Wright v. Honeywell International, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DONALD WEIGHT CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, NO. 22-00928-BAJ-SDJ
INC.
RULING AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. 78).
The Motion is opposed. (Doc. 84). Defendant filed a Reply Brief. (Doc. 88). For the
following reasons, Defendant's Motion (Doc. 78) is DENIED.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit articulated a brief
summary of this case as follows:
[Plaintiff] Donald Wright worked for [Defendant] Honeywell
International for fourteen years. When Honeywell implemented a
mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy in 2021, Wright applied for a
religious exemption to the policy but was denied. Honeywell then fired
Wright for failing to get the vaccine. Wright sued Honeywell under
Title VII for religious discrimination and disparate treatment based on
religion.
(Doc. 70 at 1).
The following facts are undisputed. On or about February 11, 2008, Plaintiff
began his employment with Defendant. (Doc. 97 T| 1). Beginning on
February 11, 2008, and through his termination on May 13, 2022, Defendant
employed Plaintiff at the Honeywell Specialty Materials facility in Baton Rouge,
Case 3:22-cv-00928-BAJ-SDJ Document 117 01/29/26 Page 1 of 16

Louisiana ("Honeywell Specialty Materials"). (Id. ^ 2).
Honeywell Specialty Materials is a continuous operation chemical processing
plant, operating 24 hours per day, 365 days per year. (Id. ^ 3). Defendant hired
Plaintiff as a C-Class Operator, and he most recently held the position of Dock B
Operator, working at an hourly rate of about $30.41 per hour for approximately 40
hours per week with occasional overtime. (Id. *j 4).
Beginning in March 2020, the COVID-19 ("COVID") pandemic posed a grave
threat to the health and safety of Americans and individuals across the world.
{Id. Tf 10). On September 9, 2021, President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. issued
Executive Order ("E.O.") 14042, entitled "Ensuring Adequate COVID-19 Safety
Protocols for Federal Contractors." (Id. ^ 11). E.0.14042 required federal contractors,
such as Defendant, to ensure that all employees who work on or in connection with a
federal contract to become fully vaccinated against COVID-19 or receive approval for
a medical or religious exemption. (Id. ^ 12).
In response to E.0.14042, Defendant adopted a mandatory COVID vaccination
policy ("Vaccination Policy") in late 2021. (Id. *j 13). By implementing its Vaccination
Policy, Defendant prioritized the health and safety of its employees (and the public
with whom its employees interact), and the Company made the decision to establish
this policy pursuant to the following: (1) guidance from public health organizations
like the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC");
Case 3:22-cv-00928-BAJ-SDJ Document 117 01/29/26 Page 2 of 16

(2) President Biden's E.O. 14042; and (3) other medical organizations' strong
recommendations supporting mandatory vaccinations. (Id. ^ 14).
Defendant's Vaccination Policy set forth Defendant's strong belief "that
vaccinations remain a vital way to protect the health and safety of [its] employees,
work sites, and customers." (Id. ^ 15). Defendant further cited in its Vaccination
Policy its published study finding that "87% of respondents surveyed on perceptions
and feelings about health and safety in the workplace expressed concern about
returning to an office as COVID-19 variants spread," and Defendant determined that
a largely vaccinated workforce . . . help[s] to address those concerns. {Id. ^ 16).
Plaintiff received a copy of Defendant's Vaccination Policy via email. (Id. ^ 17).
Under the Vaccination Policy, Plaintiff was required to get fully vaccinated for
COVID by April 15, 2022, unless he requested a medical or religious exemption and
Defendant granted that request. (Id. ^ 18). Defendant s religious exemption request
policy states the following:
Honeywell ("Company") is committed to providing equal employment
opportunities without regard to any protected status and a work
environment that is free of unlawful harassment, discrimination, and
retaliation. As such, the Company takes its obligations to provide
reasonable accommodation to persons with sincerely held religious
beliefs seriously. When requested, the Company will provide an
exemption/accommodation for an employee/candidate who adequately
articulates a sincerely held religious belief that prohibits the
employee/candidate from receiving a COVID-19 vaccine, provided the
requested exemption/accommodation is reasonable and does not create
an undue hardship for the Company or pose a direct threat to the health
and/or safety of others in the workplace and/or to the requesting
employee/candidate.
Case 3:22-cv-00928-BAJ-SDJ Document 117 01/29/26 Page 3 of 16

