Cummings et al v. State of Louisiana, Department of Children and Family Services et al

SCOTT D. JOHNSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LYNDON CUMMINGS, et al.
VERSUS
LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
et al.
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 24-956-BAJ-SDJ
NOTICE
Please take notice that the attached Magistrate Judge’s Report has been filed with the Clerk
of the U.S. District Court.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), you have 14 days after being served with the
attached report to file written objections to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
recommendations set forth therein. 	Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings,
conclusions, and recommendations within 14 days after being served will bar you, except upon
grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and
legal conclusions accepted by the District Court.
ABSOLUTELY NO EXTENSION OF TIME SHALL BE GRANTED TO FILE
WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on January 13, 2026.
S
Case 3:24-cv-00956-BAJ-SDJ Document 18 01/13/26 Page 1 of 19

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LYNDON CUMMINGS, et al.
VERSUS
LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
et al.
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 24-956-BAJ-SDJ
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants State of Louisiana, through
the Department of Children and Family Services; Tanisha Christy; Latasha Tennart; and Jamie
George (collectively, the “DCFS Defendants”) (R. Doc. 9). In their Motion, the DCFS Defendants
seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims against them pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6). 	Plaintiffs, Lyndon Cummings and Nisa Martin, who are
proceeding pro se in this matter, have not responded to the Motion to Dismiss, and the deadline
for filing an opposition has long passed. See Local Civil Rule 7(f) (responses to motions are due
within 21 days). As such, the Court considers the Motion unopposed. Because the Motion has
merit and is not opposed, the Court could grant the Motion without further discussion. However,
because Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, out of an abundance of caution, the Court provides the
following analysis based on its careful consideration of the law, the arguments of the DCFS
Defendants, and Plaintiffs’ Complaint. 	For the following reasons, the Court recommends the
Motion to Dismiss be granted and Plaintiffs’ claims against the DCFS Defendants be dismissed.
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I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiffs Lyndon Cummings and Nisa Martin, on behalf of their minor child, filed
a Complaint in this Court on November 19, 2024. 1 The Complaint lists as Defendants the State of
Louisiana through the Department of Child and Family Services, Tanisha Christy, Latasha
Tennart, Jamie George,2 Ochsner Health Network, and Paula Simon3 .
Plaintiffs aver that, following the birth of their child in November 2023, DCFS employees
took custody of the newborn at an Ochsner facility without proper authorization, barring Plaintiffs
from access to their baby.4 	The DCFS employees later performed an inspection of Plaintiffs’
home, allowing Plaintiffs’ older child to stay in the home, but deeming it unfit for the newborn.5
Plaintiffs aver that on November 21, 2023, a juvenile court judge determined that DCFS had no
grounds for continued custody of the newborn, and Plaintiffs took the baby home.6 In December
2023, it appears DCFS employees again visited Plaintiffs’ home and either removed or threatened
to remove the baby, including obtaining a court order for removal approved by Judge Gail Grover.7
DCFS 	employees 	continued 	to 	monitor 	the 	situation, 	and 	Plaintiffs 	continually 	sought
documentation of the DCFS investigation and proof of termination of their case.8
Plaintiffs’ claims are: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that Christy and Tennart, under color of
law, violated Plaintiffs’ First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (2) claims of
failure to train/supervise against DCFS, Christy, and George; (3) intentional or negligent infliction
of emotional distress against all Defendants; and (4) 28 U.S.C. § 1367 claim of breach of contract
1 R. Doc. 1.
2 The preceding individuals are DCFS employees.
3 Ochsner employee.
4 R. Doc. 1 at 5-6.
5 Id. at 6.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 7-8.
8 Id. at 8-10.
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against Ochsner and Simon. On November 26, 2025, this Court granted a Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to Prosecute filed by Defendant Gail Grover, dismissing with prejudice all claims against
her.9
II. 	LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. 	Applicable Law
1. 	Rule 12(b)(1) Standard
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction [and] possess only that power authorized
by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” 	Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). “Without subject-
matter jurisdiction, a federal court simply has no authority to decide the case.” Pidgeon v. Parker,
46 F. Supp. 3d 692, 697 (S.D. Tex. 2014). “[F]ederal courts are duty-bound to examine the basis
of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, even on appeal.” 	Union Planters Bank Nat’l Ass’n v.
