USA v. Johnson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	CRIMINAL ACTION
VERSUS 	No. 24-221
AARON TEROD JOHNSON 	SECTION I
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the government’s motion1 in limine to close the courtroom
during the testimony of a minor victim and to bar the use of minor victim’s real name
at trial. Defendant Aaron Terod Johnson (“Johnson”) opposes the motion.2 For the
following reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the
government’s motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND
As is relevant to this motion, Johnson is charged with three counts: sex
trafficking of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1) and 1591(b)(2) (Count
1); coercion and enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2422(b) (Count 2); and interstate transportation of a minor for criminal
sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (Count 3).3 All three counts involve
the same minor victim (“Minor Victim”).4
1 R. Doc. No. 112.
2 R. Doc. No. 123.
3 See generally R. Doc. No. 51.
4 See id.
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According 	to 	the 	government’s 	motion, 	Minor 	Victim, 	who 	is 	currently
seventeen years-old, intends to testify at trial but has expressed “trepidation and
anxiety about testifying in front of an open courtroom.”5 Minor Victim’s guardian ad
litem represents in her affidavit6 that she believes, “based on [their] discussions,” that
“Minor Victim would have a hard time sharing the details of what happened to her
in an open courtroom.”7 Moreover, Minor Victim’s guardian ad litem states that she
is concerned that Minor Victim “testifying about her sexual abuse in front of a large
number of people that she does not know will cause her additional stress, anxiety,
fear and shame”8 and will “cause her additional psychological harm.”9
In addition, the government has included a letter from Minor Victim’s “Human
Trafficking Survivor Advocate . . . who has worked with Minor Victim for at least two
years.”10 Minor Victim’s Human Trafficking Survivor Advocate (“Minor Victim’s
Advocate”) states that she “feel[s] . . . [M]inor [V]ictim will have increased anxiety,
5 R. Doc. No. 112-1, at 3; see also R. Doc. No. 160, at 2 (“During our conversation,
Minor Victim reported that thinking about the trial was ‘stressing’ her out.”).
6 R. Doc. No. 160, at 2–3. The Court appointed Carol A. Kolinchak as Minor Victim’s
guardian ad litem on August 27, 2025, pursuant to this Court’s General Order
Regarding Appointment and Compensation of Guardians Ad Litem, which was
promulgated on January 7, 2025 (“General Order”). See R. Doc. No. 70. Ms. Kolinchak
has experience representing minors and has previously been appointed as a guardian
ad litem in this Court. She was also formerly the Legal Director of the Juvenile
Justice Project of Louisiana, Special Counsel for the Louisiana Center for Children’s
Rights and a member of the Louisiana Law Institute’s Children’s Code Committee.
7 R. Doc. No. 160, at 2; see also id. at 3 (“I am concerned that testifying in an open
courtroom will . . . negatively impact her ability to testify effectively.”).
8 Id. at 2
9 Id. at 3.
10 Id.; see also id. at 1 (“I, Stacey McMillin, have been the Common Thread Advocate
for the minor victim for the past two years.”).
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fear, and overall stress if having to testify in an open courtroom.”11 She also states
that “Minor [V]ictim is currently experiencing anxiety and some fear over attending”
trial, and requests that Minor Victim “be able to have a closed courtroom in order to
provide [her] some dignity as the victim in this case.”12 Minor Victim’s Advocate also
represents that this will “help . . . [M]inor [V]ictim feel more comfortable to provide
the most truthful and beneficial testimony openly.”13
As a result, the government seeks “a narrow closure”14 of the courtroom during
Minor Victim’s testimony pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3509(e).15 The closure sought by
the government would not exclude court personnel, the defendant, the attorneys,
members of the prosecution and defense team, and Minor Victim’s Advocate or
guardian 	ad 	litem.16 	The 	government 	argues 	that 	such 	closure 	“presents 	an
overriding 	interest 	essential 	to 	preserving 	Minor 	Victim’s 	personal 	dignity,
safeguarding Minor Victim’s physical and psychological well-being, and ensuring the
most truthful possible testimony.”17 The government also maintains that its proposed
closure is no broader than necessary to protect the interest at stake, particularly
because “the proceedings should be recorded, and this recording will likely be
11 Id. at 1.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 R. Doc. No. 112-1, at 4.
15 Id. at 3.
16 See id. (“[C]losure of the courtroom during Minor Victim’s testimony to all persons
except . . ., if 	Minor Victim 	desires, Minor Victim’s guardian-ad-litem and/or
advocate . . . .”).
