Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ ROMERO,
ET AL.
VERSUS
SCOTT LADWIG, ET AL.
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 25-1106-JWD-EWD
RULING AND ORDER
Before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed on December 11, 2025, by
Petitioners Francisco Rodriguez Romero, Ricardo Blanco Chomat, Luis Gaston Sanchez, and
Ibrahim Mohammed. Petitioners are currently in the custody of the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), at the civil detention facility
at the Louisiana State Penitentiary. They have filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the procedures used to re-detain them and their continued detention as
violating applicable statutes, regulations, and due process rights. (Doc. 1.) Respondents have filed
an opposition. (Doc. 18.) Petitioners have filed a reply. (Doc. 20.) The Court heard oral argument
on January 7, 2026. (Doc. 25.) As stated by another district court with a case similar to this one:
The circumstances here mirror those in numerous recent habeas cases involving re-
detained noncitizens [previously] released on supervision. In the substantial
majority of these cases, courts have granted relief after finding that the Government
failed to identify sufficient changed circumstances or demonstrate a significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. . . . These cases reflect
a broader pattern. District courts nationwide have consistently granted habeas relief
to similarly situated petitioners.
Phongsavanh v. Williams, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 3124032, at *4 (S.D. Iowa Nov. 7, 2025)
(collecting cases).1
1 Petitioners have also collected at least 25 similar cases that courts across the country have decided in the last six
months. (See Doc. 20-1.) This is nowhere near an exhaustive list.
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Having carefully considered the law, the facts in the record, and the arguments and
submissions of the parties, the Court now grants the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioners are four noncitizen residents of the United States who were, at different times,
detained by ICE and released on ICE’s own determination that supervised release was
appropriate.2 In deciding to grant supervised release, ICE found that each of these men was not a
flight risk, each was nonviolent and likely to remain nonviolent, each posed no threat to society,
and each was likely to comply with any conditions of release.3 And so, being unable to deport
them to their home countries, ICE released each Petitioner—with conditions of supervision—to
live their lives free of confinement in the United States.4
Most of these Petitioners have lived in this country for decades. They have complied with
all of ICE’s conditions of supervised release. They have established lives, jobs, communities, and
families, and have enjoyed relatively free lives in the United States. Until the summer of 2025.
Three Petitioners went to their regularly scheduled ICE check-in appointments and never went
2 Respondents assert that “[n]o matter how Petitioners color it, each of them was a criminal.” (Doc. 18 at 2.) That is
exactly right—each was convicted of a crime, and each served his sentence. And then ICE itself determined that each
should be released into regular, free civilian life. Petitioners’ criminal histories are not at issue here, and the parties
have not suggested that any part of this case would be different for similarly situated petitioners without the same
criminal history. In short, Respondents’ assertion that Petitioners were criminals is irrelevant to the analysis here.
3 Regulations require such findings before supervised release:
Criteria for release. Before making any recommendation or decision to release a detainee, a majority
of the Review Panel members, or the Director of the HQPDU in the case of a record review, must
conclude that:
(1) Travel documents for the alien are not available or, in the opinion of the Service, immediate
removal, while proper, is otherwise not practicable or not in the public interest;
(2) The detainee is presently a non-violent person;
(3) The detainee is likely to remain nonviolent if released;
(4) The detainee is not likely to pose a threat to the community following release;
(5) The detainee is not likely to violate the conditions of release; and
(6) The detainee does not pose a significant flight risk if released.
8 C.F.R. § 241.4(e). Further factors to weigh include, inter alia, criminal history, mental health, participation in work
or educational programs, ties to the United States, prior immigration history. Id. § 241.4(f).
4 Neither party has provided the documents establishing supervised release, but there is no dispute that each Petitioner
was released under conditions of supervision.
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home; the fourth was taken directly from his home. Respondents argue that Petitioners were
detained in order to effectuate their deportation; but months later, all remained in ICE lockup at
Angola prison—an ostensibly civil detention center on the grounds of the state’s only maximum-
security prison.5
Petitioners challenge the legality of the revocation of their Orders of Supervision
(“OSUPs”) and re-detention under Fifth Amendment due process, both procedural and substantive;
specifically, they argue that ICE violated their due process rights by failing to follow its own
regulations governing revocation of an OSUP. (Doc. 1 at 34–36.) Petitioners further challenge the
legality of their continued detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), because their deportation is not
reasonably foreseeable. (Doc. 1 at 37.)
Petitioner Francisco Rodriguez Romero is a 72-year-old Cuban citizen who has lived in
the United States for 45 years, having fled Cuba in 1980. (Doc. 1 at 12.) He has Parkinson’s and
Alzheimer’s diseases, bipolar disorder with psychosis, and other medical conditions. (Id.) He
requires at least ten prescription medications daily and certain assistive devices, like an inhaler and
an oxygen mask for sleeping. (Id.) He was released on an OSUP in 1997, with renewals in 2004
and 2013. (Doc. 1 at 13; Doc. 18-3 at 2.) He has lived for 28 years in Puerto Rico, working for two
decades as an addiction counselor. (Doc. 1 at 13.) He has been married to his U.S. citizen wife for
over 20 years. (Id. at 14.) Through this time, he reported to ICE for regular check-ins and abided
by the conditions of his OSUP. (Id. at 13.) On August 6, 2025, he reported for his regular check-
in at the ICE office in San Juan, where he was informed that his OSUP had been revoked. (Id. at
14.) Rodriguez Romero remains in ICE custody.
5 The Louisiana State Penitentiary is more commonly known as Angola. The ICE detention facility on its grounds is
also known as Camp 57, and is located in the former Camp J, a solitary confinement unit.
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Petitioner Ricardo Blanco Chomat is a 61-year-old Cuban citizen who has lived in the
United States for 52 years; he was evacuated from Cuba on a U.S.-backed Freedom Flight in 1973,
when he was 8 years old. (Id. at 16.) He was released on an OSUP in 2004. (Doc. 18-4 at 2.) For
more than 14 years, he has been the primary caretaker of his disabled adult brother; he is close
with his ex-wife and his daughter. (Doc. 1 at 17–18.) He has maintained employment authorization
and remained employed as a landscaper and mechanic. (Id. at 18.) For the entirety of his over 20
years of supervised release, he has complied with ICE’s conditions of release. (Id. at 17.) On June
25, 2025, he reported for his regularly scheduled check-in at the ICE office in Miramar, where he
was told that his OSUP had been revoked. (Id. at 18.) Blanco Chomat remains in ICE custody.
Petitioner Luis Gaston Sanchez is a 66-year-old Cuban citizen who has lived in the United
States for 59 years, having arrived on a Freedom Flight in 1966. (Id. at 19.) He was released on an
OSUP in 2023 and complied with its conditions faithfully. (Id. at 20.) He maintained employment
authorization and a job in maintenance, paid taxes, and built his relationship with his family. (Id.)
On June 25, 2025, he reported for his regularly scheduled check-in at the ICE office in Miramar,
where he was detained with little explanation. (Id. at 20–21.) Gaston Sanchez remains in ICE
custody.
Petitioner Ibrahim Mohammed is a 43-year-old Ethiopian citizen who has lived in the
United States for 11 years. (Id. at 24.) After receiving protection from deportation to Ethiopia
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), he was released on an OSUP on November 27,
2024. (Id. at 24–25.) He complied with the conditions of release and integrated into his community
by holding jobs and participating in his local mosque. (Id. at 25.) On July 17, 2025, he arrived
home to roughly 10 ICE officers, who detained him and eventually informed him that his OSUP
had been revoked. (Id. at 25–26.) Mohammed remains in ICE custody.
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II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Immigration Statutes and Regulations
When a noncitizen is ordered removed from the United States, the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”) requires that removal (deportation) occur within ninety days. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(1)(A). That 90-day removal period begins on the latest of three dates: (1) when the
removal order becomes final, (2) when there is a final order in a stay of removal, or (3) when the
noncitizen is released from non-immigration custody, such as the completion of a criminal
sentence. See id. § 1231(a)(1)(B). During this initial 90-day detention, the government must
attempt to remove the noncitizen. Id. § 1231(a)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(g)(1)(ii).
Detention may be extended beyond the 90-day period in specific circumstances that are not
at issue here. 6 Additionally, the Supreme Court has recognized that the Government may
practically need more time to arrange for a noncitizen’s travel to another country; and so, the
Government may detain a noncitizen only for as long as is “reasonably necessary” to effectuate
deportation, within the limits of the Constitution. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689–90 (2001).
But the Government may not, consistent with the Due Process Clause, detain a noncitizen
indefinitely. Id. at 697; see also Villanueva v. Tate, 801 F. Supp. 3d 689, 695 (S.D. Tex. 2025).
Having established that indefinite detention is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court established a
guide for lower courts: a presumption that six months is a reasonable period of post-removal-order
detention. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. But in any case, “once removal is no longer reasonably
foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Id. at 699. “After this 6-month
period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of
6 If the noncitizen fails or refuses to apply in good faith for travel documents as directed by ICE (8 C.F.R.
§ 241.4(g)(1)(i)); if the noncitizen is inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182; or if the noncitizen has committed certain
crimes, and the government determines that the noncitizen poses a risk to the community or is a flight risk (8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(6)). None of these circumstances apply to Petitioners.