Salih, 369 F.3d 457, 460 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S.
83, 94-95 (1998); Weekly v. Morrow, 204 F.3d 613, 615 & n. 6 (5th Cir. 2000)).
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion seeks dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction when a court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to hear the case. 	Home
Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, Miss., 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). The
burden of proof on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction. See
Strain v. Harrelson Rubber Co., 742 F.2d 888, 889 (5th Cir. 1984). A motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(1) is analyzed under the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
Benton v. U.S., 960 F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir. 1992). 	“When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in
conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack
9 R. Docs. 15, 16, and 17.
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before addressing any attack on the merits.” Ramming v. U.S., 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001)
(citing Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)).
2. 	Rule 12(b)(5) Standard
“A defendant has no obligation to appear in court or defend an action before it is formally
served with process directing it to appear before that forum.” Thompson v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l
Trust Co., 775 F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 2014) (emphasis in original). 	Proper service is critical
because “[i]t is axiomatic that in order for there to be in personam jurisdiction there must be valid
service of process.” Attwell v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 1157, 1159 (5th Cir. 1979). Indeed,
“[a] court which lacks personal jurisdiction over a defendant cannot enter a valid judgment against
that defendant.” 	Trust Co. of La. v. N.N.P. Inc., 104 F.3d 1478, 1486 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. M.T.S. Enters., 811 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1987)). If a plaintiff fails to
properly effectuate service, the defendant may seek to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint under Rule
12(b)(5). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) (authorizing a court to dismiss a civil action when service
of process is insufficient).
“A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5) turns on the legal sufficiency of the service
of process.” Holly v. Metro. Transit Auth., 213 F. App’x 343, 344 (5th Cir. 2007). The burden of
demonstrating the validity of service when an objection is made lies with the party making service.
Id. (citing Carimi v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., 959 F.2d 1344, 1346 (5th Cir. 1992)). As
set forth in Rule 4(c)(1), a summons must be served with a copy of the complaint, and the plaintiff
is responsible for having the summons and complaint served on the defendant within the time
allowed by Rule 4(m). “The district court has broad discretion in determining whether to dismiss
an action for ineffective service of process.” Trimble v. Strength, No. 20-355, 2022 WL 636729,
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at *2 (M.D. La. Jan. 25, 2022) (citing George v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Occupational Safety &
Health Admin., 788 F.2d 1115, 1116 (5th Cir. 1986)).
3. 	Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant can seek dismissal of a complaint, or any part
thereof, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
“To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Shiell v. Jones, No. 19-848,
2020 WL 2331637, at *10 (E.D. La. May 11, 2020) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009)) (internal quotations omitted). 	“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Shiell, 2020 WL 2331637,
at *10 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
A court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff. 	Gines v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 699 F.3d 812, 816 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting In re
Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)). “Dismissal is appropriate when
the complaint on its face shows a bar to relief.” Shiell, 2020 WL 2331637, at *10 (quoting Cutrer
v. McMillan, 308 F. App’x 819, 820 (5th Cir. 2009)). “Determining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw
on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A court does not assume
the truth of conclusory statements, but rather looks for facts which support the elements of the
pleader’s claim. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).
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4. 	Standard for Pro Se Litigants
Plaintiffs are proceeding in this litigation pro se. Pro se pleadings are to be held “to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972); see also S.E.C. v. AMX, Int’l, Inc., 7 F.3d 71, 75 (5th Cir. 1993) (recognizing the
established rule that a court “must construe [a pro se plaintiff’s] allegations and briefs more
permissively”). 	A court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, taking all well-pleaded
allegations as true. Johnson v. Atkins, 999 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). Nevertheless,
“a pro se litigant is not exempt . . . from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and
substantive law.” NCO Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Harper–Horsley, No. 07–4247, 2008 WL 2277843, at *3
(E.D. La. May 29, 2008) (quoting Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981)) (internal
quotations omitted). As such, a pro se plaintiff’s complaint “must set forth facts giving rise to a
claim on which relief may be granted.” Johnson, 999 F.2d at 100 (citation omitted).