17 Id.
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transcribed and, ultimately, made available to the public.”18 The government submits
that its proposed closure is “both the least invasive and most easily implemented
means 	of 	protecting 	Minor 	Victim’s 	dignity 	and 	maximizing 	the 	likelihood 	of
obtaining truthful and complete testimony and balancing those rights with the
defendant’s constitutional rights to a public trial.”19
The 	government 	also 	seeks 	an 	order 	pursuant 	to 	18 	U.S.C. 	3509(d)(3)
prohibiting the use of Minor Victim’s name at trial.20 Minor Victim’s guardian ad
litem states in her affidavit that Minor Victim “expressed fear about her name
becoming public,” because she “believes this would put her in danger.”21 Minor Victim
also represented to her guardian ad litem that she is “worried that her family and
friends would learn what happened to her” should her name be made public and that
“this would cause her additional shame and embarrassment.”22 Minor Victim’s
guardian ad litem also represents that because Minor Victim “resides in a small
community . . . for her, these are very real fears and concerns.”23 Minor Victim’s
guardian ad litem represents in her affidavit that she is concerned that “making
[Minor 	Victim’s] 	name 	and/or 	identifying 	information 	public 	would 	cause 	her
additional and unnecessary fear and anxiety.”24 Minor Victim’s Advocate likewise
18 Id. at 5.
19 Id. at 6.
20 Id. at 7.
21 R. Doc. No. 160, at 3.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
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represents that Minor Victim “fears her name being made public, as well as any
details getting out and damaging her name.”25
Johnson 	objects 	to 	the 	closure 	on 	the 	ground 	that 	generally 	the 	Sixth
Amendment entitles him to a public trial.26 Johnson contends that “this right
prevents the abuse of judicial power, discourages perjury, encourages unidentified
potential witnesses to come forward, and instills in the public the perception that
their courts are acting fairly.”27 Additionally, Johnson points out that the public-trial
right also protects the interests of the public and the press.28
With respect to Johnson’s objections to the closure proposed by the government
in this case, Johnson states that closure would be “far more prejudicial than probative
in the minds of the jury,” because “[t]here are negative inferences the jury will take
(Defendant is a scary person and this is needed for extra protection, the allegations
are so horrific that they cannot be discussed in front of everyday persons, the minor
victim is inherently truthful and thus deserves extra credit for her testimony)” should
the courtroom be closed.29 Furthermore, although he acknowledges that the public-
trial right may “give way in certain cases to other rights or interests,”30 he argues
that the facts of this case disfavor closure:
25 Id. at 1.
26 R. Doc. No. 135, at 1–3.
27 Id. at 2.
28 See id. (“The public-trial right also protects some interests that do not belong to the
defendant. After all, the right to an open courtroom protects the rights of the public
at large, and the press, as well as the rights of the accused.”).
