Williams v. Town Of Clinton et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MAURICE WILLIAMS
VERSUS
TOWN OF CLINTON, ET AL.
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 23-00119-BAJ-RLB
RULING AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. 54).
The Motion is opposed. (Doc. 59). Plaintiff filed a Reply Brief. (Doc. 69). For the
following reasons, Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 54) is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART.
I. 	FACTS
This case arises out of Plaintiff’s alleged false arrest and the alleged excessive
force used on Plaintiff during the arrest. (Doc. 1).
On October 19, 2021, Officer Charles Brown was dispatched to Plaintiff’s
neighbor’s home. (Doc. 54-2 ¶ 1; Doc. 59-1 ¶ 1). Plaintiff’s neighbor complained to
police that for “months,” Plaintiff’s dogs had been “constantly coming into her yard
and front door using the restroom and killing her plants.” (Id.). While there, Brown
issued 	a 	summons 	to 	Plaintiff 	for 	violating 	the 	“dogs 	at 	large” 	ordinance.
(Doc. 	54-2 	¶ 3; 	Doc. 	59-1 	¶ 	3). 	The 	summons 	set 	a 	court 	appearance 	for
December 7, 2021. (Id.).
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The parties dispute whether Plaintiff appeared in court as required, and there
is a discrepancy between the date listed on the summons and the correct court date
on which Plaintiff should have appeared. (Doc. 54-2 ¶ 4; Doc. 59-1 ¶ 4). Defendants
admit that Brown wrote the incorrect court date on the summons but indicate that
Brown believed the date to be correct at the time and suggested confusion over a court
scheduling change. (Doc. 54-2 ¶ 5). Plaintiff admits that Brown “finally made a
statement to clarify the ‘confusion’ regarding the incorrect date on the summons” but
argues 	that 	Brown 	purposefully 	wrote 	the 	wrong 	date 	on 	the 	summons.
(Doc. 59-1 ¶ 5).
The parties agree that ultimately, a judge in the 20th Judicial District Court
for the State of Louisiana issued a bench warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest. (Doc. 54-2 ¶ 4;
Doc. 59-1 ¶ 4). The warrant orders Plaintiff’s arrest for “FAILURE TO APPEAR FOR
ARRAIGNMENT 3:2771 DOGS NOT TO RUN AT LARGE[.]” (Doc. 20-1 at 48).
On January 24, 2022, Brown issued a second summons to Plaintiff for violating
the “dogs at large” ordinance. (Doc. 54-2 ¶ 6; Doc. 59-1 ¶ 6). On the summons, Brown
wrote: “Subject began making threats towards me[.]” (Doc. 54-2 ¶ 7; Doc. 59-1 ¶ 7).
On January 28, 2022, the District Attorney called Plaintiff to inform him about
the bench warrant and instructed Plaintiff to contact the judge that issued the
warrant. 	(Doc. 	54-2 	¶¶ 	8, 	10; 	Doc. 	59-1 	¶¶ 	8, 	10). 	Plaintiff 	recognized 	the
District Attorney’s 	phone 	number 	because 	he 	had 	“worked 	with 	[the 	District
Attorney] on several things before.” (Doc. 54-2 ¶ 9; Doc. 59-1 ¶ 9). Plaintiff contacted
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the judge who issued the warrant, and the judge arranged a meeting with Plaintiff
on the afternoon of March 2, 2022. (Doc. 54-2 ¶ 11; Doc. 59-1 ¶ 11).
On the morning of March 2, 2022, Brown went to Plaintiff’s home to execute
the bench warrant. (Doc. 54-2 ¶ 14; Doc. 59-1 ¶ 14). At the time of the arrest, Plaintiff
acknowledged the warrant to Brown, stating, “Yeah, I know. [The District Attorney]
called me Monday and I’m meeting with the judge [] this afternoon.” (Doc. 54-2 ¶ 12;
Doc. 59-1 ¶ 12). During the arrest, an altercation ensued.
The entire interaction took place on the front porch and at the threshold of an
exterior door to Plaintiff’s home; Brown never entered the home. (Doc. 54-2 ¶ 15;
Doc. 59-1 ¶ 15). It is undisputed that at the time of the arrest: (1) Plaintiff was
barefoot and had a hard cast on his right arm; (2) Plaintiff kept two handguns in his
home; and (3) Plaintiff’s fourteen-year-old granddaughter was inside his home.