Additionally, “[a] liberal reading of plaintiff’s pleadings is the only special treatment
afforded pro se plaintiffs by the courts.” Kiper v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., No. 14-313, 2015
WL 2451998, at *1 (M.D. La. May 21, 2015) (citing Callahan v. C.I.R., No. 99-0295, 2000 WL
1141607, at *1 (M.D. La. Apr. 10, 2000)). A “court is not required to search for or try to create
causes of actions or find material issues of fact for pro se plaintiffs.” Id. And “[a] pro se litigant
is not entitled to greater rights than would be a litigant represented by a lawyer.” NCO Fin. Sys.,
2008 WL 2277843, at *3 (citing Birl, 660 F.2d at 593). Finally, “[w]hile much liberality is allowed
in construing pro se complaints, a pro se litigant cannot simply dump a stack of exhibits on the
court and expect the court to sift through them to determine if some nugget is buried somewhere
in that mountain of papers, waiting to be unearthed and refined into a cognizable claim.”
Richardson v. United Wholesale Mortgage, LLC, No. 24-276, 2024 WL 5264095, at *5 	n. 24
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(M.D. La. Dec. 31, 2024) (quoting Samtani v. City of Laredo, 274 F. Supp. 3d 695, 698 (S.D. Tex.
2017)).
B. 	Discussion
In their Motion to Dismiss, the DCFS Defendants argue for dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims
against them pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6). 	As explained below, none of
Plaintiffs’ claims against any Defendant are viable, as the Court either lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over them, Plaintiffs have not properly effected service on one or more Defendants,
and/or Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted. 	Accordingly, the Court
recommends that all of Plaintiffs’ claims against these Defendants be dismissed.
1. 	Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(1) Motion
In their Motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims against DCFS and DCFS
employees in their official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.10 	The Eleventh
Amendment bars a state from being sued in federal court by its own citizens, citizens of other
states, or foreign nations. U.S. Const. Amend. XI; Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 54
(1996); Cox v. City of Dallas, Tex., 256 F.3d 281, 307 (5th Cir. 2001). “When a state agency is
the named defendant, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for both money damages and injunctive
relief unless the state has waived its immunity.” Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council—President
Gov’t, 279 F.3d 273, 280-81 (5th Cir. 2002). “This rule extends to ‘arms of the state,’ and to a
state’s ‘officials acting in their official capacities.’” Parker v. La. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr.,
No. 18-1030, 2020 WL 4353564, at *8 (M.D. La. Jul. 29, 2020) (quoting Med. RX/Sys., P.L.L.C.
v. Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs., 633 F. App’x. 607, 610 (5th Cir. 2016)). 	See also Will v.
Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)) (“Obviously, state officials literally are
10 R. Doc. 9-1 at 5.
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persons. But a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the
official but rather is a suit against the official’s office. As such, it is no different from a suit against
the State itself.”) (citations omitted). 	The State of Louisiana has not waived its immunity from
suit in federal court. Champagne v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office, 188 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir.
1999) (citing La. R.S. § 13:5106(A)).
Under the Ex Parte Young doctrine, however, “a litigant may sue a state official in his
official capacity if the suit seeks prospective relief to redress an ongoing violation of federal law.”
Williams on Behalf of J.E. v. Reeves, 954 F.3d 729, 735-36 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123, 167-68 (1908); Air Evac EMS v. Tex., Dep’t of Ins., Div. of Workers’ Comp., 851
F.3d 507, 519 (5th Cir. 2017)). This exception “rests on a legal fiction, the premise that a state
official is not the State for sovereign-immunity purposes when a federal court commands [him or
her] to do nothing more than refrain from violating federal law.” Id. at 736 (internal quotations
and citation omitted). For a suit to proceed under this doctrine, it must be a suit seeking declaratory
or injunctive relief and: “(1) be brought against state officers who are acting in their official
capacities; (2) seek prospective relief to redress ongoing conduct; and (3) allege a violation of
federal, not state, law.” Id. (citing NiGen Biotech, L.L.C. v. Paxton, 804 F.3d 389, 394 (5th Cir.
2015)). This is true, even where an injunction may have “an ancillary effect on the state treasury.”