29 Id. at 3.
30 Id. at 2 (quoting Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39,45 (1984)).
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While the allegations are in fact criminal, there is no element of
physical force (beyond consent as a matter of age), minor victim was not
shamed or degraded or injured to such a degree that it would shock the
conscience, and the allegations are not so unusual or disgusting that
they warrant special consideration. While the allegations are obviously
traumatic 	and 	personal 	to 	minor 	victim, 	trials 	occur 	every 	day
throughout the judicial system where a witness under the age of l8
testifies without closing a courtroom, or where victims of personal
crimes testify about those crimes. Moreover, the minor victim is 17, one
year away from being considered an adult under the federal system, and
is not so young that competency or confusion is a concern.31
As for his objection with respect to the use of Minor Victim’s real name,
Johnson states that “[w]hile there is a plethora of law that provides for the use of
initials or other non-identifying information for written documents, the Government
has cited no case law that specifically permits the Court to bar the use of the minor
victim’s name at trial.”32 He argues that prohibiting the use of Minor Victim’s name
would “confuse the jury, and any explanation or limiting instruction to them will only
serve to further inflame.”33 He further submits that prohibiting use of Minor Victim’s
name would give “additional, unwarranted, credence to the allegations against
[him],” which is improper because he “is innocent unless and until the Government
can prove all elements of the charges against him.”34
On November 17, 2025, the Court issued a public notice35 of the motion to close
the courtroom during Minor Victim’s testimony, in which it invited members of the
public and press to submit any objections by 12:00 P.M. on Friday, November 28,
31 Id. at 3.
32 R. Doc. No. 135, at 4 (emphasis in original).
33 Id. at 5.
34 See id.
35 R. Doc. No. 144.
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2025. As of the date of this order and reasons, no opposition has been filed into the
record.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
a. 	18 U.S.C. § 3509(e) and the Right to a Public Trial
Title 18, United States Code, section 3509(e) provides:
When a child testifies the court may order the exclusion from the
courtroom of all persons, including members of the press, who do not
have a direct interest in the case. Such an order may be made if the court
determines on the record that requiring the child to testify in open court
would cause substantial psychological harm to the child or would result
in the child’s inability to effectively communicate. Such an order shall
be narrowly tailored to serve the Government’s specific compelling
interest.
Of course, a court’s ability to close the courtroom pursuant to this statute must not
be in contravention of the Constitution. United States v. Osborne, 68 F.3d 94, 99 (5th
Cir. 1995) (assessing the constitutionality of the courtroom closure as moved for by
the government pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3509(e)); United States v. Ledee, 762 F.3d
224, 	229 	(2d 	Cir. 	2014) 	(stating 	that 	“the 	Constitution 	of 	the 	United 	States
circumscribes th[e] discretion” afforded by § 3509(e)).
The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to a public
trial. United States v. Cervantes, 706 F.3d 603, 611 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Osborne,
68 F.3d at 98). The right “exists to ensure the fairness of the proceedings and to
encourage witnesses to come forward with information.” Osborne, 68 F.3d at 98;
United States v. Ansari, 48 F.4th 393, 401–02 (5th Cir. 2022) (“By encouraging
witnesses to come forward, discouraging perjury, and enabling the attendance of
interested spectators, a public trial advances what the Supreme Court has termed
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the ‘central aim of a criminal proceeding’: trying the accused fairly.” (quoting Waller
v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984)). The public-trial right is not absolute. Cervantes,
706 F.3d at 611. Rather, it “must be ‘balanced against other interests essential to the
administration of justice.’” Ansari, 48 F.4th at 402 (quoting Osborne, 68 F.3d at 98).
The Supreme Court in Waller v. Georgia enunciated a four-factor test for
determining when a trial “can be closed and not violate the Sixth Amendment’s
command:”36 1) a party seeking to close a court proceeding must advance an
overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced; 2) the closure must be no broader
than necessary to protect that interest; 3) the trial court must consider reasonable
alternatives to closing the proceeding; and 4) it must make findings adequate to
support the closure. Osborne, 68 F.3d at 98. “[T]rial courts are required to consider
alternatives to closure even when they are not offered by the parties . . . .” Presley v.
Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 214 (2010).
However, this analysis “varies when . . .the challenged closure [is] partial
rather than complete.” Cervantes, 706 F.3d at 611. “When a criminal proceeding is
only partially closed, the court must ‘look to the particular circumstances of the case
to see if the defendant will still receive the safeguards of the public trial guarantee.’”