{Id. ^ 19).
Plaintiff requested a religious exemption to Defendant's Vaccination Policy.
(Id. ^ 20). On or around February 22, 2022, Plaintiff submitted his initial religious
exemption request from the Vaccination Policy. (Id. ^ 21). By signing his request,
Plaintiff verified the following:
[T]he information that you are submitting in support of your request for
an exemption/accommodation is complete and accurate to the best of
your knowledge, and you understand that any intentional
misrepresentation contained in this request may result in discipline in
action up to and including termination of employment. You also
understand that your request for an exemption/accommodation may not
be granted if (i) it is determined that your beliefs are not religious or
sincerely held, (ii) your requested accommodation is not reasonable, (iii)
it poses a direct threat to the health and/or safety of others in the
workplace and/or to you, or (iv) it creates an undue hardship on the
Company.
(Id. TT 22).
Plaintiffs exemption request indicated he had never sought a religious
exemption or accommodation for a mandatory vaccine for himself or his minor
children in the past, stating, "My parents [weren't] as informed as we are today we
are living in a different time. (Id. ^ 23). In response to the request s prompt to Please
thoroughly describe the nature of your religious beliefs and why it prevents you from
getting a COVID-19 vaccine," Plaintiff responded:
I am a Baptist, but my beliefs goQ way beyond that [I] bel[ie]ve our
creator gave us this gift to choose and decide for ourselves it is also in
our constitution no man should be forced to do something he [or] she is
not comfortable with and in my opinion this is a decision [that]
shouldn[']t require people having to choose between one [or] another.
4
Case 3:22-cv-00928-BAJ-SDJ Document 117 01/29/26 Page 4 of 16

(M ^T 24).
Plaintiff described the "gift" referenced in his exemption request as "[m]y
temple" and "[t]he freedom to choose what I put in my own temple" or body .
(Id. ^ 25). In response to the request's prompt stating "If a central tenet of this
religion prevents you from getting a COVID-19 vaccine, please explain the basis[,]
Plaintiff responded, "[I] won[']t say i[t] prevents me but cert[ai]n passages le[ad] me
to feel very strongly about my dec[i]sion." (Id. ^ 26).
In response to the request's prompt to either: (1) state if he had always followed
his identified religious beliefs; or (2) if not, specify when and why his religious belief
changed, Plaintiff responded, "N/A" or "not applicable." (Id. H 27). Plaintiff stated in
his request that he remembered receiving one vaccine in the last five years. (Id. ^
28). Plaintiff clarified at his deposition that he was referring to getting a tetanus
vaccine in 2015 and noted he "didn[']t like the respon[s]e [his] body had from i[t].
(Id.). In response to the request's prompt to explain the difference between his prior
tetanus vaccine and the COVID vaccine in terms of his sincerely held religious beliefs,
Plaintiff responded, "N/A" or "not applicable." (Id. ^ 29).
In response to the request s prompt to Describe the accommodations you
believe are needed to enable you to perform the essential functions of this job,
Plaintiff stated, "[I] do not need accom[mo]dation [I] mainly work alone there are
o[nly] two [I] come in contact with and [I] try to keep my distance and wear a mask.'
{Id. U 30).
Case 3:22-cv-00928-BAJ-SDJ Document 117 01/29/26 Page 5 of 16