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removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence
sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id. at 701. If the Government cannot rebut the petitioner’s
showing, it must release the petitioner. Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 529 (2021)
(citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701).
ICE may release a detainee on a supervisory basis—under an OSUP—after concluding that
immediate deportation is not practicable, and that the detainee is non-violent, likely to remain non-
violent, not likely to pose a threat to the community, not likely to violate conditions of release, and
not a significant flight risk. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(e); see also id. § 241.4(h)(3), (i)(6) (noting that the
Executive Associate Commissioner and district director “must [also] be able to reach the
conclusions set forth in paragraph (e) of this section” “[b]efore making any decision to release a
detainee”). Additional factors for consideration of supervised release include, among others,
criminal history and evidence of either recidivism or rehabilitation, family ties to the United States,
and the detainee’s likelihood of adjusting to life in community. Id. § 241.4(f).
Once a noncitizen has been released under an OSUP, there are detailed regulations
concerning when and how that OSUP may be revoked. See id. § 241.13(i). Generally speaking,
the OSUP may be revoked if the noncitizen violates any of the conditions of release. See id.
§ 241.13(i)(1). An OSUP may also be revoked to enforce a removal order when, “on account of
changed circumstances, the Service determines that there is a significant likelihood that the alien
may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. § 241.13(i)(2). When an OSUP is
revoked, the noncitizen must “be notified of the reasons for revocation of his or her release” and
must be afforded an “initial informal interview promptly after his or her return to Service custody
to afford the alien an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation.” Id. § 241.13(i)(3).
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B. Habeas Relief
Petitioners seek release through a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241.7 To be entitled to the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, a petitioner must show that he
is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3); see Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (“[N]either habeas
nor civil rights relief can be had absent the allegation by a plaintiff that he or she has been deprived
of some right secured to him or her by the United States Constitution or the laws of the United
States.” (quoting Hilliard v. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 759 F.2d 1190, 1192 (5th Cir. 1985) (per
curiam))). A habeas petitioner “bears the burden of proving that he is being held contrary to law;
and because the habeas proceeding is civil in nature, the petitioner must satisfy his burden of proof
by a preponderance of the evidence.” Skaftouros v. United States, 667 F.3d 144, 158 (2d Cir. 2011)
(citing Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 31 (1992)); see also Bruce v. Estelle, 536 F.2d 1051, 1058
(5th Cir. 1976). A court considering a habeas petition must “determine the facts, and dispose of
the matter as law and justice require.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
In determining whether a period of immigration detention is unconstitutionally prolonged,
the Supreme Court directed federal habeas courts to determine “whether the detention in question
exceeds a period reasonably necessary to secure removal” and to “measure reasonableness
primarily in terms of the statute’s basic purpose, namely, assuring the [noncitizen]’s presence at
the moment of removal.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699. If removal is not “reasonably foreseeable,
the court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.” Id.
7 Respondents assert that conditions of confinement are appropriately challenged through a civil rights suit under
§ 1983 or Bivens rather than habeas. The Court need not address this argument, as Petitioners do not challenge the
conditions of their confinement. While the Petition does illustrate the conditions of their confinement, the legal basis
of Petitioners’ habeas claim is the unlikelihood of deportation under Zadvydas and due process violations. Success on
either of these claims would “entitle [Petitioners] to accelerated release,” and so habeas is the appropriate vehicle.
(See Doc. 18 at 4 (quoting Melot v. Bergami, 970 F.3d 596, 599 (5th Cir. 2020)).)
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at 699–700. “When the Court finds that a petitioner’s constitutional rights have been violated, the
petitioner is entitled to the issuance of the requested writ.” Villanueva, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 697.
III. DISCUSSION
Noncitizens, even those who have been ordered removed from the country, are protected
by the Constitution. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. The Government may not execute removal
proceedings in violation of due process. See Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025) (per
curiam) (“It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles [noncitizens] to due process of
law in the context of removal proceedings.”) (internal quotation omitted). Nor may it execute
removals in violation of its own regulations. See Gulf States Mfrs., Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations
Bd., 579 F.2d 1298, 1308 (5th Cir. 1978) (“It is well settled that an Executive Agency of the
Government is bound by its own regulations, which have the force and effect of law, and the failure
of an agency to follow its regulations renders its decision invalid.”); see also Gov’t of Canal Zone
v. Brooks, 427 F.2d 346, 347 (5th Cir. 1970) (“It is equally well established that it is a denial of
due process for any government agency to fail to follow its own regulations providing for
procedural safeguards to persons involved in adjudicative processes before it.” (citing cases)).
With these principles in mind, the Court will consider whether the Government violated Petitioners’
constitutional rights, and whether Petitioners are entitled to habeas relief.
A. Re-Detention Without Due Process
Petitioners argue that their re-detentions are unlawful because (1) their OSUPs were
revoked and detention reinstated without properly articulated purpose, in violation of ICE
regulations and substantive due process rights; and (2) they were re-detained without notice or
opportunity to be heard, in violation of ICE regulations and procedural due process rights. (Doc.
1 passim.) Respondents do not assert that ICE followed its own regulations ensuring due process,
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(Doc. 26 at 18–20); instead, they argue that any procedural defects of Petitioners’ re-detention
were harmless error or “mere irregularities or errors of law” that can be cured and do not merit
habeas relief. (Doc. 18 at 18, 23.)
1. Reason for Revocation
Once a noncitizen has been released from detention under an OSUP, it may be revoked
(1) if the noncitizen violates his conditions of release, (2) in order to carry out deportation, (3) if
the purpose of release has been served, or (4) if the noncitizen’s conduct or another circumstance
indicates that release is no longer appropriate. 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.13(i), 241.4(l)(2). Respondents
have not argued that these Petitioners were re-detained because they violated their conditions of
release, that the purpose of release has been served, or that release is no longer appropriate.8 As
discussed below, the only stated reason for Petitioners’ re-detention—where a reason was stated—
was to effectuate deportation.9
If an OSUP is revoked for the purpose of effectuating deportation, ICE must show that “on
account of changed circumstances, . . . there is a significant likelihood that the [noncitizen] may
be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2) (emphasis added). That
is, in order to re-detain a formerly released noncitizen, it is ICE’s burden to show that the
noncitizen’s removal from the country is significantly likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable
future.10 See Garcia-Aleman v. Thompson, No. 25-886, 2025 WL 3534806, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Nov.
8 Though Respondents’ proffered declarations of Assistant Field Office Director Lisa Fruge-Prudhome assert that
Gaston Sanchez (Doc. 18-1 at 3–4), Blanco Chomat (Doc. 18-4 at 2), and Mohammed (Doc. 18-5 at 2) missed one or
more check-in appointments, Petitioners have put forth evidence—both declarations and supporting documents—
showing that those appointments were attended or were rescheduled and attended. (Gaston Sanchez: Doc. 20-4 at 2–
3, Doc. 20-10; Blanco Chomat: Doc. 20-3 at 2–5, Docs. 20-6, 20-7, 20-8, 20-9; Mohammed: Doc. 20-5 at 2, Doc. 20-
11.) Further, even if Respondents believe these appointments were missed, they have not argued—either at the time
of re-detention or now—that Petitioners were re-detained on that basis.
9 Previewed here and discussed below, one Petitioner was not given any reason for revocation.
10 This standard will be repeated quite often throughout this discussion. For brevity’s sake, the Court may occasionally
shorten it to “likely,” “significantly likely,” “foreseeable,” “reasonably foreseeable,” or the like, but note that the entire
standard—significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future—must apply.
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24, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 25-886, 2025 WL 3532179 (W.D. Tex. Dec.
9, 2025) (collecting cases). “The changed circumstances that make an [noncitizen]’s removal
likely in the foreseeable future must have existed at or before the OSUP revocation; post-hoc
justifications are inadequate.” Munagi v. McDonald, No. 25-13175, 2025 WL 3688023, at *2 (D.
Mass. Dec. 19, 2025); see also Sarail A. v. Bondi, 803 F. Supp. 3d 775, 788 (D. Minn. 2025)
(finding that revocation was unlawful where ICE was not informed that Jamaica would issue
petitioner travel documents until after his OSUP had been revoked); M.S.L. v. Bostock, No. 25-
1204, 2025 WL 2430267, at *13 (D. Or. Aug. 21, 2025) (citing cases); Zhang v. Genalo, No. 25-
6781, 2025 WL 3733542, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2025) (quoting Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer, 781 F.
Supp. 3d 137, 163 (W.D.N.Y. 2025)).
The First Circuit has found that Section 241.13(i) requires an individualized finding that
deportation has become significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. Kong v. United
States, 62 F.4th 608, 619–20 (1st Cir. 2023). One court in this Circuit has declined to adopt this
stance, stating instead that while “there must be changed circumstances that there is a significant
likelihood that the particular [noncitizen] may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future . . .
it does not follow that there must be changed circumstances that are particular to [the petitioner].”
