LAD Services of Louisiana, LLC v. Dragados/Hawaiian Dredging//Orion Joint Venture, et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAD SERVICES OF LOUISIANA, LLC
VERSUS
DRAGADOS/HAWAIIAN DREDGING/
ORION JOINT VENTURE, ET AL.
*
*
*
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 24-2446
SECTION “D” (2)
ORDER AND REASONS
The Court heard argument on December 17, 2025, on three pending motions: (1) Motion
to Compel Document Production, (2) Motion to Compel Inspection, and (3) Motion for Leave to
File Fourth Amended Complaint. 	ECF Nos. 47, 48, 51. 	Defendant Dragados/Hawaiian
Dredging/Orion, Joint Venture (“DHO”) filed Opposition Memoranda, and Plaintiff filed Reply
Memoranda. ECF Nos. 63, 65, 66, 71, 73, 74. After considering the written and oral arguments
and applicable law, the Court granted in part the motion to compel, ordering DHO to provide a
date certain for production in accordance with Rule 34 and took the remaining two motions under
advisement. ECF No. 76.
Having considered the record, the oral and written arguments of counsel, and the applicable
law, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Inspection is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and Plaintiff’s
Motion for Leave to File Fourth Amended Complaint is GRANTED for the reasons stated herein.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On October 10, 2024, Plaintiff LAD Services of Louisiana, LLC filed this diversity action
asserting claims for breach of contract, detrimental reliance, unjust enrichment, deceptive trade
practices, relating to a contract to build a floating dry dock for the U.S. Navy’s use and placement
in Pearl Harbor, Honolulu, Hawaii. 	ECF No. 1 § I, § III ¶ 7, § VI ¶¶ 34-57. 	Plaintiff filed an
Amended Complaint on October 25, 2024, dismissing certain defendants without prejudice and
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mooting the pending motion to dismiss. 	ECF Nos. 8, 9. 	Plaintiff filed a Second Amended
Complaint on February 19, 2024, repeating the same five “causes of action” but, among other
things, alleged additional facts in relation to same. ECF No. 23.1
The Court issued a Scheduling Order on April 23, 2025, establishing a deadline of May 23,
2025, for amended pleadings. ECF No. 35 at 2. The Court later continued certain dates but did
not revive the expired deadline for amending pleadings. ECF Nos. 41, 42. Plaintiff sought to file
a Third Amended Complaint that removed a request for certain damages, which Judge Vitter later
denied as moot in light of Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Fourth Amended Complaint, which
included that change as well as other modifications. ECF Nos. 43, 56 at 1 n.3, 3.
II. 	THE PENDING MOTIONS
A. Motion to Compel Inspection
Plaintiff seeks an order for site inspection to enable it to compare DHO’s as-built dry dock
and construction methods to the designs and methodologies Plaintiff provided to Defendant. ECF
No. 48; No. 48-3 at 2.2 Plaintiff asserts that inspection is relevant and proportional to the needs of
the case, and the evidence cannot be obtained through other means. 	ECF No. 48-3 at 5-6, 8-9.
Plaintiff argues that DHO’s security concerns are pretextual as courts regularly allow inspections
of secure military installations and other sensitive sites with appropriate protective conditions. Id.
at 4-5, 7-8. Plaintiff also asserts that DHO waived any objections to inspection by its failure to
provide a written response to the request. Id. at 9-10.
1 Plaintiff twice sought to file a Second Amended Complaint previously, but Judge Vitter denied the motions without
prejudice for failure to properly allege diversity jurisdiction. ECF Nos. 13, 17, 18, 19.
2 Although Plaintiff evidently desired to conduct the inspection on December 11, 2025, Plaintiff improperly noticed
the motion before Judge Vitter and scheduled same for submission on December 9, 2025, which the Clerk of Court
corrected as an automatically referred matter and scheduled same for the undersigned submission date of December
10, 2025. ECF No. 49. In either event, Plaintiff did not file a separate Motion for Expedited Consideration to ensure
a ruling before the desired December 11, 2025, date.
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In Opposition, DHO asserts that Plaintiff’s motion is premature because it filed same only
10 days after serving its Rule 34 request for inspection, and therefore, DHO could not have waived
any objections because its response deadline had not lapsed. 	ECF No. 65 at 1, 3-6. 	DHO also
argues that the request is not relevant to any claim or defense because Plaintiff asserted a breach
of contract claim, not a misappropriation of trade secrets claim, DHO does not have possession or
control over the land or vessel at issue in the request for inspection, and DHO cannot unilaterally
authorize photographs of the project. Id. at 6-7, 9-11. DHO also argues that Plaintiff’s citations
appear to be the product of AI. Id. at 8-9.
In Reply, Plaintiff argues that DHO has sufficient possession and control of the property
under Rule 34. ECF No. 73 at 2-3. It also argues that the inspection is relevant to its claims, and
any security concerns can be addressed through reasonable protocols. Id. at 1, 4-7. Plaintiff also
defends its case citations. 	Id. at 8. 	In response to the Court’s inquiry during oral argument,
Plaintiff acknowledged that the information sought via an inspection may likewise be revealed
upon review of the design or as-built drawings.