Id. (quoting Osborne, 68 F.3d at 98). “This is because ‘the partial closing of court
proceedings does not raise the same constitutional concerns as a total closure because
an audience remains to ensure the fairness of the proceedings.’” Id. (quoting Osborne,
68 F.3d at 98). A decision to partially close a proceeding will be affirmed by the Fifth
36 Hitt, 473 F.3d at 154.
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Circuit “so long as the lower court had a ‘substantial reason’ for partially closing [the]
proceeding.” Id. at 611–12 (quoting Osborne, 68 F.3d at 98–99); Ansari, 48 F.4th at
402. Although “[t]his ‘substantial reason’ requirement imposes a low bar,” Ansari, 48
F.4th at 402, the court must still “develop a detailed record of the issues and findings”
supporting closure, Cervantes, 706 F.3d at 612. See also Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582
U.S. 286, 298 (2017) (“A public-trial violation can occur, . . . simply because the trial
court omits to make the proper findings before closing the courtroom, even if those
findings might have been fully supported by the evidence.”).
“The public-trial right also protects some interests that do not belong to the
defendant.” Weaver, 582 U.S. at 298. The right to access criminal trials also belongs
to the press and public through the First Amendment. See Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Ct. for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 596, 603–04 (1982) (“[T]he press and general
public have a constitutional right of access to criminal trials. . . . Of course, this right
of 	access 	to 	criminal trials 	is 	not 	explicitly 	mentioned in 	terms 	in 	the 	First
Amendment. . . [But] [t]he First Amendment is . . . broad enough to encompass those
rights 	that, 	while 	not 	unambiguously 	enumerated 	in 	the 	very 	terms 	of 	the
Amendment, are nonetheless necessary to the enjoyment of other First Amendment
rights.”); see also Weaver, 582 U.S. at 298–99 (“After all, the right to an open
courtroom protects the rights of the public at large, and the press, as well as the rights
of the accused.”).
Where the First Amendment right to access is implicated, the court “must
make ‘specific, substantive findings . . . that closure is necessary to protect higher
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values and is narrowly tailored to serve such goals.’” United States v. Ahsani, 76 F.4th
441, 448 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting In re Hearst Newspapers, L.L.C., 641 F.3d 168, 181
(5th Cir. 2011), as revised (June 9, 2011)). “In making its findings, the court must
consider 	any 	‘reasonable 	alternatives 	to 	closure.’” 	Hearst, 	641 	F.3d 	at 	181.
Additionally, “[w]hen the court does close a proceeding, it should protect the First
Amendment right of access by making a transcript of the proceeding available within
a 	reasonable 	time 	while 	safeguarding 	the 	interests 	that 	justified 	closing 	the
proceeding in the first place.” Ahsani, 76 F.4th at 448 (citing Hearst, 641 F.3d at 181).
Furthermore, “[i]f a district court is considering closing a proceeding, it must
generally provide all interested parties—including the public and the press—notice
and an opportunity to be heard.” Id. How that is accomplished is within the district
court’s discretion. Id. (“The district court has the discretion to determine what form
[notice] takes, e.g., docketing the motion to close the proceeding or merely noting on
the docket that there is a motion to close a proceeding. Similarly, written briefs may
be a sufficient opportunity to be heard, depending on the circumstances.” (internal
citations omitted)).
b. 	18 U.S.C. 3509(d)(3)
Title 18, United States Code, section 3509(d)(3) permits the court, upon motion
by any person, to “issue an order protecting a child from public disclosure of the name
of or any other information concerning the child in the course of the proceedings, if
the court determines that there is a significant possibility that such disclosure would
be detrimental to the child.” 18 U.S.C. § 3509(d)(3)(A). Section 3509(d)(3)(B) goes on
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to explain that such protective order may “provide for any other measures that may
be necessary to protect the privacy of the child.” § 3509(d)(3)(B)(ii).