Nguyen v. Noem, 797 F. Supp. 3d 651, 665–66 (N.D. Tex. 2025). In other words, “[t]he changed
circumstances need to be applicable to [the petitioner], but that does not mean that they must be
unique to [the petitioner].” Id. at 666. On this point, the Court does not disagree—a broad change
in circumstance can, indeed, be the change that merits an individualized finding that deportation
has become significantly likely. But Nguyen takes this idea one step further, rejecting Kong and
an individualized determination entirely, relying on an assumption that a broad change in
circumstance affecting a group necessarily affects all group members equally. Id.
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The Court disagrees and finds Kong more persuasive than Nguyen. The regulation provides
that ICE may revoke release in order to effectuate deportation “if, on account of changed
circumstances, the Service determines that there is a significant likelihood that the alien may be
removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2) (emphasis added). This
clearly refers to the individual detainee, not any broad group to which the detainee belongs. Accord
Kong, 62 F.4th at 619–20. While Nguyen is correct that a broad policy may constitute a changed
circumstance that affects an entire class, such a change does not necessarily make deportation
“significantly likely” for every individual in the class. For example, improved diplomatic relations
with Cuba could make it generally more likely that Cuban detainees might be deported there. But,
if Cuba were accepting only those Cuban national deportees with no criminal record, then the
Cuban Petitioners here would be no more likely to be removed to Cuba than before diplomatic
relations improved. Thus, Kong is not only more in line with the plain language of the regulation,
but it is also a more reasonable interpretation of that regulation. While the changed circumstance
need not be unique to the petitioner, it does need to affect the likelihood of the individual
petitioner’s removal, hence the individualized determination. For these reasons, the Court rejects
Respondents’ reliance on Nguyen and finds that, in order to revoke an OSUP for the purpose of
effectuating deportation, ICE must find a significant likelihood of removal as to the individual
noncitizen in question.
Here, Petitioners argue that ICE did not make any such finding of a likelihood of
deportation in deciding to revoke Petitioners’ OSUPs and re-detain them. In response to this
assertion, Respondents were able to produce a Notice of Revocation of Release for only two of the
four Petitioners; the stated reasons for their re-detention are: “ICE has determined that you can be
expeditiously removed from the United States. . . . Your case is under review by Cuba for the
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issuance of a travel document.” (Rodriguez Romero, Doc. 18-8 at 1; and Blanco Chomat, Doc. 18-
6 at 1.) Petitioner Mohammed asserts that he was given a Notice of Revocation,11 and that the
reason stated was that his case was under review by France, the UK, Australia, Germany, and
Canada for the issuance of a travel document. (Doc. 1 at 26.) Finally, for Petitioner Gaston Sanchez,
Respondents have not provided any documents regarding the revocation of his OSUP, much less
one that demonstrates a significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.
(See Doc. 18 at 15.) The Court will take each Petitioner’s revocation of release in turn.
Gaston Sanchez. The lack of Notice of Revocation or any other evidence of the reason
for revocation of Gaston Sanchez’s OSUP makes clear that Gaston Sanchez was re-detained with
no legitimate reason. Not only has the government shown no reason for revoking his OSUP, but it
has not even shown that his OSUP was revoked. To this point, Respondents allege that a “Warrant
of Removal/Deportation” was issued on the day he was re-detained, (Doc. 18-1 at 4)—this
document is not in the record, and Respondents have not explained what this document is or what
actions, if any, it compels; in any case, it was not a Notice of Revocation of Release. Per the
declaration of Lisa Fruge-Prudhome, New Orleans Assistant Field Office Director of DHS/ICE
Enforcement and Removal Operations, 12 Gaston Sanchez was not sent any other documents
regarding his custody until September 30, after he had been in custody for over three months. (Doc.
18-1 at 4.) There being no documentation of the revocation of his release, who authorized it, or for
what reason, the Government clearly failed to carry its burden to show that there was a significant
likelihood of Gaston Sanchez’s removal justifying his re-detention. See, e.g., Villanueva, 801 F.
Supp. 3d at 699–700 (“In the absence of some evidence showing that Villanueva’s Order of
11 He asserts he received this document only in English, in which he has limited proficiency; his native language is
Amharic. ICE is unable to locate this document. (Doc. 18 at 15.)
12 Declarations by AFOD Lisa Fruge-Prudhome will hereinafter be referred to as the Prudhome declarations.
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Supervision was lawfully revoked by someone with the authority to do so and for a reason lawfully
permitted, the government has failed to show that it afforded [petitioner] with due process in
connection with the purported revocation of his Order of Supervision.”).
Mohammed. Mohammed asserts that he was given a Notice of Revocation in English,
in which he has limited proficiency, and that he did not understand why he was being detained.
(Doc. 1 at 26.) Mohammed alleges that the Notice stated that he was being detained due to
undefined “changed circumstances” and because his case was “under current review by France,
United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, and Canada for the issuance of a travel document.” Id. ICE
had been unable to deport him to these countries prior to his release on OSUP eight months earlier.
Id. Because ICE had very recently failed to deport Mohammed to the five countries listed in the
Notice of Revocation, it cannot be said that there was a significant likelihood that he could be
removed to one of those countries absent some changed circumstance between the first attempt to
deport him and his re-detention. But no such change was articulated. The conclusory statement
that there were “changed circumstances” and alleged review by countries that very recently did
not accept this Petitioner cannot establish a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future. See, e.g., Abuelhawa v. Noem, No. 25-4128, 2025 WL 2937692, at *9 (S.D.
Tex. Oct. 16, 2025) (“[T]he Government fails to meet its burden where it provides only conclusory
statements as to the likelihood of removal.”) (citing cases). And so, the Government failed to carry
its burden to show that there was a significant likelihood of Mohammed’s removal justifying his
re-detention.
Rodriguez Romero. The Notice of Revocation given to Rodriguez Romero upon his
re-detention was written only in English, which Rodriguez Romero cannot read. (Doc. 1 at 14.) It
states that the revocation was based on “a determination that there are changed circumstances in
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[his] case,” that “ICE has determined that [he] can be expeditiously removed from the United
States,” and that his “case is under current review by Cuba for the issuance of a travel document.”
(Doc. 18-8 at 1.) Rodriguez Romero’s removal order was entered on May 30, 1995, and he was
detained for over two years while the Government attempted to remove him to Cuba or elsewhere,
before being released on an OSUP in July 1997.13 (Doc. 1 at 13.) For 28 years—from 1997 to
2025—ICE was unwilling or unable to remove Rodriguez Romero to his native Cuba; in fact,
renewed OSUPs in 2004 and 2013 indicate that ICE was actively evaluating his case through the
years. (Doc. 18-3 at 2.) While the Notice of Revocation indicates that Cuba was reviewing
Rodriguez Romero’s eligibility for acceptance into Cuba, the conclusory assertion of “changed
circumstances” does not explain why, after nearly three decades of not accepting Rodriguez
Romero into Cuba, the Government thought that Cuba’s review of his case in 2025 would turn out
any differently; Respondents have not attempted to identify such a changed circumstance even
after the fact. In fact, Cuba refused to accept Rodriguez Romero on this occasion, too.14 (Doc. 18
at 3.) Without a finding of changed circumstances, ICE did not meet its burden to show a
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future when Rodriguez Romero’s
case was merely under review by a country that had already rejected him.
13 Petitioner asserts that his OSUP was entered in July 1997. The Prudhome declaration acknowledges his removal
order of May 30, 1995, but makes no mention of a 1997 OSUP. It does state that on “September 23, 2004, and June
17, 2003, ICE placed Petitioner on Orders of Supervision”; there is no indication why two separate OSUPs were
needed. (Doc. 18-3 at 2.) This statement, however, does not purport to be a complete accounting of Petitioner’s ICE
history, only one that is “true and correct.” Id.
14 The stated reason for re-detention of both Rodriguez Romero and Blanco Chomat was review by Cuba. Respondents
concede that Cuba refused to accept both of these Petitioners at some time after their re-detention but before
Respondents filed their opposition to the Petition. (Doc. 18 at 3.) This Court has seen no guidance on what should
happen when the stated reason for revocation of release falls through, and thus the significant likelihood of removal
vanishes. But the internal logic of ICE’s regulations and the impermissibility of post-hoc rationalizations suggest that
return to release under the OSUP would be appropriate. See Marquez-Amaya v. Thompson, No. 25-1501, 2025 WL
3654327, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 2025) (“The Government cannot cure the wrongful commencement of detention
through after-the-fact determinations of potential expeditious removal.”)
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Blanco Chomat. In the Petition, Blanco Chomat asserts that he was not given a Notice
of Revocation, but that on the day of his re-detention, he was told that Cuba was not accepting him.
