Tran v. Gulf Coast Bank & Trust Company et al

2:24-cv-01933Laed16.10.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MY THI NHU TRAN, ET AL. 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 24-1933
GULF COAST BANK & TRUST CO., ET AL. 	SECTION: D(5)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before 	the 	Court 	is 	Plaintiffs’ 	Motion 	for 	Reconsideration 	of 	Summary
Judgment as to Nga Baird and New World Realty.1 Defendants oppose the Motion.2
Plaintiffs filed a reply.3 After careful consideration of the parties’ memoranda, the
record, and the applicable law, the Motion is DENIED.
I. 	LAW AND ANALYSIS4
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) “allows parties to seek reconsideration of
interlocutory orders and authorizes the district court to ‘revise[] at any time’ ‘any
order or other decision . . . [that] does not end the action.”5 Under Rule 54(b), “the
trial court is free to reconsider and reverse its decision for any reason it deems
sufficient, even in the absence of new evidence or an intervening change in or
clarification of the substantive law.”6 Whether to grant a motion to reconsider under
1 R. Doc. 306.
2 R. Doc. 325.
3 R. Doc. 331.
4 In the interest of judicial economy, and because the factual and procedural history of this case was
set out in great detail in several previous Orders and Reasons, it adopts the Factual Background as
set forth in those rulings. See R. Doc. 299 and 227.
5 Austin v. Kroger Texas, L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 336 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)).
6 Id. (quoting Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 185 (5th Cir. 1990),
abrogated on other grounds, Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 n.14 (5th Cir. 1994))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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Rule 54(b) “rests within the discretion of the court.”7 Still, the broad authority to
reconsider an interlocutory order under Rule 54(b) “must be exercised sparingly in
order to forestall the perpetual reexamination of orders and the resulting burdens
and delays.”8 Motions for such reconsideration “are not the proper vehicle for
rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments.”9
On September 18, 2026, the Court issued an Order and Reasons granting
Summary Judgment as to Nga Baird and New World Realty, LLC.10 On September
28, 2026, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion to Reconsider.11 Plaintiffs seek limited
reconsideration 	regarding 	the 	dispositive 	constructive-notice 	determination
underlying dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims of negligent misrepresentation and breach
of fiduciary duty.12 Plaintiffs contend that they were not placed on notice by the Gulf
Coast Bank mailing received in approximately December 2020 or January 2021
7 Namer v. Scottsdale Insur. Co., 314 F.R.D. 392, 393 (E.D. La. 2016) (Africk, J.) (quoting Bernard v.
Grefer, Civ. A. No. 14-887, 2015 WL 3485761, at *5 (E.D. La. June 2, 2015) (Fallon, J.)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
8 Southern Snow Mfg. Co. v. SnoWizard Holdings, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 2d 548, 564–65 (E.D. La. 2013)
(citing 18B C HARLES A. WRIGHT & A RTHUR R. MILLER, FED. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4478.1 (2d ed.
2002)).
9 Whale Cap., L.P. v. Ridgeway, No. CV 22-2570, 2024 WL 894866, at *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 1, 2024)
(Currault, M.J.) (citing Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990)).
10 R. Doc. 299.
11 R. Doc. 306. The Court addresses fn 1 in Plaintiffs’ Motion in which it is seemingly suggested that
Plaintiffs did not have a “fair, adequate, or meaningful opportunity to oppose summary judgment.” See
R. Doc. 306 at fn 1. Counsel failed to include that the Court held a status conference with all counsel
to discuss the case, including Plaintiffs’ Motion for Extension of Time. During that status conference,
counsel informed the Court that it had timely filed the oppositions. Nevertheless, the Court inquired
with counsel as to whether there was additional information that he was unable to include in his
oppositions in support of his arguments. During that conference, counsel was unable to provide the
Court with any information that he had obtained and wished to be included that might further support
his arguments in his opposition brief. See R. Doc. 289, fn 6.