Courts routinely order, pursuant to § 3509(d)(3), that the names of testifying
minor victims not be used during trial, allowing instead the use of pseudonyms, the
minor victims’ initials, or the minor victims’ first name only. See, e.g., United States
v. Anderson, 139 F.3d 291, 302 (1st Cir. 1998) (affirming the district court’s order,
pursuant to § 3509(d)(3), that the last names of the juvenile witnesses not be disclosed
during the trial to protect their identities); United States v. Kidd, 385 F. Supp. 3d
250, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), aff’d, No. 22-287, 2023 WL 7290904 (2d Cir. Nov. 6, 2023)
(“The 	Government 	requests 	that 	minor 	victims 	be 	allowed 	to 	testify 	under
pseudonyms, consistent with the practice of other courts in this district and as
expressly permitted by 18 U.S.C. Section 3509(d)(3).”); United States v. Porterfield,
No. 20-42, 2022 WL 16918163, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2022) (ordering, pursuant to
§ 3509(d)(3), that the parties were prohibited from using the minor victim’s full name
“during the trial and any ancillary proceedings;” “The [minor] victim shall instead be
referred to by her first name and last initial, only.”); United States v. Noble, No. 19-
20525, 2021 WL 2980683, at *4 (E.D. Mich. July 15, 2021) (same); United States v.
Gilmore, No. 99-73, 2009 WL 10697091, at *4 (M.D. Fla. June 4, 2009) (requiring that
the minor victim “be referred to b[y] her initials only and that her full name not be
used or disclosed on the record in any pleading, filing or proceeding” (emphasis
added)).
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“In applying § 3509, the court must determine whether there is a ‘significant
possibility’ that exposure of the victim’s identity ‘would be detrimental to the child.’”
Noble, 2021 WL 2980683, at *4 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3509(d)(3)). Courts have found
sufficient, for example, evidence indicating that “needless anxiety, negative social
stigma, potential harassment, [or] undue embarrassment” could result if the victim’s
identity were not protected. See Terranova, 750 F. Supp. 3d at 26 (internal quotations
omitted) (“The Court finds that permitting the John Does . . . to use only first names
or pseudonyms will spare the John Does needless embarrassment, anxiety, potential
harassment, and social stigma, and will avoid chilling their testimony in the instant
case.”); Noble, 2021 WL 2980683, at *4 (“The government cites the potential of
harassment from the media, as well as other adverse personal and professional
consequences that could result from her testimony were her identity not protected.”).
Courts also consider the chilling effect disclosure of a minor victim’s identity could
have 	on 	a 	victim’s 	willingness 	to 	testify. 	Terranova, 	750 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	26
(“Courts . . . routinely 	permit 	alleged 	victims 	of 	sexual 	abuse 	to 	testify 	under
pseudonyms because requiring them to publicly provide their names could chill their
willingness to testify for fear of having their personal histories publicized.” (internal
quotations omitted)).
Additionally, 	“[i]n 	deciding 	whether 	to 	enter 	a 	protective 	order 	under
[§ 3509(d)(3)], a court must weigh the ‘testifying witness’s interest in anonymity
against the defendant’s due process and cross examination rights, as well as the
rights of the public and the press to access the trial.’” Id. (quoting United States v.
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Daskal, No. 21-110, 2023 WL 9424080, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 12, 2023)); Gilmore, 2009
WL 10697091, at *4 (“While the public interest in access to the full information about
witnesses’ identities is less significant than the public interest in being present
during criminal proceedings, access to this information still implicates the right to
participate in informed ‘discussion of governmental affairs’ and is thus also protected
by the First Amendment.”).
III. 	ANALYSIS
a. Partial Closure of the Courtroom
Having 	considered 	the 	parties’ 	briefs, 	applicable 	caselaw, 	the 	evidence
proffered by the government with respect to Minor Victim, and the concerns raised
by Johnson, the Court finds it is appropriate to grant the government’s motion to
close 	the 	courtroom 	for 	the 	duration 	of 	Minor 	Victim’s 	testimony 	with 	some
modifications.
In addition to allowing court personnel, the defendant, the attorneys, members
of the prosecution and defense team, and Minor Victim’s guardian ad litem, Minor
Victim’s Advocate will also be permitted to be present during Minor Victim’s
testimony. Both Minor Victim’s guardian ad litem and Advocate shall sit with the
members of the prosecution team, rather than in the gallery, to avoid the appearance
of unbalanced public support. The Court will also take a recess prior to partial
closure, so that closure of the courtroom may be accomplished outside of the presence
of the jury and avoid the jury taking any “negative inferences” from the fact that the
courtroom is being closed. Moreover, any member of the public or press will be
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permitted to access Minor Victim’s testimony by livestream in a nearby courtroom,
and a transcript of her testimony will be made available to the public following trial.