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337 (1979).
Plaintiffs’ claims against DCFS and DCFS employees in their official capacities are barred
by the Eleventh Amendment. This Court and others have consistently found that DCFS and its
employees in their official capacities are entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.
See Harmony Ctr., LLC v. Jindal, No. 10-621, 2010 WL 4955167, at *3 (M.D. La. Nov. 30, 2010)
(“The Court finds that the immunity afforded by the Eleventh Amendment is applicable to the
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State and DCFS, and serves as a bar to [the plaintiff’s] suit against these defendants.”); El Bey v.
Caddo Parish Juvenile Court, No. 21-4245, 2023 WL 1421955, at *2 (W.D. La. Jan. 30, 2023)
(“DCFS – as an agency of the State – is entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.”);
Head v. Gardner, No. 21-1891, 2022 WL 570463, at *3 (W.D. La. Feb. 9, 2022) (“In sum, this
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to proceed against Marcelle [a DCFS case worker], in her
official capacity, based on her Eleventh Amendment immunity.”).
In addition, Plaintiffs have not alleged an ongoing violation of federal law by either DCFS
or its employees such that the Ex Parte Young doctrine is triggered. 	While Plaintiffs seek
prospective relief in the form of a preliminary and permanent injunction against Defendants, said
relief is not sought to redress ongoing conduct. Plaintiffs allege in their Complaint that the DCFS
workers conducted a “termination visit” at Plaintiffs’ home and that the case was closed.11
Plaintiffs do assert that they have not yet received a copy of the “case-closed documents,” despite
numerous requests.12 However, the requested injunctions are to prevent Defendants from being
able to work with children, from being able to “mandate parents to do anything at all,” or from
being able to retaliate against Plaintiffs or other people “who exercise their Constitutionally
guaranteed rights,”13 and do not pertain to the only potentially alleged ongoing conduct, i.e., the
alleged failure to provide requested documentation, which Plaintiffs do not argue is a violation of
federal law. 	As such, the Ex Parte Young doctrine does not apply here. 	It, therefore, is
recommended that Plaintiffs’ claims against DCFS and against Christy, Tennart, and George in
their official capacities be dismissed without prejudice. See Warnock v. Pecos County, Tex., 88
F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Because [Eleventh Amendment] sovereign immunity deprives the
11 R. Doc. 1 at 10 ¶ 32.
12 Id. ¶¶ 33-34.
13 Id. at 21 ¶ 6.
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court of jurisdiction, the claims barred by sovereign immunity can be dismissed only under Rule
12(b)(1) and not with prejudice.”).
2. 	Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(5) Motion
a. 	Whether Service Was Proper
The Court turns next to the DCFS Defendants’ request for dismissal pursuant to Rule
12(b)(5). In their Motion to Dismiss, the DCFS Defendants claim that service of process on the
DCFS employees—Christy, Tennart, and George—in their individual capacities was improperly
executed. Per Defendants, there was no personal service on an authorized agent, as service was
made at the employees’ place of business on Cierra Willis, who accepted service on behalf of
DCFS. 14
Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an individual may be served
by either “(1) following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general
jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where service is made; or (2) doing
any of the following: (A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual
personally; (B) leaving a copy of each at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode with
someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there; or (C) delivering a copy of each to an
agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
“Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure articles 1231 through 1235 govern state law procedure
for serving individuals and call for personal or domiciliary service.” Black v. La. Dep’t of Corr.,
No. 16-799, 2017 WL 11710636, at *2 (M.D. La. Nov. 17, 2017). 	“A defendant is personally
served ‘when a proper officer tenders the citation or other process to the person to be served.’” Id.
(quoting La. C.C.P. art. 1232). “ Domiciliary service is completed ‘when a proper officer leaves
14 R. Doc. 3 at 2-4.
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the citation or other process at the dwelling house or usual place of abode of the person to be served
or with a person of suitable age and discretion residing in the domiciliary establishment.’” 	Id.
(quoting La. C.C.P. art. 1234). “Further, ‘[a] public officer, sued as such, may be served at his
office either personally, or in his absence, by service upon any employee of suitable age and
discretion.’” Id. (quoting La. C.C.P. art. 1265).