B. Motion for Leave to Amend
Plaintiff’s 	Fourth 	Amended 	Complaint 	seeks 	to 	clarify 	and 	expand 	its 	design
misappropriation claim, and it contends that good cause exists to allow amendment outside of the
Scheduling Order’s deadline because the claim is based on newly discovered evidence that was
not previously available despite its diligence due to DHO’s refusal to allow site inspection and
failure to produce documents in response to discovery requests. ECF No. 51 ¶¶ 2-6. Specifically,
Plaintiff contends that, after DHO refused to allow inspection or produce documents, it hired a
helicopter to conduct an aerial observation which revealed that DHO has incorporated substantial
elements of Plaintiff’s proprietary design. Id. at ¶¶ 6-8; ECF No. 51-3 at 2, 4-6, 8. Plaintiff asserts
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that DHO will suffer no prejudice as the amendment does not add new parties or entirely new
theories but rather clarifies an existing claim disclosed in prior pleadings. ECF No. 51-3 at 6-7.
In Opposition, DHO asserts that Plaintiff has not established good cause to add an entirely
new cause of action and category of damages after the deadline for amendments, and Plaintiff
cannot blame DHO’s discovery conduct because Plaintiff did not issue discovery requests until
after the deadline for amending pleadings and Plaintiff requested a 30-day extension of the
discovery response deadline. 	ECF No. 63 at 3-8. 	DHO has no objection to Plaintiff’s Third
Amended Complaint, which removed its request for lost opportunity damages but objects to
Plaintiff’s late amendment to assert a claim Plaintiff concedes it knew about but failed to raise
when it filed its Second Amended Complaint. Id. at 2 n.1, 7, 10. DHO asserts that it would be
extremely prejudiced by the amendment because it already started to prepare a motion to dismiss
the lost opportunity damages and would need to shift focus to address this entirely new cause of
action. Id. at 8-9.
In Reply, Plaintiff argues that it is not seeking to assert a new cause of action but rather to
properly plead the statutory bases and additional facts of its trade secret claim that was already
present in the Second Amended Complaint. 	ECF No. 74 at 1-2. 	It then reiterates its prior
arguments. Id. at 2-5.
III. 	APPLICABLE LAW
A. 	Scope of Discovery
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the parties to
obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s
claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the
parties’ 	relative 	access 	to 	relevant 	information, 	the 	parties’ 	resources, 	the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or
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expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within
this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.
FED. R. C IV. P. 26(b)(1). Information need not be admissible into evidence to be discoverable. Id.
Rather, the information merely needs to be proportional and relevant to any claim or defense. Id.
The threshold for relevance at the discovery stage is lower than the threshold for relevance
of admissibility of evidence at the trial stage.3 This broader scope is necessary given the nature of
litigation, where determinations of relevance for discovery purposes are made well in advance of
trial; facts that are not considered in determining the ultimate issues may be eliminated in due
course of the proceeding.4 At the discovery stage, relevance includes “[a]ny matter that bears on,
or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the
case.”5 	Relevant evidence thus has the tendency to make a fact that is of consequence in
determining an action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.6
The relevancy evaluation necessarily begins with an examination of the pending claims
and defenses.7 Discovery should be allowed unless the party opposing discovery establishes that
the information sought “can have no possible bearing on the claim or defense of the party seeking
discovery.”8 However, the comments to Rule 26 “confirm that requiring relevance to a claim or
defense ‘signals to the court that it has the authority to confine discovery to the claims and defenses
asserted in the pleadings, and signals to the parties that they have no entitlement to discovery to
develop new claims or defenses that are not already identified in the pleadings.’”9 	Discovery
3 Rangel v. Gonzalez Mascorro, 274 F.R.D. 585, 590 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (citations omitted).
4 Id. at 590 n.5 (citation and quotations omitted).
5 Id. at 590 (citations omitted).
6 FED. R. E VID. 401.
7 Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Crescent Ford Truck Sales, Inc., No. 02-3398, 2006 WL 378523, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb.
17, 2006) (Zainey, J.).
8 Dotson v. Edmonson, No. 16-15371, 2017 WL 11535244, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 21, 2017) (Morgan, J.) (citing Merrill
v. Waffle House, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 467, 470 (N.D. Tex. 2005)).
9 Waste Mgmt. of La., LLC v. River Birch, Inc., No. 11-2405, 2017 WL 2271982, at *4 (E.D. La. May 24, 2017)
(quoting Whitney v. Krystal Co., No. 10-773, 2012 WL 777161, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 7, 2012)).
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directed only to dismissed claims and not any remaining claim is simply not relevant to the
litigation nor proportional to the needs of the case.10
While the discovery rules are accorded broad and liberal treatment to achieve their purpose
of adequately informing litigants in civil trials,11 discovery does have “ultimate and necessary
boundaries.”12 Rule 26(b)(2)(C) mandates that the Court limit the frequency or extent of discovery
otherwise allowed, if it determines: (1) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or
duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome,
or less expensive; (2) the party seeking discovery had ample opportunity to obtain the information;
or (3) the proposed discovery is outside the scope of Rule 26(b)(1).13 Further, Rule 26(b) “has
never been a license to engage in an unwieldy, burdensome, and speculative fishing expedition.”14
Thus, while relevance in the discovery context is broader than in the trial context, that legal tenet
should not be misapplied to allow fishing expeditions in discovery.15
B. Rule 34 Request for Inspection
Rule 34(a)(2) provides that a party “may serve on any other party a request” to enter onto
“designated land or other property possessed or controlled by the responding party, so that the
requesting party may inspect . . . the property.”16 The request must (1) describe with reasonable
particularity each item or category of items to be inspected and (2) specify a reasonable time, place,
10 See Ganpat v. E. Pac. Shipping, PTE, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 3d 305, 311 (E.D. La. 2020) (Morgan, J.); see also Johnson
v. Hope Vill. Apartments, No. 10-385, 2011 WL 13217330, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2011) (noting impropriety of
seeking discovery on dismissed claims); Socol v. Haas, No. 18-90, 2021 WL 2635847, at *7 (W.D. Va. June 25, 2021)
(denying discovery directed to dismissed claims but allowing discovery that also related to remaining claims).