The Court finds that the evidence contained in the government’s motion,
including the supplemental materials from Minor Victim’s guardian ad litem and
Advocate, justify this modified, partial37 closure which will safeguard Minor Victim’s
well-being and privacy and protect her from emotional harm. Cf. Osborne, 68 F.3d at
99 (“The protection of a minor from emotional harm is a substantial enough reason
to defend a limited closing of the proceedings.”); United States v. Hitt, 473 F.3d 146,
154 n.7 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding that there was “a compelling interest in protecting
the privacy and psychological well-being of [a minor victim]” who was sixteen years
old at the time he testified during the sex trafficking trial); see also Globe, 457 U.S.
37 Fifth Circuit precedent supports that the modified closure taken by the Court is a
partial rather than total closure. See United States v. Atkinson, No. 21-40470, 2022
WL 2383867, at *3 (5th Cir. July 1, 2022) (“It is particularly difficult to show a ‘total’
closure where, as here, the district court ordered the audio feed of the undercover
agent’s testimony to be played in a nearby courtroom, so that nothing was kept from
the public.”); Ansari, 48 F.4th at 401 n.7 (“[The defendant’s] contention at oral
argument that the courtroom closure was total is puzzling and belied by the record.
Because any member of the public could fully access the trial by livestream in an
overflow room down the hall, we deem the closure in this case a partial one and analyze
the issue accordingly.” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 403 (describing the closure
as “largely trivial” because the court had merely “require[d] spectators to watch and
listen on livestream rather than in-person”). Nonetheless, the Court also finds, as
explained herein, that the modified closure taken by this Court satisfies the Waller
factors and comports with the Sixth and First Amendments. Cf. Hitt, 473 F.3d at 154
n.7 (“We note that this order meets the Press–Enterprise closure requirements. There
is a compelling interest in protecting the privacy and psychological well-being of [the
minor victim]. The closure was also limited to [the minor victim’s] testimony, and
there have been no reasonable alternatives suggested. The order, with its implicit
adoption of the government’s motion, contained findings sufficient to justify the
closure.”).
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at 607–08 (“[S]afeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor—is
a compelling [interest.] . . . A trial court can determine on a case-by-case basis
whether closure is necessary to protect the welfare of a minor victim.”); see also
United States v. Yazzie, 743 F.3d 1278, 1291 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The court made
reasonable determinations based on its review of the [evidence], the government’s
assertions, 	and 	its 	commonsense 	understanding 	that 	child 	victims 	may 	have
difficulty testifying about sexual abuse in a public setting where the defendant’s
friends and family are present.”).
The Court reaches its decision after consideration of reasonable alternatives38
and finding that this modified closure is no broader than necessary to protect the
particular interests at stake with respect to Minor Victim. Cf. Yazzie, 743 F.3d at
1287.
38 The Court notes that although Johnson opposes closure, he does not suggest any
reasonable alternatives. See generally R. Doc. No. 135. Nevertheless, the Court’s
modified closure order is a result of its duty to consider reasonable alternatives,
Presley, 558 U.S. at 214, and its decision that such modified closure is sufficiently
narrowly 	tailored 	to 	protecting 	Minor 	Victim 	while 	also 	addressing 	Johnson’s
concerns and ensuring that he still receives the safeguards of the public trial
guarantee. See Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 169 (4th Cir. 2000) (“As an initial premise,
we think it reasonable to conclude that the limited nature of the closure directed by
the trial judge, and his concern that it be carried out in the most discreet way possible,
suggests that he considered the situation and determined the most appropriate
means to balance the goal of protecting [the minor victim] with [the defendant’s]
constitutional right to a public trial.”); Ledee, 762 F.3d at 230 (affirming the district
court even though it had not considered two alternatives that were proffered only on
appeal because they were not “reasonable” alternatives; “The district court did not
have a duty to consider these alternatives, however, because they are not reasonable
solutions for ensuring that [the minor victim] would be an uninhibited and effective
witness.”).