(Doc. 1 at 18.) Respondents have produced a Notice of Revocation for Blanco Chomat on the date
of his re-detention, marked to indicate that he refused to sign the acknowledgment of receipt.15
(Doc. 18-6 at 1–2.) Because Respondents have produced it, the Court will assume Blanco Chomat
did receive this document. This Notice of Revocation is substantially identical to Rodriguez
Romero’s, citing conclusory “changed circumstances,” the determination that Blanco Chomat can
be “expeditiously removed,” and that his case is “under review by Cuba.” (Id. at 1.) Blanco Chomat
was released on his OSUP in 2003 or 2004. (Doc. 1 at 17; Doc. 18-4 at 2.) For over two decades,
ICE has failed to remove him to Cuba, and the Notice of Revocation does not indicate any changed
circumstances that would have suggested a different outcome for his re-detention in 2025. For the
same reasons listed above as to Rodriguez Romero, ICE failed to meet its burden to show a
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.
2. Right to Challenge Revocation
In addition to requiring a significant likelihood of removal in order to revoke an OSUP,
ICE’s regulations provide that a noncitizen being re-detained must be informed of the reason for
revocation and afforded an “initial informal interview promptly after [his] return to Service
custody to afford the [noncitizen] an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.13(i)(3). The Notice of Revocation of Release also assures detainees that they will have this
opportunity to respond: “You will promptly be afforded an informal interview at which you will
be given an opportunity to respond to the reasons for the revocation. You may submit any evidence
or information you wish to be reviewed in support of your release.” (See, e.g., Doc. 18-8 at 1.)
15 N.b., the other Notice of Revocation in the record, Rodriguez Romero’s, is not signed by Rodriguez Romero, but is
not marked “Refused to Sign.” (Doc. 18-8 at 2.)
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While the regulations do not give exact specifications for what constitutes an acceptable
informal interview, the purpose stated in the regulations is clear: a detainee must have an
opportunity to respond to and contest the reason for re-detention. None of the Petitioners received
such an interview. Respondents do not argue otherwise. (Doc. 26 at 19–20 (“[Judge]: They didn’t
get an initial interview . . . that the regulation says they’re entitled to. Am I correct about that?
[Respondent]: We don’t have any documentation, Your Honor, that they were given— [Judge]:
Meaning that they didn’t get it. Right? [Respondent]: Yes, Your Honor.”).) Respondents argue
that Petitioners have now been afforded the opportunity to rebut their re-detention in federal court,
and so the lack of interview is cured. (Doc. 18 at 21–22.) The Court cannot agree. Arguments
before the Court are not arguments to ICE; and more importantly, the intent of the interview is to
contest re-detention and avoid erroneous deprivation of a noncitizen’s liberty. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.13(i)(3). Nothing this Court can do can retroactively cure the lack of process resulting in
Petitioners’ wrongful detention; 16 indeed, “additional process would not so much cure their
unconstitutional detention as prolong it.” (Doc. 26 at 17, Petitioner.)
3. Availability of Habeas Relief for Due Process Violations
Having found that ICE failed to comply with its own regulations when revoking
Petitioners’ OSUPs and re-detaining them, the Court now turns to Respondents’ argument
regarding the availability of habeas relief. (Doc. 13 at 13–18; Doc. 18 at 13–24.)
Respondents note that habeas is only available to “correct unlawful imprisonment or
custody based on the denial of fundamental constitutional rights.” (Doc. 13 at 15.) It may “not be
16 For similar reasons, the Court rejects the notion—briefly referenced by Respondents—that the process owed to
Petitioners simply has not happened yet. (Doc. 18 at 22 (citing Ladak v. Noem, No. 25-194, 2025 WL 3764016, at *5
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 30, 2025).) The regulations command that the interview happen “promptly . . . to afford the
[noncitizen] an opportunity” to challenge the re-detention. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3). The purpose is not served if
petitioners can be held for months before the “prompt” interview happens.
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used to correct mere irregularities” like the ones alleged here—i.e., violations of “mere
administrative regulations, not required as a result of the Constitution.” (Doc. 18 at 23.) And
because Respondents claim ICE’s revocation regulations are “mere[ly] administrative,” they insist
that Petitioners must show “substantial prejudice to state a procedural due process claim.” (Id. at
18, 23.) They suggest that Petitioners have made no showing of prejudice. And even if they had,
Respondents argue Petitioners’ habeas claims would still fail for one simple reason: they have not
alleged a constitutionally protected right. (Id. at 23.) More specifically, Petitioners have “not
explain[ed] how they had any constitutional right to notice and an informal interview.” (Id.) The
Court does not agree.
In United States v. Accardi, the Supreme Court held that when the Government promulgates
regulations “with the force and effect of law,” agencies are bound to follow their own “existing
valid regulations.” 347 U.S. 260, 265, 268 (1954). As Respondents suggest, to prove an Accardi
claim, and therefore a due process violation, the petitioner must ordinarily demonstrate prejudice
resulting from the violation. See Am. Farm Liens v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532, 539
(1970). However, prejudice may be presumed when “compliance with the regulation is mandated
by the Constitution” and “where an entire procedural framework, designed to ensure the fair
processing of an action affecting an individual is created but then not followed by an agency.”
Delgado-Corea v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 804 F.2d 261, 263 (4th Cir. 1986); see also
Villanueva, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 698–99 (“The statutes and regulations governing immigration and
removal proceedings afford important procedural safeguards to detainees.”); Gurung v. Warden, S.
Tex. ICE Processing Ctr., No. 25-1614, 2026 WL 93145, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2026) (“The
regulations enacted by the government itself are intended to ensure that noncitizens who have been
released to supervision do not arbitrarily have that supervision revoked. By failing to follow its
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own regulations, the government has denied Petitioner notice . . . and an opportunity to challenge
those reasons. . . . Again, the government can have no legitimate interest in ignoring its own
regulations, which are intended to ensure that the discretion afforded to the government's agents is
not exercised arbitrarily.”).
Multiple courts within this circuit and throughout the country, being faced with fact
patterns nearly identical to Petitioners’, have considered the regulations discussed above and
found:
[T]hese regulations are intended to provide due process in that they are fairly
construed to be part of a procedural framework designed to ensure the fair
processing of an action affecting an individual, such that when they are not
followed, prejudice is presumed.”
Santamaria Orellana v. Baker, No. 25-1788, 2025 WL 2444087, at *6 (D. Md. Aug. 25, 2025)
(emphasis added); see also Bonitto v. Bureau of Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 547 F. Supp. 2d 747,
755–56 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (“Where individual interests are implicated, the Due Process clause
requires that an executive agency adhere to the standards by which it professes its action to be
judged. The regulations involved here [(8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4, 241.13)] do not merely facilitate
internal agency housekeeping, but rather afford important and imperative procedural safeguards to
detainees. This Court must insist on DHS’s compliance with the post-order custody regulations”
for detention to be considered constitutional.); Misirbekov v. Venegas, 796 F. Supp. 3d 436, 439–
40 (S.D. Tex. 2025) (“The review process contemplated by the regulations [(8 C.F.R. § 241.4)] is
a meaningful individualized review, as the interest involved is the most elemental of liberty
interests—the interest in being free from physical detention. The record shows that Petitioner has
not been afforded this process.” For that reason, the court ordered the non-citizens’ release from
detention.); Villanueva, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 698–99 (“The statutes and regulations governing
immigration and removal proceedings afford important procedural safeguards to detainees. For
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Villanueva’s detention to be constitutional, the government must have complied with both the
applicable statutory provisions and its own regulations.”); Gurung, 2026 WL 93145, at *4, *8 (The
“mandatory” procedural regulations “enacted by the government itself are intended to ensure that
noncitizens who have been released to supervision do not arbitrarily have that supervision
revoked.” ICE’s noncompliance has “denied Petitioner notice of its intent to revoke his
supervision, notice of the reasons for the revocation, and an opportunity to challenge those
reasons. . . . Again, the government can have no legitimate interest in ignoring its own regulations,
which are intended to ensure that the discretion afforded to the government’s agents is not
exercised arbitrarily.”); Rombot v. Souza, 296 F. Supp. 3d 383, 389 (D. Mass. 2017) (As described
above, ICE failed to follow its own [mandatory procedural] regulations in at least three ways. The
Supreme Court has recognized that an “alien may no doubt be returned to custody upon a violation
of supervision conditions, but it has never given ICE a carte blanche to re-incarcerate someone
without basic due process protection.” (internal citations omitted)); Primero v. Mattivelo, No. 25-
11442, 2025 WL 1899115, at *5 (D. Mass. July 9, 2025) (“DHS’s detailed regulations provide for
custody determinations to be made where an individual is detained beyond the removal period. A
decision to retain custody beyond the removal period must briefly set forth the reasons for the
continued detention. Petitioner is constitutionally entitled to this process.”); Sanchez v. Bondi, No.
25-2573, 2026 WL 160882, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 21, 2026) (“The re-detention of a noncitizen
subject to a final order of removal is governed by 8 C.F.R. § 241.13. The regulation was intended
to provide due process protections to noncitizens following the removal period as they are
considered for continued detention, release, and then possible revocation of release.” (internal
citations omitted)); M.Q. v. United States, 776 F. Supp. 3d 180, 187, 190 & n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2025)
(holding that 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l) required ICE to provide petitioner, who had not violated
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conditions of release, with notice and an informal interview); Constantinovici v. Bondi, — F. Supp.