11 Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176 (1979) (citations omitted).
12 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507
(1947)).
13 FED. R. C IV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i)–(iii).
14 Crosby v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 647 F.3d 258, 264 (5th Cir. 2011).
15 Trident Mgmt. Grp., LLC v. GLF Constr. Corp., No. 16-17277, 2017 WL 3011144, at *4 (E.D. La. July 14, 2017)
(citations omitted); see also Crosby, 647 F.3d at 264; Ganpat, 611 F. Supp. 3d at 311.
16 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(2).
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and manner for the inspection and for performing the related acts.17 The party to whom the request
is directed must respond in writing within 30 days after being served or, if the request was delivered
under Rule 26(d)(2), within 30 days after the parties’ first Rule 26(f) conference.18 If a responding
party does not agree to an inspection, the requesting party may move for an order compelling the
inspection.19 The resisting party must show why an inspection would be “irrelevant, overly broad,
unduly burdensome or oppressive.”20
C. Standard for Amendments
While Rule 15(a) applies to a request for leave to amend before expiration of the deadline
for amendments, when leave is sought after the scheduling order deadline for amendments has
expired, the analysis is first governed by Rule 16.21 Under Rule 16, the court has “broad discretion
to preserve the integrity and purpose of the pretrial order,” and “[o]nly upon the movant's
demonstration of good cause to modify the scheduling order will the more liberal standard of Rule
15(a) apply to the district court's decision to grant or deny leave.”22
To establish good cause to modify a scheduling order under Rule 16(b)(4), the movant
must “show that the deadlines cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party needing
17 Id. at 34(b)(1)(A)-(B).
18 Id. at 34(b)(2)(A).
19 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(iv).
20 Stanton 4433 Owners Assoc. v. State Farm Lloyds, No. 20-280, 2022 WL 17752218, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 6,
2022) (quoting Camoco, LLC v. Leyva, 333 F.R.D. 603, 606 (W.D. Tex. 2019)).
21 See S&W Enters., L.L.C. v. SouthTrust Bank of Ala., NA, 315 F.3d 533, 535–36 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) governs the amendment of pleadings after a scheduling order deadline has expired and
only upon a showing of good cause will the more liberal standard of Rule 15(a) apply to the court’s decision to grant
or deny leave); see J.M. v. La. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n., Inc., No. 23-6514, 2025 WL 1372979, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr.
4, 2025) (“The good cause requirements of Rule 16(b) govern a party’s motion for leave to amend or supplement after
the deadline set forth in the scheduling order.”); Wilson v. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams., No. 18-854, 2019 WL
5840325, at *16 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2019) (“When . . . the deadline to amend pleadings has expired, a court considering
a motion to amend or supplement pleadings must first determine whether to modify the scheduling order under the
Rule 16(b)(4) good cause standard.”).
22 See S&W Enters., 315 F.3d at 535–36 (citation omitted); see also Fahim v. Marriott Hotel Servs., Inc., 551 F.3d
344, 348 (5th Cir. 2008).
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the extension.”23 In Geiserman v. MacDonald, the Fifth Circuit identified four factors to determine
the existence of good cause to modify a scheduling order,24 and it adopted that standard to requests
to amend pleadings after expiration of the scheduling order deadline in S&W Enterprises, L.L.C.
v. SouthTrust Bank of Alabama, NA.25 Thus, the court must consider: “(1) the explanation for the
failure to timely move for leave to amend; (2) the importance of the amendment; (3) potential
prejudice in allowing the amendment; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such
prejudice.”26 	“No single factor is dispositive, nor must all the factors be present.”27 	The four
factors are considered holistically, and the court has wide discretion to weigh and balance the
factors, including the discretion to find that any one factor outweighs the others.28
Only when “good cause” is established under Rule 16 does the court analyze whether leave
to amend is proper under Rule 15(a)(2), which instructs the court to “freely give leave [to amend]
when justice so requires.”29 Leave to amend under Rule 15 is not automatic,30 but given the bias
in favor of granting leave, a court “must possess a ‘substantial reason’ to deny a request.”31 The
five relevant factors for the Rule 15 analysis are: (1) undue delay, (2) bad faith or dilatory motive,
(3) repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, (4) undue prejudice to the
23 Filgueira v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass'n, 734 F.3d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
24 See 893 F.2d 787, 791 (5th Cir. 1990).
25 315 F.3d at 536.
26 Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. City of El Paso, 346 F.3d 541, 546 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting S&W Enters., 315 F.3d at 536).
27 Sapp v. Mem'l Hermann Healthcare Sys., 406 F. App'x 866, 869 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing S&W Enters., 315 F.3d at
536–37).
