Porter v. Tynes et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
TOMARCUS PORTER 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 24-2871
JOHNATHEN TYNES, ET AL. 	SECTION “D”(4)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 39) filed by Defendants Johnathen
Tynes, Brooke Thomas, Billy Mersereau, Andria Johnson, Truly Dillon, and Kevin Luper,
collectively “Defendants”, seeking dismissal of Plaintiff Tomarcus Porter’s (“Porter”) claims
asserted in his pro se and in forma pauperis 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. Also pending before the
Court is Porter’s Motion for Cross Summary Judgment (ECF No. 45), seeking summary
judgment on the liability of all Defendants who allegedly violated his constitutional rights.
The motions and underlying matter were referred to a United States Magistrate Judge to
conduct a hearing, including an evidentiary hearing, if necessary, and to submit proposed findings
and recommendations for disposition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), § 1915e(2),
and § 1915A, and as applicable, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) and(2). No party filed an opposition to
either motion or requested oral argument in accordance with Local Rule 78.1. The Court agrees
that oral argument is unnecessary.
I. 	Background
A. 	The Complaint
At the time of filing his complaint, Porter was an inmate housed at David Wade
Correctional Center in which he named Lt. Johnathen Tynes, Brooke Thomas, Correctional Officer
Billy Mersereau, Major Andria Johnson, Correctional Officer Truly Dillon, and Assistant Warden
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Kevin Luper, all employees of Rayburn Correctional Center (“RCC”), as Defendants. ECF No.
21, ¶III(A)-(G), at 4-9. On January 8, 2023, while housed at RCC, Lt. Brooke Thomas observed
a “pinclasp” in Porter’s hair when he was in the infirmary after injuring himself. ECF No. 21-2 at
9. Porter claims the “pinclasp” was holding his dreadlock because an excessive chemical agent
that was sprayed on him was causing his hair to fall out. Id. He states the object came from an
envelope that was issued by the facility with legal supplies and was not contraband. ECF No. 21-
2 at 13. He claims he asked the lieutenants if he could remove it himself but was denied. ECF No.
21-2 at 11. Porter states that Lt. Tynes and Lt. Thomas proceeded to cut five dreadlocks from his
head without his consent. Id.
The following day, Porter claims his name was on the court disciplinary board. ECF No.
21-2 at 11. He states he asked Officer Billy Mersereau if he could go to court. Id. Porter claims the
facility has a waiver form, and he was not asked if he wanted to waive his presence in court. ECF.
No. 21-2 at 14. He alleges he was denied access to the disciplinary hearing and from representing
himself in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. ECF No. 21-1 at 9.
Also, on the same day of the disciplinary hearing, Porter states that he was escorted from
his cell, placed in a chair, and all his remaining dreadlocks were cut off by Major Truly Dillon
without his consent. Id. 	Porter alleges that Major Dillon informed him he violated a DOC
regulation, and, by order of Assistant Warden Kevin Luper at the hearing, his dreadlocks were to
be cut off. ECF No. 21-2 at 14. He claims cutting his hair was a violation of his constitutional
rights as a “Rasta,” as it is against his religion to cut his hair or consume meat products. ECF No.
21-1 at 9. Porter further alleges that Major Andria Johnson was deliberately indifferent to his
grievance report by not reviewing body camera footage from the incident and failing to address
that he was denied attending disciplinary court. ECF No. 21-2 at 14.
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Attached to Porter’s complaint are inmate grievance records from RCC related to the
incident. ECF No. 21-2 at 3. In the response form, the facility states that on January 8, 2023, Porter
was taken to the infirmary after a fall and was observed to have a metal clasp i.e. contraband in his
hair. Id. The response states the metal was so tangled in Porter’s hair that Lt. Tynes and Lt. Thomas
had no choice but to cut it out. Id. The response goes on to state that per the Exemption for
Religious Purposes Request form, “the Head Warden of the facility may withdraw the religious
exemption if you abuse it in a manner that undermines the prison’s compelling interest.” Id. The
response notes that by using his hair to conceal contraband, Porter violated the terms of the
religious exemption and approval was issued to cut his hair. Id. Porter also attached the second
step grievance response where the facility indicated that his dreadlock needed to be cut due his
own of placing the contraband in his hair and therefore no further investigation was warranted.
