Miller v. Penn Entertainment, Inc. et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ROBMONIQUE MILLER 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO: 25-1497
PENN ENTERTAINMENT, INC. ET AL. 	SECTION “H”
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant Louisiana-I Gaming, a Louisiana
Partnership in Commendam d/b/a/ Boomtown Casino & Hotel New Orleans’s
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 17). For the following reasons, the Motion is
GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Robmonique Miller filed this pro se action arising out of her
termination from her job as an assistant beverage manager at Boomtown
Casino.1 Plaintiff alleges that her termination was the result of race and
disability discrimination in violation of Title VII and the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Defendant Louisiana-I Gaming has moved to dismiss
1 The defendant is Louisiana-I Gaming, a Louisiana Partnership in Commendam
d/b/a/ Boomtown Casino & Hotel New Orleans. Plaintiff incorrectly identified the defendant
as Penn Entertainment Boom Town Casino.
Case 2:25-cv-01497-JTM-EJD Document 29 Filed 01/29/26 Page 1 of 8

2
Plaintiff’s claims, alleging that she has failed to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. Plaintiff opposes.
LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead
enough facts “to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”2 A claim is
“plausible on its face” when the pleaded facts allow the court to “draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”3
A court must accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and must “draw
all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.”4 The court need not, however,
accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.5 To be legally
sufficient, a complaint must establish more than a “sheer possibility” that the
plaintiff’s claims are true.6 If it is apparent from the face of the complaint that
an insurmountable bar to relief exists and the plaintiff is not entitled to relief,
the 	court 	must 	dismiss 	the 	claim.7 The 	court’s 	review 	is 	limited 	to 	the
complaint and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are
central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.8
2 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 547 (2007)).
3 Id.
4 Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009).
5 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
6 Id.
7 Lormand, 565 F.3d at 255–57.
8 Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000).
Case 2:25-cv-01497-JTM-EJD Document 29 Filed 01/29/26 Page 2 of 8

3
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Plaintiff’s 	Complaint 	alleges 	that 	she 	was 	retaliated 	against 	and
wrongfully terminated after “agreeing that some text messages were about
another manager” and failing to escalate the matter. She alleges that these
accusations were false. To her Complaint, she attaches the charge filed with
the EEOC, which contains some additional details. Therein, she alleged that
the stated reason for her discharge was “showing a team member several text
messages which caused him to feel threatened.” She also alleged that:
[O]n June 11, 2024, after I was physically attacked on the job by a
drunk server, nothing was done to change the policies. I heard
Quentina on the phone stating that she didn’t understand me and
that I claimed to be hurt, and my personal life was a mess. After I
informed Gretchen that I overheard Quentin’s conversation, I
asked for the corporate number, but she refused to provide the
number for the corporate office. In July 2024, after I was written
up by Scott McKinley, he stated that everything he was doing to
me was because they made him do it. In August 2024 after two of
my 	subordinates 	engaged 	in 	an 	altercation, 	I 	received 	many
derogatory messages from one subordinate insinuating that he
wanted to hurt someone. Zachary Harvin (Asst Casino Manager)
stated that themessages were about him. Quentina asked to see
the messages, but I refused to provide a copy of them. On August
16, 2024, I was suspended pending an investigation. On August
21, 2024, I was discharged.
Defendant alleges that these allegations do not state a claim under either Title
VII or the ADA. This Court will consider each in turn.
A. Title VII Discrimination and Disparate Treatment
First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to plead a prima facie
case of Title VII discrimination or disparate treatment. “A plaintiff establishes
a prima facie case of race-based discrimination if he demonstrates that he (1)
Case 2:25-cv-01497-JTM-EJD Document 29 Filed 01/29/26 Page 3 of 8

4
is a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified for the position; (3) was
subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) was replaced by someone
outside of the protected class, or, in the case of disparate treatment, shows that
other 	similarly 	situated 	employees 	were 	treated 	more 	favorably.”9 	Here,
Plaintiff fails to allege any facts supporting the fourth prong of a prima facie
case. Neither her Complaint nor the EEOC Charge indicate that she was
replaced by someone of a different race or that similarly situated employees
were treated more favorably. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a
Title VII claim.
In her Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff provides
further 	details 	regarding 	her 	claim. 	There, 	Plaintiff 	lists 	several 	other
employees of varying races who violated workplace rules and the discipline
they received. Defendant argues that none of these employees is similarly
situated to Plaintiff to state a disparate treatment claim under Title VII. “In
disparate treatment cases, the plaintiff-employee must show ‘nearly identical’
circumstances for employees to be considered similarly situated.”10 “[I]f a
plaintiff proffers a comparator, the employment actions being compared will
be deemed to have been taken under nearly identical circumstances when the
employees being compared: (1) held the same job or responsibilities; (2) shared
the same supervisor or had their employment status determined by the same
person; and (3) have essentially comparable violation histories.”11 None of the
comparators listed by Plaintiff in her Opposition worked as an assistant
9 Standley v. Rogers, 680 F. App’x 326, 327 (5th Cir. 2017).
10 Willis v. Napolitano, 986 F. Supp. 2d 738, 745 (M.D. La. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Willis
v. United States, 576 F. App’x 340 (5th Cir. 2014).
11 Id.
Case 2:25-cv-01497-JTM-EJD Document 29 Filed 01/29/26 Page 4 of 8