(Doc. 54-2 ¶¶ 16–19; Doc. 59-1 ¶¶ 16–19).
When Brown informed Plaintiff that he was under arrest, Plaintiff rotated
back towards his home to “grab [his] shoes.” (Doc. 54-2 ¶ 19; Doc. 59-1 ¶ 19). Plaintiff
asserts that he did not “make any type of offensive move towards [] Brown; all he
wanted was his shoes.” 	(Doc. 59-1 ¶ 20). Defendants assert that Brown initiated
contact with Plaintiff when Plaintiff made a movement to turn back inside his home.
(Doc. 54-2 ¶ 20). The initial physical contact caused Plaintiff’s face to make contact
with the door jam. (Doc. 54-2 ¶ 21; Doc. 59-1 ¶ 21).
Next, Defendants assert that Plaintiff moved toward a second exterior door of
his home. (Doc. 54-1 ¶ 21). Plaintiff argues that he stepped onto the front porch of his
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home to alert his granddaughter to his arrest when Brown pepper sprayed him.
(Doc. 59-1 ¶ 21).
At 9:57:18 AM, Officer Brown made an emergency radio transmission stating,
“SUBJ IS FIGHTING.” (Doc. 54-2 ¶ 24; Doc. 59-1 ¶ 24). At 9:57:26 AM, eight seconds
later, Officer Brown transmitted that the subject was “DETAINED.” (Doc. 54-2 ¶ 25;
Doc. 	59-1 	¶ 	25). 	After 	the 	arrest, 	Brown 	transported 	Plaintiff 	to 	the
East Feliciana Parish 	Jail 	and 	called 	for 	an 	ambulance 	to 	evaluate 	Plaintiff.
(Doc. 54-2 ¶ 26; Doc. 59-1 ¶ 26).
II. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed suit against Officer Charles Brown and
the Town of Clinton. Defendants moved to dismiss. (Doc. 10). On Defendants’ Motion
to 	Dismiss, 	the 	Court 	dismissed 	Plaintiff’s 	claims 	of 	false arrest, 	defamation,
malicious prosecution, and punitive damages, without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to
amend his Complaint. (Doc. 26).
On January 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, asserting the
following claims under federal law: (1) false arrest; (2) illegal seizure and excessive
force; and (3) malicious prosecution. (Doc. 30). Plaintiff also asserts the following
state law claims: (1) battery; (2) defamation; and (3) malicious prosecution. (Id.).
Now, Defendants move for summary judgment on each of Plaintiff’s claims. For
the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 54) will be GRANTED IN PART
and DENIED IN PART.
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III. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A district court should “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Funches v. Progressive Tractor
& Implement Co., L.L.C., 905 F.3d 846, 849 (5th Cir. 2018) (“This occurs when a party
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”).
For issues on which the movant bears the burden of proof at trial, they “must
come forward with evidence which would entitle [them] to a directed verdict if the
evidence 	went 	uncontroverted 	at 	trial.” 	Int’l 	Shortstop, 	Inc. 	v. 	Rally’s, 	Inc.,
939 F.2d 1257, 1264–65 (5th Cir. 1991). The nonmoving party can then defeat the
motion by either countering with evidence establishing a genuine dispute of material
fact, or “showing that the moving party’s evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade
the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving party.” Id. at
1265.
Where the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party must
offer evidence that undermines the nonmovant’s claim or point out the absence of
evidence 	supporting 	essential 	elements 	of 	the 	claim. 	See 	Lujan 	v.
Nat’l Wildlife Federation, 	497 	U.S. 	871, 	885 	(1990). 	Once 	the 	movant 	shows
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the nonmovant must bring forward
evidence 	to 	create 	a 	genuine 	issue 	of 	material 	fact. 	Giles 	v. 	Gen. 	Elec. 	Co.,
245 F.3d 474, 493 (5th Cir. 2001). “The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed,
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and 	all 	justifiable 	inferences 	are 	to 	be 	drawn 	in 	[its] 	favor.” 	Darden 	v.