28 See E.E.O.C. v. Serv. Temps Inc., 679 F.3d 323, 334 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting the district court’s finding that plaintiff’s
failure to account for its delay was dispositive and outweighed the other three factors and finding same within the
court’s discretion).
29 Denial of leave to amend is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Carroll v. Fort James Corp., 470 F.3d 1171, 1174
(5th Cir. 2006). The term “discretion” in this context “may be misleading, because [Rule] 15(a) evinces a bias in
favor of granting leave to amend.” Mayeaux v. La. Health Sers. & Indem. Co., 376 F.3d 420, 425 (5th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., 234 F.3d 863, 872 (5th Cir. 2000)). A district court properly exercises its
discretion under Rule 15(a)(2) when it denies leave to amend for a substantial reason, such as undue delay, repeated
failures to cure deficiencies, undue prejudice, or futility. U.S. ex rel. Spicer v. Westbrook, 751 F.3d 354, 367 (5th Cir.
2014) (citation omitted).
30 Avatar Expl., Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 933 F.2d 314, 320 (5th Cir. 1991).
31 Smith v. EMC Corp., 393 F.3d 590, 595 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); accord. Mayeaux, 376 F.3d at 425
(quoting Stripling, 234 F.3d at 872; Foman v. Davis, 371, 178, 182 (1962)).
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opposing party, and (5) futility of the amendment.32 	Denial of leave to amend is reviewed for
abuse of discretion,33 but absent a “substantial reason,” the court’s discretion “is not broad enough
to permit denial” of a request for leave to amend.34
D. Elements of a Trade Secret Claim
The required elements to recover under the Louisiana Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(“LUTSA”) and the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”) are similar. To recover damages
under LUTSA, a plaintiff “must prove (a) the existence of a trade secret, (b) a misappropriation of
the trade secret by another, and (c) the actual loss caused by the misappropriation.”35 To succeed
on a DTSA claim, a plaintiff must also show (a) the existence of a trade secret, (b) misappropriation
of that trade secret, and (c) the trade secret’s relation to a good or service in interstate or foreign
commerce.36
The threshold inquiry in every trade secret case is whether a legally protectable trade secret
exists.37 	The LUTSA and DTSA set forth substantially similar definitions for a trade secret.38
LUTSA defines a trade secret as
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
technique, or process, that:
32 Gregory v. Mitchell, 634 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. Jan. 1981) (quoting Foman, 371 U.S. at 182); see also Spicer, 751
F.3d at 367 (citation omitted); Strickland v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 838 F. App’x 815, 821 (5th Cir. 2020) (“Denying a
motion to amend is not an abuse of discretion if allowing an amendment would be futile.” (quoting Marucci Sports,
L.L.C. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014))).
33 Carroll, 470 F.3d at 1174 (citation omitted).
34 Mayeaux, 376 F.3d at 425 (citing Martin’s Herend Imps., Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading U.S. of Am. Co., 195
F.3d 765, 770 (5th Cir. 1999); Stripling, 234 F.3d at 872).
35 Comput. Mgmt. Assistance Co. v. DeCastro, 220 F.3d 396, 403 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Reingold v. Swiftships, Inc.,
126 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 1997)) (finding a lack of proof of misappropriation).
36 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1); Complete Logistical Servs., LLC v. Rulh, 350 F. Supp. 3d 512, 517 (E.D. La. 2018) (Fallon,
J.) (ruling under the FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) standard).
37 Turbine Powered Tech., LLC v. Crowe, No. 2018-0881, 2019 WL 4201579, at *10 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2019) (citing
Engineered Mech. Servs., Inc. v. Langlois, 464 So. 2d 329, 333 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984)).
38 Source Prod. & Equip. Co. v. Schehr, No. 16-17528, 2019 WL 4752058, at *5 (E.D. La. Sept. 30, 2019) (Ashe, J.)
(noting DTSA and LUTSA, are substantially similar and LUTSA’s definition of “trade secret” is nearly identical to
the DTSA.); Ruby Slipper Café, LLC v. Belou, No. 18-1548, 2019 WL 1254897, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 19, 2019) (Ashe,
J.).
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(a) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
LA. R EV. S TAT. § 51:1431(4). Likewise, the DTSA defines a trade secret as:
[A]ll forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or
engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices,
formulas, 	designs, 	prototypes, 	methods, 	techniques, 	processes, 	procedures,
programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored,
compiled, 	or 	memorialized 	physically, 	electronically, 	graphically,
photographically, or in writing if –
(A) the owner thereon has taken reasonable measures to keep such information
secret; and
(B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable
through proper means by, another person who can obtain economic value
from the disclosure or use of the information.
18 U.S.C. § 1839(3). Despite those definitions, courts have recognized that “[a] trade secret ‘is
one of the most elusive and difficult concepts in the law to define.’”39
The plaintiff “must identify the trade secrets and carry the burden of showing that they
exist.”40 While trade secrets need not be pled with extreme specificity in a complaint,41 even a
complaint must disclose sufficient facts to put the defendant on notice as to what is alleged to have
been misappropriated and must describe the subject matter with sufficient particularity to separate
it from matters of general knowledge in the trade or of special knowledge of those persons skilled
39 Source Prod., 2019 WL 4752058 at *5 (quoting Tewari De-Ox Sys., Inc. v. Mountain States/Rosen, L.L.C., 637 F.3d
604, 613 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Ark–Ell Springs, Inc., 569 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir. 1978))).