Defendant asked Plaintiff to supplement his exemption request because he
failed to attach a third-party attestation letter to his initial request, as required in
the request's instructions. (Id. ^ 31). On or around March 14, 2022, Plaintiff
submitted a supplemental request, attaching a handwritten letter from his daughter,
Damera Gallow, which stated:
It is in our belief that humans should only use things that are created of
the earth by God. We believe the vaccine is a claim of the mark of the
beast it is man made and goes against our religion. It starts with the
vaccine that controls us making us unable to make purchases without
it. As quoted in Revelation [Chapter] 13[,] Verse 16-17[,] "and he
causeth all, both small and great, rich and poor [,] free and bond to
rec[ei]ve in the right hand of in their forehead: And that no man might
buy or sell, save he that had the mark of the beast or the number of his
name." We should be free to make our own choices with the body and
soul God gave us.
(Id. Ti 32).
James Schwab was Vice President, Human Resources & Communications
within the Performance Materials and Technologies ("PMT") business group at
Honeywell during the implementation of Defendant's Vaccination Policy, and he took
part in the review of employee requests for religious and medical exemptions from
this policy. (Id. ^ 33). With legal guidance from Defendant's Legal Department,
Schwab personally reviewed medical and religious exemption requests for some of the
PMT employees, including some employees at the Honeywell Specialty M.aterials
facility in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, which was part of PMT. (Id. ^ 34). For those
exemption requests Schwab reviewed of certain PMT employees, Schwab was the
decision-maker for whether to approve or deny the exemption request. (Id. ^ 35).
6
Case 3:22-cv-00928-BAJ-SDJ Document 117 01/29/26 Page 6 of 16

Schwab reviewed 12 of the 42 religious exemption requests received from
Honeywell Specialty Materials, while other decision-makers reviewed the remaining
requests at this facility. (Id. ^ 36). Schwab personally reviewed Plaintiffs religious
exemption request. (Id. 1 37).
Of the 42 religious exemption requests received from Honeywell Specialty
Materials, Defendant granted 40 requests and denied 2 requests. (Id. ^ 39). The 2
denials were Plaintiffs request and Justin Daniel's request. (Id. ^ 40). Daniel's
request was denied because he plagiarized another employee's exemption request.
(Id. ^ 41). Defendant also denied Plaintiffs request because he indicated he received
a prior non-COVID vaccine but provided a response of"N/A" or "not applicable" to the
prompt asking him to explain what was different about the COVID vaccine in terms
of his sincerely held religious beliefs. (Id. Tf 38).
On or around March 22, 2022, Defendant issued Plaintiff a written denial,
signed by Schwab, of Plaintiffs request for religious exemption to Defendants
Vaccination Policy, stating the following:
While we do not doubt that you are a religious person, your submission
did not adequately identify any sincerely held religious belief or tenet
that would prohibit you from taking the COVID-19 vaccine, beyond
freedom of choice. Your submission also indicates that you previously
received a vaccine and didn't like the response your body had from it.
The information contained in your submission is not sufficient to
support a religious accommodation under the law.
(M TT 42).
Case 3:22-cv-00928-BAJ-SDJ Document 117 01/29/26 Page 7 of 16

Because of the denial of Plaintiffs religious exemption request, Defendant
informed Plaintiff that, per the Vaccination Policy, he must get vaccinated for COVID
no later than the extended deadline of May 5, 2022, or else he would be terminated.
(Id. ^ 43). On or around April 22, 2022, Defendant placed Plaintiff on suspension
because he was not vaccinated for COVID-19. (Id. *j 44).
Plaintiff did not get the COVID vaccine on or before May 5, 2022. (Id. ^ 46).
On May 13, 2023, Human Resource Manager Gregory Panger telephoned and texted
Plaintiff to inform him that, effective that day, Plaintiffs employment was
terminated. {Id. ^ 47). Plaintiffs "termination solely rested on the fact that he did not
get vaccinated" for COVID following Defendant's denial of Plaintiffs religious
exemption request, in violation of the Vaccination Policy. (Id. ^ 48).
Plaintiff testified that when he was terminated, Defendant told him his reason
for termination was "failure to follow [Defendant's] COVID mandates." {Id. ^ 49).
Plaintiff testified no one at Honeywell told him he was being terminated because of
his religion. (Id. ^ 50). Prior to Plaintiffs termination, Plaintiff never complained to
anyone at Honeywell that Defendant was discriminating against him. (Id. ^ 52).
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This is the second time Defendant has moved for summary judgment in this
case. In Defendant's initial IVIotion for Summary Judgment, Defendant asked the
Court to issue summary judgment in its favor on both of Plaintiff s claims: (1) failure
to accommodate a religious observance under Title VII; and (2) disparate treatment
8
Case 3:22-cv-00928-BAJ-SDJ Document 117 01/29/26 Page 8 of 16