City of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, 727 (5th Cir. 2018).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
Defendants move for summary judgment on each of Plaintiff’s claims, arguing
the undisputed facts show that: (1) Brown’s arrest of Plaintiff was conducted
pursuant to a facially valid judicial warrant and was therefore supported by probable
cause; (2) Brown’s calibrated use of force was an objectively reasonable response to
Plaintiff’s admitted and escalating physical resistance; and (3) the official reporting
of 	the 	arrest 	was 	protected 	by 	a 	qualified 	privilege. 	(Doc. 	54). 	Alternatively,
Defendants argue that Brown is entitled to qualified immunity. The Court will
address each claim in turn.
A. False Arrest Claims Under Federal and State Law.
First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s false arrest claims under both federal
and state law must fail because Brown conducted the arrest pursuant to a facially
valid bench warrant.
Under 	federal 	law, 	to 	establish 	that 	Defendants 	violated 	Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights by arresting him, Plaintiff must show that the officers lacked
probable cause. Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 164 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal
citations omitted). “If there was probable cause for any of the charges made . . . then
the arrest was supported by probable cause, and the claim for false arrest fails.” Id.
(citing Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 95 (5th Cir. 1995)).
Under Louisiana law, “[f]alse arrest and imprisonment occur when one arrests
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and restrains another against his will without a warrant or other statutory authority.
Simply stated, it is restraint without color of legal authority.” Deville, 567 F.3d at 172
(citing Kyle v. City of New Orleans, 353 So.2d 969, 971 (La. 1977)). “A facially valid
arrest warrant immunizes the officers from false arrest and imprisonment claims[.]”
Deville, 567 F.3d at 172 (citing Deville v. Jefferson Par. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 1999-1629
(La. App. 3 Cir. 5/3/00), 762 So. 2d 641, 643, writ denied, 2000-1589 (La. 8/31/00),
766 So. 2d 1281; Rodriguez v. Deen, 33,308 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/10/00), 759 So. 2d 1032,
1035, 	writ 	denied, 	2000-1414 	(La. 6/23/00), 	765 	So. 	2d 	1049; 	Molette 	v.
City of Alexandria, 2005 WL 2445432, at *8 (W.D. La. 2005)).
This Court has found it appropriate to consider false arrest claims under both
federal 	and 	state 	law 	together, 	and 	the 	Court 	will 	do 	so 	here. 	Imani 	v.
City of Baton Rouge, 614 F. Supp. 3d 306, 381–82 (M.D. La. 2022) (“This Court’s
analysis to [p]laintiffs’ § 1983 false imprisonment and false arrest claims applies with
equal force to the state law claims.”) (citing O’Dwyer v. Nelson, 310 F. App’x 741, 745
n.4 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding that, because Fourth Amendment principles underpin
Louisiana 	law 	relating 	to 	false 	arrests, 	the 	Fourth 	Amendment 	inquiry 	was
applicable to both plaintiff’s federal and state law claims) (additional citations
omitted)).
Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s arrest, made pursuant to a facially
valid warrant, is, by definition, an arrest supported by probable cause. (Doc. 54-1 at
16). 	Because 	Brown’s 	arrest 	of 	Plaintiff 	was 	lawful, 	Defendants 	contend 	that
Plaintiff’s false arrest claims must fail. (Id.).
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Plaintiff admits that generally, an intermediary’s decision breaks the chain of
causation for a false arrest claim. (Doc. 59 at 11). Plaintiff asserts, however, that
Defendants may still be liable for false arrest “if the plaintiff shows that the
deliberations of the intermediary were in some way tainted by the actions of the
[D]efendant.” (Id.).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held: “It is well
settled 	that 	if 	facts 	supporting 	an 	arrest 	are 	placed 	before 	an 	independent
intermediary such as a magistrate or grand jury, the intermediary’s decision breaks
the chain of causation for false arrest, insulating the initiating party.” McLin v. Ard,
866 F.3d 682, 689 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Deville, 567 F.3d at 170; Taylor v. Gregg,
36 F.3d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Castellano v. Fragozo,
352 F.3d 939, 949 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc)). “[T]he initiating party may be liable for
false 	arrest,” 	however, 	“if 	the 	plaintiff 	shows 	that 	the 	‘deliberations 	of 	that
intermediary were in some way tainted by the actions of the defendant.’” McLin,
866 F.3d at 689 (citing Deville, 567 F.3d at 170; Taylor, 36 F.3d at 456; quoting Hand
v. Gary, 838 F.2d 1420, 1428 (5th Cir. 1988)). But, “because the intermediary’s
deliberations protect even officers with malicious intent,” a plaintiff must show that
the official’s malicious motive led the official to withhold relevant information or
otherwise misdirect the independent intermediary by omission or commission.