Here, service on Christy, Tennart, and George in their individual capacities was improper.
Neither personal nor domiciliary service was effected on these Defendants, as summons was
served on Cierra Willis, who, according to the Proofs of Service, is designated by law to accept
service of process on behalf of DCFS, not these Defendants. And nothing in the record indicates
otherwise. This does not comport with the requirements of Rule 4(e). “Establishing that he has
properly effectuated service upon each defendant is Plaintiff’s burden to bear.” Gilmore v. Wolfe,
No. 15-280, 2016 WL 438978, at *2 (M.D. La. Feb. 3, 2016) (citing Carimi, 959 F.2d at 1346).
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to carry this burden, and that service on Christy, Tennart,
and George in their individual capacities was improper.
b. 	Whether Plaintiffs Should Be Allowed to Correct Service
Defects
While proceeding pro se “does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of
procedural and substantive law,” Birl, 660 F.2d at 593 (citation omitted), the District Court has
wide discretion in determining whether to dismiss an action for insufficient service, and courts
often give pro se litigants leeway in correcting defects in service of process. Lisson v. ING GROEP
N.V., 262 F. App’x 567, 571 (5th Cir. 2007). Here, however, the Court finds that such leeway is
not warranted. Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on November 19, 2024. Since then, Plaintiffs have
not filed anything, including an opposition to the instant Motion, in this case or otherwise
participated in any way in this litigation. 	Given Plaintiffs’ failure to pursue their claims in any
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way over the preceding year, the Court finds that Plaintiffs should not be granted the opportunity
to correct the defects in his service of process.
3. 	Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion
While the Court has determined that all of Plaintiffs’ claims against the DCFS Defendants
should be dismissed pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(5), the DCFS Defendants also seek
dismissal of certain of Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
a. 	Plaintiffs’ Claims Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Count One of Plaintiffs’ Complaint brings claims against Defendants Christy and Tennart
in their official and individual capacities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the First,
Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.15 In their Motion to Dismiss, the DCFS Defendants
argue that these claims should be dismissed because the DCFS Defendants are not “persons”
capable of being sued under § 198316 and DCFS employees are entitled to qualified immunity in
their individual capacities.17
i. 	Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against Christy and Tennart in
their official capacities must be dismissed because they
are not “persons” under § 1983.
To the extent Plaintiffs assert at § 1983 claim against Christy and Tennart in their official
capacities, Defendants are entitled to dismissal because they are not “persons” under § 1983. “The
Supreme Court has held that a State is not a person against whom a § 1983 claim for money
damages might be asserted.” Med RX/Sys., P.L.L.C. v. Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs., 633 F.
App’x 607, 610 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S.
613, 617 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This rule extends to ‘arms of the state,’ and
15 R. Doc. 1 at 11.
16 R. Doc. 9-1 at 9-10.
17 Id. at 11-21.
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to a state’s ‘officials acting in their official capacities.’” Id. (quoting Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S.
356, 365 (1990); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)).
Here, Plaintiffs have alleged a § 1983 claim for money damages against Christy and
Tennart, DCFS employees, in their official capacities. DCFS is an arm of the state. See Martin v.
Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 500 F. Supp. 3d 527, 543 (E.D. La. 2020). As such, to the
extent Plaintiffs asserts a claim under § 1983 against Christy and Tennart in their official
capacities, those claims should be dismissed, as these Defendants are not considered “persons”
within the meaning of § 1983. See id. at 544; Williams v. La., No. 17-453, 2019 WL 1003645, at
*4 (M.D. La. Feb. 28, 2019); Price v. La., No. 16-402, 2017 WL 151394, at *2 (M.D. La. Jan. 13,
2017).
ii. 	Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against Christy and Tennart in
their individual capacities must be dismissed because
they are entitled to qualified immunity.