40 Source Prod., 2019 WL 4752058, at *5 (quoting Mfg. Automation & Software Sys., Inc. v. Hughes, No. 16-08962,
2018 WL 3197696, at *14 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2018) (quoting MAI Sys. Corp v. Peak Comput., Inc., 991 F.2d 511,
522 (9th Cir. 1993))).
41 C&M Oilfield Rentals, LLC v. Location Illuminator Techs., LLC, No. 18-00039, 2020 WL 5745833, at *3, *6 (W.D.
Tex. Aug. 3, 2020 (citing Wellogix, Inc. v. Accenture, L.L.P., 716 F.3d 867, 874 (5th Cir. 2013))), R.& R. adopted,
2020 WL 7012008 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2020)
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in the trade.42
Of course, the subject matter of a trade secret must be secret.43 “Information that is public
knowledge . . . or that is generally known in an industry, cannot qualify as a trade secret.”44
Although matters of public knowledge or general knowledge in an industry cannot qualify as trade
secrets, “a compilation of the public information which incorporates the information in a unique
way is, nonetheless, protectable as a trade secret.”45 As the Fifth Circuit has explained, “a trade
secret can exist in a combination of characteristics and components each of which, by itself, is in
the public domain, but the unified process, design and operation of which in unique combination,
affords a competitive advantage and is a protectible secret.”46 Thus, a unique combination of items
that by themselves do not constitute trade secrets can be a trade secret.47
Public disclosure destroys secrecy and trade-secret protection.48 	“[I]f an individual
discloses his trade secret to others who are under no obligation to protect the confidentiality of the
42 Source Prod., 2019 WL 4752058, at *5 (citing Yeiser Rsch. & Dev. LLC v. Teknor Apex Co., 281 F. Supp. 3d 1021,
1043-44 (S.D. Cal. 2017); and quoting Mfg. Automation, 2018 WL 3197696, at *14); AlterG, Inc. v. Boost Treadmills
LLC, 388 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1144 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Next Commc’ns, Inc. v. Viber Media, Inc., 758 F. App’x 46, 49
(2d Cir. 2018) (“[I]n the context of a trade secret misappropriation claim, the party opposing summary judgment must
be able to identify the alleged trade secret with sufficient specificity to make the moving party aware of what
information it has allegedly misappropriated.”).
43 Tewari De-Ox Sys., 637 F.3d at 611 (citation omitted).
44 Cajun Servs. Unlimited, LLC v. Benton Energy Serv. Co., No. 17-0491, 2020 WL 3188991, at *38 (E.D. La. June
15, 2020) (Ashe, J.); see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984); Flotec, Inc. v. S. Rsch., Inc.,
16 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1000 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (stating “trade secret law does not protect information that is publicly
available, including information that can be discerned with reasonable effort by inspecting a product available for
purchase on the market.” (citations omitted)); Ecimos, LLC v. Carrier Corp., 971 F.3d 616, 643 (6th Cir. 2020)
(defining trade secrets to exclude publicly disclosed or easily acquired information or matters of general knowledge
in the industry, or ideas that are well known or easily ascertainable).
45 Centurum Info. Tech. Inc. v. Geocent, LLC, No. 21-0082, 2021 WL 533707, at *13 (E.D. La. Feb. 12, 2021) (Fallon,
J.) (quoting Geo Grp., Inc. v. Cmty. First Servs., Inc., No. 11- 1711, 2012 WL 1077846 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012)).
46 Tewari De-Ox Sys., 637 F.3d at 613 (quoting Imperial Chem., Ltd. v. Nat'l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 342 F.2d 737,
742 (2d Cir. 1965)); see also Metallurgical Indus. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1202 (5th Cir. 1986) (rejecting
contention that a combination of disclosed technologies cannot itself constitute a trade secret).
47 See Complete Logistical Servs., 350 F. Supp.3d at 518; Ultraflor Corp. v. Pelican Tank Parts, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 2d
935, 960 (S.D. Tex. 2013); Centurum Info. Tech., 2021 WL 533707, at *13.
48 See Johns Manville Corp. v. Knauf Insulation, LLC, No. 15-00531, 2017 WL 4222621, at *6 (D. Colo. Sept. 22,
2017).
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information . . . his property right is extinguished.”49 A trade secret is lost when information is
disclosed under a license that does not include a confidentiality or non-disclosure provision.50
IV. 	ANALYSIS
A. Request for Inspection
Plaintiff’s Request for Inspection is improper. Plaintiff asserts that, on November 3, 2025,
it made a formal request for inspection, seeking to inspect certain property on December 11, 2025.
ECF No. 48-3 at 3. Before expiration of the 30-day response period, Plaintiff filed this motion to
compel on November 13, 2025. Before DHO responded, Plaintiff prematurely filed this motion
to compel. 	Setting aside the issue of “control” argued by the parties, Plaintiff conceded at oral
argument that the information sought via inspection may be reflected in the documents requested
which have not yet been produced. Accordingly, the motion to compel inspection will be denied
without prejudice. If inspection is necessary after responsive documents have been produced and
reviewed and DHO objects, the Court may then address the merits of the request after an
appropriately filed motion and briefing.