ECF No. 21-2 at 5.
As relief, Porter seeks no retaliation, requests that all parties lose their current rank and “go
back 2,” monetary damages in the amount of $5,000 per dreadlock for each of his 48 dreadlocks,
all attorney’s fees and court costs, as well as “injunction relief” and “declaratory judgment.” ECF
No. 21, ¶V, at 6.
B. 	Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 39)
Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), Defendants generally move to dismiss
Porter’s § 1983 claims against them for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a
claim for which relief can be granted. ECF No. 39-1 at 1. In their motion, Defendants assert the
Court lacks jurisdiction over any claim against Defendants acting in their official capacity as all
Defendants are state employees of Rayburn Correctional Center, which is operated by the
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Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections. Id. at 4-5. Defendants therefore assert
Porter’s claim is barred under Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 5.
Additionally, broadly construing the complaint, Defendants argue Porter fails to state a
claim for which relief can be granted under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (“RLUIPA”). Id. at 6. Defendants argue that RLUIPA does not allow monetary damages for
claims brought against state officials in their official capacities. Id. at 8. Furthermore, Defendants
state that RLUIPA does not create a cause of action for damages against Defendants in their
individual capacities. Id. Finally, Defendants state that pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (“PLRA”), absent any physical injury, any claims Porter makes for compensatory damages
must be dismissed. Id. at 9.
C. 	Porter’s Motion for Cross Summary Judgment (ECF No. 45)
After Defendants filed their motion to dismiss, Porter filed a motion for cross summary
judgment. ECF No. 45. In the motion, Porter states he is entitled to summary judgment against all
Defendants. Id. at 1. In support of his motion, Porter restates the facts as asserted in his complaint.
He claims Defendants cut his dreadlocks for holding contraband in his hair by the direction of
Warden Luper and that he was denied attendance of the disciplinary court. ECF No. 45-2 at 5-6.
As to the pending motion to dismiss, Porter argues that Defendants’ assertion that
jurisdiction is improper is incorrect as the events giving rise to his claims occurred within the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Id. at 2. Porter claims any
assumption by Defendants that his complaint fails to state a claim is malicious as he passed initial
screening by this Court. Id. As relief, Porter reiterates he is seeking maximum monetary damages
for the “48” dreadlocks that were cut from his hair. Id.
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II. 	Standards of Review
A. 	Statutory Frivolousness Review
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c), the Court is
required to sua sponte dismiss cases filed by prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis upon a
determination that they are frivolous. The Court has broad discretion in determining the frivolous
nature of the complaint. See Cay v. Estelle, 789 F.2d 318, 325 (5th Cir. 1986), modified on other
grounds, Booker v. Koonce, 2 F.3d 114 (5th Cir. 1993). However, the Court may not sua sponte
dismiss an action merely because of questionable legal theories or unlikely factual allegations in
the complaint.
Under this statute, a claim is frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir.
1998). “A [claim] lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal
theory, such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not
exist.” Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 718 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d
882, 889 (5th Cir. 1998)). It also lacks an arguable factual basis if the facts alleged are “clearly
baseless,” a category encompassing fanciful, fantastic, and delusional allegations. 	Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28). Thus, the Court must
determine whether plaintiff’s claims are based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or clearly
baseless factual allegations. 	Reeves v. Collins, 27 F.3d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1994); Jackson v.
Vannoy, 49 F.3d 175, 176-77 (5th Cir. 1995); Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268, 269 (5th Cir. 1992).
B. 	Motions Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), “[a] case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.”
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Home Builders Ass’n of Mississippi, Inc. v. City of Madison, Miss., 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir.