McLin, 866 F.3d at 689 (citing Buehler v. City of Aus./Aus. Police Dep’t., 824 F.3d 548,
555 (5th Cir. 2016); Hand, 838 F.2d at 1427).
The Fifth Circuit has held that “mere allegations of ‘taint,’ without more, are
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insufficient to overcome summary judgment.” McLin, 866 F.3d at 689 (“We have
previously held that ‘mere allegations of taint, without more, are insufficient to
overcome 	summary 	judgment.’”) 	(quotations 	omitted) 	(citing 	Cuadra 	v.
Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 813 (5th Cir. 2010); see, e.g., id. at 813–14
(finding no “fact issue” regarding whether appellees tainted the decision of two grand
juries to return indictments); Taylor, 36 F.3d at 456–57 (finding that plaintiffs
presented no summary judgment evidence showing that the intermediary was tainted
by the actions of the defendants); Buehler, 824 F.3d at 555–56 (finding no error in
district court summary judgment ruling that appellant “failed to show a triable issue
whether the grand jury’s findings of probable cause were obtained by false or
misleading statements by the arresting officers”)).
Rather, Plaintiff must “affirmatively show[ ]” that the defendants tainted the
intermediary’s 	decision. 	Buehler, 	824 F.3d at 555 	(citing 	Craig 	v.
Dall. Area Rapid Transit Auth., 504 F. App’x 328, 332 (5th Cir. 2012); Shields v.
Twiss, 389 F.3d 142, 150 (5th Cir. 2004)). To satisfy the taint exception, omissions of
exculpatory information must be “knowing[ ].” Buehler, 824 F.3d at 555 (citing
Cuadra, 	626 	F.3d 	at 	813–14; 	Allen 	v. 	Jackson 	Cnty., 	623 	F. 	App’x 	161, 	162
(5th Cir. 2015)). And because the intermediary’s deliberations protect even officers
with malicious intent, that an officer “harbored ill-will toward” the defendant does
not suffice. Buehler, 824 F.3d at 555 (citing Hand, 838 F.2d at 1427; Craig,
504 F. App’x at 333).
Here, Defendants argue that Brown’s deposition testimony demonstrates, at
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worst, 	simple 	mistake 	or 	negligence, 	and 	“shows 	the 	opposite 	of 	knowledge,
intentionality, or reckless disregard for the truth.” (Doc. 54-1 at 18). Brown testified
as follows:
Q. Who wrote up the summons?
A. I wrote it up.
Q. Okay. Who decided to put December 7th on there?
A. I put what our court date was.
Q. You thought the court date was on December 7th; right?
A. At that time it was supposed to be.
Q. So you’re saying the judge was wrong?
A. I don’t know who was wrong.
(Doc. 57-5 at 48:22–49:6).
Plaintiff responds that Brown purposefully provided the wrong date on the
summons, based “[o]n information and belief.” (Doc. 59 at 12 (Plaintiff’s Opposition
Brief, stating: “On information and belief, Defendant Brown purposefully provided
the wrong date on the summons, which in turn resulted in the issue of the arrest
warrant.”)). The only evidence Plaintiff relies on is a November 29, 2022 transcript of
state court proceedings, in which the state court judge stated that the summons
“clearly 	states 	that 	[Plaintiff] 	was 	summoned 	to 	appear 	in 	Mayor’s 	Court 	on
December 7th. Mayor’s Court is not on a Tuesday; it’s on Monday. So the officer who
wrote the ticket very obviously created all this confusion by putting the wrong date
on the ticket.” (Doc. 20-1 at 30–31). As Defendants point out, this transcript, at most,
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shows a mistake. Plaintiff has pointed to no other summary judgment evidence in
support 	of 	his 	assertion 	that 	Brown 	knowingly 	and 	purposefully 	tainted 	the
intermediary’s decision in issuing the warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest.