based on religion under Title VII. (Id.).
The Court granted Defendant's Motion and dismissed both of Plaintiffs claims
under Title VII, finding, in relevant part, that Plaintiff did not provide competent
summary judgment evidence showing that Defendant failed to accommodate his
sincerely held religious beliefs. (Doc. 57). Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the
Court's Ruling and the Court denied the Motion. (Doc. 60; Doc. 66).
Plaintiff then appealed the portion of the Court's Ruling dismissing his failure
to accommodate claim to the Fifth Circuit. (Doc. 67). Plaintiff did not appeal the
portion of the Court's Ruling dismissing his disparate treatment claim.1
On appeal, the Circuit reversed the Court's Ruling and remanded the case to
this Court for further proceedings. The Circuit found:
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to [Plaintiff] and
drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, Gray, 18 F.4th at 467, a
reasonable jury could find that [Plaintiff] held at least a mixed motive
for his vaccine refusal: a bona fide religious belief alongside political
beliefs and personal preference.
(Doc. 70 at 10). The Circuit thus concluded: "Because a plaintiffs sincerity in
espousing a religious practice 'is largely a matter of individual credibility,' Davis,
1 Because Plaintiff did not appeal the Court's Ruling dismissing his disparate treatment
claim, the disparate treatment claim remains dismissed. Accordingly, Plaintiffs failure to
accommodate claim is the only claim remaining in this case. (See Doc. 70 at 6 (The Circuit's
Mandate emphasizing: [Plaintiff] appeals only the district courts ruling as to his religious
discrimination claim, not its ruling as to his disparate treatment claim."); see also Doc. 97 at
5 (The parties' Joint Pretrial Order indicating that "Plaintiffs disparate treatment claim
based on religion was dismissed by the district court and was not appealed to the Fifth
Circuit. Accordingly, the only remaining claim is Plaintiffs Title VII failure to accommodate
claim.")).
9
Case 3:22-cv-00928-BAJ-SDJ Document 117 01/29/26 Page 9 of 16

765 F.3d at 485-86 (quoting Tagore, 735 F.3d at 328), [Plaintiffs] evidence would be
better weighed by a jury than by the court at the summary judgment stage." (Id.).
The Circuit further found that Plaintiff submitted sufficient evidence for a reasonable
jury to return a verdict finding that Plaintiff informed Defendant that his belief was
religious. (Id.).
Following the Circuit's Mandate, the Court issued an Order requiring the
parties to file a Joint Status Report addressing the remaining claims and defenses in
light of the Circuit's Mandate. (Doc. 71). The parties filed the Joint Status Report,
indicating the following:
The Court Q did not rule on the portion of Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs claim for punitive
damages. Doc. 35-2, pp. 28-29; see Doc. 57. Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment has been fully briefed by the parties. Docs. 35, 41,
45. Defendant respectfully requests that this Court issue a substantive
ruling on Defendant's request for dismissal of Plaintiffs punitive
damages claim in this matter.
(Doc. 74 at 2). To promote clarity in the record, the Court ordered the parties to
re-file the Motion at issue. (Doc. 75).
In response to the Court's Order, Defendant re-filed its Motion for Summary
Judgment in its entirety as originally filed. (See Doc. 77 at 1). Defendant notified the
Court, however, that it only seeks a Ruling concerning Plaintiffs claim for punitive
damages. (Id.). Defendant further notified the Court that "[t]he remaining arguments
in Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment are not at issue before this Court, as
this Court, and the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, have already
10
Case 3:22-cv-00928-BAJ-SDJ Document 117 01/29/26 Page 10 of 16

