liability collapses into respondeat superior liability.’”262 Still, “‘[w]here a
plaintiff claims that a particular municipal action itself violates federal law, or directs an employee
to do so,’ the causation determination ‘is straightforward.’”263
Plaintiff argues that because he has presented evidence upon which a reasonable juror could
find that OPDA’s unconstitutional customs caused his constitutional injury, he has met the
causation requirement of the “moving force” element. Causation has been discussed to an extent
in the discussion above on whether there was a custom of suppressing exculpatory evidence within
OPDA. Plaintiff has presented evidence to show that 39 convictions were vacated because of
Brady violations occurring during Harry Connick’s tenure as the District Attorney for Orleans
Parish. If proven, a custom of withholding evidence in violation of Brady is clearly
unconstitutional, and Plaintiff alleges that same custom caused the Brady violation in his case.
Therefore, Plaintiff has presented evidence upon which a reasonable juror could find that OPDA’s
custom of suppressing exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady was the moving force behind
the constitutional violations he suffered.
V. Conclusion
There are facts in dispute precluding summary judgment on the Monell claim brought
against Williams in his official capacity as District Attorney. Plaintiff has not presented sufficient
evidence to show that OPDA maintained an official policy in violation of Brady. However, the
amount and similarity of Brady violations occurring under Connick’s tenure, combined with other
262 Covington v. City of Madisonville, Tex., 812 F. App’x 219, 225–26 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Alvarez,
904 F.3d at 390).
263 Jauch v. Choctaw Cnty., 874 F.3d 425, 436 (5th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).
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circumstantial evidence of a pervasive culture of indifference to Brady, is enough for a reasonable
juror to conclude there was a custom of withholding exculpatory witness testimony within OPDA
and Connick had constructive and/or actual notice of the practice. The same facts are enough for
a reasonable juror to find OPDA failed to train, supervise, and discipline its employees regarding
their obligations under Brady and that these failures amounted to deliberate indifference to the
“known or obvious” risk that criminal defendants’ rights would be violated. A reasonable juror
could also find that the custom of Brady violations was the moving force behind Plaintiff’s claimed
constitutional violation.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Jason Williams’s Motion for Summary
Judgment264 is DENIED.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this ____ day of November, 2025.
_________________________________
NANNETTE JOLIVETTE BROWN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
264 Rec. Doc. 66.
24th
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