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Moreover, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	the 	press’ 	and 	public’s 	ability 	to
contemporaneously 	access 	Minor 	Victim’s 	testimony 	and 	public 	access 	to 	the
transcript of her testimony following trial is sufficient to “protect[] [Johnson’s]
interest in a fair trial subject to observation by the public.” See Cervantes, 706 F.3d
at 612; Ahsani, 76 F.4th at 448. For these reasons, the Court will order that the
courtroom be partially closed for the duration of Minor Victim’s testimony, consistent
with the modifications articulated herein.
b. 	Use of Minor Victim’s Name at Trial
For similar reasons, the Court also finds that there is a “significant possibility”
that exposure of Minor Victim’s full name at trial “would be detrimental” to her. See
§ 3509(d)(3). The evidence demonstrates that Minor Victim is afraid that her name
becoming public “would put her in danger” and that she is concerned about the
likelihood that “her family and friends would learn about what happened to her”
should her name be made public.39 Minor Victim’s guardian ad litem stated in her
affidavit 	that 	this 	would 	“cause 	[Minor 	Victim] 	additional 	shame 	and
embarrassment” as well as “additional and unnecessary fear and anxiety.”40 Minor
Victim lives in a small community which causes additional concern.41 Johnson does
not refute this evidence or otherwise undermine the likelihood that publicizing Minor
39 R. Doc. No. 112-1, at 7; see also id. at 3 (Minor Victim’s Advocate indicating that
she is “concerned that a public trial might result in Minor Victim’s identity being
known and the effect that may have on the Minor Victim’s reputation in the Minor
Victim’s small community”).
40 R. Doc. No. 160, at 3.
41 See id.
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Victim’s name at trial would be detrimental to her.42 And other courts faced with
similar evidence and reasons have found them sufficient to justify an order limiting
the use of a minor victim’s full name at trial. See, e.g., Noble, 2021 WL 2980683, at
*4; Terranova, 750 F. Supp. 3d at 26; see also United States v. Polk, No. 19-20107,
2019 WL 3943160, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 21, 2019) (“As an alleged victim, there is a
significant possibility that public disclosure of the witness’s last name could be
detrimental to the witness.”); United States v. Troup, No. 12-36, 2012 WL 3818242,
at *3 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 31, 2012) (“It is easy to see how the disclosure of a child’s name
as the victim of a sex offense can be ‘detrimental to the child, . . .’”).
Furthermore, the Court sees no constitutional bar to ordering that the Minor
Victim’s name not be used at trial. Johnson knows Minor Victim’s name and he does
not represent that he has been limited in his ability to investigate his case or will be
limited in his ability to cross examine Minor Victim.43 See Kidd, 385 F. Supp. 3d at
255 (“It is well established that permitting witnesses to testify anonymously does not
violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.”); Terranova, 750 F. Supp. 3d at 26–
27 	(“[D]ivulging 	the 	John 	Does’ 	identities 	is 	unnecessary 	for 	effective 	cross-
examination because that information is immaterial to [the defendant’s] guilt or
innocence.” (internal quotations omitted)); Daskal, 2023 WL 9424080, at *5 (holding
42 See R. Doc. No. 135, at 4–5.
43 See R. Doc. No. 112-1, at 8 (stating that the defense has “received discovery without
redactions . . . and therefore has all of the information needed to prepare for trial”);
see also Kidd, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 255 (“Of course, if the Government never produces
the victims’ real names . . . there may be a Sixth Amendment violation. But the right
to know the victims’ identity is separate from whether the victims may testify at trial
anonymously.” (internal citations omitted)).
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that allowing the minor victim to testify under her first name “does not impair the
Defendant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights whatsoever. [The defendant]
knows the Complaining Witness’s name and is free to undertake whatever research
he sees fit in advance of trial. . . . [T]he court finds that withholding identifying
information about the Complaining Witness from the public where the defendant
already 	knows 	the 	Complaining 	Witness’s 	true 	identity, 	will 	not 	impair 	the
defendant’s ability to cross-examine the alleged victim.” (internal quotations and
alterations omitted)).