B. Request for Leave to File Fourth Amended Complaint
Initially, Plaintiff’s request for leave was filed after expiration of the deadline for amending
pleadings. As such, Plaintiff must first establish good cause under Rule 16 before the Court may
assess whether granting leave is proper under the more liberal provisions of Rule 15.
49 Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1002.
50 Nova Chems., Inc. v. Sekisui Plastics Co., 579 F.3d 319, 327–28 (3d Cir. 2009); see also SocialApps, LLC v. Zynga
Inc., No. 11-04910, 2012 WL 381216, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2012) (stating that publicly available information, by
definition, cannot be protected as a trade secret).
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1. 	Rule 16
a. 	Explanation for Failure to Timely Amend
Inadvertence is generally insufficient to establish good cause under Rule 16.51 	And
although Plaintiff argues that its delay resulted from DHO’s failure to produce responsive
documents, it did not issue any discovery prior to the deadline for amending pleadings. Further,
Plaintiff alleges it learned of the use of its designs when it performed aerial surveillance but does
not provide any reason that it could not conduct that same surveillance earlier.
In short, Plaintiff has not provided a reasonable explanation for its failure to timely move
to amend. This factor weighs against Plaintiff.
b. 	Importance of Amendment
When a proposed amendment potentially provides additional grounds for recovery or
directly affects the prospects of recovery, it satisfies the Rule 16(b) importance requirement.52
Both the DTSA and LUTSA are subject to a three-year statute of limitations/prescriptive period.
18 U.S.C. § 1836(d) (for misappropriation of trade secrets under federal law); LA. R EV. S TAT.
§ 51:1436 (for misappropriation of trade secrets under Louisiana law). Plaintiff’s interaction with
Defendants on the project began in early 2023 (ECF No. 23 ¶ 12), indicating the claims have been
raised within the prescriptive periods.
As the amendment would provide an additional avenue of recovery, it satisfies the
importance prong. This factor weighs in favor of Plaintiff.
51 S&W Enters., 315 F.3d at 536 (affirming denial of leave to amend and stating that counsel’s delayed analysis of
recent supreme court decision is essentially inadvertence, which is tantamount to no explanation at all); Rios v. City
of Conroe, 674 F. App'x 366, 368-69 (5th Cir. 2016) (affirming denial of leave to amend where district court reasoned
that mere inadvertence, coupled with potential prejudice to the non-movant, is insufficient to constitute good cause
under Rule 16).
52 See E.E.O.C. v. Serv. Temps, Inc., No. 08-1552, 2009 WL 3294863, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2009) (citations
omitted) (finding the importance factor met when party sought to add new affirmative defenses and a counterclaim
because they would protect the party from damages and entitle it to additional recovery if successful), aff'd, 679 F.3d
323 (5th Cir. 2012).
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c. 	Prejudice and Availability of Continuance
Proposed amendments that merely propose “alternative legal theories for recovery on the
same underlying facts . . . generally should be permitted, as they advance Rule 15(a)’s policy of
promoting litigation on the merits rather than on procedural technicalities.”53 	But late-stage
amendments that essentially plead a fundamentally different case with new causes of action and
different parties, effectively reconstructing the case anew, are unduly prejudicial and should not
be permitted.54
To determine whether a new claim fundamentally alters the case, the court looks to the
factual similarities between the new claim and the existing claim, whether the addition would
require expansive discovery and litigation, and whether the addition would delay the resolution of
the case.55 When “the proposed amendments are based on the same underlying facts alleged in
the original complaint,” the Court should not find the new claim fundamentally alters the nature
of the case.56 When, however, an added claim would require the defendant “to reopen discovery
and prepare a defense for a claim different from the [one] . . . that was before the court,” prejudice
is established.57 Courts thus regularly find prejudice when the amendment is asserted after the
53 Mayeaux, 376 F.3d at 427; see also Operaciones Tecnicas Marinas S.A.S. v. Diversified Marine Servs., LLC, No.
12-1979, 2015 WL 4254130, at *5 (E.D. La. July 13, 2015) (Roby, M.J.) (quoting Mayeaux, 376 F.3d at 427).
54 Mayeaux, 376 F.3d at 427 (finding proposed amendment destroying the court's jurisdiction years into the litigation
fundamentally altered the case); Phoenix Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. UH Servs. Grp., LLC, No. 20-1684, 2021 WL 6108319,
at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 28, 2021) (Douglas, M.J.) (finding proposed amendment adding fraud claim after expiration of
discovery deadline changed the nature of the case and constituted prejudice).
55 See In re Am. Int'l Refinery, Inc., 676 F.3d 455, 467 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting that new allegations of fraud in
bankruptcy proceeding would have “fundamentally altered” the nature of a case which had previously been limited to
determination of whether one party possessed a conflict of interest warranting disgorgement of monies paid).
56 Operaciones Tecnicas, 2015 WL 4254130, at *5; see also Washington St. Tammany Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Grid Power
Prods., L.L.C., No. 17-17447, 2018 WL 10246146, at *3 (E.D. La. July 11, 2018) (granting leave to amend products
liability action to add redhibition claim where there is substantial overlap in evidence and discovery, the claims are
frequently and typically pled, prosecuted and tried together, and discovery was in its early stages with four months
remaining before the discovery deadline); Bouchard Transp. Co. v. VT Halter Marine, Inc., No. 16-11264, 2016 WL
4131376, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 3, 2016) (holding that amendment to breach of contract, breach of warranty and
negligence action to add claims of products and/or strict liability did not cause prejudice).
