Bradley v. Children's Hospital

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
AMY BRADLEY 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 25-1326
CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL 	SECTION “R” (1)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendant Children’s Hospital’s partial motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 1 Plaintiff
Amy Bradley did not respond directly to the motion, instead filing a First
Amended Complaint. 2 	Children’s Hospital amended the motion to dismiss
to address the Amended Complaint. 3 Bradley opposed the amended motion
to dismiss. 4 For the following reasons, the Court grants defendant’s motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND
In her complaint, Bradley alleges that she was born in 1965 and began
working for Children’s Hospital in 1996. 5 	Over the next twenty years, she
allegedly served in various roles as a staff nurse and charge nurse in the
1 	R. Doc. 3.
2 	R. Doc. 5.
3 	R. Doc. 7.
4 	R. Doc. 10.
5 	R. Doc. 1, at 7.
Case 2:25-cv-01326-SSV-JVM Document 12 Filed 10/31/25 Page 1 of 9

2
pediatric intensive care unit and the emergency room. 6 Bradley alleges that
she 	applied 	for 	the 	clinical 	lead 	position 	for 	the 	Children’s 	Hospital
Emergency Room in Metairie in March 2023.7 	Bradley alleges that despite
being 	highly 	qualified 	and 	having 	over 	twenty-five 	years 	of 	nursing
experience, the lead position was awarded to a nurse with only six to eight
years of nursing experience and no clinical lead experience.8 	After the
selection of the other nurse, Bradley spoke to her supervisor, who allegedly
told Bradley that the panel’s selection was unanimous. 9 Bradley alleges that
she later learned that the panel members did not make a final selection and
instead merely “highlighted qualities,” contradicting the information she
received from her supervisor. 10
In March 2024, the nurse to whom the lead position had been awarded
allegedly vacated the position. 11 	Bradley avers that she informed her
supervisor that she was interested in the position, and her supervisor said
the position would remain vacant. 12 	The complaint alleges that shortly
6 	Id. at 2-4.
7 	R. Doc. 1, at 5.
8 	Id.
9 	R. Doc. 5, at 5.
10 	Id.
11 	Id.
12 	Id.
Case 2:25-cv-01326-SSV-JVM Document 12 Filed 10/31/25 Page 2 of 9

3
thereafter, a young nurse with significantly less experience as a charge nurse
than Bradley received the promotion. 13
Bradley filed a Charge of Discrimination against Children’s Hospital
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on January
23, 2025. 14 	The EEOC dismissed the charge and confirmed Bradley’s right
to sue on March 31, 2025.
On 	June 	27, 	2025, 	Bradley 	filed 	a 	complaint 	against 	Children’s
Hospital 	in 	this 	Court 	for 	a 	violation 	of 	the 	Age 	Discrimination 	in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). 15 	Bradley demanded a declaratory
judgment; damages including back pay, front pay, liquidated damages, and
punitive damages; pre- and post-judgment interest; costs and disbursements
from the action; and compensatory and punitive damages for emotional
distress, humiliation, embarrassment, and anguish.16
13 	Id. at 6.
14 	Id. at 9. Children’s Hospital asserts that Bradley filed the Charge of
Discrimination 	on 	December 	12, 	2024. 	R. 	Doc. 	3-1, 	at 	3. 	A
discrimination charge is considered “filed” on the date that the EEOC
receives the charge, not the date that the charge is signed or mailed.
Taylor v. Gen. Telephone Co. of the Southwest, 759 F.2d 437, 441-42
(5th Cir. 1985). The December 12, 2024 date is when Bradley signed
the charge. R. Doc. 1-3, at 1. There is no further information provided
as to the date the EEOC received the charge.
15 	Id. at 6.
16 	Id. at 10-11.
Case 2:25-cv-01326-SSV-JVM Document 12 Filed 10/31/25 Page 3 of 9

4
Children’s Hospital moved to partially dismiss the claim under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. 17 	Bradley then filed a First Amended Complaint that
requested equitable tolling of the EEOC filing deadline and withdrew the
claims for compensatory and punitive damages. 18 	Children’s Hospital then
amended the partial motion to dismiss, addressing the equitable tolling
argument. 19
The Court considers the motion below.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead
enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible
“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court must accept all well-
pleaded facts as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff. 	Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 239, 244 (5th Cir.
17 	R. Doc. 3.
18 	R. Doc. 5.
19 	R. Doc. 7.
Case 2:25-cv-01326-SSV-JVM Document 12 Filed 10/31/25 Page 4 of 9