12 Id. at p. 3.
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bearing the designation “Tung My, LLC.”13 Plaintiffs contend that the issue is
narrow:
[W]hether the summary judgment record establishes beyond genuine
dispute that what Plaintiffs knew in December 2020 or January 2021
was sufficient to place a reasonable person in their circumstances on
notice of the facts underlying the alleged injury and its cause. That
inquiry cannot be divorced from the circumstances reflected in the
record: 	Ms. 	Tran 	could 	not 	read 	or 	understand 	English 	financial
documents, had only a fifth-grade education, and Plaintiffs had no prior
experience with business entities or commercial borrowing.14
Plaintiffs assert that Ms. Tran’s alarm was related to her concern that her
husband’s name was somehow connected to her personal bank (Gulf Coast Bank).15
Further, Plaintiffs assert that Plaintiff’s subsequent inquiry to Samantha Tran was
related to “diligence.”16 Plaintiffs allege that they believed Samantha Tran to be the
source of funding for the house, and that when Samantha Tran reassured her, they
believed there was no further issue.17 Plaintiffs state that the Order treated their
inquiry as evidence they had been placed on notice, without regard to what the
Plaintiffs understood as the reason for the inquiry.18
In their Response,19 Defendants argue reconsideration is improper in this
matter for three reasons. First, they argue, Plaintiffs are merely rehashing the same
arguments made in the original response to the Motion for Summary Judgment.20
Second, 	Defendants 	argue 	that 	Plaintiffs 	cannot 	assert 	new 	arguments 	and
13 Id.
14 Id. at p. 4.
15 Id. at p. 6.
16 Id. at p. 7.
17 Id. at pp. 7-8.
18 Id. at p. 9.
19 R. Doc. 325.
20 Id. at p. 6.
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previously 	available 	evidence 	for 	the 	first 	time 	on 	reconsideration.21 	Finally,
Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs’ Motion relies on legal error.22 Defendants
contend that prescription begins running when there was “notice enough to call for
inquiry.”23
In their Reply,24 Plaintiffs assert that the appearance of “Tung My LLC” alone
did not provide notice, despite Ms. Tran’s reaction.25 Plaintiffs contend that the
evidence permits a reasonable inference, “considering the inquiry actually made and
the response actually received,” that the claim had not prescribed.26 Plaintiffs point
to the fact they are limited English speakers and lack education and experience with
commercial borrowing.27 Plaintiffs assert that these facts bear on the objective
reasonableness of Ms. Tran’s conduct and actions following her receipt of the mail
with the LLC designation.28
Plaintiffs fail to meet the standard for reconsideration. “When there exists no
independent reason for reconsideration other than mere disagreement with a prior
order, reconsideration is a waste of judicial time and resources and should not be
granted.”29 	Plaintiffs 	give 	no 	new 	facts, 	authority, 	or 	argument 	warranting
reconsideration of the Order. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ straightforwardly announce that
21 Id. at p. 3.
22 Id.
23 Id. (citing In re Taxotere (Docetaxel) Prods. Liab. Litig., 995 F.3d 384, 391 (5th Cir. 2021) (emphasis
in original)).
24 R. Doc. 331.
25 Id. at 1.
26 Id. at 2.
27 Id. at 8.
28 Id.
29 Whale Cap., L.P. v. Ridgeway, No. CV 22-2570, 2024 WL 894866, at *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 1, 2024)
(Currault, M.J.) (citing Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990)).
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This [constructive notice] issue is not raised for the first time on
reconsideration. 	Plaintiff’s summary judgment opposition expressly
disputed that the ‘Tung My LLC’ mailing supplied constructive notice,
explained 	that 	Ms. 	Tran 	did 	not 	understand 	the 	designation 	as
disclosure 	of 	the 	LLC 	commercial 	structure, 	and 	relied 	on 	her
immediately inquiry and the reassurance she received.30
Thus, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration seeks a rehashing of evidence, legal
theories and arguments.
Additionally, Plaintiffs point to deposition testimony not cited in the summary-
judgment opposition, but these arguments are forfeited.31 The Court is not required
to reconsider its ruling on summary judgment in light of previously unsubmitted
evidence.32 Doing so would hinder the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination”
of the action.33
Plaintiffs point to the deposition testimony of Ms. Tran, Mr. Vo, Ms. Tung
Nguyen and Ms. Tran Duc Nhu Vo in its motion for reconsideration, which was not
previously included in its opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.34
Plaintiffs give no reason for including that deposition testimony in this Motion for
Reconsideraton and yet not including it in its Opposition to the Motion for Summary
Judgment. Indeed, the deposition testimony of Mr. Vo and Ms. Tran was already in
30 R. Doc. 306-1 at p. 3.
31 Mieco, L.L.C. v. Pioneer Nat. Res. USA, Inc., 109 F.4th 710, 717 n.5 (5th Cir. 2024) (arguments first
raised on reconsideration are forfeited); Malaco, Inc. v. Norman, No. 25-CV-266, 2026 WL 2919968, at
*2 (E.D. La. Sep. 29, 2026) (St. John, J.) (not considering evidence attached to a motion to reconsider
a summary judgment but omitted from the actual summary-judgment briefing).