To the extent this claim is asserted against Tanisha Christy and Latasha Tennart in their
individual capacities, they are entitled to qualified immunity. “The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly
held that child care workers are entitled to qualified immunity in the performance of discretionary,
nonprosecutorial functions.” Martin, 500 F. Supp. 3d at 544 (citing Doe v. State of La., 2 F.3d
1412, 1416 (5th Cir. 1993)). 	See also Darian v. Cashe, No. 17-52, 2017 WL 3326976, at *12
(M.D. La. Jul. 14, 2017) (“[S]tate child care workers such as the DCFS defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity in the performance of discretionary, non-prosecutorial functions.”). As such,
to hold Christy and Tennart personally liable, Plaintiffs “must pierce the qualified immunity that
they inherently enjoy by demonstrating that the workers breached ‘clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” 	Darian, 2017 WL
3326976, at *12 (quoting Stem v. Ahearn, 908 F.2d 1, 5 (5th Cir. 1990)). “In determining whether
a clearly established constitutional right was violated, the Supreme Court has instructed courts to
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focus on the law existing at the time of the alleged violation.” 	Martin, 500 F. Supp. 3d at 544
(quoting Darian, 2017 WL 3326976, at *12). “When a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the
burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense.” McClendon v. City of
Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002).
Here, it is clear that Plaintiffs have not carried their burden of demonstrating the
inapplicability of the defense. In fact, they have not responded in any way to Defendants assertion
of the defense of qualified immunity. 	As Plaintiffs have failed to carry this burden, the Court
recommends that Plaintiffs’ claims under § 1983 against Christy and Tennart in their individual
capacities also be dismissed.
b. 	Plaintiffs’ Claims for Failure to Train/Supervise
Count Two of Plaintiffs’ Complaint is against DCFS, Christy, and George for “failure to
train/supervise hired actors of government.”18 	Specifically, they allege that these Defendants
“failed to properly train, observe and supervise” Tennart.19 While Plaintiffs fail to identify what
statue or regulation these Defendants allegedly violated, the Court will interpret this as a claim for
failure to supervise pursuant to § 1983, as Plaintiffs’ prior claim was for violation of § 1983.
“When alleging a failure to train or supervise, Plaintiff must show that (1) the supervisor
either failed to supervise or train the subordinate official; (2) a causal link exists between the failure
to train or supervise and the violation of the plaintiffs rights; and (3) the failure to train or supervise
amounts to deliberate indifference.” Abbott v. Town of Livingston, No. 16-188, 2018 WL 1095557,
at *4 (M.D. La. Feb. 27, 2018) (quoting Gates v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs.,
537 F.3d 404, 435 (5th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotations omitted). “In all but the most exceptional
of circumstances, a failure-to-train claim requires a pattern of similar occurrences.” Id.
18 R. Doc. 1 at 12.
19 Id. at 13 ¶ 40.
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Plaintiffs’ claims for failure to train or supervise must fail. Plaintiffs do not specify how
Tennart’s training was inadequate. Plaintiffs also have not alleged facts to show DCFS, Christy,
or George failed to supervise Tennart. 	Nor do Plaintiffs allege any facts from which it can be
plausibly inferred that DCFS, Christy, or George provided inadequate training or supervision, or
that any of them was aware that the training practices were likely to result in a constitutional
violation. For example, Plaintiffs allege only:20
DCFS failed to train its caseworkers, including LATASHA and TANISHA, with
accurate training on their policies. That was proven multiple times when LYNDON
and NISA asked for policy that backed up their actions and threats over the several
months of interactions between the parties. Not one time did anyone give proof of
policy or even aid in showing how to locate and find policy.
They further allege that “DCFS and TANISHA CHRISTY failed to properly train, observe and
supervise LATASHA TENNART who engaged in deceit, lies, and a campaign to intentionally or
negligently inflict emotional distress on LYNDON and NISA.” 21 Such conclusory allegations are
not sufficient to sustain a claim for failure to supervise pursuant to § 1983. 	As such, the Court
recommends that this claim be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
c. 	Plaintiffs’ Claims for Intentional or Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress
Count Three of Plaintiffs’ Complaint brings claims for intentional or negligent infliction
of emotional distress against all Defendants.22 Beginning with intentional infliction of emotional
distress, “[i]n order to recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff
must establish that: (1) the conduct of the defendant was extreme and outrageous, (2) the emotional
distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe, and (3) the defendant desired to inflict severe
emotional distress or knew that severe emotional distress would be certain or substantially certain