57 Smith, 393 F.3d at 596 (quoting Duggins v. Steak ‘N Shake, Inc., 195 F.3d 828, 834 (6th Cir. 1999)).
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close of discovery; after dispositive motions have been filed, briefed, or decided; or on the eve of
or in the middle of trial.58
A side-by-side comparison of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint with its prior
complaint reflects that it seeks to delete ¶¶ 30, 36(b), and 49 relating to a potential job for Crosby
Marine and add a new “Sixth Cause of Action – Misappropriation of Trade Secrets” outlined in
new ¶¶ 53-79. Compare ECF No. 23, with ECF No. 51-2.59 Contrary to its argument, Plaintiff
did not previously assert a misappropriation of trade secret claim.60 Plaintiff’s prior filings simply
do not set forth the factual elements necessary to state a trade secret claim, nor did Plaintiff
otherwise indicate it sought to assert such a claim. Thus, the amendment does not merely clarify
an existing claim but rather seeks to add a new claim. 	The proposed amendment does
fundamentally alter the nature of the case and will necessitate extensive discovery.
Discovery, however, is still in its early stages, with a recently extended discovery deadline
of June 21, 2026. ECF No. 56. The parties should be able to accomplish the necessary discovery
within this extended deadline, and the proposed amendment should not disrupt the discovery
deadline or trial date. As such, there should be no need for continuance. Even if there were, the
Court would have the ability to continue these dates.
58 See Smith, 393 F.3d at 594-96 (affirming denial of leave to amend based on undue delay and prejudice when
amendment would add a new claim in the middle of trial after discovery had closed); Campbell v. Emory Clinic, 166
F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted) (“Prejudice and undue delay are inherent in an amendment asserted
after the close of discovery and after dispositive motions have been filed, briefed, and decided.”); Solomon v. N. Am.
Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 151 F.3d 1132, 1139 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming denial of leave to amend when the plaintiff filed
the motion “on the eve of the discovery deadline”); see also Ruby Slipper Cafe, L.L.C. v. Belou, No. 18-01548, 2018
WL 11179117, at *2 (E.D. La. July 3, 2018) (looking to whether the filing is within the court-imposed deadlines or
would require the re-opening of discovery to assess undue delay and prejudice).
59 DHO has no objection to the deletion of ¶¶ 30, 36(b) and 49. DHO does, however, object to the addition of the
misappropriation of trade secrets claim. ECF No. 63 at 2 n.1.
60 At most, Plaintiff alleged that it provided valuable services for which it was not compensated and DHO’s actions
constituted unfair or deceptive practices. See ECF No. 74 at 2 (citing specific paragraphs from the complaints alleged
to encompass misappropriation of trade secrets claim).
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Although the proposed amendment does fundamentally alter the case, it was not
sought after the close of discovery, after dispositive motions have been decided, or on the eve of
or in the middle of trial. Thus, while both parties have facts in their favor as to these factors, the
balance tips slightly in favor of Plaintiff. Overall, though a close call, the balance tilts in favor of
finding good cause for granting leave to amend after the expiration of the deadline.61
2. Rule 15 Considerations
DHO does not argue bad faith, repeated failures to cure deficiencies, or futility. Rather, it
assert undue delay and prejudice. ECF No. 63.
Although Rule 15(a)(2) does not itself impose a time limit on seeking leave to amend,62 a
litigant’s failure to assert a claim as soon as he could have done so factors against the request.63
At some point, plaintiff’s delay can be procedurally fatal,64 in which case plaintiff must establish
that the delay “was due to oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.”65 For instance, the Fifth
Circuit has affirmed a court’s denial of leave to amend to add a new party when leave was not
sought until thirteen months after filing suit and eight months after becoming aware of the new
entity’s existence.66 Likewise, courts have found “undue delay” when a plaintiff knew the facts
“all along” but waited over a year after the first amended complaint to seek leave to amend raising
those facts.67 “Merely because a claim was not presented as promptly as possible, however, does
61 Cf. Meaux Surface Prot., Inc. v. Fogleman, 607 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding amendment to add lost profits
claim warranted to prevent substantial injustice because amendment was very important and Plaintiff would be “dead
in the water” without it).
62 See Smith, 393 F.3d at 595 (citation omitted) (stating that Rule 15(a) does not impose a time limit “for permissive
amendment”).
63 Carson v. Polley, 689 F.2d 562, 584 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding late assertion of claim acceptable when all other factors
pointed in favor of movant, no pretrial order or pretrial conference had been held, and no evidence of bad faith).
64 Smith, 393 F.3d at 595 (quoting Whitaker v. City of Hou., 963 F.2d 831, 836 (5th Cir. 1992)).
65 Id. (citation omitted); see also Parish v. Frazier, 195 F.3d 761, 763 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
66 B. A. Kelly Land Co., L.L.C. v. Aethon Energy Operating, L.L.C., 25 F.4th 369, 384 (5th Cir. 2022).
67 See, e.g., C3PO Int’l, Ltd. v. DynCorp Int’l, L.L.C., 663 F. App’x 311, 314-15 (5th Cir. 2016) (affirming district
court’s decision); see also Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 864–65 (5th Cir. 2003) (concluding the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend because plaintiffs had not raised any facts that were not
previously available and made a “strategic” decision to delay amending the complaint).