3d —, 2025 WL 2898985, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025) (“The Government has significant
discretion to enforce the immigration laws and . . . to revoke an Order of Supervision. However,
the government’s discretion to incarcerate non-citizens is always constrained by the requirements
of due process.”); Nazarian v. Noem, No. 25-2694, 2025 WL 3236209, at *4, *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
3, 2025) (agreeing with petitioner that “revocation of his release and subsequent re-detention
violate[d] ICE’s own regulations and, thereby, the Due Process Clause”; and explaining: “Even if
Section 241.4 grants certain officials broad discretion over revocation, the regulation still requires
ICE to provide Petitioner notice and an interview. Respondents offer no authority to suggest ICE
may simply ignore Section 241.4’s procedural safeguards in discretionary revocations.”); Delkash
v. Noem, No. 25-1675, 2025 WL 2683988, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025) (“These procedures are
not optional or discretionary; they must be followed, and failure to do so renders the detention
unlawful.”); Perez-Escobar v. Moniz, 792 F. Supp. 3d 224, 226 (D. Mass. 2025) (“ICE’s failure to
give Petitioner meaningful notice of the basis for its revocation of his release violated the
regulation and due process.”); Nguyen v. Lyons, No. 25-631, 2026 WL 125093, at * 4 (D.R.I. Jan.
16, 2026) (“[T]he government is not free to ignore their own regulations or the Fifth Amendment
due process protections in order to re-detain Mr. Nguyen while they are simply waiting for ‘ICE
to determine whether a travel document is approved.’ . . . Respondents have re-detained Mr.
Nguyen in violation of 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2) . . . . ICE’s own immigration regulation was
promulgated to protect a fundamental right derived from the Constitution.”); Mata Velasquez v.
Kurzdorfer, 794 F. Supp. 3d 128, 149, 150 (W.D.N.Y. 2025) (“The new administration is free to
shift policies and change course. But that does not mean it can do so without complying with the
law and due process. . . . And as Mata Velasquez observes, while the new administration may wish
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to change course, his engendered reliance interest, and his compliance with everything that the
Executive Branch asked of him, entitles him to more than summary arrest and detention ‘on the
mere say-so of a government official.’”).
And so, courts have overwhelmingly ruled that the revocation regulations provide
important procedural safeguards and are intended to protect a fundamental right derived from the
constitution—liberty. The Court finds these cases persuasive and agrees with their holdings. Even
still, we must address the cases compiled by Respondents, and offered as a “[]complete statement
of the law in the Fifth Circuit.” (Doc. 18 at 18.)
Respondents cite to several cases as support for their argument that “[i]n the Fifth Circuit,
Petitioners are required to establish substantial prejudice to state a procedural due process claim.”
(Id.) The Court has thoroughly examined each of the cases discussed in Respondents’ filings and
finds them unpersuasive. In the overwhelming majority, the petitioner is asking the court to
invalidate a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals based on an alleged violation of the
regulations applicable to administrative adjudications before an immigration judge or the Board of
Immigration Appeals. See Molina v. Sewell, 983 F.2d 676, 678 (5th Cir. 1993) (In BIA proceedings,
“Lozano had not been advised of his right to present evidence or object to the Government’s
evidence. . . . To prove that administrative proceedings should be invalidated for violation of
regulations, an alien must show substantial prejudice.”); Ka Fung Chan v. INS, 634 F.2d 248, 258
(5th Cir. 1981) (“Chan . . . contends that the immigration judge at his deportation proceeding
violated due process when he denied Chan’s request for a continuance. Second, he argues that the
immigration judge . . . violated due process when he engaged in ex parte communications with a
deportation officer. . . . [E]ach of these due process attacks fails because proof of a denial of due
process in an administrative proceeding requires a showing of substantial prejudice.”); Retana
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Leyva v. Barr, 838 F. App’x 13, 18 (5th Cir. 2020) (noncitizen claimed he was improperly served
with NTA in connection with hearings before IJ and BIA, which violated hearing regulation; “We
affirm the BIA on the grounds discussed below, namely, that Retana has not demonstrated that he
was prejudiced by the defective service.”); Osorio Diaz v. Barr, 831 F. App’x 718, 719 (5th Cir.
2020) (same); Ayala Chapa v. Bondi, 132 F.4th 796, 799–800 (5th Cir. 2025) (seeking review of
BIA order; court found no violation of statute or regulations where a reappointed temporary Board
member issued BIA order); Francois v. Garland, 120 F.4th 459, 464 (5th Cir. 2024) (seeking
review of decision by BIA where it applied an incorrect standard of review when considering the
IJ’s decision on appeal; “because the BIA’s standard of review is not compelled by the Constitution
or statute,” petitioner must show substantial prejudice—i.e., that violation affected outcome of
proceedings). In the cases cited above, the petitioner is not alleging unlawful, unexpected, and
presumably indefinite, re-detention by ICE, nor do they seek release from re-detention.
The immigration habeas cases relied on and discussed by Respondents come from the
Northern District of Texas17—Nguyen v. Noem, 797 F. Supp. 3d 651 (N.D. Tex. 2025), Surovtsev
17 Respondents repeatedly cite, and indeed take the time to analyze and discuss, the Northern District of Texas cases,
on which the gravamen of their argument is based—Nguyen v. Noem, 797 F. Supp. 3d 651 (N.D. Tex. 2025), Surovtsev
v. Noem, No. 25-160, 2025 WL 3264479 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2025), Ladak v. Noem, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL
3764016, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 30, 2025), and Nouansisouhak v. Noem, No. 25-2222, 2025 WL 3165161 (N.D. Tex.
Oct. 9, 2025. (Doc. 18 at 18.)
While Respondents do cite a few other immigration habeas cases, they do not provide any discussion. (Doc. 18 at 22,
23.) Having read these other cases as well, the Court is not persuaded. See, e.g., Doe v. Smith, No. 18-11363, 2018
WL 4696748, at *9 (D. Mass. Oct. 1, 2018) (case decided under very different circumstances—Uganda confirmed it
would issue travel document but only after petitioner was returned to ICE custody; upon re-detention, petitioner given
notice of revocation, reasons were explained and informal interview conducted, all on the day of re-detention; second
interview conducted 4 weeks later; parties disputed whether first or second interview counted for purposes of
regulation; when read in context, quoted language—“no apparent reason why a violation, even assuming it occurred,
should result in release”—does not support Respondents’ position considering Doe’s removal was truly imminent);
Ahmad v. Whitaker, No. 18-287, 2018 WL 6928540, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 4, 2018) (acknowledging ICE failed to
provide the informal interview, but that failure alone did not warrant habeas relief where petitioner seems to have not
allege lack of interview in connection with due process claim; and habeas relief not warranted “given that ICE had
procured a travel document and scheduled Mr. Ahmad’s removal” before his re-detention, and considering the purpose
of the interview is so the “noncitizen may present information showing that there is no significant likelihood of
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future”); Umanzor-Chavez v. Noem, No. 25-1634, 2025 WL 2467640, at *5 n.4
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v. Noem, No. 25-160, 2025 WL 3264479 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2025), Ladak v. Noem, — F. Supp.
3d —, 2025 WL 3764016, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 30, 2025), and Nouansisouhak v. Noem, No. 25-
2222, 2025 WL 3165161 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2025).
Citing these opinions, Respondents suggest that “several district courts,” (Doc. 18 at 20),
have found that the harmless error/substantial prejudice standard applies under facts similar to
those alleged by Petitioners. But we disagree where each case not only came out of a single district
court—the Northern District of Texas—each opinion is virtually a carbon copy of the others. In
other words, four different courts considering similar issues did not reach the conclusion advocated
by the government. Rather, a single court copy-and-pasted the same opinion four times. And so,
in reality, one court supports the government’s position. See Nguyen, 797 F. Supp. 3d at 664 (“A
violation of Section 241.13(i)(3) alone cannot justify habeas. It is a mere administrative regulation,
not required as the result of the Constitution.”). For simplicity, the Court refers to Nguyen v. Noem
as representative of the four Northern District of Texas cases.
Nguyen represents a hyper-minority. It unpersuasively relies on either ‘criminal’ habeas
cases or immigration cases that do not deal with detention or habeas. For example, Nguyen relies
on Jalloh v. Garland, No. 20-2117, 2023 WL 1859918, at *2 (4th Cir. 2023), and Ngarurih v.
Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 190 n.8 (4th Cir. 2004), for the proposition that “Harmless error applies
in immigration cases generally.” Nguyen, 797 F. Supp. 3d at 662. But both Jalloh and Ngarurih
concern judicial review of decisions by the Board of Immigration Appeals. They do not concern
immigration detention or habeas relief. In other words, they are wholly inapplicable to the issues
presented in both Nguyen and the case at hand. See also Nguyen, 797 F. Supp. 3d at 664 (“The
(D. Md. Aug. 27, 2025) (in a footnote, court questions whether regulation requiring informal interview even applies
to petitioner’s situation; alternatively, if regulation does apply, court finds without any analysis that failure to conduct
the interview is not, by itself, enough to warrant relief).