20 Id. ¶ 42.
21 Id.¶ 40.
22 Id. at 14.
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to result from his or her conduct.” Quinlan v. Sugar-Gold, 51,191 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/5/17), 219
So.3d 1173, 1185 (citing White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So.2d 1205 (La. 1991); Henderson v. Bailey
Bark Materials, 47,946 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/13), 116 So.3d 30). “Conduct is considered extreme
and outrageous when it goes ‘beyond all possible bounds of decency’ and is ‘regarded as atrocious
and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’” 	Id. (quoting White, 585 So.2d at 1209;
Henderson, 116 So.3d 30). 	“Liability does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats,
annoyances, petty oppressions or other trivialities.” Id. (citations omitted).
“Liability does not attach where the actor has done no more than to insist upon his legal
rights in a permissible way, even though he is aware that such insistence is certain to cause
emotional stress.” White, 585 So.2d at 1210. Moreover, “[t]he distress suffered must be such that
no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.” Id. And, “[t]he conduct must be intended
or calculated to cause severe emotional distress and not just some lesser degree of fright,
humiliation, embarrassment, worry, or the like.” Id.
It cannot be said that the actions of DCFS and its employees, in performing the
discretionary work function of a child welfare investigation, rises to the level of “outrageous
conduct” required to find intentional infliction of emotional distress. If such actions by the DCFS
constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress, it would essentially allow a plaintiff to
bypass the broad protections that state employees receive under the qualified immunity doctrine
for performing discretionary functions like investigating and reporting child abuse or child
endangerment. Moreover, there is no indication, or even allegation, that the conduct was intended
or calculated to cause severe emotional distress. The Court, therefore, recommends that this claim
be dismissed.
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The same is true for Plaintiffs’ negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. “Recovery
for the negligent infliction of emotional distress is based on Article 2315, which provides, in
pertinent part, that ‘[e]very act whatever of man that causes damages to another obliges him by
whose fault it happened to repair it.’” Walker v. Allen Parish Health Unit, 97-1007 (La.App. 3
Cir. 4/1/98), 711 So.2d 734, 736. 	To determine whether a plaintiff is entitled to recover for
negligent infliction of emotional distress, courts employ a duty-risk analysis. Id. “For liability to
attach, a plaintiff must prove five separate elements: (1) the defendant had a duty to conform his
or her conduct to a specific standard of care (the duty element); (2) the defendant failed to conform
his or her conduct to the appropriate standard (the breach of duty element); (3) the defendant’s
substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injuries (the cause-in-fact element); (4)
the defendant’s substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries (the scope of
liability or scope of protection element); and (5) actual damages (the damages element).”
Covington v. Howard, 49,135 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/13/14), 146 So.3d 933, 937 (citing Mathieu v.
Imperial Toy Corp., 94-0952 (La. 11/30/94), 646 So.2d 318). “A negative answer to any of those
inquiries results in a determination of no liability.” Id. (citing Mathieu, 646 So.2d at 326).
Louisiana courts have determined that “[t]he correct standard for the recovery of negligent
infliction of emotional distress absent physical injury is that the plaintiff must show an ‘especial
likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress, arising from the special circumstances, which
serves as a guarantee that the claim is not spurious.’” Johnson v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 2006-
1223 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/30/08), 975 So.2d 698, 711 (citing Moresi v. State Through Dep’t of
Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So.2d 1081, 1096 (La. 1990); Bonnette v. Conoco, Inc., 2001-2767 (La.
1/28/03), 837 So.2d 1219). 	Plaintiffs here have failed to demonstrate that Defendants did not
conform to the appropriate standard of care for conducting a child welfare investigation. 	They
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SCOTT D. JOHNSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
have not identified that standard of care, nor specified how Defendants allegedly breached same.
And, they did not file an opposition to this Motion to Dismiss challenging Defendants’ arguments.
As such, the Court recommends that this claim, too, be dismissed.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants State of
Louisiana, through the Department of Children and Family Services; Tanisha Christy; Latasha
Tennart; and Jamie George (R. Doc. 9) be GRANTED, and that all claims against these
Defendants be dismissed with prejudice.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on January 13, 2026.
S
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