5
2009). But the Court is not bound to accept as true legal conclusions couched
as factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
A legally sufficient complaint must establish more than a “sheer
possibility” that the party’s claim is true. See id. It need not contain “detailed
factual allegations,” but it must go beyond “‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’” 	See id. 	(quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In other words, “[t]he complaint (1) on its face
(2) must contain enough factual matter (taken as true) (3) to raise a
reasonable hope or expectation (4) that discovery will reveal relevant
evidence of each element of a claim.” 	Lormand, 565 F.3d at 257 (cleaned
up). The claim must be dismissed if there are insufficient factual allegations
“to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555, or if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that there is an
insuperable bar to relief, see Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 	199, 215 (2007).
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate when it is evident from the
pleadings that the action is barred by the statute of limitations and there is
no basis for tolling. Jones v. Alcoa, Inc., 339 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 2003).
III. 	DISCUSSION
In Louisiana, a plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the
EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory conduct. 	Janmeja v.
Case 2:25-cv-01326-SSV-JVM Document 12 Filed 10/31/25 Page 5 of 9

6
Bd. of Sup’rs of La. State Univ. & Agric. & Mech. College, 96 F. App’x 212,
214 (5th Cir. 2004); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). 	Promotion denials are
discrete acts that trigger separate EEOC filing periods. Nat’l R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002). 	Here, Bradley asserts that she
filed the charge with the EEOC on January 23, 2025. Accordingly, any claims
based on discrete acts that occurred 300 days before January 23, 2025, i.e.,
before March 9, 2024, would be time-barred. Children’s Hospital moves to
dismiss Bradley’s March 2023 promotion denial claims as time-barred. 20
Filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a
jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but rather a requirement,
like a statute of limitations, that is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable
tolling. Taylor v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 554 F.3d 510, 521 (5th Cir. 2008).
Equitable tolling is to be applied “sparingly.” 	Granger v. Aaron’s Inc., 636
F.3d 708, 712 (5th Cir. 2011). 	The plaintiff has the burden of justifying
equitable tolling. Id.
Bradley asserts that the Court should equitably toll the 300-day filing
period. 21 	The Fifth Circuit applies equitable tolling to the limitation period
on filing a charge of employment discrimination. 	Manning, 332 F.3d 874,
20 	R. Doc. 3-1, at 3.
21 	R. Doc. 5, at 7.
Case 2:25-cv-01326-SSV-JVM Document 12 Filed 10/31/25 Page 6 of 9

7
880 (5th Cir. 2003). 	The Fifth Circuit has held that there are at least three
bases for equitable tolling in cases involving the EEOC: (1) pending a suit
between the same parties in the wrong forum; (2) plaintiff’s unawareness of
facts giving rise to the claim because of defendant’s intentional concealment;
or (3) the EEOC misleading the plaintiff about the nature of her rights. Hood
v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 168 F.3d 231, 232 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that there
may be other bases that warrant equitable tolling).
Bradley asserts the second ground here. 	Bradley alleges that her
supervisor actively misled her about the March 2023 promotion process. 22
Bradley pleads that defendant’s “misrepresentation and concealment of the
true facts of the promotion process” prevented her “from discovering that
age discrimination was a likely cause of the denial.” 23 Bradley alleges that her
supervisor 	led 	her 	to 	believe 	that 	a 	selection 	panel 	unanimously
recommended 	a 	different 	nurse, 	which 	prevented 	Bradley 	from
understanding the discriminatory action behind the failure to promote her. 24
These pleadings do not plausibly allege facts sufficient for equitable
tolling at this stage. Here, Bradley knew that a younger employee was hired
for the March 2023 promotion in March 2023. That alone sufficed to place
22 	Id. at 5-6.
23 	Id. at 7.
24 	Id. at 5.
Case 2:25-cv-01326-SSV-JVM Document 12 Filed 10/31/25 Page 7 of 9

8
her on notice of an ADEA claim. See Conaway v. Control Data Corp, 955
F.2d 258, 362 (5th Cir. 1992) (“This court has held that a plaintiff knows
enough to support filing a claim when that plaintiff is ‘aware that she is being
replaced in a position she believes she is able to handle by a person outside
the protected age group.’”) (quoting Blumberg v. HCA Management Co.,
848 F.2d 642, 645 (5th Cir. 1988)).
That Bradley allegedly thought the decision was unanimous does not
alter the analysis. Plaintiff does not allege facts indicating why a unanimous
decision would foreclose age discrimination, nor is there basis in law for this
to be true. The Amended Complaint fails to plead factual content sufficient
to establish the reasonable inferences required for equitable tolling to apply.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff has not plausibly that this is the rare and
exceptional case in which equitable tolling should apply. 	McCollum v.
Puckett Machinery Co., 628 F. App’x 225, 229 (2015).
Dismissal under 12(b)(6) for a time-bar is appropriate when it is
evident from the pleadings that the action is time-barred, and plaintiff has
presented no basis for tolling. 	Jones, 339 F.3d at 366. 	Here, it is evident
from the pleadings that the action as to the March 2023 promotion is time-
barred and Bradley has presented no basis for tolling. 	The Court grants
defendant’s partial motion to dismiss the claims.
Case 2:25-cv-01326-SSV-JVM Document 12 Filed 10/31/25 Page 8 of 9

9
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant’s partial
motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of October, 2025.
_____________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
31st
Case 2:25-cv-01326-SSV-JVM Document 12 Filed 10/31/25 Page 9 of 9