Without more, Plaintiff’s “mere allegations of taint” are insufficient to survive
summary judgment under Fifth Circuit precedent. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s false
arrest 	claims 	under 	both 	state 	and 	federal 	law 	are 	DISMISSED 	WITH
PREJUDICE. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 54) is GRANTED
in this respect.
B. Malicious Prosecution Claims Under Federal and State Law.
Second, Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s malicious
prosecution 	claims 	under 	both 	federal 	and 	state 	law. 	The 	Fifth 	Circuit 	has
emphasized that, similar to false arrest, “the gravamen of the Fourth Amendment
claim for malicious prosecution . . . is the wrongful initiation of charges without
probable 	cause.” 	Hughes 	v. 	Garcia, 	100 	F.4th 	611, 	619 	(5th Cir. 2024) 	(citing
Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 43 (2022)). Because “[t]he elements of a § 1983
malicious 	prosecution 	claim 	and 	the 	elements 	of 	a 	Louisiana 	state 	malicious
prosecution claim are coextensive[,]” the Court will simultaneously analyze whether
there has been a violation of a constitutionally protected right along with the state
law 	malicious 	prosecution 	claim.1 	Wooten 	v. 	Harrell, 	No. CV 23-368-SDD-SDJ,
1 	Under 	Louisiana 	law, 	the 	elements 	of 	a 	malicious 	prosecution 	claim 	are:
(1) the commencement or continuation of an original criminal or civil proceeding; (2) its legal
causation by the present defendant in the original proceeding; (3) its bona fide termination
in favor of the present plaintiff; (4) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (5) the
presence of malice therein; and (6) damage conforming to legal standards resulting to
plaintiff. Deville, 567 F.3d at 173 (citing Jones v. Soileau, 448 So.2d 1268, 1271 (La. 1984)).
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2024 WL 	1815349, 	at 	*7 	(M.D. La. Apr. 25, 	2024) 	(citing 	Armstrong 	v. 	Ashley,
60 F.4th 262, 279 (5th Cir. 2023)).
The parties’ arguments regarding Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claims
mirror the arguments raised concerning Plaintiff’s false arrest claims. Plaintiff
argues that the state court judge’s finding of probable cause was tainted by Brown’s
inclusion of the wrong date on the summons. (Doc. 59 at 13). Plaintiff contends that
“whether 	Brown 	put 	the 	incorrect 	date 	on 	the 	summons 	due 	to 	malice 	or
incompetence is the role of the fact finder.” (Id.).
Defendants respond that at the summary judgment stage, after discovery is
complete, Plaintiff cannot rest on “information and belief” or bare allegations.
(Doc. 69 at 16). Instead, Defendants contend that Plaintiff must produce evidence,
but Plaintiff has produced none. (Id.).
For the same reasons discussed in Section A, supra, the Court finds that
Plaintiff’s arrest was supported by a bench warrant, and there is no summary
judgment 	evidence 	supporting 	Plaintiff’s 	argument 	that 	Brown 	tainted 	the
state court 	judge’s 	decision 	when 	issuing 	the 	warrant. 	Accordingly, 	Plaintiff’s
malicious prosecution claims under both state and federal law are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 54) is
GRANTED in this respect.
C. Excessive Force Claim Under Federal Law and Battery Claim
Under State Law.
Third, Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s excessive force claim under federal law and battery claim under state law
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because Brown’s use of force was objectively reasonable. (Doc. 54-1 at 22). Plaintiff
responds that a genuine issue of material fact precludes summary judgment because
Plaintiff and Brown have two conflicting accounts of what transpired on the morning
of March 2, 2022, such that the jury must decide. (Doc. 59 at 6–7).
i. 	Excessive Force.