addressed these arguments in substantive rulings." (Id. n.l). Thus, the Court will
address only the portion of Defendant's Motion asking the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs
claim for punitive damages.
For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion (Doc. 78) is DENIED.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A district court should grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Punches v. Progressive Tractor
& Implement Co., L.L.C., 905 F.3d 846, 849 (5th Gir. 2018) ("This occurs when a party
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.").
For issues on which the movant bears the burden of proof at trial, they "must
come forward with evidence which would entitle [them] to a directed verdict if the
evidence went uncontroverted at trial. Intl Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally s, Inc.,
939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991). The nonmoving party can then defeat the
motion by either countering with evidence establishing a genuine dispute of material
fact, or "showing that the moving party's evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade
the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving party. Id. at
1265.
Where the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party must
offer evidence that undermines the nonmovant s claim or point out the absence of
11
Case 3:22-cv-00928-BAJ-SDJ Document 117 01/29/26 Page 11 of 16

evidence supporting essential elements of the claim. See Lujan v.
Nat'l Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990). Once the movant shows
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the nonmovant must bring forward
evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. Giles v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
245 F.3d 474, 493 (5th Cir. 2001). "The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed,
and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [its] favor. Darden v.
City of Fort Worth, 880 F. 3d 722, 727 (5th Cir. 2018).
IV. DISCUSSION
Defendant asks the Court to issue summary judgment in its favor on Plaintiffs
claim for punitive damages, arguing that Plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages
because Defendant reasonably believed that its conduct in reviewing and denying
Plaintiffs request was lawful. (Doc. 78-2 at 29).
Plaintiff responds that the record before the Court would permit a jury to find
reckless indifference because Defendant denied Plaintiffs exemption request without
individualized consideration, approved nearly all others, and terminated Plaintiff
after fourteen years of service. (Doc. 84 at 4).
The Fifth Circuit has described the relevant standard as follows:
Proving punitive damages presents "a higher standard than the showing
necessary for compensatory damages, satisfied in 'only a subset of cases
involving intentional discrimination."' [E.E.O.C. v. Boh Bros. Const. Co.,
731 F.3d 444, 467 (5th Cir. 2013)] (quoting Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass n,
527 U.S. 526, 534 [| (1999)). Under Title VII, punitive damages are
recoverable only if the employer "engaged in a discriminatory practice .
. . with malice or with reckless indifference to [an employee s] federally
protected rights." 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(l). "The terms 'malice' or
12
Case 3:22-cv-00928-BAJ-SDJ Document 117 01/29/26 Page 12 of 16

'reckless indifference pertain to the employer's knowledge that it may
be acting in violation of federal law, not its awareness that it is engaging
in discrimination. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 535 Q.
Malice has been described as "evil motive or intent," and reckless
indifference has been described as "a 'subjective consciousness' of a risk
of injury or illegality and a 'criminal indifference to civil obligations.
Id. at 536 D (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 37 n. 6, 41, 56 []
(1983)). "Pointing to evidence of an employer's egregious behavior would
provide one means of satisfying the plaintiffs burden to 'demonstrate
that the employer acted with the requisite 'malice or ... reckless
indifference/" but "an employer's conduct need not be independently
'egregious' to satisfy § 1981a's requirements for punitive damages
award." Id. at 539, 546 D (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(l)).
Henry v. CorpCar Servs. Houston, Ltd., 625 F. App'x 607, 614 (5th Cir. 2015); see also
Williams v. E.I. du Font de Nemours & Co., 180 F. Supp. 3d 451, 465 (M.D. La. 2016).
"Moreover, [| if particular agents acted with malice or reckless indifference, an
employer may avoid vicarious punitive damages liability if it can show that it made
good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII." Harris v. FedEx Corp. Servs., Inc.,
92 F.4th 286, 302 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 168 (2024) (citing Boh Bros.,
731 F.3d at 467). "Given these stringent standards, a plaintiff faces ... a 'formidable
burden' in seeking punitive damages for employment discrimination. Harris,
92F.4th at 302 (citing Boh Bros., 731 F.3d at 467; quoting Canny v.
Dr. Pepper/Seven-Up Bottling Grp., Inc., 439 F.3d 894, 903 (8th Cir. 2006)).
The Circuit has further emphasized that, "[u]ltimately, the terms 'malice' and
'reckless indifference' focus on the actor's state of mind. Harris, 92 F.4th at 302
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "[F]or punitive damages, it is the
employer's subjective intent that matters." Id.
13
Case 3:22-cv-00928-BAJ-SDJ Document 117 01/29/26 Page 13 of 16