1998) (quotation marks omitted). “The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on
the party asserting jurisdiction. Accordingly, the plaintiff constantly bears the burden of proof that
jurisdiction does in fact exist.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001)
(citations omitted). A court should consider a Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing
alternative motions attacking the merits of a plaintiff’s claims. Id.
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. 	To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead in the
complaint “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing the complaint
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 624 F.3d 201,
210 (5th Cir. 2010); Guidry v. Am. Pub. Life Ins. Co., 512 F.3d 177, 180 (5th Cir. 2007).
The Supreme Court, however, has declared that “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(internal citation omitted). 	Moreover, “‘[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level,’” and “[t]he plaintiff must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Guidry, 512 F.3d 177, 180 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570). The United States Supreme Court has explained:
A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. 	The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability
requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully. 	Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility
of entitlement to relief.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
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To determine whether a complaint states a claim that is plausible on its face, the Court
“draw[s] on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, as stated
above, to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.,
550 U.S. at 570). For a claim to be plausible at the pleading stage, the complaint need not strike
the reviewing court as probably meritorious, but it must raise “more than a sheer possibility” that
the defendant has violated the law as alleged. See Id.
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that, when reviewing pro se
complaints, the court must employ less stringent standards while still guided by the Iqbal pleading
requirements. High v. Karbhari, 774 F. App’x 180, 182 (5th Cir. Jun. 12, 2019). “A document
filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must
be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 106 (1976)). In Taylor v. Gibson, 529 F.2d 709 (5th Cir.1976), the Court further explained
this standard in the prisoner context:
It is the responsibility of the courts to be sensitive to possible abuses [in the prison
systems] in order to ensure that prisoner complaints, particularly pro se complaints,
are not dismissed prematurely, however unlikely the set of facts postulated. 	An
opportunity should be provided [to] the prisoner to develop his case at least to the
point where any merit it contains is brought to light.
Id., 529 F.2d at 713-14.
C. 	Summary Judgment
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that “[t]he court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The initial burden falls
on the movant, who must show that there is an “absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact.”
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Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). “The movant satisfies this burden by
showing that a reasonable jury could not find for the nonmovant, based on the burdens that would
apply at trial.” Joseph ex rel. Estate of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 329 (5th Cir. 2020). When
the movant meets this initial burden, “the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce evidence
or designate specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial. 	Doubts are to be
resolved in favor of the nonmoving party, and any reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor
of that party.” Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Therefore, where, as here, a motion for summary judgment is filed by a plaintiff, the
plaintiff is essentially taking the position “that he is entitled to prevail as a matter of law because
the opponent has no valid . . . defense to the action . . .” 10A CHARLES ALAN W RIGHT , ARTHUR R.
M ILLER & M ARY KAY KANE , FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2711 (4th ed. Oct. 2020).
III. 	Discussion
A. 	RLUIPA
Broadly construing his allegations, Porter claims that his right to free exercise of his
religion was violated as a practicing Rastafarian because his dreadlocks were cut after a metal
object was found in his hair. See ECF No. 21. Although not specifically mentioned by Porter, as
discussed by Defendants, these claims may be addressed under RLUIPA.
RLUIPA provides:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of [an
inmate] ... unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on
that person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.
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42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a).
RLUIPA defines “religious exercise” broadly to include “any exercise of religion, whether
or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).
Essentially, “RLUIPA prevents government practices that substantially burden the religious
exercise of an inmate unless the practice furthers a compelling interest and is the least restrictive
means of doing so.” Brown v. Collier, 929 F.3d 218, 229 (5th Cir. 2019).
RLUIPA established a burden-shifting framework for analysis. Ali v. Stephens, 822 F.3d
776, 782–83 (5th Cir. 2016). First, the plaintiff must make two showings: “(1) the relevant
religious exercise is ‘grounded in a sincerely held religious belief’ and (2) the government’s action
or policy ‘substantially burden[s] that exercise’ by, for example, forcing the plaintiff ‘to engage in
conduct that seriously violates [his or her] religious beliefs.’” Id. (quoting Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S.