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Fifth Circuit has confirmed in other contexts that the failure of officials ‘to follow their own
policies, without more, does not constitute a violation of due process,’ making a writ of habeas
corpus generally not available.” (quoting Iruegas-Maciel v. Dobre, 67 F. App’x 253, 253 (5th Cir.
2003) (a single-paragraph opinion affirming dismissal of an inmate’s habeas petition that claimed
“he was denied due process in connection with his disciplinary hearing”)). Considering the
overwhelming majority of district courts in the Fifth Circuit and throughout the country have
reached the opposite conclusion, the Court is not persuaded by Nguyen.
Instead, we join the majority of courts throughout the country and find that ICE’s
regulations—8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4, 241.13—mandate important procedural safeguards against
wrongful detention. This conclusion is especially warranted considering the re-detention of a
noncitizen following supervised release deprives them of personal liberty. See Villanueva, 801 F.
Supp. 3d at 704 (“[E]ven if the government has the discretion to revoke [Petitioners’] supervision,
[their] constitutionally protected liberty interests are implicated by [their] re-detention.”).
“The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause forbids the Government to deprive any
person of liberty without due process of law. Freedom from imprisonment—from government
custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause
protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. What’s more, individuals who have been conditionally
released from detention have a protected interest in their “continued liberty.” Young v. Harper, 520
U.S. 143, 147 (1997). This is true even when the released individual is subject to extensive
conditions of release. Villanueva, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 704.
With that in mind, this Court now joins the multitude of courts within the Fifth Circuit and
across the country recognizing that non-citizens have an “overwhelming liberty interest” in their
“continued release under [an] Order of Supervision . . . that may not be removed without due
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process.” Gurung, 2026 WL 93145, at *8 (“Petitioner has a liberty interest in his continued release
under his Order of Supervision. He was free under that Order for over two years. He has a job and
a family. He has complied with all of the terms of his Order of Supervision. . . . There is no
principled reason to find that [Petitioner] does not have an overwhelming liberty interest in his
continued release that may not be removed without due process.”); see also Villanueva, 801 F.
Supp. 3d at 704 (“Here, even if the government has the discretion to revoke Villanueva’s
supervision, his constitutionally protected liberty interests are implicated by his re-detention.”);
Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa, 801 F. Supp. 3d 668, 686 (W.D. Tex. 2025) (“[O]nce released from
immigration custody, noncitizens acquire a protectable liberty interest in remaining out of custody
. . . .”); Trejo v. Warden of ERO El Paso E. Montana, —F. Supp. 3d—, 2025 WL 2992187, at *7
(W.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2025) (“Many courts, including this one, have found that ICE’s decision to
release a noncitizen confers a significant liberty interest that cannot be revoked without an
individualized determination by a neutral adjudicator.”); Ramirez Tesara v. Wamsley, 800 F. Supp.
3d 1130, 1136 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“Petitioner’s actions since his initial release” from ICE
detention “show that he has not only reasonably relied on this [liberty] interest, but that the interest
is weighty. Upon being released, Petitioner reunited with his family, whom he supported as the
“primary breadwinner” and “[h]e and his partner had their first child together, who is a citizen of
the United States. He successfully and timely filed for asylum. These actions were only made
possible by Petitioner’s freedom, which is the most elemental of liberty interests.”); Iza v. Arnott,
No. 25-3392, 2026 WL 67152, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 8, 2026) (“When the government grants an
alien parole into the country, it creates a liberty interest intimately tied to freedom from
imprisonment.”).
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Indeed, the Western District of Texas has even recognized that noncitizens like
Petitioners—i.e., those previously released on an OSUP but now re-detained—enjoy a “liberty
interest [that] is stronger than the usual Zadvydas petitioner, who is detained continuously from
the time of their final removal order.” Trejo, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 2992187, at *6 (“After
his removal order was reinstated, Trejo was released pursuant to an OSUP and lived at liberty in
the United States for nearly six and a half years. Thus, in the alternative, the Court finds that Trejo
is entitled to additional procedural protections by virtue of the liberty interest he obtained through
his release.”).
The Court is persuaded by Trejo, and the cases cited above, and finds Petitioners had an
overwhelming liberty interest in their continued supervised release that was entitled to due process
protections. ICE’s failure to follow its own mandatory regulations (or otherwise afford Petitioners
any meaningful notice or opportunity to be heard) in revoking supervised release was per se
prejudicial. For these reasons, Petitioners are entitled to habeas relief and immediate release from
detention.
B. Continued Detention Under Zadvydas
Even if Petitioners’ initial detentions were lawful, or if the related due process claims could
be cured, they also challenge their ongoing detention under the Zadvydas doctrine, asserting that
their deportation is not reasonably foreseeable and should be ended. In Zadvydas, the Supreme
Court recognized that while the government may need more than the 90-day removal period to
effect deportation, it cannot lawfully detain people indefinitely. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 697. Finding
that detention longer than six months is constitutionally suspect, the court established that a period
of up to six months is a presumptively reasonable time to detain people for the purpose of
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effectuating removal; when removal is not reasonably foreseeable, detention is no longer lawful.
Id. at 699, 701.
1. Zadvydas Period and Re-detention
Respondents argue that Petitioners’ Zadvydas claims are premature because they have not
been detained for longer than the 6-month presumptively reasonable period. But when calculated
properly, each Petitioner’s period of detention exceeds 6 months.
As other courts have explained, a re-detention after release on an OSUP “is not
your typical first round detainment of an alien awaiting removal.” Escalante v.
Noem, No. 25-CV-182, 2025 WL 2206113, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2025). When
an immigrant “was previously detained, then released on supervised release, . . . his
90-day removal period has long expired.” See Balouch v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-216,
2025 WL 2871914, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2025).
Garcia-Aleman v. Thompson, No. 25-886, 2025 WL 3534806, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 24, 2025),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 25-886, 2025 WL 3532179 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2025).
In a re-detention case, a petitioner’s period of post-removal detention entails not only his current
detention, but also his initial detention:
At least four district courts around the country have held that the clock does not
“start over” for purposes of Zadvydas if a person is re-detained. See, e.g.,
Villanueva v. Tate, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2025 WL 2774610, at *9 (S.D. Tex.
Sept. 26, 2025); Nguyen v. Scott, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2025 WL 2419288, at
*13 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 2025); Sied v. Nielsen, 2018 WL 1876907, at *6 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 19, 2018); Chen v. Holder, 2015 WL 13236635, at *2 (W.D. La. Nov. 20,
2015) (“Surely, under the reasoning of Zadvydas, a series of releases and re-
detentions by the government, as was done in this case, while technically not in
violation of the presumptively reasonable jurisprudential six month removal period,
in essence results in an indefinite period of detention, albeit executed in successive
six month intervals.”). Three district courts have seemingly held the opposite. See
Guerra-Castro v. Parra, 2025 WL 1984300, at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2025); Thai
v. Hyde, 788 F.Supp.3d 57, 60-61 (D. Mass. 2025); Meskini v. Att’y Gen. of United
States, 2018 WL 1321576 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 2018). This Court, however, is
persuaded by the reasoning in Chen and is disinclined to allow such gamesmanship
by the government. See also Villanueva, ––– F.Supp.3d at ––––, 2025 WL 2774610,
at *9 (coming to a similar conclusion).
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Jimenez Chacon v. Lyons, No. 25-977, 2025 WL 3496702, at *7 (D.N.M. Dec. 4, 2025) (citations
unaltered); see also Aguilar v. Noem, No. 25-3463, 2025 WL 3514282, at *3 (D. Colo. Dec. 8,
2025) (collecting cases); Abuelhawa, 2025 WL 2937692, at *4 (collecting cases) (“Most courts to
consider the issue have concluded that the Zadvydas period is cumulative, motivated by a concern
that the federal government could otherwise detain aliens indefinitely by continuously releasing
and re-detaining them.”).18 This Court agrees: To consider only the current period of detention
would be to allow the Government to indefinitely detain noncitizens through successive detentions,
at direct odds with Zadvydas’s protection against indefinite detention. See Chen, 2015 WL
13236635 at *2 (“[T]he danger sought to be addressed by Zadvydas was ‘indefinite detention’ of
aliens.”). And so, because Petitioners’ current periods of detention combine with their previous
detentions for the purposes of Zadvydas, Petitioners’ claims are not premature.19
2. Presumption of Reasonableness is Rebuttable
Even if the Zadvydas period started over with each instance of detention and the analysis
here were limited only to the current period of detention, Petitioners would still have a valid
Zadvydas claim. Respondents argue that Petitioners’ Zadvydas claims are premature because they
were detained for less than six months at the time of filing, but “nothing in Zadvydas precludes a
challenge to detention before the presumptive[ ] . . . period has elapsed.” Villanueva, 801 F. Supp.
3d at 702; see Puertas-Mendoza v. Bondi, No. 25-890, 2025 WL 3142089, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Oct.