Here, Defendant contends that the record plainly demonstrates that
Defendant and Defendant s employees who processed Plaintiffs religious exemption
request reasonably believed their conduct in reviewing and denying Plaintiffs
request was lawful, pointing to the following facts. (Doc. 78-2 at 29).
Defendant's religious exemption request states the following:
Honeywell ("Company") is committed to providing equal employment
opportunities without regard to any protected status and a work
environment that is free of unlawful harassment, discrimination, and
retaliation. As such, the Company takes its obligations to provide
reasonable accommodation to persons with sincerely held religious
beliefs seriously. When requested, the Company will provide an
exemption/accommodation for an employee/candidate who adequately
articulates a sincerely held religious belief that prohibits the
employee/candidate from receiving a COVID-19 vaccine, provided the
requested exemption/accommodation is reasonable and does not create
an undue hardship for the Company or pose a direct threat to the health
and/or safety of others in the workplace and/or to the requesting
e mp loye e/candidate.
(Doc. 97 H 19). Plaintiff testified that when he was terminated, Defendant told him
his reason for termination was "failure to follow [Defendant's] COVID mandates."
(Id. ^ 49). Plaintiff testified that no one at Honeywell told him he was being
terminated because of his religion. {Id. ^ 50).
Plaintiff responds that punitive damages turn on the credibility of witnesses,
the weight of testimony, and the reasonableness of Plaintiffs efforts. (Doc. 84 at 8).
Plaintiff contends that under settled law, credibility determinations and the
balancing of evidence are the exclusive province of the jury, not the Court at summary
judgment. (Id.). Plaintiff further asserts that the Circuit has already "held that
14
Case 3:22-cv-00928-BAJ-SDJ Document 117 01/29/26 Page 14 of 16

[Plaintiff] presented sufficient evidence of sincerity to create genuine disputes for
trial. If the Fifth Circuit concluded that the record required a jury on sincerity, the
same record easily supports jury consideration of [Defendant's] state of mind and
whether its conduct was recklessly indifferent." {Id. at 10).
In light of the procedural history in this case, the Court must agree with
Plaintiff. The Circuit has emphasized that the permissibility of punitive damages is
an issue of the "employer's subjective intent," which the Court cannot judge on
summary judgment. See Wantou v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas, L.L.C., 23 F.4th 422,440
(5th Cir. 2022) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150
(2000) ("Thus, the Court will deny summary judgment on this issue. A reasonable
jury could credit [plaintiffs] version of the facts and reject [defendant's] view; the
jury, alone, weighs evidence and determines credibility"); see also Williams,
180 F. Supp. 3d at 465 ("The Court finds that there are issues of fact as to the
availability of punitive damages."). Based on the Circuit's Ruling in this case, the
Court finds it appropriate to allow the jury to weigh the evidence at trial on the issue
of punitive damages.2
For these reasons, Defendant's IVtotion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 78)
is DENIED.
2 Defendant may, however, move for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 50 at the appropriate time during the course of trial.
15
Case 3:22-cv-00928-BAJ-SDJ Document 117 01/29/26 Page 15 of 16

V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment
(Doc. 78) is DENIED.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, thisA*_L day of January, 2026
^
/^.
JUDGE BRIAN A. J^G^SON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
16
Case 3:22-cv-00928-BAJ-SDJ Document 117 01/29/26 Page 16 of 16