351, 361 (2015)). If plaintiff satisfies these requirements, the burden shifts then to the government,
who must “show that its action or policy (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.” Id. at 783.
i. 	Eleventh Amendment Immunity and Official Capacity
First, Defendants claim that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Porter’s
RLUIPA claims against them in their official capacities for money damages by virtue of Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity. ECF No. 39-1 at 8.
The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: “The judicial power
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects
of any foreign state.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. The United States Supreme Court further explains:
“For over a century, however, we have recognized that the States’ sovereign immunity is not
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limited to the literal terms of the Eleventh Amendment. Although the text of the Amendment refers
only to suits against a State by citizens of another State, we have repeatedly held that an
unconsenting State also is immune from suits by its own citizens.” Tennessee Student Assistance
Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 446 (2004) (emphasis added; citation omitted).
In other words, “[b]ecause of the Eleventh Amendment, States may not be sued in federal
court unless they consent to it in unequivocal terms or unless Congress, pursuant to a valid exercise
of power, unequivocally expresses its intent to abrogate the immunity.” Green v. Mansour, 474
U.S. 64, 68 (1985). The State of Louisiana has not consented to waive immunity. Cozzo v.
Tangipahoa Parish Council-President Government, 279 F.3d 273, 281 (5th Cir. 2002) (“By statute,
Louisiana has refused any ... waiver of its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity regarding
suits in federal court. See La Rev. Stat. § 13:5106(A).”). Additionally, Congress has not abrogated
Eleventh Amendment immunity for cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Quern v.
Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979) (“[W]e simply are unwilling to believe … that Congress
intended by the general language of § 1983 to override the traditional sovereign immunity of the
States.”).
Therefore, Eleventh Amendment immunity is applicable to § 1983 claims against the State
of Louisiana, and by extension, to official-capacity claims for monetary damages against Louisiana
state officers. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985) (“The Court has held that, absent
waiver by the State or valid congressional override, the Eleventh Amendment bars a damages
action against a State in federal court. This bar remains in effect when State officials are sued for
damages in their official capacity.”) (footnote and citation omitted); McKinley v. Abbott, 643 F.3d
403, 406 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to state officials who are sued
in their official capacities because such a suit is actually one against the state itself.”); K.P. v.
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LeBlanc, 627 F.3d 115, 124 (5th Cir. 2010) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits by private
citizens against a state in federal court. The bar applies not only to the state itself, but also protects
state actors in their official capacities.” (citations omitted)).
“When the Eleventh Amendment applies, [federal] courts [further] lack subject-matter
jurisdiction over the claim.” Bryant v. Texas Dep’t of Aging & Disability Services, 781 F.3d 764,
769 (5th Cir. 2015); see Harris v. Louisiana Dep’t of Pub.c Safety & Corrections, No. 22-2473,
2023 WL 3612400, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 28, 2023) (Roby, M.J.) (recommending that official-
capacity claims against state officials for monetary damages were barred by the Eleventh
Amendment and so should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)), adopted as modified, 2023
WL 3601656 (E.D. La. May 23, 2023) (Vance, J.) (adopting recommendation but modifying
dismissal to be without prejudice); Brenckle v. MacFay, No. 17-13500, 2018 WL 3340382, at *1
(E.D. La. Apr. 2, 2018) (Knowles, M.J.), adopted, 2018 WL 3329075 (E.D. La. July 6, 2018)
(Barbier, J.).
In this case, RCC is a facility operated by the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and
Corrections that provides for the custody of incarcerated individuals. Therefore, the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction as to all Defendants who employees of RCC because they are
considered arms of the state and therefore immune from suit in their official capacities.
Even apart from Eleventh Amendment immunity, Porter’s claims for monetary damages
fail for additional reasons. First, state officials sued in their official capacities do not qualify as
“persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’
under § 1983.”). Second, monetary damages are not available for claims brought against state
employees in their official capacities under RLUIPA. Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, 560
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F.3d 316, 331 (5th Cir. 2009), aff’d sub. Nom., Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2011); DeMoss
v. Crain, 636 F.3d 145, 151 (5th Cir. 2011) (“RLUIPA does not create a cause of action for damages
against [the defendants] in their official capacities …”) (quotation omitted).