5
beverage manager, and none of their violations involved failing to properly
escalate an issue to human resources.12 Accordingly, even considering these
facts outside of the Complaint, Plaintiff has not alleged facts supporting a
claim that similarly situated employees of a different race were treated more
favorably than her. Therefore, Plaintiff has not stated a discrimination or
disparate treatment claim under Title VII.
B. ADA Discrimination
Defendant next argues that Plaintiff has failed to state an ADA claim.
“To make out a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA [Plaintiff]
must show that (a) [she] has a disability; (b) [she] is a qualified individual for
the job in question; and (c) an adverse employment decision was made because
of his disability.”13 The ADA defines a “disability” as “a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such
individual; a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as having such
an impairment.14
Plaintiff’s Complaint and the EEOC charge attached do not allege any
disability or physical or mental challenge. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint
does not state a claim under the ADA. In her Opposition, Plaintiff alleges that
she was physically attacked at work in June 2024—just a few months before
she was terminated. She alleges that the psychological impact of the attack
12 Plaintiff alleges facts regarding workplace violations by Caucasian and Hispanic
workers who served as a barback, server, bartender, dual-rate supervisor, and table game
supervisor. Doc. 24. The employee-comparators that Plaintiff provides were accused of
physical altercations, threatening guests or team members, or using inappropriate language.
13 Hamilton v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1050 (5th Cir. 1998).
14 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102.
Case 2:25-cv-01497-JTM-EJD Document 29 Filed 01/29/26 Page 5 of 8

6
“proved to be significantly debilitating.”15 She alleges she was diagnosed with
PTSD, anxiety disorder, and clinical depression and that “at one point,” she
was unable to leave her home due to fear.16 Even assuming these allegations
are sufficient to allege a disability under the ADA,17 however, Plaintiff does
not include any allegation that her PTSD, anxiety disorder, and clinical
depression were the cause of her termination. Indeed, Plaintiff alleges that she
was terminated because she was falsely accused of failing to escalate an
employee matter to human resources. Accordingly, even considering these
additional facts, Plaintiff has not alleged an ADA discrimination claim.
C. Title VII and ADA Retaliation
Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege a retaliation
claim under either Title VII or the ADA. To establish a prima facie case of
retaliation under either law, Plaintiff must allege, among other things, that
she engaged in an activity protected by either Title VII or the ADA.18 An
employee has engaged in an activity protected by Title VII or the ADA if she
has either (1) “opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice”
by 	Title 	VII 	or 	the 	ADA, 	or 	(2) 	“made 	a 	charge, 	testified, 	assisted, 	or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under
Title VII or the ADA.19 	In addition, “making a request for a reasonable
15 Doc. 24.
16 Id.
17 “PTSD . . . standing alone, is not necessarily a disability contemplated by the ADA.
The statute requires an impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities.” Hamilton, 136 F.3d at 1050.
18 Feist v. Louisiana, Dep’t of Just., Off. of the Atty. Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 454 (5th Cir.
2013). 19 Grimes v. Texas Dep’t of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 102 F.3d 137, 140
(5th Cir. 1996); Way v. City of Missouri City, 133 F.4th 509, 522 (5th Cir. 2025).
Case 2:25-cv-01497-JTM-EJD Document 29 Filed 01/29/26 Page 6 of 8

7
accommodation 	under 	the 	ADA 	constitutes 	‘participat[ing] 	in 	an 	activity
protected under the statute.’”20
Plaintiff’s Complaint and the EEOC Charge attached do not allege that
she engaged in any protected activity. Accordingly, she has not stated a claim
for ADA or Title VII retaliation. In her Opposition to this Motion, Plaintiff
appears to allege that her termination was in retaliation for filing a worker’s
compensation claim as a result of the June 2024 physical altercation with
another employee. She alleges that after filing her worker’s compensation
claim, she observed a shift in her work conditions and treatment, including
schedule changes and denial of leave. She alleges that these adverse actions
were a result of her worker’s compensation claim. The filing of a worker’s
compensation claim, however, is not a protected activity under either Title VII
or the ADA. Instead, employees are protected from discrimination following
the filing of worker’s compensation claims under state law.21 Accordingly, even
considering the additional facts alleged in her Opposition, Plaintiff has not
stated a Title VII or ADA claim.
D. Leave to Amend
Having found that Plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded any claim, the
Court 	must 	consider 	whether 	she 	should 	be 	given 	leave 	to 	amend 	her
Complaint. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) “requires courts ‘freely give
leave [to amend] when justice so requires.’”22 The Fifth Circuit has held that
20 Way, 133 F.4th at 522 (quoting Feist, 730 F.3d at 454).
21 See LA. REV. S TAT. § 23:1361. Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under
federal law, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear a state law claim for worker’s compensation
discrimination.
22 Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting FED. R. CIV. PRO. 15).
Case 2:25-cv-01497-JTM-EJD Document 29 Filed 01/29/26 Page 7 of 8

8
courts “may not dismiss a complaint under [R]ule 12(b)(6) ‘unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief.’”23 Accordingly, Plaintiff shall be given leave
to amend.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is GRANTED, and Plaintiff shall
amend her Complaint within 20 days of this Order to the extent that she can
remedy the deficiencies identified herein. Failure to amend will result in
dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 29th day of January, 2026.
____________________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
23 Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 873 (5th Cir. 2000).
Case 2:25-cv-01497-JTM-EJD Document 29 Filed 01/29/26 Page 8 of 8