18 This conclusion is also consistent with the purpose of the Zadvydas presumptive period: to allow the government
leeway to continue detaining noncitizens while processing their deportation. If a noncitizen has been released on an
OSUP for 30 years and re-detained in order to effectuate removal, the government has had 30 years of opportunity to
lay the groundwork for that removal. (See Doc. 26 at 27–28 (“[Judge]: When one of these noncitizens is [released]
under OSUP, ICE continues to try to deport him. Right? . . . [Respondents]: That’s correct.”).)
19 Rodriguez Romero, was detained on August 6, 2025—over 4 months before the Petition was filed, with an initial
post-removal detention of over two years. (Doc. 1 at 13; Doc. 18-3 at 2.) Mohammed was detained on July 17, 2025
(almost 5 months), with initial period of almost three months. (Doc. 1 at 25.) Blanco Chomat was detained on June
25, 2025 (5.5 months), with initial period of over 3 months. (Doc. 18-4 at 2.) And Gaston Sanchez was detained on
June 25, 2025 (5.5 months) with initial period of nearly 4 months. (Doc. 18-1 at 3.)
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22, 2025) (“Zadvydas recognized a presumptively—not categorically—reasonable period of
detention.”) (citation modified); see also Zavvar v. Scott, No. 25-2104, 2025 WL 2592543 (D. Md.
Sept. 8, 2025), at *5–6 (collecting cases). The presumption was a “guide” for lower court
determinations of whether removal is reasonably foreseeable. Munoz-Saucedo v. Pittman, 789 F.
Supp. 3d 387, 397 (D.N.J. June 24, 2025) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700–01). And Zadvydas
unequivocally held that “once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is
no longer authorized.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699.
Some courts have assumed that the six-month presumption precludes a challenge to
detention before that time elapses. Cruz Medina v. Noem, 794 F. Supp. 3d 365, 374 (D. Md. Aug.
11, 2025) (collecting cases); see also Chance v. Napolitano, 453 F. App’x 535, 536 (5th Cir. 2011)
(per curiam) (non-precedential opinion denying IFP on appeal and, in the process, affirming a
district court’s finding that a challenge to post-removal detention was premature because “Chance
had not been in post-removal-order detention longer than the presumptively reasonable six-month
period,” but the underlying district court order had held that the petition was premature because
the 90-day removal period and thus the six-month presumptive period had not yet begun (Chance
v. Napolitano, No. 10-596, ECF No. 9 at 2 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2010))); Agyei-Kodie v. Holder,
418 F. App’x 317, 318 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (denial of IFP on appeal, concluding without
discussion that petitioner’s claim was premature, and citing only Zadvydas itself).
Zadvydas’s creation of a presumption rather than a conclusive bar (see Cruz Medina, 794
F. Supp. 3d at 375) and the case’s actual rule—“if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court
should hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute”—militate
against that understanding. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699–700.
This six-month presumption is not a bright line, however, and Zadvydas did not
automatically authorize all detention until it reaches constitutional limits. See Clark,
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543 U.S. at 384; see also Ian Bratlie & Adriana Lafaille, A 180-Day Free Pass?
Zadvydas and Post-Order Detention Challenges Brought Before the Six-Month
Mark, 30 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 213, 239 (2016) (noting that six-month presumption is
not an element of authorizing statute, but rather, an aid to courts; allowing a six-
month bright line rule would give government authority beyond the statute to
arbitrarily detain without judicial review for six months). Rather, habeas courts
have the duty to ask whether detention has “exceed[ed] a period reasonably
necessary to secure removal.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699–700. Where removal is
not reasonably foreseeable, “the court should hold continued detention
unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute,” and release the petitioner under
appropriate supervised conditions. Id. at 700.
Ali v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 451 F. Supp. 3d 703, 707 (S.D. Tex. 2020). “Even within the
presumptively constitutional detention period, whether a noncitizen’s detention is constitutional
hinges on whether his removal from the United States is reasonably likely in the foreseeable future,
not on how long the noncitizen has been detained.” Villanueva, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 703. And so,
Petitioners could challenge their detention as unconstitutional even if their detention period were
less than 6 months.
2. Likelihood of Removal in the Reasonably Foreseeable Future
Having established that Petitioners’ Zadvydas claims are properly brought, the Court now
turns to the substantive question: Is there a significant likelihood of Petitioners’ deportation in the
reasonably foreseeable future? In a Zadvydas analysis, it is Petitioners’ burden to show that there
is good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future; in order to continue detaining Petitioners, the Government must show evidence
sufficient to rebut Petitioners’ showing. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
Each Petitioner has a diplomatic barrier to removal to their home country: U.S. relations
with Cuba prevent the Cuban Petitioners from being deported there, and Mohammed has CAT
protection from removal to his native Ethiopia. (Doc. 1 at 9.) At the time of filing, the Cuban
Petitioners also showed that Mexico would not accept deportees over the age of 60, meaning their
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removal to Mexico would be impossible,20 and Mohammed asserted that he had already been
rejected by the countries listed as potential targets for his deportation. (Id. at 19, 26.) These
assertions are good reason to believe Petitioners are not likely to be removed in the reasonably
foreseeable future.
Attempting to rebut these claims, Respondents assert that Mexico has begun accepting
deportees over the age of 60; as to Mohammed, Respondents assert that there are ongoing efforts
to deport him to Canada. (Doc. 18 at 3.) In ordering that Respondents respond to the Petition, the
Court ordered that such a response should include “any evidence which supports their position.”
(Doc. 17 at 2.) Regarding Petitioners’ likelihood of deportation in the near future, Respondents put
forth declarations by AFOD Prudhome;21 these declarations are the only evidence in the record of
ICE’s efforts to deport Petitioners.22 Regarding ICE’s efforts to deport the Cuban Petitioners, the
declarations provide the following information.23
Gaston Sanchez was ordered removed from the United States on September 24, 2001.
From that time through January 18, 2002, ICE was unable to deport him, and so released him on
an OSUP. He was convicted of a crime on May 3, 2005, and was released from prison on
November 13, 2023, at which time ICE resumed custody. He was re-detained on June 25, 2025.
ICE attempted to deport him to Mexico on October 23, 2025, but Mexico denied his entry because
he was over the age of 60. On December 10, 2025, ICE learned that Mexico is accepting third
20 And Respondents had not and still have not identified any other viable country for these Petitioners.
21 The Court notes that while this declaration is “based upon knowledge and information obtained from various records
and systems maintained by DHA in the regular course of business,” there is no indication that Prudhome has firsthand
knowledge of Petitioners’ cases. (Docs. 18-1 at 1; 18-3 at 1; 18-4 at 1, 18-5 at 1.)
22 Respondents’ evidence also includes the Notices of Revocation for Blanco Chomat and Rodriguez Romero, Notices
of Removal for Blanco Chomat and Mohammed, and an ICE internal document regarding delegation of signature
authority.
23 In the following paragraphs, the Court summarizes the Prudhome declarations: Declaration and Supplemental
Declaration as to Gaston Sanchez at Docs. 18-1 and 18-2; Rodriguez Romero, Doc. 18-3; Blanco Chomat, Doc. 18-4.
The Declaration as to Mohammed (Doc. 18-5) is summarized separately below.
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country removals of people over the age of 60, and so “it is likely that the petitioner could be
removed to Mexico in the near future.” (Docs. 18-1, 18-2.)
Rodriguez Romero was ordered removed on May 30, 1995. He was issued OSUPs in
September 2004 and June 2013. He was re-detained on August 6, 2025. On December 10, 2025,
ICE learned that Mexico is accepting third country removals of people over the age of 60, and so
“it is likely that Petitioner could be removed to Mexico in the near future.” (Doc. 18-3.)
Blanco Chomat was ordered removed on September 20, 2001. He “came into ICE custody”
on February 24, 2004, and was released on an OSUP on June 11, 2004. On October 23, 2025, ICE
issued a Notice of Removal stating its intent to deport Blanco Chomat to Mexico, but Mexico
denied his entry on November 18, 2025, because he was over 60 years old. On November 21, 2025,
ICE learned that Cuba declined to accept him. On December 10, 2025, ICE learned that Mexico is
accepting third country removals of people over the age of 60, and so “it is likely that the petitioner
could be removed to Mexico in the near future.” (Doc. 18-4.)
While Respondents assert that Mexico has reversed its policy and is now accepting
deportees over the age of 60, they clarified for the Court that the policy of refusing deportees over
60 was only in place for about a month, several months after Petitioners were detained—that is,
Respondents had custody of Petitioners for months before the policy was implemented and failed
to remove Petitioners in that time. (Doc. 26 at 31.) It is clear that there is no individualized
acceptance to Mexico for the Cuban Petitioners—and Respondents affirmed as much at oral
argument. (Doc. 26 at 23–32.) There are no travel documents, there is no evidence of any informal
acceptance, no suggestion that Mexico regularly accepts similarly situated deportees, or even
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evidence that Respondents have made any affirmative steps toward obtaining travel documents for
these Petitioners.24
In contrast to Respondents’ lack of affirmative evidence of Petitioners’ acceptance to
Mexico, Petitioners have put forth evidence that “people who have medical issues, disabilities, or
are in wheelchairs would not be accepted.” (Doc. 20-3 at 4.) This disqualifies at least Rodriguez
Romero, and possibly other Petitioners,25 and Respondents have made no attempt to rebut this
assertion. This possibility of rejection on other grounds demonstrates that the withdrawal of the
ban on deportees over 60 was the removal of only one impediment to deportation—it does not
speak to the existence of other impediments. And Respondents have not cured this logical error.