Hence, 	Porter’s 	RLUIPA 	official-capacity 	claims 	for 	monetary 	damages 	against
Defendants should be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and § 1915A as
frivolous and otherwise for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
ii. 	Individual Capacity
Defendants also assert that RLUIPA does not create a cause of action against them in their
individual capacities. ECF No. 39-1 at 7.
While the Eleventh Amendment bars suing state actors in their official capacities, it does
not bar suit against officials in their individual capacities. Martin v. Thomas, 973 F.2d 449, 458
(5th Cir. 1992) (“The Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against officials in their individual
capacities.”); accord Kermode v. University of Mississippi Medical Center, 496 F. App’x 483, 491
(5th Cir. 2012) (“[A] plaintiff may sue state officers without implicating the state’s sovereign
immunity ... [by] fil[ing] suit against the state officers in their individual capacities for money
damages to be paid by the defendant individually and not by the state.”).
However, RLUIPA does not authorize a private cause of action against defendants in their
individual capacities. Landor v. Louisiana Dep’t of Corr. & Pub. Safety, 82 F.4th 337, 341 (5th
Cir. 2023) (“RLUIPA does not permit suits against officers in their individual capacities, which,
in turn, means claimants cannot recover monetary damages.”), cert. granted sub nom, Landor v.
LA DOC, No. 23-1197, 2025 WL 1727386 (U.S. June 23, 2025); Coleman v. Lincoln Parish
Detention Center, 858 F.3d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2017) (“RLUIPA does not authorize a private cause
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of action for compensatory or punitive damages against the appellees in their individual or official
capacities.”).
Therefore, any claims Porter has under RLUIPA against Defendants in their individual
capacities also must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and § 1915A as frivolous and
otherwise for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
B. 	Prison Litigation Reform Act
Finally, Defendants assert that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) precludes
Porter’s claims for compensatory damages as he does not allege facts demonstrating he suffered a
physical injury. ECF No. 39-1 at 9.
Monetary relief of this kind is prohibited under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Section 1997e(e)
provides that “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or
other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior
showing of physical injury.” The Fifth Circuit has made clear that this provision is based on the
relief sought by a prisoner and prevents a prisoner from seeking compensatory damages for
violations of federal law where no physical injury is alleged. See Geiger, 404 F.3d at 375.
In this case, Porter has not alleged any physical injury resulting from the facility cutting
his dreadlocks as a result of having a metal object in his hair. Porter only asserts mental anguish
resulting from the incident. ECF No. 21 at 7. As such, Porter’s request for monetary damages is
barred by § 1997e(e) and also should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and § 1915A
as frivolous and otherwise for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
C. 	The First Amendment
While not addressed by Defendants in their motion to dismiss, Porter’s claims may also be
addressed under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. In connection with the Court’s
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required frivolousness review, consideration will be given to the Free Exercise Clause and whether
it provides a claim.
“The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment” (applied to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment) “provides that ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...’” Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993) (emphasis in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. I). Prisoners do not
lose 	their 	First 	Amendment 	religious 	liberties, 	and 	they 	must 	be 	afforded 	“reasonable
opportunities” to exercise their religion “without fear of penalty.” Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322
n. 2 (1972); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987).