“To prevail on an excessive-force claim, a plaintiff must show (1) [an] injury,
(2) which resulted directly and only from a use of force that was clearly excessive, and
(3) the excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable.” Wooten, 2024 WL 1815349,
at *6 (citing Darden v. City of Ft. Wor., Tex., 880 F.3d 722, 728 (5th Cir. 2018); quoting
Cooper v. Brown, 844 F.3d 517, 522 (5th Cir. 2016)). Excessive force claims are
necessarily fact intensive, and “whether the force used is ‘excessive’ or ‘unreasonable’
depends 	on 	‘the 	facts 	and 	circumstances 	of 	each 	particular 	case.’” 	Wooten,
2024 WL 1815349, at *6 (citing Deville, 567 F.3d at 167; quoting Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).
Factors the Court should consider include “the severity of the crime at issue,
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,
and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”
Id. Additionally, “[t]he extent of the injury required to demonstrate that the force
used was excessive depends on the context in which the injury occurs.” Wooten,
2024 WL 	1815349, 	at 	*6 	(citing 	Goffney 	v. 	Sauceda, 	340 	F. 	App’x 	181, 	184
(5th Cir. 2009); Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430, 434 (5th Cir. 1996)). Finally, excessive
force and false arrest claims are “separate and distinct,” such that an excessive force
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claim must be analyzed “without regard to whether the arrest itself was justified.”
Wooten, 2024 WL 1815349 (citing Thomas v. Gulotta, 2017 WL 379449, at *7
(M.D. La. Jan. 26, 2017); quoting Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 417 (5th Cir. 2007)).
Because the parties dispute all material facts surrounding the altercation that
ensued during Brown’s arrest of Plaintiff, the Court cannot make the “fact intensive”
determination of whether Brown’s actions were objectively reasonable as a matter of
law on the record before it. Thus, the Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact
precludes summary judgment on this issue. The Court, however, will analyze
Defendants’ invocation of qualified immunity below.
ii. 	Battery.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 220 provides, “A person shall
submit peaceably to a lawful arrest. The person making a lawful arrest may use
reasonable force to effect the arrest and detention, and also to overcome any
resistance or threatened resistance of the person being arrested or detained.”
La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 220. “The use of force by law enforcement officers must be
tested by the ‘reasonable force’ standard established by this article. The test
precludes ‘clearly inappropriate force.’” Kyle v. City of New Orleans, 353 So. 2d 969,
972 (La. 1977) (quoting La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 220, Official Revision Comment (b)).
“The use of force when necessary to make an arrest is a legitimate police
function.” Id. “But if the officers use unreasonable or excessive force, they and their
employer are liable for any injuries which result.” Id. (citations omitted); see also
Penn v. St. Tammany Par. Sheriff’s Off., 2002-0893 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/2/03),
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843 So. 2d 1157, 1161 (stating that excessive force transforms authorized use of force
into a battery). “Whether the force used is reasonable depends upon the totality of
the facts and circumstances in each case.” Kyle, 353 So. 2d at 973. “A court must
evaluate the officers’ actions against those of ordinary, prudent, and reasonable men
placed in the same position as the officers and with the same knowledge as the
officers.” Id. “The degree of force employed is a factual issue.” Id. (citations omitted).
The Louisiana Supreme Court has explained further:
Several factors to be considered in making this determination are the
known character of the arrestee, the risks and dangers faced by the
officers, the nature of the offense involved, the chance of the arrestee’s
escape if the particular means are not employed, the existence of
alternative methods of arrest, the physical size, strength, and weaponry
of the officers as compared to the arrestee, and the exigencies of the
moment.
Kyle, 353 So. 2d at 973 (citations omitted).
Ultimately, “excessive force claims under both federal and Louisiana law turn
on whether the use of force was objectively reasonable given the totality of the
circumstances. This has been widely recognized by [the Fifth Circuit], Louisiana
federal district courts, and the Louisiana Supreme Court.” Shepherd on behalf of
Est. of Shepherd v. City of Shreveport, 920 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 2019) (collecting
cases); see Imani v. City of Baton Rouge, 614 F. Supp. 3d 306, 380–81 (M.D. La. 2022).
For the same reasons described regarding Plaintiff’s excessive force claim, the
Court cannot determine whether Brown’s actions were objectively reasonable on the
record before it. Because a genuine issue of material fact precludes summary
judgment on this issue, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 54) is
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DENIED with respect to Plaintiff’s state law battery claim.
iii. 	Qualified Immunity.