32 Malaco, Inc, 2026 WL 2919968, at *2.
33 Calpetco 1981 v. Marshall Expl., Inc., 989 F.2d 1408, 1415 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
1).
34 Specifically, Plaintiffs use the following citations in their Motion for reconsideration: Ms. Tran’s
deposition, p. 261:18–25; Mr. Vo’s deposition, p. 15:17–23; Ms. Nguyen’s deposition, pp. 46:14–18,
47:6–10, 162:4–8; Ms. Vo’s deposition, pp. 37:1–23, 41:4–16, 68:3–69:1. The Court could not find any
references to these pages in the Plaintiffs’ Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment. See R. Doc.
267.
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Plaintiffs’ possession as they cited other portions of that testimony in its opposition
to the Motion for Summary Judgment. Based on the dates of the other depositions, it
is clear that Plaintiffs were aware of the testimony in those depositions for at least
six months before the opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment was
due.35 An unexcused failure to present evidence available at the time of summary
judgment 	provides 	a 	valid 	basis 	for 	denying 	a 	subsequent 	motion 	for
reconsideration.36
Even considering the new evidence provided by Plaintiffs, and viewing that
evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, that new evidence fails to establish
grounds for reconsideration. Plaintiffs argue that the new evidence shows that the
Plaintiffs “could not read or understand English financial documents, had only a fifth-
grade education, and Plaintiffs had no prior experience with business entities or
commercial borrowing.”37 Further, they argue that the new evidence shows the
Plaintiffs “made the inquiry prompted by the irregularity they perceived, directed
that inquiry to the mortgage professional they understood to have arranged the
financing, and were told there was ‘no problem.’”38 The Court finds this “new
evidence” unpersuasive.
35 Ms. Tung Nguyen and Ms. Tran Duc Nhu Vo’s depositions also appear to have been in Plaintiffs’
possession at the date of filing of the Plaintiffs Response. Plaintiffs’ Response to the Motion for
Summary Judgment (R. Doc. 267) was filed on May 18, 2026. Ms. Tung Nguyen’s deposition was
conducted on November 7, 2025. See R. Doc. 306-5 at p. 1. Ms. Tran Duc Nhu Vo’s deposition was
conducted on September 12, 2025. See R. Doc. 306-6 at p. 1. Plaintiffs do not assert any reason for
failing to include those witnesses’ testimony in their original Response to Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment filed on May 18, 2026.
36 Templet v. HydroChem, Inc., 367 F.3d 473 (5th Cir. 2004).
37 R. Doc. 306-1 at p. 4-5.
38 Id. at p. 8.
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Prescription begins to run “from the time there is notice enough to call for
inquiry about a claim, not from the time when the inquiry reveals facts or evidence
sufficient to prove the claim.”39 It is uncontested that Plaintiffs received a statement
from Gulf Coast Bank in either December 2020 or January 2021 addressed to the
LLC, which caused Plaintiff My Tran alarm.40 Plaintiff testified that she made an
inquiry by confronting her husband and thereafter sending a picture of the statement
to the Mortgage Broker.41 When asked to explain her concern, she testified that was
upset about receiving the statement addressed to “My Tung, LLC.”42 Plaintiffs had
constructive notice in 2020 or 2021, and that notice was, in fact, “enough to call for
inquiry.”43 The Plaintiffs’ subjective understanding of an LLC is not relevant in
determining whether they had constructive notice to begin the prescriptive period.44
While the Court has the authority to reconsider and reverse its prior decision
under Rule 54 “for any reason it deems sufficient, even in the absence of new evidence
or an intervening change in or clarification of the substantive law,”45 the Court finds
no sufficient reason exists to do so on this motion.
39 In re Taxotere, 995 F.3d at 391 (emphasis in original).
40 R. Doc. 258-3; Deposition of My Thi Nhu Tran, at pp. 12-13.
41 Id.
42 Id. at pp. 13-14 (“Q: You got a piece of mail that said Tung My, LLC? A: My Tung, LLC. So I —
always say it LLC, you know. So he text to Ms. Tuyet. So then I was so upset. I snap the phone, and I
talk to Ms. Tuyet, so — you lent me – you loan me the money, but how come, you know, it has here My
Tung, LLC?”).
43 In re Taxotere, 995 F.3d at 391 (emphasis in original)
44 Id. at 394-95.
45 Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 185.
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II. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration of
Summary Judgment as to Nga Baird and New World Realty 46 is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, October 16, 2026.
_____________________________
WENDY B. VITTER
United States District Judge
46 R. Doc. 306.
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