When pressed at least nine separate times during oral argument for any evidence that Mexico
would affirmatively accept these Cuban Petitioners, Respondents cited only the Prudhome
declarations and their speculation that the Cuban Petitioners could possibly be removed to
Mexico.26 (Doc. 26 at 23, 24, 25, 29, 31.) Respondents also pointed to the fact that Petitioner
Gaston Sanchez had been moved to the Mexican border for deportation but was turned away
because of the 60+ ban. (Id. at 31.) But the fact that Gaston Sanchez was brought all the way to
the border does not show that these Petitioners are likely to be removed to Mexico; instead, it only
shows a likelihood of unsuccessful removal attempts. (See id. at 13.) Finally, there is evidence in
the record that deportation to Mexico will “take a long time” because Mexico must individually
accept each person on a “long list” of deportees. (Doc. 20-3 at 5.) The Court cannot find on the
24 At oral argument, Respondents asserted that they have not taken affirmative steps toward removal to Mexico since
December 12, 2025, “in respect of the Court’s order” staying removal from this District while the Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order is pending. (Doc. 26 at 25; Doc. 12.) To be clear, the Court’s order does not prevent
ICE from communicating with a target country or arranging for travel documents; and in any case, this
misunderstanding only affects Respondents’ efforts after the order was issued.
25 The Court is not privy to the exact policy regarding which disabilities would disqualify a deportee.
26 To be clear, the Court does not discredit the Prudhome declarations, but rather finds that they contain only
speculative and conclusory statements as to the possibility of Petitioners’ deportations.
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evidence presented that there is a significant likelihood of the Cuban Petitioners’ removal from the
United States in the reasonably foreseeable future; therefore, Respondents have failed to rebut
Petitioners’ Zadvydas assertion that removal is unlikely.
The Prudhome declaration as to Petitioner Mohammed asserts that ICE continues to make
efforts to deport him: Mohammed was ordered removed on November 18, 2018. On February 8,
2023, he reopened his case in order to pursue deferral under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). In March 2023, he was issued an OSUP and released. On June 14, 2023, he was re-
detained because ICE had obtained a travel document to deport him to Ethiopia. Removal was
deferred, and his CAT protection became final on September 5, 2024. ICE then attempted to deport
him to a third country,27 but entry was denied to Australia, France, Germany, and Canada; he was
released on an OSUP on November 26, 2024. He was re-detained on July 17, 2025, for the
purposes of deportation to Canada. He was transferred to Angola on September 2, 2025, and ICE
“continues to work to process Petitioner for removal to a third country.” On December 7, 2025,
the local ICE office “followed up with ICE’s headquarters component about ongoing efforts to
remove Petitioner to Canada.” (Doc. 18-5.)
Respondents have provided no explanation of ICE’s plan to deport Mohammed to Canada
despite Canada’s rejection less than a year earlier. The only indication of any ongoing effort at
deportation is the local ICE office’s seemingly unanswered “follow-up” with ICE headquarters
regarding removal to Canada. (Doc. 18-5 at 3.) This statement of vague efforts is not sufficient to
rebut Mohammed’s Zadvydas assertion that his removal is not significantly likely to occur in the
reasonably foreseeable future.
27 “Third country” here meaning a country other than the United States or the petitioner’s home country.
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Finally, as a general argument, Respondents cited previous unsuccessful removals as
evidence that attempts are being made to remove Petitioners. (Doc. 26 at 31–32 (“[Respondents]:
Petitioner Sanchez was at the border ready to be removed to Mexico. . . . Petitioner Mohammed
received travel documents for Ethiopia and then sought CAT protection. . . . [M]y greater point is
ICE has made attempts to effectuate these [] Petitioners’ removals in the past.”).) But “continued
efforts” or good faith efforts are not enough; Zadvydas itself rejected this idea. There, the Supreme
Court found that the Fifth Circuit’s holding that “continued detention [was] lawful as long as ‘good
faith efforts to effectuate . . . deportation continue’” would require a noncitizen to show that
removal is impossible—“which demands more than our reading of the statute can bear.” Zadvydas,
533 U.S. at 702.
Even if continued efforts at removal could show a likelihood of removal, “third-country
removals are not quick, and even when they are successful, they’re taking a while.” Garcia-Aleman,
2025 WL 3534806 at *5, report and recommendation adopted, No. 25-886, 2025 WL 3532179
(W.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2025) (internal quotation omitted); see also Doc. 20-3 at 5 (deportation to
Mexico will “take time because there was a long list [to work] through, and Mexico ha[s] to
approve each person individually,” and “it would take a long time [] to go through that process for
each person”). “And that is not simply a matter of United States policy—foreign governments
routinely deny requests to receive people who lack a connection to the would-be receiving country.”
Puertas-Mendoza, 2025 WL 3142089, at *3 (citation modified). Even with the intent to remove
Petitioners to third countries, Respondents cannot give an estimated time for removal. The mere
possibility of removal does not demonstrate a significant likelihood of removal. See Balouch v.
Bondi, No. 25-216, 2025 WL 2871914, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2025) (finding that the “potential
for another removal flight” in 1–2 weeks, when petitioner is not scheduled to be on that flight,
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does not meet the Government’s burden); see also Kane v. Mukasey, No. 8-37, 2008 WL 11393137,
at *5 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 21, 2008), superseded by, 2008 WL 11393094 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2008) (a
new report and recommendation was entered denying the petition as moot because petitioner was
deported prior to the order adopting), report and recommendation adopted, 2008 WL 11393148
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2008) (“A remote possibility of an eventual removal is not analogous to a
significant likelihood that removal will occur in the reasonably foreseeable future.”). Respondents’
reference to the mere possibility of deportation further supports the Court’s conclusion that
Respondents have not made a showing to rebut Petitioners’ Zadvydas claim that their removal is
not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.
C. Relief
As discussed above, Petitioners are currently detained in violation of their constitutional
rights. Further, they have been detained with no opportunity to arrange for care for their dependents,
pets, or homes; the Court can only assume that bills have gone unpaid, jobs may have been lost,
and Petitioners may be released into housing and food instability, all because the Government
unlawfully detained them. Petitioners suffer additional irreparable harm every day they remain in
custody. See Nazarian v. Noem, No. 25-2694, 2025 WL 3236209, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025).
As a remedy, courts across the country have ordered the release of individuals
stemming from ICE’s illegal detention. Roble v. Bondi, 2025 WL 2443453, at *5
(D. Minn. Aug. 25, 2025) (ordering petitioner's “release from custody as a remedy
for ICE's illegal re-detention”); Nguyen v. Hyde, 2025 WL 1725791, at *5 (D. Mass.
June 20, 2025) (holding that because ICE violated “its own regulations...
[petitioner’s] detention is unlawful and that his release is appropriate”); Rombot v.
Souza, 296 F.Supp. 3d 383, 389 (finding that because ICE’s detention failed to
follow due process, the court ordered release “pursuant to the conditions in
[petitioner’s] preexisting Order of Supervision.”) The Supreme Court has
recognized that “Habeas has traditionally been a means to secure release from
unlawful detention.” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 107
(2020) (emphasis in original).
K.E.O. v. Woosley, No. 25-74, 2025 WL 2553394, at *7 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 4, 2025).
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Respondents assert that habeas relief would not change the fact that Petitioners are
removable and could be re-detained upon release from custody, that “a do-over in this case would
be wasteful.” (Doc. 18 at 22, n.71 (citation omitted).) Respondents are wrong. They may only re-
detain Petitioners lawfully. This Court cannot allow Respondents to continue unlawfully detaining
people in anticipation that they may someday do so lawfully. As Petitioners stated at oral argument,
“Even if that concrete removal plan were put in place quite rapidly following release, release itself
is still meaningful relief because it allows Petitioners to have their freedom, as is their right, until
removal is actually imminent.” (Doc. 26 at 7–8). The Court agrees.
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JUDGE JOHN W. deGRAVELLES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
VI. CONCLUSION
Having found that the Government has detained Petitioners unlawfully, this Court now
joins the large and growing camp of sister courts in determining that habeas relief is appropriate
when ICE has detained noncitizens in violation of their constitutional rights. And so,
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is
GRANTED. Respondents shall release Petitioners from their custody within 3 hours of this order,
under the conditions of the previously revoked OSUPs.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as soon as practicable, but no less than 2 hours prior
to Petitioners’ release, Respondents shall inform Petitioners’ counsel of the time and location of
Petitioners’ release.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents shall not re-detain Petitioners without
due process of law, in accordance with this Order.
Finally, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 7) is
TERMINATED AS MOOT.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on February 6, 2026.
S
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