In 	the 	alternative, 	however, 	Defendants 	assert 	the 	defense 	of 	qualified
immunity to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim under federal law. The doctrine of
qualified immunity “balances two important interests—the need to hold public
officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield
officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties
reasonably.” Pearson 	v. 	Callahan, 	555 	U.S. 	223, 	231 	(2009); 	Ezell 	v. 	Seal,
No. CV 23-1514-SDD-EWD, 2025 WL 3124046, at *4 (M.D. La. Nov. 7, 2025).
“In determining whether an official enjoys immunity, [courts] ask (1) whether
the 	plaintiff 	has 	demonstrated 	a 	violation 	of 	a 	clearly 	established 	federal
constitutional or statutory right and (2) whether the official’s actions violated that
right to the extent that an objectively reasonable person would have known.”
Gobert v. 	Caldwell, 	463 	F.3d 	339, 	345 	(5th 	Cir. 	2006) 	(citing 	Hope 	v. 	Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730 (2002)). Courts are “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in
deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be
addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” See
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
The assertion of the qualified immunity defense alters the summary judgment
burden of proof. Rodgers v. Edwards, No. CV 21-233-JWD-SDJ, 2023 WL 9007801, at
*2 	(M.D. 	La. 	Dec. 	18, 	2023), 	report 	and 	recommendation 	adopted,
No. CV 21-233-JWD-SDJ, 2023 WL 9001282 (M.D. La. Dec. 28, 2023) (citing Michalik
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v. Hermann, 422 F.3d 252, 262 (5th Cir. 2005)). Once a defendant pleads qualified
immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who “must rebut the defense by
establishing that the official’s allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established
law and that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the reasonableness of the
official’s conduct.” Rodgers, 2023 WL 9007801, at *2. “The plaintiff bears the burden
of negating the defense and cannot rest on conclusory allegations and assertions but
must demonstrate genuine issues of material fact regarding the reasonableness of the
officer’s conduct.” Id. (citing Michalik, 422 F.3d at 262).
Here, 	Defendants 	argue 	that 	even 	if 	a 	factual 	dispute 	exists 	regarding
Plaintiff’s excessive force claim, Brown is entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. 69 at
12). In support of their argument, Defendants offer the affidavit of their use-of-force
expert, Kery Najolia, in which Najolia opines that Brown’s use of force—the hands-
on technique to prevent retreat, and the deployment of pepper spray—was consistent
with police procedures, training, and police protocols. (Doc. 54-9 at ¶ 62). Defendants
assert that “Plaintiff’s core argument—that ‘conflicting stories’ (Doc. 59, p. 6)
preclude summary judgment—misstates the qualified immunity standard.” (Doc. 69
at 12).
For Plaintiff’s part, he argues that he has “sufficiently alleged” that Brown
acted with malice, stating: “Officer Brown was motivated by evil motive or intent and
demonstrated reckless and callous indifference to plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”
(Doc. 59 at 13). Plaintiff further argues that whether Brown’s actions amounted to
malice or incompetence is a question of fact for the jury. (Id. at 14).
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Based on the altered burden of proof before the Court, however, Plaintiff must
offer more than a conclusory allegation that Brown acted with malice to survive
summary judgment. Instead, Plaintiff must rebut the defense by establishing that
Brown’s allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law and that genuine
issues of material fact exist regarding the reasonableness of the official’s conduct.
Rodgers, 2023 WL 9007801, at *2. Plaintiff has not done so.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Brown is entitled to qualified immunity
regarding Plaintiff’s excessive force claim under federal law. Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 54) is GRANTED in this respect.
D. Defamation Under State Law.
Fourth, Defendants ask the Court to grant summary judgment in their favor
because qualified privilege protects Brown from Plaintiff’s defamation claim under
Louisiana law. (Doc. 54-1 at 28). Plaintiff alleges that Brown defamed him by falsely
charging Plaintiff with resisting arrest and trespass, which harmed Plaintiff’s
reputation in the community. (Doc. 30 at 8).