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not vest the district court with authority to punish the litigant.”68
“[D]elay alone is an insufficient basis for denial of leave to amend: The delay must be
undue, i.e., it must prejudice the nonmoving party or impose unwarranted burdens on the court.”69
Courts have found prejudice when the amendment is asserted after the close of discovery; after
dispositive motions have been filed, briefed, or decided; or on the eve of or in the middle of trial.70
A defendant is prejudiced if an amendment would require a party to “reopen discovery and prepare
a defense for a claim different from the [one] . . . that was before the court.”71 	Likewise,
amendments that fundamentally alter the nature of the case or would force a party to re-urge the
same arguments presented in previous dispositive motions72 are considered prejudicial.73 Merely
being forced to incur additional fees and costs to respond, which may cause some prejudice,
however, does not constitute “undue” prejudice necessary to justify denial of a motion to amend.74
68 Carson, 689 F.2d at 584.
69 Mayeaux, 376 F.3d at 427 (citations omitted).
70 See Smith, 393 F.3d at 594–96 (affirming denial of leave to amend based on undue delay and prejudice where
amendment would add a new claim in the middle of trial after discovery had closed); Campbell, 166 F.3d at 1162
(“Prejudice and undue delay are inherent in an amendment asserted after the close of discovery and after dispositive
motions have been filed, briefed, and decided.”); Solomon, 151 F.3d at 1139 (affirming denial of leave to amend where
the plaintiff filed the motion “on the eve of the discovery deadline”); see also Ruby Slipper Cafe, 2018 WL 11179117,
at *2 (looking to whether the filing is within the court-imposed deadlines or would require the re-opening of discovery
to assess undue delay and prejudice).
71 Smith, 393 F.3d at 596 (quoting Duggins, 195 F.3d at 834); see also C3PO Int’l, 663 F. App’x at 314 (denying leave
to amend based on, among other things, prejudice because of pressing discovery and trial deadlines); cf. Mayeaux,
376 F.3d at 427 (distinguishing between amendments that propose alternative legal theories of recovery, which
“generally should be permitted,” and those that “fundamentally alter the nature of the case,” which “may be denied if
the circumstances warrant,” and finding no abuse of discretion in denial of amendment that would have unduly
prejudiced the original and proposed new defendants by allowing plaintiffs to plead “a fundamentally different case
with new causes of action and different parties” after the case had been pending for years and was nearing the close
of extensive discovery).
72 U.S. ex rel. Bias v. Tangipahoa Par. Sch. Bd., 816 F.3d 315, 328 (5th Cir. 2016).
73 Am. Int’l Refinery, 676 F.3d at 467 & n.12 (finding leave properly denied where proposed amendment was based
on documents known to plaintiff for over a year and added new causes of action that would have “dramatically altered
the subject matter of the suit at a late juncture . . . requir[ing] expansive [additional] discovery and litigation”);
Mayeaux, 376 F.3d at 427–28 (finding the complaint would be “fundamentally altered” where proposed amendment
would destroy jurisdiction and “effectively reconstruct[] the case anew.”).
74 See, e.g., Babin v. Caddo E. Ests. I, Ltd., No. 10-896, 2012 WL 3310017, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2012) (granting
motion to amend despite argued prejudice of additional costs because that is not sufficient to establish undue
prejudice); Richards’ Realty Co., L.L.C. v. Paramount Disaster Recovery, Inc., No. 06-2396, 2008 WL 440325, at *3
(E.D. La. Feb. 8, 2008) (Vance, J.) (stating that continued expenditure of substantial litigation resources does not
establish undue prejudice); see also Adams v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 19-870, 2022 WL 3268506, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Aug.
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Although DHO argues it would be severely prejudiced by the proposed amendment adding
a misappropriation claim,75 incurring costs to respond to a new cause of action, while unfortunate,
does not constitute the type of prejudice necessary to establish a substantial reason to deny
amendment under Rule 15.
V. 	CONCLUSION
Although Plaintiff has not set forth a reasonable explanation for its failure to assert a
misappropriation of trade secrets claim earlier and the amendment will necessitate additional
discovery, balance of the relevant factors, particularly the importance of amendment, and
recognizing the underlying policy favoring resolution of litigation on the merits rather than
procedural technicalities, the Rule 16 and Rule 15 factors do not support the denial of Plaintiff’s
request for leave to amend.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Inspection is DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Fourth Amended
Complaint is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to docket ECF No. 51-2 into the court record.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this ________ day of December, 2025.
___________________________________
DONNA PHILLIPS CURRAULT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
10, 2022) (preparing additional discovery and re-deposing an unidentified number of witnesses is not “considerable
delay and expense” as necessary to establish undue prejudice); EnergyBill.com, L.L.C. v. Arcadis U.S., Inc., No. 21-
00426, 2021 WL 9352581, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2021) (citing Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594,
599 (5th Cir. 1981)) (stating that cursory references to the increase in cost, complication and potential juror confusion
are insufficient to demonstrate the kind of undue prejudice warranting denial of leave to amend at the early stage in
proceedings).
75 ECF No. 63 at 8-9.
31st
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