However, this right is subject to “reasonable restrictions and limitations necessitated by
penological interests.” McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564, 571-72 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “A burden on the inmate's right to free exercise is constitutionally
permissible so long as the restriction is ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’”
Tipton v. Lumpkin, No. SA-21-CV-00060-FB, 2022 WL 980278, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2022)
(quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). The same standard applies to states under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
To state a free exercise claim, a prisoner “must do more than point to the existence of a
generic First Amendment right. He must also establish that he exercised that right in a manner
consistent with his status as a prisoner.” Freeman v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Just., 369 F.3d 854, 864
(5th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original). Relevant factors for evaluating the reasonableness of a
regulation impinging on an inmate's First Amendment rights include:
(1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection” between the prison regulation and the
legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it, (2) whether there are alternative
means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates, (3) the impact
accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates,
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and on the allocation of prison resources generally, and (4) the availability of other
alternatives to the prison regulation in question that would accommodate the prisoners'
rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests.
Green v. Polunsky, 229 F.3d 486, 489-90 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90).
In this case, Porter does not explicitly challenge any RCC policy nor does he dispute that
any existing policy expresses the facility’s legitimate penological interests or the reasonable
relation between a policy and its interests. Although the validity of a facility’s penological purpose
behind a policy could be viewed as a fact-dependent inquiry, the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly stated
that “as a general matter”, grooming policies are rationally related to several valid penological
goals. See Toppins v. Day, 73 Fed. App'x 84, at *2 (5th Cir. 2003) (identifying goals of prisoner
security and inmate identification as among those advanced by Louisiana Department of
Corrections grooming policy); Green, 229 F.3d at 490–91 (concluding Texas Department of
Criminal Justice’s grooming policy advances valid penological goals of prisoner identification
(especially during escape), protection of guards against hidden contraband, and preventing
signaling of gang affiliation); Scott v. Miss. Dep't of Corr., 961 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir. 1992)
(concluding Mississippi Department of Corrections grooming policy was “reasonably related to
the prison's paramount security concerns”). Therefore, the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly dismissed
claims of prisoners challenging such policies under the First Amendment as frivolous or on a
threshold motion to dismiss. See Green, 229 F.3d at 490–91 (affirming dismissal of First
Amendment challenge to grooming policy's prohibition on inmate beards).
However, the Court need not reach the issue of whether any RCC policy has a compelling
penological interest as Porter does not request injunctive or declaratory relief. Despite using the
phrases “injunction relief” and “declaratory judgment,” Porter’s requested relief appears to be
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compensatory in nature as he repeatedly requests monetary compensation in the amount of $5,000
for each of his 48 dreadlocks that were cut. ECF No. 21-2 at 4. As previously discussed, Porter
cannot obtain compensatory damages without a showing of physical injury under the PRLA. See
Thomas v. Cooley, No. 23-0592, 2024 WL 4537088, *4 (W.D. La. Sept. 27, 2024) report and
recommendation adopted, No. 23-0592, 2024 WL 457152 (W.D. La. Oct. 21, 2024) (holding that
plaintiff did not allege facts showing he suffered a physical injury when his dreadlocks were cut
as a Rastafari and dismissing his claims for compensatory damages as barred by the PLRA);
Vaughn v. Collier, No. 22-2395, 2025 WL 1238373, *3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2025) (plaintiff did
not allege a physical injury and was not entitled to compensatory damages under § 1983 after
defendants cut his dreadlocks); see also Sheppard v. Collum, No. 21-55, 2021 WL 5315391, *2
(E.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2021) (highlighting the Fifth Circuit rejected plaintiff’s contention that cutting
his dreadlocks put him in danger of serious physical injury).
Even under the broadest of interpretations, or if Porter were to later articulate specific
injunctive or declaratory relief, any request against Defendants would be moot. Since the filing of
this suit, Porter has been transferred to the Louisiana State Penitentiary. ECF No. 44 (Notice of
Change of Address). All Defendants are employees at RCC and that is where the alleged events
occurred. Porter offers no suggestion that there is a strong likelihood that he will return to RCC.
Further, any suggestion of relief based on the possibility of transfer back to RCC is too
speculative to warrant relief. See Bailey v. Southerland, 821 F.2d 277, 279 (5th Cir.1987).
Therefore, any claims Porter may raise for injunctive relief are moot and he cannot proceed against
them. See Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock County, Tex., 929 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir.1991) (holding
that an inmate's transfer to a different facility mooted his claims for injunctive relief); Herman v.
Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 665 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that a transfer to a new correctional facility
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rendered an inmate's “claims for declaratory and injunctive relief moot”); see also Hoyt v. Big
Spring State Hosp., No. 6:15-cv-0003-BL, 2016 WL 7189844, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2016)
(holding that because plaintiff's request for injunctive relief was moot, he had no viable claim for
prospective injunctive relief under Ex parte Young).
Based on the foregoing reasons, to the degree Porter had a First Amendment claim, it
should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and § 1915A, and as applicable, 42 U.S.C. §
1997e, as frivolous and otherwise for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
D. 	Disciplinary Proceedings
Lastly, Porter claims his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated
when he was denied attendance at the disciplinary hearing where it was ordered that his dreadlocks
be cut. ECF No. 21-2 at 9.
Prisoners charged with rule violations are entitled to certain due process rights when the
disciplinary action may result in a sanction that will impose upon a liberty interest. Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995). As a general rule, only sanctions that result in loss of good
conduct time credits for inmates who are eligible for release on mandatory supervision, or that
otherwise directly and adversely affect release on mandatory supervision, will impend upon a
liberty interest. See Moody v. Miller, 864 F.2d 1178, 1180 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating “there is
certainly authority for the proposition that the due process clause requires that prisoners must be
given, in most cases, the opportunity to attended disciplinary hearings in which the prisoner is
threatened with the loss of good-time credits or the imposition of solitary confinement” (citing
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974) (holding that a prisoner “facing disciplinary
proceedings should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his
defense”)); Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31-32 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Although Sandin cites with
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approval cases in which it was held that state law could create a constitutional liberty interest in
good-time credits, or release on parole, it is difficult to see that any other deprivations in the prison
context ... will henceforth qualify for constitutional ‘liberty’ status.”) (citations omitted).
In this case, the result of the disciplinary proceeding that Porter was denied attendance
from was the cutting of his dreadlocks. In other words, Porter did not receive a loss of good time
credits nor was he placed in solitary confinement. Therefore, because the disciplinary proceedings
did not impose upon a liberty interest, Defendants denying Porter attendance at the hearing does
not rise to the level of a due process violation. See Howell v. Bridges, No. 9:22-CV-161, 2023 WL
10478799, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 9:22-CV-
161, 2024 WL 1251502 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2024) (dismissing with prejudice plaintiff’s claims
that denial of attendance at a disciplinary proceeding was a due process violation when the
proceeding did not impose upon a liberty interest).
Thus, Porter’s due process claims against Defendants from denying him attendance at his
disciplinary proceeding too should be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
and § 1915A as frivolous and otherwise for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
E. 	Frivolity Findings
For the reasons provided in this Report, Porter’s § 1983 claims are frivolous and otherwise
fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted. 	Thus, the Motion to Dismiss filed by
Defendants (ECF No. 39) and the Motion for Cross Summary Judgment filed by Porter (ECF No.
45) before the Court could complete its statutorily required frivolousness review, are rendered
moot by the findings and recommendations in this Report and should be denied without prejudice.
IV. 	RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons,
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It is therefore RECOMMENDED that Tomarcus Porter’s § 1983 claims against
Defendants Johnathen Tynes, Brooke Thomas, Billy Mersereau, Andria Johnson, Truly Dillon,
and Kevin Luper be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and §
1915A, and as applicable, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, as frivolous and otherwise for failure to state a claim
for which relief can be granted.
It is FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 39)
and Porter’s Motion for Cross Summary Judgment (ECF No. 45) be DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE as MOOT.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within fourteen (14) days
after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from
attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by
the district court, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will
result from a failure to object. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Assn., 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir.
1996).1
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 	day of November, 2025.
__________________________________
KAREN WELLS ROBY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
1 Douglass referenced the previously applicable ten-day period for the filing of objections. 	Effective
December 1, 2009, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) was amended to extend the period to fourteen days.
17th
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