“Under Louisiana law a plaintiff must show four elements to prove defamation:
(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an unprivileged
communication to a third party; (3) fault (negligence or greater) on the part of the
publisher; and (4) resulting injury.” Wooten, 2024 WL 1815349, at *8 (citing Bellard
v. Gautreaux, 675 F.3d 454, 464 (5th Cir. 2012); Costello v. Hardy, 864 So.2d 129, 139
(La. 2004)). “If even one of the required elements of the tort is lacking, the cause of
action fails.” Wooten, 2024 WL 1815349 (citing Costello, 864 So.2d at 139).
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When “there is probable cause for [an] arrest, Louisiana law affords police
officers a qualified privilege against defamation actions related to reports of the
arrest and the charges on which the arrest was based.” Wooten, 2024 WL 1815349
(citing Robertson v. City of Shreveport, No. CV 17-CV-0565, 2018 WL 1769373, at *3
(W.D. La. Apr. 12, 2018); Thorn v. McGary, 684 F. App’x 430, 435 (5th Cir. 2017)).
The Fifth Circuit has held that when there is probable cause for an arrest,
“Louisiana 	law 	affords 	police 	officers 	a 	qualified 	privilege 	against 	defamation
actions.” Thorn, 684 F. App’x at 435 (“Indeed, we have already concluded that there
was probable cause for Thorn’s arrest, and under these circumstances, Louisiana law
affords police officers a qualified privilege against defamation actions.”) (citing
Trentecosta v. Beck, 96-2388 (La. 10/21/97), 703 So. 2d 552, 562–64 (holding that
police officers have a qualified privilege against defamation claims for “report[ing]
the fact that a person was arrested and the charges for which the person is being
held”); see also Roche v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 303 So. 2d 888 (La. Ct. App. 1974),
writ denied, 307 So. 2d 372 (La. 1975) (affirming dismissal of defamation claim where
officer’s arrest was supported by probable cause); Wooten, 2026 WL 299849, at *9
(When “there is probable cause for [an] arrest, Louisiana law affords police officers a
qualified privilege against defamation actions related to reports of the arrest and the
charges on which the arrest was based.”); Robertson, 2018 WL 1769373, at *3
(“If there is probable cause for arrest, Louisiana law affords police officers a qualified
privilege against defamation actions related to reports of the arrest and the charges
on which the arrest was based.”)).
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Because the Court has found that Plaintiff’s arrest was supported by probable
cause, namely, the bench warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest, Brown is entitled to a
qualified 	privilege 	against 	Plaintiff’s 	defamation 	claim. 	Accordingly, 	Plaintiff’s
defamation claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 54) is GRANTED in this respect.
E. Jurisdiction Over Remaining Claims.
Plaintiff’s surviving claims include the following: (1) battery under state law
against 	Defendant 	Brown; 	and 	(2) 	vicarious 	liability 	under 	state 	law 	against
Defendant the Town of Clinton. A district court may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over state law claims if the claims raise novel or complex issues of state
law, if the claims substantially predominate over the claims over which the district
court has original jurisdiction, if the district court has dismissed all claims over which
it had original jurisdiction, or for other compelling reasons. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Here,
having dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims, the Court concludes that it is appropriate
for the Court to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state
law claims. See Mitchell v. D.O.C., No. CIV.A. 12-0092-BAJ, 2013 WL 311440, at *6
(M.D. La. Jan. 25, 2013) (“[H]aving recommended that the plaintiff’s federal claims
asserted against the moving defendants be dismissed, the Court concludes that it is
appropriate for the Court to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the
plaintiff’s state law claims asserted herein.”).
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V. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment
(Doc. 54) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s false arrest claims under both
federal and state law are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claims
under both federal and state law are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Brown is entitled to qualified immunity
with respect to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim under federal law.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s defamation claim under state
law is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT 	IS 	FURTHER 	ORDERED 	that 	the 	Court 	declines 	to 	exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims.
Final Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 23rd day of February, 2026
_____________________________________
JUDGE BRIAN A. JACKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
______________________	_____	________	______ _________
DGE BRIAN A. JAC	AC	C	AC	C	AC	AC	C	C	AC	AC	A	A	AC	C	AC	C	A	AC	C	AC	C	AC	AC	AC	AC	C	AC	AC	A	A	A	AC	C	A	A	AC	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	AC	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	AC	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	CKS	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K 	ON
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