Likewise, this limited restriction on the press and public’s access to the Minor
Victim’s name serves compelling interests, such as, securing the privacy and well-
being of Minor Victim and protecting her from the possible adverse consequences of
testifying. See Hitt, 473 F.3d at 154 n.7; Porterfield, 2022 WL 16918163, at *2 (“The
Government has compelling interests in (1) limiting identification of the victim in this
case to protect her from probable adverse personal, psychological, and professional
consequences that would stem from linking her identity to that of a victim of a child
pornography crime; and (2) encouraging crime victims to testify by protecting them
from the adverse consequences of testifying.” (internal quotations omitted)). And the
limitation is narrowly tailored because the press and the public will still be able to
access Minor Victim’s testimony in full in a nearby courtroom. Cf. Porterfield, 2022
WL 16918163, at *2 (“[T]he press and the public could still attend trial and follow the
testimony and evidence and hear the victim’s testimony in full. The only information
that would be denied to the public and the press is the victim’s full name and her
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mother’s 	full 	name.”); 	Daskal, 	No. 	21-110, 	2023 	WL 	9424080, 	at 	*4 	(“[T]he
Government’s requested limitation on access—non-disclosure of the Complaining
Witness’s last name—is narrowly tailored because the press and public will be able
to see and hear her testify and be present for the entirety of trial.”). As the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York stated in Terranova, “[t]he ‘minor
abridgement’ of public access caused by withholding specific identifying information
will have at most a negligible impact on the public’s ability to understand and monitor
the proceedings.” 750 F. Supp. 3d at 27; accord United States v. Putillion, No. 18-
00186, 2018 WL 5087238, at *3 (S.D.W. Va. Oct. 18, 2018) (“This limited restriction
[of requiring that the minor be referred to by her first and last initials] adequately
protects the minor’s well-being while preserving the public’s right to have open access
to the courts, the defendant’s right to a public trial, and the defendant’s right to
confront accusers.”).
Turning to the arguments raised by Johnson, the Court finds they are without
merit. Johnson’s contention that prohibiting the use of Minor Victim’s name will
“confuse the jury” is unsupported and belied by the many cases in which pseudonyms
or initials were used in place of a minor victim’s name without issue.44 Cf. United
States v. Weber, No. 17-50033, 2020 WL 5531562, at *1 (D.S.D. Sept. 15, 2020)
(deciding, due in part to “the number of minor victim witnesses who may be allowed
44 See supra p. 11 (collecting cases in which a minor victim’s name was anonymized
during trial).
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to testify at trial,” that the parties would “use first names, so that we can all
understand what we’re talking about”).
So too is Johnson’s unexplained conclusion that anonymizing Minor Victim’s
name will “give[] additional, unwarranted, credence to the allegations against” him;
any potential prejudice is adequately resolved by an appropriate jury instruction. See
Putillion, 2018 WL 5087238, at *3 (finding no prejudice where “any perceived
prejudice can be resolved with a simple instruction to the jury”); Daskal, 2023 WL
9424080, at *5 (“The court believes that an appropriate limiting instruction could
ameliorate the potential for bias arising from such an accommodation for the
Complaining Witness.”); see also Anderson, 139 F.3d at 302 (disposing the defendant’s
argument that the order prohibiting the use of minor witness’ last names “lent
impermissible credence” to those witnesses as one with “little merit;” “We simply fail
to see how this protective order somehow bolstered the government’s case, perhaps
because [the defendant] makes no attempt to explain it to us.”).
For these reasons, the Court orders that Minor Victim shall be referred to by
her first name only, consistent with other anticipated evidence and testimony.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the government’s motion45 in limine is GRANTED IN
PART AND DENIED IN PART consistent with the Court’s rulings set forth above.
45 R. Doc. No. 112.
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New Orleans, Louisiana, December 1, 2025.
_______________________________________
LANCE M. AFRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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